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CIVILIZED LIFE

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*The Principles and Applications
of Social Psychology*

By

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*A Revision and Enlargement of
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, 1925*

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PREFACE

IN THE present volume, I have retained the greater part of the *Social Psychology* which I wrote in 1925, with appropriate corrections, elisions and additions. The changes which I have made in the several chapters retained have been, for the most part, in the interest of clarification and completeness. I have attempted to reformulate certain of the minor points in such a way as to make the whole presentation more systematically consistent, and in certain cases have further developed points which were inadequately treated in the former book.

The introductory chapter has been completely rewritten and, I hope, improved. The chapters on *Deviance*, on *Race and Civilization*, and on the *Child*, are new, and are intended to fill gaps which were noted by many readers of *Social Psychology*, but which required the further elaboration of materials with which I was not fully satisfied in 1925. The present volume contains as full a range of materials as I feel justified in including in a general treatise. Further elaboration of the topics of the family, religion, and politics is needed, but this I propose to do through separate treatises on each of these. Materials for the first two are available, although the organization and presentation of these materials in such a way as to make them available for the public will require no small amount of labor. Political psychology, on the other hand, is as yet in an uncharted condition.

With the plan and scope of the present volume, I am fairly well satisfied, although I by no means consider it as final. I believe, in fact, that social psychology will continue to develop along the lines I have followed, and in such a way that in a decade more there will be no point to a further revision of my presentation.

It is appropriate that I should say here that I have followed in fundamental respects the lead of McDougall, and with the same objectives, in large part, as those he had in view, although repudiating his specific concepts and methods. We owe a double debt to McDougall, in fact. He made the break with the "crowd mind" psychology of Sighele. The essential feature of McDougall's *Social Psychology* was his attempt to develop it on an actual psychological foundation. Thus

attitude has characterized Social Psychology since the publication of McDougall's book, in spite of the efforts of certain authors who have remained in part under the influence of the first period.

I might add, in conclusion, that I have seen no reason to recede from my emphasis on the far-reaching importance of amorous and genital processes for individual and social life. On this point again, my interest and convictions were largely fixed before 1910, and were derived in the main from my study of the writings of Pierre Janet and various other French writers prior to 1906.

Baltimore, 1934

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CHAPTER I

THE BASIS OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

INTRODUCTION

1. The field of social psychology

PSYCHOLOGY may be broadly defined as the *science of living*. Human psychology therefore, might be described as *the study of the processes by which men live, of the conditions under which he lives in specific ways, and the results of his living*. This description, however, requires both limitation and amplification in order to make it accurately descriptive of psychology as it exists today, and as it has existed since Aristotle.

Some inkling as to the nature of psychology may be obtained from the consideration of the name "Psychology" as a word formed from two Greek words, one of which, *logos*, means primarily speech, and secondarily reason, or plan. Hence, the word-part *-ology* in English, and corresponding word-parts in other European languages, are uniformly employed to mean "science of." The other Greek word is *psyché*, which meant life in the abstract, or life principle. In late Greek usage, *psyché* came to have a secondary meaning nearly represented by the English word *ghost*, and another meaning which was akin to one of the many meanings of the term "soul." Aristotle, however, who wrote the first treatise on psychology which has come down to us, rejected these meanings, and employed "*psyche*" in the original sense of "life" or "life principle."

In the course of time, other life sciences have arisen, which have limited somewhat the original scope of psychology. Biology derives its name from the Greek word *bios*, which meant life in a specifically limited or qualified sense, and zoology derives its name from *zoon*, an animal, that is, a living being, and *scia*, which meant to live in the most general sense. The relations between zoology and biology are not entirely clear at present, and the terms are sometimes used interchangeably, although zoology deals usually with the lower animals, and biology with animals, man and plants. It is impossible, therefore

to distinguish sharply between psychology on the one hand, and biology, zoology and other so-called "biological sciences," such as physiology, and anatomy, on the other.¹ As a matter of fact, biologists, zoologists, and physiologists are often working on the same problems, although there are certain specific problems which are by common consent delegated to the one or the other of these sciences exclusively.

Bearing in mind that psychology is the oldest of these life-sciences, that it originally included the study of life processes and life conditions, in the broadest extension, and that it has been progressively limited in its scope by the rise of the other life-sciences which have relieved it of portions of its original burden, we may roughly define psychology by pointing out first, that it does not deal with the life of plants, but leaves that topic to biology, botany, and plant physiology. Second, in dealing with man and animals, it is not primarily concerned with the structure and organs, or with the detailed operations of the organs by themselves, but leaves these topics to the various biological sciences.

Psychology does deal with the life of the animal (including man) as an individual, or total organism. That is, taking the animal as a unit, psychology inquires how it lives, under what conditions it lives in specific ways, and what are the results of its living, so far as the effects on other individuals are concerned. Yet even here, it leaves large groups of problems concerning the lower animals to zoology.

Just what specific aspects of life are included in psychology is revealed only by a study of psychology itself, and can not be indicated in a preliminary definition or description. Moreover, the actual field of psychology changes with psychological progress, within the broad outlines sketched above. As specific sciences have arisen around topics which were included in the original field of psychology, psychology has gratefully renounced responsibility for these portions of the field. On the other hand, psychology has added to its field areas which were earlier not cultivated. Further, psychology from time to time resumes the cultivation of portions of the field which it had temporarily relinquished, as in the case of the life processes of infra-

¹ The distinction between the several Greek terms may be drawn somewhat paradoxically if we understand that *bios* meant life in what would now be called the "psychological" sense while *zōon* meant to live in the physiological sense, and *psyche* was life in the abstract.

human animals, which in the last few decades have become more and more the subject matter of psychological investigation.

Attempts have been made to define psychology in terms of concepts which have been peculiar to psychology itself, that is, which have not been shared with other life sciences. Thus, psychology was for a period defined as the "science of the soul," then as the "science of the mind," then as the "science of consciousness." None of these definitions has been satisfactory in any way. In the attempt to make psychology the study of the soul, the original problems of psychology were largely sidetracked, and what was thereupon called psychology became a sterile branch of philosophy. In order to justify its existence, psychology was obliged to revert to its earlier problems and purposes, and finally, in the 19th Century, it abandoned this definition, and proclaimed the obvious fact that it did not study and never had studied anything which could legitimately be called a "soul." The definition of psychology as the "study of the mind" is less objectionable, because it is more vague, but on that account it has been found not to be useful. We may still use the definition, but when we use it, it is necessary to point out that the "mind" is merely a general name for certain life processes which psychology studies, and this admission throws us back on the difficulties which we find more openly when we define the science as "the study of life processes and life conditions."

The definition of psychology as the "study of consciousness" is not only useless, but decidedly misleading. Psychology accepts the concept of consciousness, but now recognizes it not as meaning a stuff, entity, or force, but as an abstraction covering those life processes which are more specifically indicated by the terms "sensing," "perceiving," "thinking," and "feeling." Psychology does not primarily study this abstraction (which indeed can be treated only in a logical way), but studies the concrete life processes from which the abstraction is drawn.

Psychology is both a pure and an applied science. As a pure science, it studies the actual living processes of animals and man. As an applied science, it seeks to find out how man may live most advantageously. *General psychology* is the fundamental part of the science, "general" in the sense that it represents an interest in every phase of life, seeking everywhere, in the human and the animal, the child and the adult, the normal and the abnormal, for facts which can be de-

scribed and for principles which can be formulated. The principles and the facts in which it is primarily interested are those which, whatever the department of life in which they are first discovered, may be traced through other departments.

General psychology seeks in the life processes of one individual for that which will assist in the explanation of the living of other individuals. It seeks in the life of the child those things which will throw light on the life of the adult, and in investigating the life of the adult it throws light on that of the child. It approaches the abnormal armed with facts and principles drawn from the normal, and hopes to find in the abnormal aid for the further study of the normal. General psychology and comparative psychology then should be identical.

Since psychology, beginning as the study of normal adult human living, extends its scope to the animal, the child, and the abnormal individual, the term "comparative" is sometimes used to indicate the more general, as contrasted with the less general psychology.

The relations of the special psychologies to general psychology is complicated. Starting with adult human psychology, we have approached the study of the other special types. Every step of progress in animal psychology, however, affects our general psychology, which in turn facilitates and facilitates animal psychology. The relations of child psychology and general psychology, abnormal psychology and general psychology are similarly reciprocal. Running through these topics there is another distinction, the distinction between *individual psychology* and *social psychology*. For some purposes it is useful to treat animals, children, human adults, as individuals, each of whom has a life of his own, which is to be studied as an individual life, and compared with the life of other individuals. On the other hand, we are well aware that men and animals commonly live in groups, and that their group life is of vast importance. We find indeed urgent problems of human group life which need solution. We find the group life of children needs investigation as a special province of problems.

The scientific study of group living, is obviously group psychology. We call it, more commonly, *social psychology*, or the *psychology of society*.

From a certain point of view, every study of group life or social life is a study of social psychology. Historical investigations, eco-

conomic investigation, investigations in political science, all of these are studies of the activities and productions of groups, and of the conditions under which groups live. We do not, as a matter of fact apply the term social psychology in this broad way.

Psychology, as psychologists use the term, is a science, and seeks to apply the typical methods of science to the solution of problems of living, individual and social. The method of science is to proceed from the known to the examination of the unknown, from the definitely established fact to the ascertaining of further facts. We begin by the certification of hundreds of facts about the normal adult human individual, and enlarge the factual range by extending our investigation to the child, the animal, and the abnormal person. We develop thus a general psychology, and in extending our investigations into the field of group life, we extend the fundamental basis of the general field. Social psychology is therefore distinguished from history, economics, and political science, in that it is the extension of general psychology into the field of social problems, as a foundation upon which we hope to develop a special psychology, the psychology of group living. Social psychology had its beginnings in Greek philosophy, in the theories of the Sophists and more definitely in Plato's Republic and Aristotle's Politics. The field may be said to have had its modern opening, however, with the publication of Sigmund Sighele's *La foule delinquente* (the criminal crowd), which emphasized the social functions of imitation and suggestion, and introduced the conception of the "crowd mind," as a basic entity in society. The notions of imitation and suggestion as the primary factors determining social conduct were taken up by Gabriel Tarde and Gustave Le Bon, French sociologists, and the writings of these men immediately influenced American sociologists and philosophers, notably, Edward A. Ross and J. Mark Baldwin. Social psychology was largely written for a period in America as a matter of imitation and suggestion, and the "crowd mind" became a popular catchword.

The "crowd mind" type of psychology derived a considerable impetus from the fact that groups of people are in a certain sense analogous to individuals. Just as the groups are made up of individuals interacting on one another, so the individual animal is made up of individual cells, in what may be called social interrelations. Herbert Spencer made much of this analogy, which is indeed useful to consider, but which must be taken with certain reservations. . 4

From this point of view, there is not only an individual life, but also a group life, and although we cannot study the individual without reference to the group's influence, and cannot study the group life without reference to the life of the individual in the group, we might find it useful to emphasize the group life in social psychology and the individual life in general psychology. This is indeed a feature of the distinction between general and social psychology which is drawn or implied by many social psychologists.

The danger in the conception of social psychology as the study of group life, as contrasted with individual life, lies in the tendency to assume that there may be processes in the life of the group which are not strictly processes in the life of the individuals making up the group, McDougall definitely points out this danger but other group-life psychologists do not always steer clear of it. We find, for example, references to the "crowd mind," the "group mind," and "group behavior," which imply that over and above the consciousness, or minds or behavior of the several individuals making up the group, there is consciousness, or mind or behavior, pertaining to the group as an entity, and not strictly pertaining to, or the functions of, the individuals making up the group. This, it must be emphasized, is a mystical point of view which science strongly repudiates.

The imitation and suggestion psychology dominated until William McDougall, in his *Social Psychology* developed a system based on the conception of instincts, conceived as ultimate explanations of human and animal behavior. This was an ancient conception, universally accepted by biologists and psychologists, and its adoption as a basis for social psychology met with wide approval. Hence this type of social psychology became dominant for a time. Then the instincts were attacked as being merely arbitrary categories, under which responses might be conveniently classified, but having no explanatory value. This point was soon admitted by psychologists, and has been somewhat slowly admitted by biologists, driving McDougall to the declaration that instincts, as he conceived them, are not the traditional instincts of biology, but ultimate and inexplicable psychic energies. As a result, the social psychology based on instinct has largely disappeared.

In the meantime, another type of social psychology had developed, represented by Gordon Allport's *Social Psychology* and Gardner

Murphy's Experimental Social Psychology In order to provide a basis for the interpretation of this type, we must revert to certain fundamentals of general psychology

The life of an individual can be considered from two points of view, one of which we may, with reservations, call *mechanical*, and the other *dynamic*. These two points of view are not really in opposition to each other, as some psychologists have seemed to assume. There is nothing in life which is not *mechanical*, and there is nothing in life which is not *dynamic*. The points of view, however, are at times usefully separated, although for most of our purposes it is more useful to combine them.

From the *mechanical* point of view, life is a complex response or reaction to the environment. In this response, the environment may be modified, or the animal may be modified. Characteristically, both modifications occur in every phase of response. The environment, as it acts upon the animal, is called the *stimulus pattern*, and specific features of this pattern, which we isolate or abstract for convenience of study and treatment are called *stimuli*. It is necessary, however, to emphasize the fact that we do not really react to stimuli, but to the stimulus pattern, and that this stimulus pattern covers a long period of time, so that I am now responding not merely to present features of the pattern, but to features which, from a physical point of view, occurred or existed long ago. Thus, in writing this page, I am responding in part to the stimuli of the typewriter, and of everything which I see and hear, but in a more important way I am responding to the stimuli which occurred in childhood when I was learning the English language, and the other stimuli which occurred during years of study of psychology.

The animal, human or non-human, has an environment which can be analysed into (1) inert objects and natural forces (2) human beings (3) intra-human animals and (4) plants. It requires little effort to demonstrate that the animal responds to, or reacts to, all of these. If we confine our attention to the human being, therefore, we may say that his environment is made up of two important groups of objects or things, (A) other human beings, and (B) non-human beings and things. We might therefore say that general psychology is the study of responses to all classes of objects, and that social psychology studies the features of the responses which are due to the

stimulation by other human beings. This conception of social psychology is well exemplified in Murphy's *Experimental Social Psychology*. In that volume, will be found a great amount of material collected from the storehouse of experimental psychology, material in which it is obvious that the human environmental factor is highly important in the production of the responses.

The difficulty with social psychology as thus distinguished lies in the fact that when one attempts to draw the line between responses in which the human stimulation is an important factor, and those in which it is negligible or absent, it is found that there is very little left for the second class. In fact, there probably is not any experiment, or any experimental results, in psychology, which are not, from Murphy's point of view, to be classed as "experimental social psychology." The pointing out and emphasizing of the social factor which is universally present in human life is important and useful, but it is not confined to social psychology. In fact, a part of the work everywhere in experimental psychology is the picking out, and controlling of this factor. Social psychology as defined by the analytic isolation of the social factor in human life generally is merely a phase of general psychology under a new name, and the application of the name in this way is misleading, since it gives the distinct implication that general psychology and experimental psychology are not vitally concerned with this social factor.

More recently another, and still more bizarre type of "social psychology," has risen from the modern revival of interest in the ancient speculative pastime of making lists of "personality traits" and classifying individuals in accordance with the lists adopted. Sometimes the classification has been a simple bipolar one into sheep and goats of some sort, represented by the naive "extrovert" and "introvert" partitioning at present in fashion. Sometimes the classification is into several groups, upon what appears to be a single point of personality, as in the case of the four "temperaments" of Galen.¹ More frequently however, from the Sophists down through the pharmacologists, lists of a number of traits have been assembled and individuals rated in some scale of degree of prominence of each of these. The

¹ The sanguine, choleric, bilious and phlegmatic temperaments, based on hypotheses of blood, black-bile, yellow-bile and phlegm, assembled in theory long before Galen as the four "humors," on the analogy of the four fundamentals of ancient cosmology: earth, air, fire and water.

"personality" which is qualified by the traits in these lists is really the "soul" of the older Christian theology, and although fascinating to some psychiatrists and apprentice psychologists, has little interest for those well grounded in modern psychology.

The attempts at social psychology based on crowd mind, imitation, suggestion, and instincts, were efforts in the right direction. They were attempts to apply to social problems concepts drawn from general psychology. In the main, however, the results were merely classifications. The psychologies so constructed were tentative, and stimulated further efforts. The generality and vagueness of the concept of the "crowd mind" limited the usefulness of the construction employing it. In terms of the crowd, we can formulate our problems, but we need more fundamental facts and principles to explain these constructions and to explain the crowd mind. It is clear to all of us at present, that listing a social phenomenon as a feature of "crowd mind" may be a useful preliminary step, but doesn't explain it. Imitation is an abstraction which covers many important facts, but we must go back of this abstraction for our explanation of its results. Moreover, there are many social processes which are not covered by or usefully classified under the concept of imitation. It is at once too vague, and too limited. Many facts and principles of general psychology are required to furnish a basis for social psychology, and these facts and principles must be the most concrete, and the most clearly defined which general psychology can supply. We must seek for the most fundamental, the most elementary facts and principles of general psychology, for materials for the basis of social psychology.

The instincts are not fundamental data of psychology, but are arbitrary classifications of activities. In arbitrarily selecting a list of instincts, the social psychology based on the list is sharply determined. Nothing comes out as the end except what was put in at the beginning, and that is merely a statement of problems in classificatory terms. There is no objection to the construction of lists of instincts, but we can see no great good which has come out of the lists. To say that men fight because they have a pugnacious instinct is merely to say that they fight because, as a matter of fact they fight. To say that they make love because of a "sex instinct" is similarly to define sex as a term which covers making love. No explanations are given in either case, nor do we thus obtain any further information.

It is true, that when we discard instincts, we find that we have to deal with desires, which seem at first to be the instincts under new names. We are able to show in the proper place, however, that this is not the case, but that desires are actual data of psychology, not arbitrary constructions. Moreover, their function in a psychological scheme is quite different from that of instincts.

In laying a basis for social psychology, we must (1) avoid vague principles and conceptions and seek instead concrete facts and the most definite principles. (2) We must not expect to establish a basis for the understanding the complex phenomenon of social life in a single datum of general psychology or even a few data. Presumably every fact and every principle of general psychology becomes important for social psychology, as soon as it is certified. (3) Social psychology, although established in general psychology, is not a mere hodge-podge of data from general psychology. It is a special psychology, ■ be developed in the analysis, understanding and solution of the problems of social life. (4) Social psychology cannot be established and developed by a single bold stroke. ■ will require long and patient work in its evolution.

For the present, we must be satisfied to make beginnings. These beginnings include

1. The preliminary analysis of social problems. This is the study of social life and its conditions in order to develop the specific problems to which psychological methods and principles are to be applied, and the opening up of the avenues of application.

2. The analysis and organization of the facts and principles of general psychology with a view to their application to social problems.

By working in this way from both ends of the field, and establishing preliminary relations between the problems on the one hand and the psychological materials on the other, we shall be working towards the development of social psychology. Let us have no illusions regarding this work. The present volume and any well planned volume ■ the present time, cannot present "Social Psychology." It can merely be an *Introduction* to the field.

Social psychologists, of various "schools," lapse from time to time into formulations of problems in terms of unconsciousness. This lapsing ■ most apt to occur at points where problems are especially difficult, and seems to be usually a means of glossing over the diffi-

culty, the applications of the term arising in lieu of an attempt at analysis and explanation.

The "unconscious mind," or "the unconscious" is a waste-basket term in psychology, including, 1 Non-conscious processes, 2 Conscious processes for which the antecedents are at the time obscure, 3 Processes which are not analysed, 4 Processes which are conscious but which are speedily forgotten, 5 Processes at the merely perceptual level, as opposed to thought processes, 6, Processes which have become habitual. Those who use the term "unconscious" usually apply it indiscriminately to cover any of these cases, without seeking to discover which particular kind of process is really involved. The psychologist accordingly avoids the term. Such confusions in general psychology furnish no basis for a social psychology.

The point of view which the present writer has adopted is the most useful, and as being unquestionably sound, may be stated now in detail. Each individual is a member of a group, and usually of several groups. His life as an individual is largely determined by this group membership. His life is a continuing response to the other members of his groups, as well as to the various non-human objects making up his environment. General psychology, studying the life of the individual as an individual, must nevertheless take account of this fact, and study the individual as he actually lives, namely in society.

On the other hand, there is the possibility and the necessity of studying what may be called the "group life," that is, the lives of individuals as members of groups. Only in theory can we contrast the life of the individual in a group or groups, with life apart from groups, since no individual lives by himself or unto himself, and no individual except for the theoretical Robinson Crusoe ever has lived in social isolation. We can, however, study the lives of individuals as affected by groups of varying types, and conversely, we may study the various types of group structure and organization as affecting the lives of the individuals involved in them. This is, in fact, social psychology, and is the only type of social psychology we can really find which can be distinguished from general psychology.

A new difficulty seems to arise here, in that the conception of social psychology seems to include what is known as sociology. Theoretically, psychology does include large parts of sociology, but this inclu-

sion is of no concern. As has been already pointed out, psychology includes, in its theoretical extension, many fields which are now the specific provinces of other sciences and disciplines. We gladly relinquish to these sciences the problems and investigations which they are prepared to carry out, while retaining the right to extend at any time, our work into these fields if and when psychological investigation and psychological discussions require such extension. Sciences overlap everywhere, and the drawing of exact metes and boundaries of the several sciences is of not great interest to the scientist. The anatomist works in the field of physiology and *vice versa*. The boundaries between physics and chemistry and biology are merely imaginative. The boundaries between psychology and these sciences, and between psychology and sociology, economics and political science, are also merely matters of temporary convenience.

One more science, between which and psychology no boundaries can be established, is *anthropology*. Social psychology in particular has intimate relations with anthropology, and overlaps with it broadly. Literally, anthropology is the "science of man" in the most extensive consideration of mankind, and includes archaeology, human anatomy and physiology, comparative philology and literature, history, political science, economics, religion, and every other topic which covers an aspect of man's structure, development, history, life and products. Practically, anthropology works in all of these fields. The history and development of human institutions, that is, of forms of human group life and the comparison of institutions in various stages of development and in their various directions of development is in a specific way in the field of anthropology. This historical and comparative aspect of group life, however, is of vital importance for social psychology. Just as we cannot understand the individual organism anatomically without tracing its evolutionary development and comparing it with organisms which have developed along different lines, so we cannot understand human groups without tracing their developments, and without comparing groups which have developed along different lines. Hence we must pursue, to a large extent in social psychology, what may reasonably be called the anthropological method, and this text can reasonably be said to embody an attempt to utilize the anthropological point of view, however unsuccessful that attempt may be. If one more tentative definition be permitted, we

may define social psychology as a synthesis of psychology, anthropology and ethics. The relationship to ethics, however, may be omitted from present consideration, and left for later discussion.

§2. The principles of general psychology

From the comprehensive consideration of the way in which human beings act and of the conditions under which they act we derive rules or principles of actions, and on the basis of these principles, in so far as they are valid, we can predict (within limits, of course), the acts of human beings in specific circumstances. On the basis of these principles, further, one can explain the past acts of human beings, in so far as we know the circumstances in which the actions were performed.

The principles of action, or psychological principles as we designate them, are in part derived from observation of human life, but are corrected by amplified and systematized experimental research. Exact knowledge of the psychological principles requires obviously an adequate understanding of the bodily mechanism of the human being with which he reacts. If we make our study general, we find that our procedure with the lower animals is similar to that with man, although the details are different.

The process of psychology is necessarily slow and laborious. From initial observation and crude experiment, tentative principles are deduced. On the basis of these principles and the attempts to apply them, sounder observation and more effective experiments are based. On the results of these improved observations more adequate principles are based, and so the process of development of psychology goes on.

The actions of humans and other animals are not, by psychology, viewed as simple behavior, or changes in the animal with respect to the environment. All actions are indeed changes in the animal body, and may directly affect the environment or the animal's relation thereto. If you pick up a book from your table, the act includes, at the least, movements of your fingers and arm: movements which are changes in these members. The result or effect of the act is to change your environment by changing the position of the book with regard to other external objects, and also to change your relation to the book.

A complete account of the act as a mere act might stop here. But since we are interested in the conditions in which action occur, we must go further.

In general, actions are results of forces which "irritate" or *stimulate* the organism, and are hence called *stimulations*. In order to include the reference to the stimulatory conditions which produce actions, as well as the effects of the actions upon the environment and upon the organism itself, we employ the term *reaction*, or its equivalent, *response*. Our psychology and its principles are therefore not expressed in terms of actions or behavior, but in terms of reactions or responses.

We are concerned, as will be made clear later, not with isolated reactions stimulated by and expended upon isolated features of the environment, but integrated responses, stimulated by large tracts of the environment, including the action of the environment of the individual's past, and experienced by the individual's organism as a whole.

"Living," as we employ the term when we say that a man lives in a certain place, or that he lives well or ill, is the integrated system of adjustments which man makes to his environment, past, present and future, and which he makes to himself. "Living" is of course used in another, physiological or zoological sense, to refer to the specific processes which go on in tissues and organs, and which are the analytical details of the process of living in the physiological sense. Psychology is of course interested in these physiological processes, since they are details in the total life process, but its physiological interest is secondary, and dependent on the primary interest in responses. While the psychologist must make full use of available physiological or zoological data, and must constantly carry his research over into the physiological field, the physiologist is compelled equally to utilize the results of psychology, and pursue his research into the field of psychology. It is of more than passing importance to note that some of the important work in physiology is being done by psychologists, and *vice-versa*. This mutually embracing relation is important for both sciences. It is no more accurate to designate psychology as a "physiological science" than it would be to class physiology as a "psychological science." Both are *life sciences*.

The life of man is made up in part of responses to the world about him, and this surrounding world is not composed merely of inanimate objects, and sub-human living beings. It includes other men, to

whom he reacts, hence mind, throughout, involves a fundamental social element

Man reacts to his environment, and to himself, in a complicated way in which we can analytically distinguish three important response-types, namely, *perceiving*, *thinking*, and *feeling*. From a concrete point of view, it is true that none of these response types actually occurs, or if they do occur, such occurrence is exceptional and infrequent. When we speak of *perceiving*, we refer to a response which is predominantly of the type which we abstractly describe as perceiving, but which is at the same time, in a less extensive way, thinking and feeling. So it is with the responses which we designate as thinking, and with those which we designate as feeling. We mean that the most important, but non-separable features, are what in our analysis we designate by those names. In a simpler and less accurate way, we express the general truth by saying that perceiving, thinking, and feeling characteristically do not occur in a "pure" state, but almost always combined with one another. Nevertheless, the abstract consideration of these features of response is essential to our understanding of the actual processes of living.

What do we mean, in psychology, by "*perceiving*," "*thinking*," and "*feeling*?" We mean nothing more, and nothing less, than what is meant by them in the every-day conversation of men of average education. These are terms which, by the conventions of language, are employed to designate occurrences which are recognized by all. In our further work, we may arrive at explanations and understandings of these processes which are not possessed by the average man, but first it is necessary to indicate what processes we propose to discuss. These terms give the indication without explanation, without hypotheses and without assumptions.

When a speaker describes a blind man as one who cannot see, or when a cross-examiner asks a witness to tell what he saw, no one is in doubt as to what is meant by "*seeing*," although he may have no knowledge of how seeing is possible, or of any of the laws or principles of visual perception. Two men may disagree as to what they see in a given case, but this very disagreement is evidence that they agree as to what is meant by "*seeing*." In the same way, "*hearing*," "*smelling*," "*tasting*," and certain other terms of the same order, refer to occurrences of fact which every one admits, and concerning

which there is no doubt as to the type of facts to which reference is made. It may astonish the student of elementary psychology to find that a great deal of what he has thought he tasted, he actually smelled, but this very astonishment is evidence that by "tasting" and "smelling" ■ means just what every one else does.

For convenience, we have in our language evolved general terms to cover groups of particulars, and still more general terms to cover groups of the less general. Terriers, greyhounds, mastiffs, beagles, and others are all included under the term "dog," and dogs, cats, seals, horses and cows are included under the term "beast." In the same way, we have built up the convention of calling hearing, seeing, smelling, tasting and certain other processes, *perceiving*. We may be in doubt as to the complete list of facts to be included under this term, but the significance of the term is plain, because the employing the term is a mere convention, or agreement in usage.

Equally definite and general are the agreement as to the use of the terms "imagining," "remembering" and "anticipating." When asked if he can remember what he ate for breakfast one week ago, one might answer "yes," "no," or "not with certainty." ■ any case, his answer establishes the fact that he and the questioner mean the same thing by remembering. Can you imagine a situation in which you have not been placed, but in which, if you were so placed, you would be much embarrassed? Now, whatever your theory as to the nature of the process indicated in this question you have no doubt as to what process you are being asked about. You may assume that you imagine the situation in terms of inner speech, or in terms of pictorial images, and you may be wrong in either assumption, but the specific processes to which the term "imagining" refers is not in doubt.

By majority usage, the general term which covers "remembering," "imagining," and "anticipating," is *thinking*. In every-day speech, you may substitute the word "thinking" for any of the others. In fact, "anticipating" is not in as common speech use as are the other terms, and you are more apt to say that you are "thinking of what you will do tomorrow" than to say that you are "anticipating what you will do." Anticipating is thinking of something as *to be*, and is antithetical to *memory*, which is thinking of something as *having been*.

The processes included under the term *feeling* are not so clearly designated in common speech as are the processes included under

perceiving and thinking, yet the conventional agreement is sufficient for our purposes. One trouble here is that "feeling" has been used also as synonymous with "touching," but the other and more important usage is as a matter of fact understood by almost every one. We say, "I feel hungry," "I am feeling tired," "I feel excited," "I feel pleased," "I feel dissatisfied." Now, no one doubts that people do feel in these ways, and the term is conventionally accepted as referring to just such processes. Unfortunately, we use the term also to designate *that which is felt*, as well as the feeling of it. We say: "I have a tired feeling," "a hungry feeling," "a pleasant feeling," etc. This is apparently a confusing shift of usage, but really indicates further important characteristics of the feeling process, which however, are irrelevant to the mere pointing out of the process itself.

All this would be quite needless elaboration of what is obvious to the reader, were it not for the fact that there is a term of still higher generality which has long been used, and which has become confusing through the attempt to make it explain the processes which it includes in its reference. This general term, in its primary form, is *being conscious*, and its original and conventional use is as a general term to cover perceiving, thinking, and feeling, and nothing more. If one perceives, or feels or thinks, he is said to be conscious. If he is assumed to be doing none of these, he is said to be *not conscious*, or *unconscious*. This usage is thoroughly fixed in common language. It is unfortunate that whereas the terms included under this higher class term are all active verbs, the higher term itself is a passive verb. This unfortunate change of voice has been suspected of being responsible for the confusion which has attended the term, and psychologists in the past have suggested substitute terms of active form, but the term is actually so well established in speech conventions that it seems impossible to dislodge it, and since terms are merely conventions, the particular term is accepted we does not really matter.

The confusion has occurred, as a matter of fact, not in regard to the concrete verb, but in regard to the abstract noun corresponding to it. Just as we find it convenient to use the abstract terms "vision," "audition," "perception," "imagination," "thought," etc. for convenience in referring in general ways to the processes of seeing, hearing, perceiving, imagining, etc., we find it convenient to refer in an abstract way to all of the processes together or indifferently (that is,

to being conscious), and the proper abstract term, of course, is *consciousness*.

This usage should occasion no trouble, but historically it has caused a great deal. "Consciousness" became employed as a concrete term, designating a mythical mind stuff, or something out of which a substantial mind was supposed to be made. Although in the later stages of this astonishing mythology, those who employed the term in this way denied that they meant a stuff or substance, they continued to treat it as such, and claimed to be able to observe it, and in effect they averred that one can be conscious of nothing but consciousness. That is to say, that we see, hear, smell, taste, in short, perceive, nothing but consciousness (in the form of "sensations"), think of nothing but consciousness (in the form of images), and feel nothing but consciousness (in the form of feelings).

It was not strange therefore, that skeptics in the profession began to question whether "consciousness," in this mystic sense, really existed. The present writer was one of the pioneer skeptics. Of course the answer, as is now readily seen, is the one indicated above. "Consciousness" is merely an abstract term, by which we refer to the processes of perceiving, thinking and feeling. It is not a thing, stuff, observable entity, or even a process, but is merely a way of referring to processes abstractly. The failure of certain psychologists to see this obvious explanation of the fallacy, who yet were persuaded by the skeptics that there was a fallacy involved, led to behaviorism, which instead of recognizing the fallacious concrete use of the abstract term consciousness, attempted to deny being conscious, that is, in effect to deny the fact of seeing, hearing, and every other form of perceiving, along with thinking and feeling. That was born an "ism" as fantastic as the "ism" it opposed, and in fact founded on it. We may avoid all confusion by adhering to the practical point of view of straight psychology, which bases its investigations on mere facts, to be explained, and carefully aligns its terms by which it refers to these facts with common usage of language, thus avoiding the illicit smuggling of explanation into the mere description of the problem.

The life processes with which psychology deals are considered as responses or reactions to the environment (including the individual

⁴ Introspectionism or ideationism: the theory of a dual world of physical objects and psychic objects.

as a part of his own environment) In principle, the present view is similar to the "stimulus-response" viewpoint, in that it makes stimulation, (the action of the environment on the individual through his receptor mechanism), the primary factor in psychic life. Actually, however, the modern conception is more complete, more adequate to actual life problems, than was the conception which was known as the "stimulus-response theory," and which was elaborated in terms of "bonds" established in the brain between individual neurones.

The "stimulus," of which we still speak, for convenience, is now recognized as an abstraction, and always to be treated as such. No actual responses to isolated stimuli occur. The effect of the environment is impressed on the organism as *stimulus-patterns*, in which we may analytically distinguish this or that stimulus which exists only for analytic purposes. In the nervous system, correspondingly, we recognise *neural patterns*, and the notion of specific "bonds" or connections established between particular nerve cells is abandoned completely. The same cells may be, and obviously are, involved in numberless neural patterns, and the important differential results of different patterns are due to the integrative total of interrelated neurones, not to the relationships between particular isolated neurones. Further, the action, in which a definite response ends, is no longer looked at as the movement of a limited system of muscles but as a total activity of the muscular and glandular systems.

At the same time, we recognise that the earlier consideration of a reaction as the performance of a small muscular group, consequent upon the occurrence of focused stimuli to specific receptor organs, was based on a peculiarity of response which is important, and which needs accurate recognition. This peculiarity we now express through use of the term *dominance*, a term of which is difficult to explain, and which we must guard from becoming a pseudo-explanatory term. This fate has overtaken many abstract terms, and the term "dominance" seems to be in some present danger of succumbing to it.

In the case of the "simple reaction" to light, where the reactor is instructed to press a key immediately upon the appearance of a flash of light, for example, we may still continue to call the flash of light the stimulus, and the action of the muscles which directly move the finger downwards "the action" at which the response terminates. At the same time, we recognise the fact that the actual response is

stimulated by all the forces playing upon all the receptors of the body; not only all the receptors in the eye, but all the receptors everywhere, and that the action in which the response terminates involves all of the muscles and at least many of the glands of the body. In fact, we can demonstrate this integrative nature of the reaction to be an actuality.⁴ Yet we recognize the fact that in this particular response, a change in the light flash may produce a more significant⁵ change in the response than may a change in other parts of the stimulus pattern, and hence we refer to the flash as the "dominant" part of the particular stimulus pattern. Similarly, we recognize that a change in the action of the finger and arm muscles may reproduce a more significant change in the results of the action than may changes in the action of other muscles or the glands, hence these finger and arm factors are called the "dominant" parts of the total action-pattern. Obviously, in the total neural pattern, certain systems of interconnection of neurons may be of especial practical importance in a given response, and we may speak then, but at present not very definitely, of "dominant" parts or phases of the neural pattern.

With continued response to similar stimulus patterns, and probably under still other conditions, the dominance of features of stimulus pattern and action pattern progressively changes. The study of these changes is one of the live problem-fields for psychology at the present time, and the new point of view makes certain phenomena which hitherto have been merely interesting in themselves (such as the phenomena involved in simple reaction time experiments) of vital significance for the advancement of our general knowledge of mental processes.

A change in our view-points which has contributed heavily to the development of the modern reaction hypothesis, involves new interpretations of sensory data and of relations between sense data. In the point of view under which experimental psychology labored in its early history, sensory data, such as color and sounds, were called *sensations*, *s.s.*; particular bits of the stuff which was supposed to be "consciousness," and perception was supposed to be primarily the

⁴ The demonstration is readily made by use of the string-galvanometer.

⁵ "Significant," that is, for the particular problem in which the experimenter is interested, and because of which he arranges the experiment and stimulates the reactor. From some other point of view it may not be significant at all.

observation of these entities, modified by the cooperation of the thought process. Thought also, was described as the observation or "experience" of other forms of objective "consciousness," called *images*. Such "sensations" and "images" could be schematically identified with hypothetical brain-states. The relations which are apparent in the real world, however, could not be so naively identified with brain-states, or even with mind-stuff, and hence were ignored, the resultant "mind" being a curious structure of "images" and "sensations" with perhaps, but not certainly, other sorts of "consciousness" called "feelings." Skeptical criticism, doubting the reality of "sensation" and "images" and insisting that so far as observation goes, the relations in the environment are perceived and thought about in the same way as that in which the sensory data are, opened the way for the discarding of conscious factors as things perceived, or things thought of, and progress towards the conception of conscious processes as perceiving and thinking. Only in this sense can mental facts be considered as responses. So long as the real facts of being conscious were ignored, and such things as color and odors were assumed to be the "conscious" facts, it was of course impossible to assume conscious processes or mental facts to be responses. The color red, or the odor of violet, or the note *g*♯—these can not be by any possibility considered as reactions of mine, but the seeing of the red, the smelling of the odor, the hearing of the sound, can be considered as my reactions.

After all, then, the developments in modern psychology have torn away the remnants of superstition which clouded the science, and definitely aligned psychology with everyday life. We live in a world which we actually perceive by responding to it. In this world are colors, sounds, and other so-called sense data and relations, but if we call these parts of our minds, we are merely using the term "mind" to designate the total universe. The perceiving of these data, and the thinking about these, are features of our minds, and with these perceivings, thinkings and feelings, psychology is concerned solely. About the nature of perceived data, psychology does not have to worry.

For example: I see a chair which has a red-colored upholstery. Analytically, all I really see reduces to the color, the brightness and the form. Common sense, with which psychology today is in full accord, holds that the color and the form are parts of the chair, and not of me.

This is really a decided change from the psychology of a generation ago, which in a confused way was driven to hold that the red was only a part of the "consciousness" of the person seeing it, and had therefore no existence except in his individual "mind." Since, however, every other perceptible feature of the chair reduced to the same mystic condition of being "something" in the "mind" (rather, parts of the mind), of an individual, the psychologist found himself in the uncomfortable position of accepting the ancient philosophies which reduce the whole actual world to identity with the individual human mind, as a mysterious function of the individual, or else of resolutely forgetting his fatal commitments, and ignoring the alleged basis of psychology. The latter course was almost universally chosen. Modern psychology has no such skeleton in its closet. The relation between sense-data as seen, heard or otherwise perceived, and the mathematically conceived matter and energy of the physicist may be a skeleton, but it is not in the psychologist's closet.

Admitting a real outer world to which man responds, there is no difficulty in treating relations on the same ground as sense data. The patterns of external objects which stimulate our responses, of course include both objects and relations, and it does not matter which is held to be more fundamental. In the stimulation-patterns, relations may be dominant, or sense-data may be dominant. In no case are we responding to sense qualities as such, or to relations as such, but to both as integrated in a pattern. I can observe, or think about, the difference between red and blue, or their spatial relation in a given object, just as readily as I can think about either red or blue, and I think about them, by responding to the objects or situations in which they are involved.

In the case of feeling, the case is superficially different. I (that is my organism) am not responding to external objects, but is responding to itself. The dominant features of the stimulus pattern in these cases are supplied from the tissues of the body itself, not from outside. For, since the body is fundamentally an object among other objects in the world, the difference in causation of the response processes of feeling and other response processes is no more fundamental and no greater, than the difference between the causation of the response to an inanimate object and the response to another human being.

Identifying responses with perceptions, thoughts and feelings,

we may seem to be omitting a large section of human reactions. Should we not add *along* to these other classes? What about the actions which modify the environment? What about such acts as smiting the hot iron on the anvil, dancing the minuet, starting an automobile, and cutting the food on one's plate? From a superficial point of view, these are performances which may follow and depend upon perception or thought, or which may be "automatic" in some cases. From the psychological point of view, they are perceiving, or thinking, or both. Our common habit of discriminating between "perceiving" and "doing," for example, is based merely on the fact that in the one case the actions which are the terminal part of the response are unconscious, and in the other conspicuous. The essential nature is the same.

Mere behavior: action which is not of the typical conscious sort, may occur, but if so, it is abnormal, and while it may be of interest to psychology because of its being a result of previous mental response, so also are many other products of human response which are not in themselves responses. We may take the case of sleep-walking as an illustration. In some cases, the somnambulist appears not to see or hear, and we may for the sake of the argument assume that he does not smell or taste. Are his actions then unconscious? Apparently not, in most cases. His walking is guided by the stimulation of his feet by the floor. But if we assume that consciousness is entirely absent, what then? The walker then is decidedly not responding to his environment, but responding to internal stimulation alone, his responses would seem to approximate to the condition of pure feeling. If we assume that his actions are not responses to any stimulation, then the performance is even more abnormal, and is not a life process at all, but merely a threat to living. The study of such cases is important as throwing light on the mechanism through which the important life processes are carried on, just as the study of anatomy on the dead subject is important.

The term "feeling" requires further consideration on account of the present confusion of feelings, emotions and sentiments. Feelings, (in the substantive use of the term), we regard at present as bodily conditions, which are capable of exciting receptors terminating in the bodily tissues, thereby starting responses through which the feelings are felt. We distinguish therefore between the feeling as an effect, as something

on which one is aware, or of which he may be aware, and feeling as the process of being aware of the bodily condition (affect). It is unfortunate that we do not have different terms in common use for these.

An "emotion" is a complex affair, which can be considered analytically as combining the perceiving or thinking of something, with an affect. "Having an emotion," or "experiencing an emotion," in other words, is a complex response which involves thinking and feeling. We list and classify emotions in various ways, but these classifications for the most part are not based on differences in feelings (affects) but are based in part on distinctions in what is thought-of, and in part on the external or environmental situations, in which emotions arise. Fear, for example, is the emotion which includes the thought of something threatening one, which is to be avoided. This complex of thought is the important thing and the particular feeling involved is not important. As a matter of fact, different "fears" are vastly different in their feeling-inclusions, and the external expressions are as widely different. For emotion, as conventionally named and described, the only important characteristic is a certain type of thinking and some fairly strong feeling, of any sort whatever. There are however, some relations between types of thinking and types of feeling, in that in certain circumstances certain varieties of feelings are not apt to occur, and in others, other types of feelings are not probable. These relationships, however, have not yet been psychologically worked out.

So much for the psychological features of the individual from the mechanical point of view. When we examine the dynamics of human life we find analytically certain features which we call *desires*, *purposes*, and *impulses*. These features are of course susceptible to mechanical analysis into complexes of perception, feeling and thought. It is useful, however, to consider the responses of human beings on the level of desire and impulse when we diverge from the intensely analytical problems of general psychology into those of social psychology. In other words, when we describe human life in terms of desire and its satisfaction and impulsive conduct we assume the possibility of further analysis, and we recognize that without such analysis, critically conducted, the descriptions are apt to be astray, and fallacious laws and principles be deduced. Mechanistic psychology therefore is, in a way, more fundamental than dynamic psychology.

Yet, in many cases, the analytic competence and skill of the psychologist being assumed, procedure from the dynamic standpoint is the more effective, because closer to the actual or concrete life processes. The results of analysis are always mental, since we have by analysis separated that which in life is not separated.

The dynamic point of view, which will be substantially embodied throughout this volume, is of such importance that the topic of desire is allotted a separate chapter.

3. Groups and classes

When we consider a number of individuals taken together, we designate them usually as a *class* or *group*. The exact applications of these two terms vary somewhat in practice, but the most logical usage is to consider the term "class" as the more general, and to consider the group as a specially distinguished class.

A class may be defined as the total of all the individuals which possess a common trait or character, or a common pattern of traits. In general, the more complex the common pattern, the smaller the class. Cattle, for example, constitute a class which is distinguished by common traits from sheep, swine, and all other animals and objects. When we add to the distinguishing traits certain further details which make the class Hereford cattle, the class is much smaller.

The common characteristics which determine a class may be of any sort whatever. When the characters are of certain sorts, however, we give special names to the classes. If the common character is that of occupying the same limited spatial area, we call the class a *collection*. Thus, the objects on the bowl, on that wall, in that cabinet, in that field, constitute a collection. We may define a collection as a number of objects spatially contiguous to one another, but this spatial contiguity is a space character common to the objects, and constitutes of them a class in the same sense as a common coloration, a common shape, or a common function constitutes a class of red soils, a class of spheres, or a class of vehicles.

When we are dealing with objects from the physical point of view, a collection is called a *group*, the two terms being interchangeable. Thus we speak of a group of trees, of stones, or of animals. We use the term "group" in social psychology, however, in a somewhat different sense, designating by it a class of individuals who are not

necessarily in spatial contiguity, but who are contiguous in another sense—the sense of influencing one another's actions. The distinction between social groups and social classes of other sorts is thus analogous to the distinction between physical groups and physical classes, but is not exactly the same distinction.

Classification is the process of selecting traits in which numbers of individuals may agree, and noting or listing the individuals which possess these traits. The number of classes of human beings is infinite, and classification, therefore, is useless except in so far as we select characteristics which are of actual importance in social life and which distinguish classes of individuals which can be more adequately and economically treated collectively¹ than individually.

Classification, moreover, does not dispose of individuals except in regard to the particular trait or traits by which we classify them. Each individual belongs to unnumerable classes, and although for a certain purpose we may place him in a certain class, for another purpose we must place him in another class. John Smith, for example, is a male. That statement classifies him in an important way. He is also myopic, a Republican, a Bostonian, an adult, a stammerer, a mathematician, a parent, a economist, and so on. In each of these classes he is a unit because of a different character, and in each class is in a different roster of individuals.

Certain human traits and circumstances are of definite importance for social psychology because of effects of these traits upon human organization. Important classes are determined, for example, by sex, age, race or stock, nativeness, food supply, geographical location, climatic conditions, industries, property, and physical and mental abilities.

A social group is a class of individuals which has a discernible degree of group organization and group life through social contiguity and through psychological group characteristics. It is a class which has an integrated life. The types of group which are of fundamental importance for social psychology are: 1, crowds and mobs, 2, bands, 3, families, 4, local or geographical groups, 5, civic or political groups,

¹ The adjective "collective" and the adverb "collectively" do not agree with the noun "collection," but have reference to the process of collecting in thought, or discussion, that which may or may not be collected physically. The actual meaning of "collective" therefore is "pertaining to a class," and not "pertaining to a collection."

6, martial groups, 7, occupational groups, 8, commercial groups, which are more complex occupational groups, 9, religious groups or churches, and 10, play groups. We shall discuss each of these group types in the proper place.

Through the possession of common characteristics, certain classes tend to acquire group organization, to become groups of varying degrees of integration. Hence we have collections intermediate between the mere class and the distinctive group. Racial classes furnish one example of this tendency. In a community of a mixed racial extraction there may be a class of citizens of German extraction. They may be organized into the local group fairly completely, may be units in several church groups, several occupational groups, etc., and may yet through the psychological bonds of common extraction and common language be loosely organized into a racial or foreign nationality group. Occupational classes, too large and too widely scattered to acquire a comprehensive group organization, may have highly organized groups, such as labor unions, arising within the class. The class of hard-of-hearing persons has within it the definitely organized Federation of Organizations for the Hard of Hearing. At any time, the organization within a class may increase and extend to such an extent that the whole class may constitute a group.

41. Castes

An intermediate class of especial importance is the caste. Castes are initially classes within groups, the members of a given group being subject to classification in accordance with certain traits, and because this classification is evident to the members of the class, a group organization, of varying degrees of integration, is effected.

Every social group of a considerable number of individuals tends to develop castes. This development is not simply the division into occupational groups, (which is a matter of specialization of functions), nor division according to abilities or capacities, although the caste distinctions grow out of these.

Castes are formed in general on a hereditary basis. Social status is inherited. The person of a certain family group, regardless of his capacities, abilities, or attainments, is *sine facto* a member of a caste group, and may lose that status either by voluntary withdrawal, or by marriage with an outsider.

In the case of royal caste members become outcasts by marrying commoners. The caste of the lesser nobility is less rigid in its rules for males at least. In some cases, male members of the nobility may remain in the caste although marrying commoners. Females, however, are more apt to lose caste by marrying outside. This difference usually obtains also for social cliques of other sorts. A woman of certain exclusive groups who marries an outcaste man, i. e., a man whose family is not registered, has her name stricken from the "blue book."

The solidification of castes in a national group is somewhat analogous to the ossification of the bones, and fixing of other tissues in individuals. Further growth is ended, and the process of dissolution is begun. Castes deteriorate unless there is a constant infusion of new blood from other castes. Even poets have realized that a fixed peasantry is a source of danger to any country, and the decay of the castes which are in control accelerates the death of the social organism.

Various provisions within caste systems for preventing decay and prolonging life are of interest. ■ some "blue-book" castes, provision is made for the constant addition of new blood. Brides of wealth, but no "family," are not admitted. But if they adopt, (as far as possible), the modes of life, (in non-essentials), prescribed by the caste, then, in two or three generations, (sometimes in one), their descendants may be taken in. Women who are adaptable may be taken in by marriage.

Some castes of nobility, after a brief period of growth, become closed systems, and decay rapidly, so far as the general qualifications of the caste for useful participation in national life are concerned. The Roman nobility and the pre-Revolutionary French nobility are examples. Castes of this type, which exercise political control, are eventually exterminated, if the nation itself survives. The extraordinary vitality of the English nobility is due to the continuous accession of new blood through the creation of new peers by royal decree.

Other means of addition ■ castes of course are evident. A high governmental official may be a man of no family, and of minor intellectual ability, elected by a freak of political transformation. While his children are not necessarily taken in at once as members of the exclusive cliques, they are admitted as what might be called

"guests" and stand an excellent chance of full admission. So a scholar or an explorer who has made a popular name for himself, may become an "associate" member of a caste.

The characteristics of castes may be supposed to be due to mere biological heredity, and the decay of aristocratic caste to the lack of fresh mixtures of stocks. It is probable, however, that the causes are deeper than this, and are really cultural. The actual blood matters little, but the development of uniform ways of thinking and uniform codes of action, at variance with sound national ways and codes matters greatly. In particular, the distortion of values, by which non-essentials become of maximal importance and vital factors are minimised, (that is, the making the peculiar caste features of supreme importance to members of the caste), is the important factor in the development and decay of caste. The effect of fixation of the servile caste is somewhat similar, but not so marked. The strenuous castes, by their decay, bring revolution or national disaster. Servile classes, by becoming fixed, cease to contribute to the national life, become socially sterile, and hasten national decay by their loss to the national life, or if economic conditions become intolerable through domination of decaying aristocratic castes, the whole system is abolished by revolution of the lower classes.

An aristocracy of mere wealth, however, is not a caste, and however unfortunate for the nation, does not so fatally lead to revolution. The evils in plutocratic domination are of more rapid development, and subject to more rapid correction than those of dominant castes.

§5. The essential features of social groups

There are certain structural or morphological features which are characteristic of social groups, and through the consideration of the presence or absence of these characteristics we can determine whether a social class is to be evaluated as a social group. These characteristics are 1, contiguity, 2, dynamic effects, 3, relations of specialisation of function of the members, 4, growth, 5, perpetuation of collective features beyond the life times of the individuals, with potential immortality, and the more specially psychological characters of 6, group consciousness, 7, group sentiment, 8, group purpose, and 9, group ideals. Each of these characteristics we shall consider at length, but

this consideration can be fruitful only after we have considered the several types of groups in some detail.

Groups, especially the more complexly organized groups, contain individuals of different classes, and these class differences are of vital importance for the group life. The family, for example, contains male and female, adult and young, sustainers and sustained. The religious group usually has within itself classes and castes peculiar to its group organization, but it has also individuals of different occupational classes, different sexes, different educational classes, and of different castes of types not determined religiously. A religious group from which any of these class distinctions should be absent would be a group of a sort quite different from one in which the class distinctions are present. For illustrative purposes, we may consider a church in which all members are of the same sex, the same occupation, the same age, or the same economic level. Such groups exist, as small groups. They are quite different in their religious life from ordinary religious groups.

36. Class differences and class comparisons

Individuals belonging to any class differ from one another, not only in respects which do not enter into the determination of the class, but also in the class characteristics.

It is safe to generalize this fact of difference and say that no two individuals are alike in either structure or action. If we class two individuals as exactly alike, or as identical in any respect, such classification is a mere matter of convenience, and is made either by overlooking differences which do not interest us, or is made under conditions in which certain actual differences can not be accurately noted.

The human individuals which are most closely alike are the so-called "identical twins." Under some conditions it may be impossible to distinguish the one from the other, either by appearance or by actions. Yet we know that closer observation is possible, and that such closer observation always reveals differences in details of structure and action through which it is actually possible to distinguish the two individuals.

On the other hand, in spite of the actual differences, individuals may resemble one another. They may be "alike" or "identical" in certain respects. Two men, however different, are identical in being

human, and in being male, and they may be identical in their ancestry, their stature and many other respects. Yet in many of these very respects they are also different. One of them may be slightly more apelike than the other, more virile, and, if measured to the thousandth of a millimeter, grates in stature. We must not suppose, then, that individuals merely differ in some traits while agreeing in others. More generally, they differ in the very respects in which they agree.

Differences and agreements are therefore not absolute characteristics of individuals in classes and groups but are strictly relative to our purposes in treating or describing class features and class characteristics. In so far as we do not take account of the differences of individuals, they are alike. In so far as we critically scrutinize resemblances, the resemblances disappear as differences. If we look for group characteristics, that is, characteristics in which all members of a group agree, we must determine the agreement or non-agreement by first determining the limits of difference which we overlook. We may ask, for example, whether or not the members of a group of boys are of the same height. The answer, based on measurements, will depend upon the limits of difference we ignore. If we consider the difference of a quarter of an inch inconsequential, the group may be of the "same height." In words of an eighth of an inch, they may be of different heights. Differences and agreements, in short, are determined by the units of measurement we employ.

In almost all important classes, the situation is still more complicated. If we use large units of measurement, we know that we are overlooking differences, and these differences may be important. Such a condition has appeared in the grouping of humans by eye color. With some few difficult cases left over, most individuals can be roughly classed as "light-eyed" or "dark-eyed." Sometimes, unfortunately, the terms "blue" and "brown" are used for the two classes. Within each class the individuals are "alike." When we attempt to make use of these classifications, in studying problems of racial origin and relationship, or in attempting to investigate the heredity of eye color, we find the classification valueless. Differences of which we have taken no account, slight differences in depth of blue or depth of brown, difference between gray-blue and green-blue, between cold brown and warm brown, etc., apparently are of as great importance as the gross differences between bluish and brownish.

Here and in many other cases, we are forced to resort to measurements which result in the unusual emphasis on differences rather than on agreements.

Further, we have reason to hold that differences among members of a class are at least as important as the resemblances, and that this is true for features of conduct as well as for structure. Finally, from the point of view of the mathematical treatment of measurements, we find that among the most important agreements of two classes is the agreement in differences within the classes and conversely, one of the important differences is the difference in differences. That is to say, it is important to know how the individuals in a class differ from one another, and to compare this with the way in which individuals in another class differ from one another.

In (a) the comparison of two classes in respect to any feature which can be measured, we therefore make our measurements as fine as necessary, that is, the units of measurement are made as small as can be practically used with accuracy. We have then for each class a range of measurements, and the comparison of the ranges, and the distribution of measurements within, is the comparison of the classes. If we are describing a single class with respect to a given characteristic, the procedure is of the same sort. We describe in terms of the range of measurements. If (b) we are forming a class, in respect to any given characteristic, we proceed by setting the limits of the range we shall employ, and select the individuals who fall within that range.

For example (a) we wish to compare adult male Samoans in respect to height with adult female Samoans. The smallest unit of measurement we can employ accurately may be a quarter of an inch. We measure individuals of both groups to the nearest quarter of an inch. We measure hundreds, or thousands, picking the individuals in such a way as to form "representative" groups. In the end, we have ranges of measurements for each group, the comparison of the distribution of the measurements in these ranges is the comparison of the sexes. We do not find any one height in which the males agree, or any one height in which the females agree.

If (b) we wish to select a company of men of the same height, we select the height, and the permitted range of variation. Let us say we wish a company all six feet in height. We must then decide whether a variation of one-eighth of an inch, or one-quarter of an

inch of one half of an inch either way is to be permitted as within the standard height. Then we can go ahead and measure our men, and accept those which come within the prescribed range.

All class comparisons, if scientifically carried out, are comparisons of distributions of measurements within the two classes. We can not usefully compare single members of one class with single members of another class, unless, as seldom happens in any case of importance, the members of each class all agree within the limits of the unit of measurement. It is \square us to attempt to settle the question as to whether men are more truthful than women by comparing some one woman with some one man. It is not useful to settle the question as to whether men are taller than women by a similar procedure. Even a few measurements on height are not sufficient, nor are a few observations on truth-telling adequate. We must have measurements on sufficient numbers of individuals adequately selected, \square represent the total class of men and the total class of women.

\square many cases measurements are not possible as yet. We have no measure of truthfulness. In these cases we fall back on our estimates, which are merely guesses. \square such group comparisons our guesses are defective for several reasons. 1. Our estimates on particular cases are highly inaccurate. From the various lies an individual tells, or that he may \square caught in telling, it is difficult to estimate his degree of truthfulness. 2. Our sampling of the population is never adequate under these conditions. We might estimate the truthfulness of the individuals we are well acquainted with, but it is not probable that these individuals fairly represent the total population. \square men and women or the total of any definite class. On account of these difficulties, coupled with the irrepressible tendency to generalize our impressions, we have a mass of contradictory statements concerning the mental characteristics of women, of men, of children, of negroes, of Englishmen, of congressmen, and so on.

The comparisons of classes, to be reliable, must be based on measurements, and these measurements must be made on samplings selected in such a way that they really represent the larger class to which we wish our comparisons \square apply. If we accurately measure any class, and then give the measurement proper mathematical treatment, the results are valid for the class we have measured. Whether or not they are valid for a larger group which we have not measured, depends on the selection of our measured group.

Having obtained our measurements how can we compare them? We have measured a class of men and women let us say, a thousand of each. How shall we compare these measurements? First, we should consider the range. In certain classes, the ranges will be about the same. The shortest man may be four feet six and a quarter inches, the tallest man six feet two inches. The shortest woman also may be four feet six and a quarter inches and the tallest woman six feet two inches. In respect to range, the sex classes are alike. This is only one detail. It is important, but not the most important feature of the distribution of measurement. We cannot say so this time, that the sexes are alike in stature.

We must next consider the form of distribution. Dividing off the range in steps of the unit of measurement, we determine how many in each group fall at each step within the range and the mode, or point at which the number of individual measurements is maximal. If the number of cases falling at the several points of the range decrease in both directions from the mode, we have a unimodal curve of distribution. If there are two or more modes, the distribution is polymodal.

A polymodal curve may be due to (1) the combination of two different types of individuals, which really ought to have been separated into two groups. (2) The measurement of too few individuals, not constituting an adequate sample of the larger group. Further investigation, and further measurements are needed to decide between these two possibilities. A unimodal curve, on the other hand, is no proof that there are not combined two groups which ought to be separated. In measuring the stature of an American group, for example, you may really have two quite distinct groups, each with its peculiarities of stature, of Scotch extraction, and a group of French extraction. This combination may show as a polymodal distribution, or it may not show at all.

In all cases of group measurements, the plotting of the curves of distribution is the important use of the measurements. There are however other comparisons, which may be made.

1. We may compute the *average measurement*, or *arithmetical mean*. To obtain this, we add together all the measurements, and divide by the number of measurements.

2. We may determine the *median measurement*. This is the measurement which divides the total number into two equal parts, there being as many below the median as there are above.

The mean and the median are interesting representative measurements of group representatives. Either or both of them may be important, but their importance is difficult of determination in many cases. In one particular case, the importance is definite. This is where the mean and the median are the same in value, which happens only where the curve of distribution is symmetrical. In that case, the mean, (which is then the median also), is an important and useful representative of the group.

Even with a symmetrical distribution, the mean is not in itself an adequate representative value. We may obtain the same mean from quite different distributions. The full significance of the mean is in connection with the form of the curve of distribution, and the range. If we should find for example, the statures of two groups have symmetrical distributions, and the curve average, that would be important. But if the range of the one distribution is considerably different from the range of the other, there is still an important difference between the two groups in regard to stature. If we find the ranges as well as the means are the same, but that the curves differ in their form, there is still an important difference in stature between the groups.

We can express the difference in range in a simple numerical way. The difference in form of distribution can not be so simply expressed. There are several measures of variation which are commonly employed in connection with the mean, namely the average deviation, the standard error, and the probable error. Each of these expresses roughly certain features of the distribution, in fact, for most distributions all of these express the same feature. If for the same mean, the mean variations are different, we know that the distributions are different, but we do not know how they differ, they may differ in range, or in form or in both respects. If on the other hand, we have two equal means, and equal mean variations, we do not know that the distributions are alike. They may be alike, or they may differ significantly in both range and form. What we have said about the mean variation applies also the standard deviation and the probable error, for each of these is a simple mathematical function which may be transformed into the others by multiplying by the proper constants.¹

¹ The probable error has a special significance for the Gaussian curve of distribution, which has a definite mathematical formula. Where the distribution curve is symmetrical, it is not necessarily Gaussian, although all Gaussian curves are symmetrical.

The significance to be ascribed to the mean and in the mean variation applies only in the cases of symmetrical distribution curves. Where the distributions are violently "skewed," the mean, the median and the mean variation have little actual significance, the mode being the best representative value in those cases. In general, the more the distribution differs from the symmetrical form, the less the significance of the mean, the median and the mean variation.

The significance of statements about classes should now be clear. If we say that men are taller than women, we do not mean that any man will be found to be taller than any woman. We do not even imply that the ranges of heights will be found to be different. What we do mean is that in certain groups, from which adequate samples may be measured, it will be found that the mode for the men will be greater than that for the women. The exact significance of the statement must be further determined by finding 1, whether the ranges of measurement are different, 2, whether the form of distributions are different. Where the ranges are approximately the same, and the distributions are roughly symmetrical, these points may be covered roughly by determining whether the mean variations differ or not.

The use of these relatively simple measures of groups is sometimes called the appearance of "simple statistical methods." Preferably, the name "statistical" is not applied here, but is reserved for the more complex treatment of data, typified by the process of deriving a coefficient of correlation. These more complex methods are widely applied in psychological and social data, but they are based on principles and assumptions seldom understood by those who apply them, and in the greater part of the material published, where conclusions have been reached through the higher statistical treatment of data, the conclusions are unimportant. A statistical result has statistical value, the value in other wise remains to be determined, and most often cannot be determined. It is exceedingly doubtful whether conclusions reached by the higher statistical methods applied to psychological data are ever useful, unless the same conclusions can be reached convincingly by simpler methods. A coefficient or correlation between two sets of psychological measurements, unless it is .8 or above, merely establishes the fact that there is some relation, important or unimportant, between the two arrays, which may be worth investi-

gating. If those who are fond of the correlation method bear in mind that the determination of a coefficient of the usual magnitude is the beginning, or formulation, of a problem, not a solution, they will be on safe ground. A coefficient of 8 or above is a different matter, but even this is not always significant.

Where a generalization not based on measurements is made as to differences between classes (as between men and women), the statement is a prediction that if measurements are made the distributions will have certain relations of range and form. Such predictions are not adequately based on observation of a few cases. Nor are they to be refuted by reference to particular cases. If measurements are impossible, verification or refutation must proceed by the observation of as many well-selected cases as possible. Predictions of this sort are useful, therefore, merely as means of stimulating further observation.

Especial emphasis must be laid on the fact that measurements and predictions are valid or are important only for the groups determined by the measurements or observations. We cannot say that women are shorter than men. This does not hold for some racial groups, although it does hold for certain other racial and national groups on which extensive measurements have been made. What the distributions would be for the whole human race we do not know, since adequate samples of all stocks have not been measured. Generalization from a small group to a wider group cannot be made, unless we know that the small group actually represents the larger. Even our predictive guesses need to be sharply restricted to the groups from which we have observed samples.

§7. The social mind

It is convenient to use the term *mind* in a rather loose way to designate the sum total of conscious processes of the individual, and also to designate any lesser system of his conscious processes which we wish to consider at the moment. It is convenient also to employ the expression "social mind" to refer in the same loose way to the conscious processes of a social group. It is convenient also to use the terms "social consciousness," or "group consciousness" and "social feeling," or "group feeling," but these terms must be carefully defined.

The social mind is, of course, the mind of a social group, but it is in no wise distinguishable from the individual minds in the group. The social group itself is nothing more than the sum of the individuals. It is not the sum of the individuals as they would be if isolated from the group, but as they actually are in the group. So, the social mind is either (a) the enumerative total of the individual minds in the group, or (b) the mind of some individual in this group who is considered as typical of all in the group. The term is actually used in both these senses, and there is little danger of confusion if the general principle involved is clearly understood. In the first sense, the total is *enumerative* merely; we cannot actually combine the mental reactions of two individuals to make a resultant mental total. If three men, a, b, and c, pull on a rope together, the total "pull" registered on the dynamometer to which the rope may be attached is the sum of the individual pulls of a, b, and c considered separately. But the actual muscular activities of the three men are three distinct systems of things, and their conscious processes during the pulling are also distinct, and there is no more possibility of summing the mental processes to give a total different from the mere enumeration of the three systems, than there is of summing the three sets of muscular activities except by enumerating them.

The case may be put in another way by pointing out that the total "pull" in pounds of three men, a, b, and c, may be exactly the same as the total "pull" of three other men, d, e, and f, although the individual "pull" of no man in the first group may be equal to that of any man in the second. But the total of muscular activities in the one group cannot be the same as the total in the other group unless the activities of each man in the one group are exactly the same as those of a man in the second group. In the same way, the total "group mind" in the first case cannot be the same as that in the second case unless the mind of each man in the first group is exactly the same as that of one of the men in the second group.

The reactions of two or more individuals, when each influences the other, are obviously not the same as they would be if each were uninfluenced by the other. Yet in both cases, the actions of each individual are their individual actions. So, the consciousness of each, when the reactions are mutually interdependent, is not the same as it would be if each were isolated, yet even when the

reaction and the consciousness are "social," they are always the reactions and consciousness of the individuals. Failure to grasp this point is responsible for the doctrine of the "social mind" as "something more" than the total of the individual minds: a confusing doctrine, involving no more truth than the obvious fact that the minds of the several individuals when social are not the same as the minds of the same individuals when socially isolated.

In the second sense of "social mind," we are considering the mind of some one person in a group as involving certain processes, which we assume are characteristic of the other minds in the group also, although not necessarily in the same degree or complexity. We must not assume, however, that any one mind is typical of the group in the sense that it represents the other minds so completely that the individual differences may be neglected. Consideration of the social mind in this sense is never complete until we have considered the various ranges of variation of the specific mental processes which are the subject of study. In the case of a group of persons enviously discussing the fortunes of a successful man, the envy in the mind of one of the individuals may be taken as representative of the envy of the others, but the various types and degrees of envy in the various minds, and its varying relation to the other emotional attitudes of the individuals, prevent our considering the mind of any one individual in the group as completely typical, even in respect to this particular emotion and its manifestations.

The social mind, in any case, involves social consciousness. This is the consciousness (in the individual, of course) of others in the group, and consciousness of them as related, in the group, to oneself, in other words, consciousness of being a member of the group. The consciousness of the others may be perceptual, or it may be ideational. One may be conscious of one's membership in the Lutheran Church, or in the group of athletes, when physically alone, and this group consciousness may be as important and as vivid under such circumstances as when one is physically surrounded by other members of the group. Usually, however, the group consciousness is more vivid when one is actually in the group in a spatial sense.

The group relations of which one is conscious vary in order and complexity according to the individual, and according to the group. In the most highly developed minds, duty is prominent, and in many

group consciousness is accompanied by an emotional attitude, or emotional background, sometimes called group spirit, or group enthusiasm, in certain specific cases, called patriotic emotion, loyalty, pride of race, etc. but these emotional complements also may be entirely lacking, although the group consciousness exists. These factors will be more fully treated in the later discussions of group organization.

The social mind also involves social feelings. These are feelings which the individuals in the group have "towards" the group, that is to say, in conjunction with social consciousness. The term "group feeling" is also employed to indicate feelings which members of the group have towards individuals outside of the group, or towards situations or objects of various sorts. This usage is not approved, except in so far as it refers to the consciousness of the group itself, as related to other individuals or to objects, or as involved in the situation. In such cases, the feeling is towards the group as affecting, or as affected by, the external factors, and therefore is properly called group feeling. A feeling which happens merely to be common to members of the group, is not, on that account, group feeling, but is best designated as "collective feeling in the group." Specific feelings and also emotions, such as pride, satisfaction, etc., are adequately called group pride, group satisfaction, etc., under similar restrictions.

CHAPTER II

RACES AND CIVILIZATION

43. Ethnic factors in social problems

THE human population of the globe includes ones of many varieties, and it has been customary to classify these varieties as diverse *racæ*. In the hands of various classifiers, the list of "races" has varied greatly in length and in principles of classification. In fact, there are several different conceptions as to just what a race is.

1. A race is a class of the population determined by the possession of a common physical trait, or a certain complex of traits. Thus we have, by one classification, the white, black, brown, yellow and red races, as classified by coloration and shading of the skin.

2. A race is a group of human beings who, ancestrally, have lived in a certain area of the globe for a considerable number of generations. We speak thus of the Chinese race, the Japanese race, and sometimes of the English, French, and African races, meaning those peoples who are native to China, Japan, England, France or Africa.

3. A race is a group of people all of whom have descended from a common ancestry. In this sense, and according to the monogenetic theory, all human beings constitute the "human race." It is sometimes assumed, however, that within the human race, there are smaller races, that is, groups which could be traced genetically to a single pair of ancestors.

4. A race is a group of people, of whatever origin genetically, in which extensive interbreeding, together with processes of natural selection, have resulted in a certain approximation towards homogeneity of population, as regards outstanding physical characteristics.

In the usual classifications of races, none of these principles is really followed. We do speak of the "white race," but in it we include people who are really pale skinned, and others who are blacker than most of those included in the "black race." Other physical bases of classification are rarely found useful. There may have been a "blond

race" long ago, but now blondes are so scattered among various regional and national groups that when they are classified together it is generally not under the term "race." We do refer to certain groups marked by short stature as races of "pygmies," but find it necessary to add regional qualifications (Congo, New Guinea), or tribal names to identify particular groups, and we do not include in these races many individuals of stature as low, whom we find in various other groups. Usually, in any classification, some genetic relationship in the group is implied. In speaking of the race of Batwa pygmies in equatorial Africa, or in speaking of the Chinese race, we assume that the members of the race are of the same stock, that is, are more or less closely related in blood, but we know very well that there are no groups of any considerable size which are actually descended from a single pair of ancestors, and that in all large groups, there are results of mixtures of various original stocks. We do find, in different parts of the world, groups in which there is an approximation to homogeneity of physical traits, but we do not happen to call these groups "races," but prefer to use the term "type." Thus we speak of the "Canton type" of Chinese, and of various other types. We speak of the several quite different types of French, and the different types of Scotch, instead of referring to several Scotch races, several French races, and so on.

We admit that the population of the United States does not constitute a race in any sense of the term. We are apt to say that it is a mixture or assemblage of a large number of races, European, Asiatic, African, and early American, with various minor racial admixtures. When we examine the so-called races which have contributed to the population of the United States, we find the same to be true of them.

The people we call French, for example, are the product of the settlement in France of a large number of different peoples from different other areas. In addition to the most ancient population, Germanic tribes, Romans, Greeks, Phoenicians and many others have in the last few thousand years settled in France and contributed their descendants to the population. The physical types of the French range widely: from blonde to black hair, from blue to dark brown eyes, from tall to short stature, and so on all other physical traits; with these combined in endless variety. If we trace further back the peoples who contributed to this French population, we find the same conditions. The Greeks who settled in France were a mixture

of many stocks. So were the Germanic tribes, and so presumably were all the others.

If we examine the people we today call "Germans," we find conditions even more complicated. Almost all of the original peoples who settled in France are represented in Germany, and also, various Asiatic stocks. The other peoples of Europe are practically as complex mixtures as the French and Germans. In Asia conditions are on the whole no simpler, and the same is true of most peoples in Africa. Even the American Indians are obviously a conglomerate of many different original peoples. Some of the Indian tribes, however, were fairly homogeneous, and we might speak of the "Sioux race," the "Yacqui race," and many others, but as a matter of fact we do not call these tribes "races."

The term "race," in short, has not proved to be a useful one. It has, in fact been positively confusing, because many loose speculators have called certain divisions of the human family "races," and have assumed in the races so classified a certain fundamental homogeneity of traits which observation does not reveal, and on this basis they have solemnly discussed problems of racial inferiority and superiority, and problems of racial tendencies, as if the discussions had some meaning. The conclusions about the Aryan race, the Negro race, the Nordic race, the Alpine race, and the Mediterranean race have been especially unfortunate in so far as they have not been merely absurd. The truth is, that while we can construct imposing definitions of these races, and may conjecture that some of them once existed, we cannot, today, find any such races. At the most we find minor groups, here and there, which correspond to the definition.

We find a considerable number of "Nordics" in Northern Germany, Latvia, Finland, Sweden, Russia, England, France, Italy, and other countries, intermixed with people of quite different types. We find groups corresponding to the various definitions of "Mediterranean" in Southern Italy, France, and Greece, and also in various other places. The so-called "Aryans," like the so-called "Semites" are not discoverable even in ancient history, the names really indicating families of languages, which are quite different things from races of men.

The importance of stock is not to be ignored. We find it demonstrably important in domestic animals and plants, and we find it

important in man. The child of parents who both have noses of a certain sort is likely to have the same sort of a nose. If all four grandparents have the same sort of nose the probability is higher. With certain traits, where the trait is possessed by all direct ancestors for many preceding generations, the probability becomes almost a certainty. The Chinese child of ancestry unmixed with foreign blood for many generations is almost certain to have hair of the Mongolian type, although there is always the slight probability that he may not. When, however, stocks with sharp differences in a certain trait are crossed, the resultant hybrids are not predictable (except statistically in certain cases). The trait of the one parent or of the other may appear, or a trait intermediate between the two, or a trait which differs surprisingly from both.

On the other hand, few physical traits seem to persist in a stock for a long series of generations, without modification, if conditions of climate, food, and type of activity are materially changed. The shape of the skull, once looked upon as a fatally "hereditary," and thus an index of stock over long periods of time, is now no longer so regarded. It seems quite possible that certain groups which have migrated from one region to another have changed from dolichocephals to brachycephals in a relatively few centuries,¹ and that the reverse change may have occurred as readily. Stature, bodily proportions, and other details are certainly not stable unless living conditions are constant. Skin characteristics, we know little about, but it is probable that eye color and hair color and form are relatively the least affected genetically by living conditions since they are of little if any practical importance, and are not functions of the essential adaptation to biotic conditions. With regard to so-called "mental" traits we are the least informed, but we may reasonably assume that there is a tendency for the persistence in the stock for certain mental traits, a yet unidentified.

The social factors affecting human development are undoubtedly the most important in determining the psychological characteristics of individuals. Yet, there may be stock capacity features, making certain stocks respond in certain ways to these cultural forces, and making other stocks respond in other ways. If certain genetically

¹ See Brachycephaly and glauclius balance, 1933 Science, 78: 604-4, for a suggestion as to the possible causes of certain of these changes.

integrated groups, such as the Neapolitans, differ in their potentialities from other genetically integrated groups, such as the Tuscans or the Cantonese, we certainly need to know these differences if we are to understand either the cultural developments of the past or the political problems of the present. If we are concerned with group characteristics in this broad way, rather than with more specific stock differences within these groups, we may reasonably call our topic of interest the *racial problem*, finding, as in many other cases, an adjective useful where the noun from which it is derived is not.

Our first point of interest is the origin of racial mixtures, as we find them in the world today. To some extent we can trace the making of mixtures historically, and archaeology carries us somewhat further to a point beyond which we can proceed only on the principle of continuity, by projecting the line of development traced in the known past back into the unknown past.

Four primary types or species of man are known to have existed on the earth. 1. *Modern man, homo sapiens*, the breed to which you and I belong. 2. *Neanderthal man*, who lived in Europe during the late Paleolithic age, and how much earlier we do not know. 3. *Heidelberg man*, whom we know only from his jaw bones, and who apparently was earlier than Neanderthal man. 4. *Rhodesian man*, whose remains are found only in South Africa. In addition there have been fossil remains found in England and in China, which may or may not represent species different from any of these. We have no reason in doubt that remains of other species will eventually be discovered, and that many species which have existed have left no trace. Certain bones found in Java, which are much older geologically than any of the remains which are certainly identified as human, except the fossils from China, have been held to represent a very early human species, which has been named *pithecanthropus erectus*, that is "erect ape-man." This is still a conjectural species.

Of the three important species, Heidelberg man, Neanderthal man and *homo sapiens*, no one can be said to be earlier than the others. In Continental Europe, the fossils of Heidelberg man are from an earlier period than those of Neanderthal man, and the fossils of Neanderthal man from a period earlier than the earliest of modern man. In England, however, have been discovered remains of modern man which are at least as old as those of Neanderthal man on the continent.

Moreover, negative evidence is not conclusive. For the preservation of human bones over more than a brief period of time very particular conditions are required, and these conditions can be realized only in an infinitesimal number of cases. Millions of men must exist, in order that the bones of one or two of them may meet the series of fortunate conditions which will cause their preservation for even a few thousand years. Of the remains preserved to the present time, moreover, we can not expect that the majority will be discovered.

We can not assume either that Neanderthal man evolved from Heidelberg man, or that *homo sapiens* evolved from Neanderthal man. Even if we should find that they succeeded one another in this order in Europe, we know too much about the persistent human habit of migration to overlook the probability that the second group, moving into Europe, found the first there, and were in turn replaced by the third filtering in from a distant point of origin. On the other hand, it is entirely possible that *homo sapiens* coming in contact with Heidelberg man in Europe, Neanderthal man arose as a hybrid between the two. Hybridizations analogous to these have certainly occurred in Africa in more recent times, as in the case of the Hottentots who are reasonably assumed to have originated as a hybrid of Bushman and Bantu.

All this is merely illustrative of the point. What we know is that man has persistently tended to hybridize, and that two groups, however different, if long resident contiguously, tend either to blend, or to throw off a hybrid which takes on eventually the characteristics of a third racial group. It is fairly certain that with the predominance of modern man in Europe, the remnants of Neanderthal man were absorbed. That there is also Heidelberg blood in the early European stocks of modern man is very probable.

Further than this, the prehistory of modern man is a matter for conjecture. It is useful, however, to consider a plausible theory as an illustration of the complex process of differentiation and mixture which has made man what he is today.

Modern man, obviously not a "pure race," eventually migrated Eastward into Asia, from which perhaps some if not all of his ancestral strains had come. What blendings and hybridizations occurred in Asia further, we cannot guess. We know, however, that Asia was

inhabited already, and the eastward movement from Europe pushed these earlier inhabitants into deserts, peninsulas, islands and coastal borders.¹ Some of the Europeans bode pushed into the Nile valley, and occupied, (if that had not already been occupied), the northern coast of Africa.

Curiously enough, we can make some guesses as to the physical characteristics of these early Europeans. They were of medium height or above, they were swarthy of skin, and brown of eyes and hair, and their hair was probably straight and coarse. We may call this type *Breed A*.

Reaching Eastern Asia, these people developed a slightly different type, but still of the same general description. Perhaps their mental characteristics improved. At any rate, they commenced, in China and the regions of Indo-China, the development of civilization, that is, a distinctive form of culture, from which ours has descended. This type of men we may call *Breed B*.

Meantime, there appeared in Central Asia, probably in or near the Pamir, a different type of man. Whether this was an ancient breed, resident in Asia before the European invasion, or whether it was a result of hybridization after the invasion, we cannot guess. We can infer, however, that the people of this breed had blue eyes, and hair differing significantly from that of the other breeds, in that instead of having a brown pigmentation it had a red pigmentation probably in the cortex only. We may call this *Breed C*.

Still later, a new breed appeared in Northern or Central Asia, and its growth and spread was the cause of profound changes in the racial distributions of the whole world. This type, among other peculiarities, had a type of hair which was straight and coarse with black pigment, possibly in both medulla and cortex. These were the Mongols, or to adopt a safety-first name, the proto-Mongols. We may call these *Breed D*. This group pushed in expansion in all directions. The various groups of Breed B were pushed westward again towards Europe, and southward, and eastward, causing new migra-

¹ The geographical disposition of population-types after displacement through migration seems to follow laws which are as definite as those of any other phenomenon of nature. The principles deducible from population distribution in Africa for example, where comparatively recent migrations can be traced, seem applicable to Asia and the Americas, with correspondingly interesting results.

ments among the autochthones¹ in the peninsula, islands, mountains, deserts and coastal borders. The Japanese Islands, for example, had been the refuge of one autochthonous group who are called the *Karo-pai-pai*, or dwellers in pots, apparently closely related to the "gypsies" of Eastern Europe and North Africa. Now, under Mongol pressure, some of Group B passed over to Japan, and partly exterminated, partly absorbed the earlier people. Similar changes occurred in other regions.

The civilized group in China withstood the Mongol hordes for a time, but finally, large groups emigrated to the East Indies. Others were exterminated, and the remnants absorbed by the invading Mongols, who picked up the fragments of civilization and organized what has been known since as Chinese culture.

Of the civilized groups who migrated to the East Indies, some eventually passed eastward through the Pacific, harassed by the autochthonous negroid dwellers there (who themselves had been earlier forced out of Asia), and their culture degenerating, their descendants have been known to us as Polynesians. Others migrated westward from the Indies, following the coast, but proceeding by water. Some settled in the Tigris-Euphrates Valley, founding the culture which eventually became Babylonian, others went further and settled in the Nile Valley, founding the Egyptian civilization, and others settled on the shores of the Mediterranean. In these places, the immigrants of Breed B found Breed A, already established, and out of the amalgamation of these closely related breeds came the Mediterranean race. The cultures of the eastern Mediterranean shore and islands, and of Mesopotamia and Egypt, were three branches of one culture, developed by racial mixtures essentially similar in the three regions.

The continued expansion of the Mongols produced further migrations. A Dravidian group, of unknown origin, probably from India, settled in Arabia, and entered Africa by the Horn. Here they found the Proto-Negroes, and further racial developments in Africa are easily traced, and referred to three groups: the Bushmen, the Proto-Negroes, and the Hamites, as these migrating Dravidians are called.

¹ "Autochthones" are peoples residing in given regions or areas in the earliest assignable periods or eras. They constitute what is loosely called the "original" population of an area, but the terms "autochthon" and "autochthonous" do not imply that there may not have been still earlier populations-types, unknown to us.

A Hamitic group from Africa shortly moved up the coast of the Arabian Gulf and Red Sea, and entered Egypt, where they took possession of the land and the culture, and dominated it for nearly four thousand years. These were the Pharaohs and their hosts.

The constant pressure westward from Asia forced down upon Mesopotamia various groups of Breed A—Hittites, Assyrians, Mitanni, and others, eventually crushing civilization in Babylonia. In Europe, the Hellenes, soon calling "barbarians," came from the North and almost overwhelmed the civilization of the Eastern Mediterranean, but adopted it, and out of the ruins developed what we know as "Greek" culture. These Hellenes, however, were of breeds different from those so far described.

The hybridization of Breeds A and B with Breed C produced curious results. Both A and B, apparently, had brown eyes, and brown pigment in hair cortex and medulla. Group C had blue or violet eyes, with red pigment in the cortex of the hair. Some of the hybrids and their characteristics were:

Breed E. Blue eyes, no pigment in either hair-medulla or cortex. These were the blue-eyed blondes.

Breed F. Blue eyes, both of the pigments present in the hair. These had therefore reddish brown hair, which in individuals today turns red, before turning gray.

Breed G. Blue eyes, and dark brown hair.

Probably also, the combination of brown eyes and red hair, and brown eyes and the blonde hair, occurred in distinct groups or breeds. Further hybridization between these hybrid types and the changes due to varied biotic conditions has produced an endless series of intermediate types.

Most of these hybrid breeds probably had brown skins, with a slight sun-darkening coefficient. Further changes have produced several skin types, viz: I. Fair skin, which darkens profoundly when exposed to the sun. II. Fair skin which does not sun-darken at all. III. Dark (swarthy) skin, which darkens further and considerably in the sun. Interbreeds have arisen between the sun-darkening and the darkening, with mosaic skin patterns of both, giving rise to freckles. IV. Dark skin, which does not sun-darken. This occurs today in the medium shades of brown, and in the dark brown, sometimes called "black," of negroes.

If we come down to historic times we find the processes of migrations and mixtures actively in progress. Into the near East have pushed various oriental peoples, including black haired and red haired Turks, and the expanding Arabs have pushed north, east and west. In a few generations, mixture with the original inhabitants has caused the disappearance of the earlier types in many places, and the formation of varieties of new types.

Into Europe, a succession of diverse mongoloid breeds have penetrated in successive waves to the Baltic and into Central Germany. The make-up of the population of Germany is a sample of the result. In the northern portions the mixed population shows the outcropping of Nordic types, rather conspicuously. ■ the southern part, various types described as Alpine, together with variations of the Mediterranean predominate. In the central part, Mongol blood is conspicuous, and the eastern mixtures are even more complex.

In Southern Russia, assorted broods of Mongol-Mediterranean-Alpine-Nordic have multiplied and the last fifty years the tide of migration has again turned, and this "Slavic" population has been pouring into Asia, so that today the population of the half of the continent northwest of the mountainous backbone is more than ■ per cent Slavic and the tide is setting down the North Pacific Coast of Asia. The only "yellow peril" apparent today is the real peril in which the "yellow man" stands of being swept out of Asia in the next fifty years. In India the population has been for centuries so completely mixed that there are almost as many different types in India as in the whole rest of the world. The population types in Siam, Burmah, and Indo-China have been fairly stable for some centuries, but there is no indication that they will remain so for the next century. The Japanese are of several distinct types, resulting for successive immigrations of early and later Manchurians and Malays, added to still earlier breeds. Africa and South American show no greater homogeneity or stability.

The scheme of ethnological development briefly sketched above is merely one among many which have been elaborated, but it shows ■ least as well as any the generally admitted complexity of human breeds and the difficulties inherent in the attempt to distribute the present human population of the earth into "races." Our notions concerning the details of human history must remain tentative for

years to come. The facts which are really certain are: 1. That there has been from the beginning of human history a slow but significant process of differentiation of types, and further modification of types. In this process, the effects of natural selection, mutation, and modifications by biotic factors evidently enter, and the effects of social selection through war, control of reproduction etc. are not negligible. 2. Along with the differentiating process, there has been a constant succession of mixtures and hybridizations of the different types as they have developed. 3. In early periods, when the total population of the globe was small at any given time, and isolation of groups for relatively long successions of generations was possible, relatively large homogeneous groups of definite types may have developed. Within the last few thousand years, however, migrations and contacts have been so frequent, that except in a few isolated areas, no groups of national or wide areal importance have been allowed time to become homogeneous, but have been made up of diverse and constantly changing mixtures. 4. In hybridization and mixture of stocks, the evidence for linkage of traits in a systematic way is slight. For example, the mating of two individuals, one from a blond haired, tall stock, the other from a brunette short stock, may result in combinations of blond hair and short stature, and of brunette hair and tall stature, or of combinations resembling one or the other of the parental patterns. There may also result intermediate traits or blends. While certain specific traits seem to show an all-or-none characteristic in hybrids, the specific trait either appearing in its original parental form, or being replaced with the trait of the other parent, with no blending, it is not certain that any traits behave in this way exclusively.* 5. The mental, and to a less striking extent, the physical traits of individuals are results of processes of growth, this growth being determined throughout by the interaction of the

* The Mongol hair, for example, may be such a trait, although specific selection as to results of hybridization of Mongol and other races is lacking on this point, as on most other points of fundamental interest. The hairs of the peoples of all types other than the Mongol race when the stocks are hybridized. Thus, between the kinky dark-brown hair of the negro, and the straight blond Nordic hair, all intermediate types may be produced. The Mongol hair, it is notable, is a "true black" or "blue black," whereas other so-called black hair is really dark brown. There is probably a true black hair other than the Mongol in central Europe, but this has not yet been established.

individual and his environment, physical and social. The development of groups in our total environment gives no certain basis of prediction as to what the progeny of that group will attain in different environmental conditions. 6 The most rapid and important development of human beings and of cultures is promoted by hybridization of types which have become differentiated.

From the popular point of view, the world racial situation is highly discouraging, and has furnished a fine field for the terrorists and propagandists. From the scientific point of view, this same situation is stimulating, even thrilling, furnishing opportunities for ethnic investigations which have been so far but superficially begun. We know, however, what has to be done, which in itself is an advance.

In brief, the immediate tasks of ethnology are as follows: 1 Adequate and comprehensive description of existing peoples. In most cases, available descriptions are lacking in the essential features, and are seldom based on adequate sampling. Minute measurements of all human details are at present less needed than are intensive studies of traits selected for their specific genetic significance. 2 Investigation of the behavior, its hybridization, of eye-color, hair-form (with respect to roundness, straightness, straightness, roughness, and the ranges to the opposites of softness, coarseness, curliness and brittleness), hair-color, skin-characteristics, in which must be distinguished (a) bleached color and shade (b) rapidity of sun-darkening or "tanning" and (c) limits of sun-darkening, these three characteristics apparently being somewhat independent variables. Certain other characteristics of a persistent nature, which are little subject to natural selection, such as the epicanthic fold, the Mongol spot, and peculiarities of the genital organs, also need exhaustive study.

Our lack of definite information on these fundamental characters is appalling. Still more appalling has been the lack of interest in investigating these problems, and the easy acceptance of theories based on casual observation. We have been satisfied for example, with the gross classification of men as blue-eyed or brown-eyed, overlooking the purple, green, orange and other types which are numerous, and overlooking the fact that eye coloration is not an "all-or-none" trait, but that in mixed populations mixtures of blue and brown with other colors is the rule. Along with the careful observations of adults, must go, of course, study of the ontogenetic variations, the changes

which occur in these characters from infancy to adult life. Eye coloration, for example, while not a "growth characteristic" in the sense in which stature, head form, and other body proportions are, changes markedly in the early months of life, and in a passing way. So do hair coloration and form. The analysis of these changes is of peculiar importance to ethnology.

On the basis of the results of these fundamental investigations better descriptions and classifications of men will be possible, and this will lead to further investigations into the more vital characteristics. The basal traits of man, however, for ethnological purposes, are those listed, which are not only capable of metrical determination, but which also are the characters least subject to change by biotic conditions.

In the meantime, racial psychology is merely a mass of speculation on so slight a foundation as to be useless. National psychology, tribal psychology, and the psychology of other political groups may be another matter, the basis for which can be found only in exact measurement of representative samples of the groups. The difficulties in the way of the development of such national psychology are enormous, and it has not even been attempted or seriously projected up to the present time.

{2} Civilized and uncivilized social systems

When we consider the ways of life of a group of people which has developed and maintained these modes over a considerable period of time, we speak of the *culture* of the people. This is a highly technical usage in the term "culture," carefully to be distinguished from the meaning of the term as used otherwise. In this technical sense, we include under the term "culture," the laws, conventions, and customs of the people, their forms of group organization, or institutions, their commercial, industrial and economic methods and procedures, in so far as these are standardized, their attitudes, as regard to morals, their language system, their philosophy, science and religion, and their common funds of folk-lore and literature. At different times we emphasize different aspects of this vague and complex mass, and seldom do we have a thoroughgoing comprehension of the total culture of any group. With regard to this sketchily conceived culture, we commonly divide the peoples of the world, present and past, into two groups, the *civilized* and the *uncivilized*. We have apparently, some

sort of abstract concept of something called "civilization," in which some peoples participate, and others do not. Although we may admit that there is no sharp line to be drawn between civilized and uncivilized cultures, we assume that in spite of the intermediate zone there are important differences between the civilized and the uncivilized.

For the uncivilized peoples and their cultures we have various other names, including "savage," "wild," "barbarian," and "primitive." None of these terms, however, seems really appropriate. Some uncivilized people are really savage, even ferocious. Others are mild and gentle, exceeding ourselves in this respect. Some are truly wild, and avoid inquisitive explorers, and even avoid contacts with the neighbors of long standing. Others, however, are as tame or tamer than most civilized men.

The term "barbarian" was applied by the Hellenic Greeks to peoples in the North and East of Greece, whom the Greeks considered as rough and uncouth, and for whom the Greeks selected the symbol of their luxuriant whiskers. These Greeks, however, had as one group of their ancestor peoples as rough, uncouth and bewhiskered, as any of their barbarian contemporaries. On the whole, we still use the term to denote people of personally disagreeable traits and habits, and these are not universal characteristics of uncivilized peoples.

"Primitive" implies literally an original type. The remote Paleolithic men, of whom we know little, might perhaps be called "primitive," in the proper sense of the term. Relatively, we might speak of any early people from whom a later people have descended as "primitive" with respect to the later group. We might also speak of any early culture from which a later culture evolved as "primitive" in respect to the later culture. In such cases, however, we cannot apply the term "primitive" to any groups of uncivilized men, or to any uncivilized culture. None of the present uncivilized people are ancestors of civilized peoples, and civilized cultures have not evolved from any of the uncivilized cultures, either of the present, or those known to history.

Sometimes the contradiction involved in the application of the term "primitive" is glossed over, and the implication retained, by calling uncivilized men "untutored-folks," as if they stood, in some mysterious way, closer to "nature" than did civilized peoples. This is of

course absurd. Natural laws are all-embracing and inescapable, and the banister in a New York skyscraper leads just as "natural" a life as the naked native of Patagonia ever did.

The term "primitive," applied to uncivilized man as the most misleading of all, as anthropologists have pointed out. It has actually caused many persons to assume implicitly that civilization has passed through stages identical with, or essentially similar to, existing uncivilized cultures. This is a serious mistake. Civilization has had a long history, as we estimate history, but a brief career from the point of view of Anthropology. It is quite likely that some savage cultures have had longer spans of development. Unquestionably, many cultures, including civilization, go back to a common origin. Perhaps this is true of all cultures. The common cultures, which were "primitive" as regards modern cultures, were, however, quite different from any of the cultures which developed from them. This may be an over-statement. It is possible that a really ancient culture may have persisted unchanged through thousands of years down to recent time while other cultures which branched off from it in remote times have developed into different systems. If this be so, we do not have any means of identifying this primitive system. If the primitive culture from which civilization developed exists today, we do not know what it is, nor where it is.

The case is somewhat similar to that of normal intelligence and feeble-mindedness. Let us consider three men, each 28 years old, one of whom, A, has normal intelligence, one, B, the retarded intelligence which might be rated as "mental age of 14 years" and the third more retarded, C, be rated as "mental age of 9 years." Would we assume that the two retarded individuals represent stages in the development of the normal individual? That A actually passed through, in the course of his development, the mental condition which C now has, and then the mental condition which B has? Apparently, some mental testers do make this assumption, but psychologists certainly do not.

What we assume is that in early life, perhaps before birth, these three individuals began to follow different lines of development, and that probably none of them has since passed through any of the stages through which any of the others has passed. If we compare two individuals of the same mental age, and same chronological age,

whether they are retarded or not, we might assume that these two individuals have followed the same course of development, but even this assumption would be only a matter of probability.

In the same way, different cultures are the latest stages in the evolution along lines which may have had common stems, or corresponding phases, thousands or millions of years ago, but which since their separation have so diverged that no subsequent stage of the one can hastily be assumed to have been a stage of the other.

On the other hand, we recognize that just as two individuals may follow the same line of development, through the same stages, two cultures, isolated from each other, might for a long period follow the same course of development, one arriving finally at a stage which is very closely like some intermediate stage of the other. This is possible because any social evolution is determined, in part at least, by type of human beings in the evolving group, and the type of environmental conditions under which the evolution takes place. However, where two cultures, such as that of Central America and of Ancient Egypt, have developed strikingly similar features, we always search for possible evidence that the two cultures (not necessarily the two peoples), branched from a common stem at some relatively late period.

The development of cultures is, however, not determined exclusively by type of people, and the conditions of the physical environment. Borrowings of culture from one people by another, and hybridizations of culture are frequent, and have probably taken place wherever two cultures have come into contact. The exact conditions of contact determine the extent of the borrowing, and racial hybridisation, although often the one facilitates the other, and *vice versa*.

Borrowing and hybridization are conspicuous in certain features of culture, such as language and religion. The religions of Europe are the hybridized results of the ancient Oriental and African religions with many pagan religions of ancient Europe. The English language is a picturesque hybrid of several Germanic dialects, Latin, Greek, French, and in minor degree, many others.

Sometimes the borrowing is so comprehensive that the borrowed culture or cultural feature abolishes a former one. Negroes in certain parts of West Indies speak an English which is close to that of their English masters. Most American negroes speak an English which

has deviated from the standard English, but which has no trace or effect of the African dialects. In historical times, certain languages in Africa have biased paths across the continent, displacing other languages, and with no accompanying mixture of racial stocks. The religion of one people may be adopted bodily by another people, as the Mongolo-Turki Khazars in southeastern Europe adopted Judaism in a mass. *Shinto*, however, is the original religion completely obliterated. Language is a fallacious index to racial connections. Religion is a somewhat better one, but not trustworthy prior to careful study ■ the composition.

The comparative study of cultures is nevertheless a useful pursuit. Cultures of which the genetic connections are remote may throw light upon one another, when studied in relation to the racial types and the environmental conditions in which the cultures have developed.

Civilization ■ apparently a culture the main stem of which goes back through a complex course to a single stem. Along the way, however, it has received elements from many non-civilized cultures. What are the outstanding features of this civilization? 1. It seems to be a culture which fits the needs of men of many types in many parts of the world. It is an expanding culture which seems capable of becoming universal. Perhaps other cultures may have this capacity, but they do not seem to have demonstrated it. In contact with other cultures, under conditions which have not been too unfavorable, from the point of view of numbers of men and armed force, civilization, even in its weaker forms, seems to survive. It was almost extinguished in the Mediterranean by the Hellenic Greeks, but was finally adopted by them. In Mesopotamia, it survived the overwhelming by several successive waves of uncivilized peoples, finally succumbing after repeated rallies, and unparalleled vicissitudes. In Egypt, it survived the Pharaonic invasion for 4000 years, perishing eventually through the exhaustion of centuries of war. In China, it survived in a modified form for several thousand years. In Europe, it survived wave after wave of Asiatic invasion, and is now spreading rapidly over Asia.

2. It is still, especially in its best forms, a developing culture. Savage cultures and the cultures of wild men all reached a static stage, which they maintained until destroyed by other cultures. This static or crystallized condition of uncivilized cultures is apparently re-

sponsible for their rapid decay when they come in contact with civilization. Their power of adjustment is lost.

3 Civilization throughout is characterized by crime as a normal feature, whereas most uncivilized cultures are relatively free from crime. Savage societies reach a condition of great complexity or organization, and extreme limitation of individual action. Rules, whether laws or conventions, completely determine conduct, and these conventions are characterized by their inviolability. This condition, of universal respect for rules of conduct, is responsible for the crystalline condition. Once reduce personal conduct and social relations to mechanical system, and obtain universal obedience to the rules and conventions, and further growth is possible only through revolution of a destructive character. If the rules are completely obeyed, they cannot be changed, for the agitation for the change of rules is itself disobedience, and is not tolerated.

Social progress, in short, seems possible through two procedures: 1 Violation of conventions, leading to the formation of new conventions. 2 Where the conventions have the form of law, there crime, (the breaking of law), is the indispensable method of progress. All great reformers have been law breakers, and wherever laws limit progress, the systematic and conscientious infraction of law is the only possible progressive method. Flouting of conventions and infraction of laws seem to constitute the essential spirit of civilization. Where a population shall have become universally law abiding, civilization will have died.

The comparative study of social institutions, from the point of view of civilization, is strikingly similar to the comparative study of zoology. In both cases, it is important to distinguish stages in a direct line of evolution from stages in different lines. It is instructive to compare the family, religion, economic, and political organization of Mongols, Negroes, and American Indians with our own organizations. We do not, however, assume that our institutions have developed from those of these other people. We know, however, that many of our social institutions have descended from those of the Greeks and the Babylonians, and other institutions from those of certain other peoples. The problem of comparative social science is to find the actual lineages of our civilization, and the ultimate goal or to trace these back to remote common stems of civilization and uncivilized cultures.

The problem is complicated by the fact that inventions and discoveries may be communicated from one culture to another without any true genetic bequest of the culture. Civilization, for example, in no wise derives from Negro culture, yet the art of working iron, discovered probably by Negro people, was adopted by civilized peoples, and profoundly influenced civilization. In the same way, many other inventions and discoveries, have passed from uncivilized to civilized people and from civilized to uncivilized, modifying the cultures which have adopted them, without any accompanying adoptions of culture. The adoption of inventions, however, undoubtedly does dispose uncivilized peoples to the adoption of the culture from which the invention has come. Thus the Japanese, through adopting the inventions and discoveries of civilization, have been disposed to a partial adoption of civilization itself.

In some cases, people of one culture may adopt another very largely, while still retaining fundamental features of their original culture. Where the culture is a composite of civilization and an uncivilized culture, there is sometimes a persistent tendency, periodically manifested, to throw off the features of civilization and return to the uncivilized culture. This course was publicly urged in Germany during the war, and is ardently advocated by the Nazi leaders now. Such manifestations are indications that civilization has neither completely displaced the uncivilized culture, nor has finally and completely merged with it.

It has been assumed that there are racial differences predisposing to the development and maintenance of different types of culture. In particular, it has been argued that certain racial stocks are better able to maintain and further develop civilization than are others. While this cannot be disproved as a theoretical point, we have no evidence for specific racial differences in this respect. The arguments for racial superiority and inferiority, moreover, seem throughout to rest on the point that races which have not developed civilization are obviously incompetent to do so. This in turn, rests on the assumption that the cultures which various uncivilized groups have developed are stages in the development of civilization, which, as we have above indicated, is a fallacious assumption.

If a people has actually developed a culture which is really a low stage of civilization, its stopping at that stage might be taken to be

an indication of racial incompetence, although the environmental conditions would need to be carefully checked before the assumption could be conclusive. Uncivilized peoples, however, have not developed incipient civilization. They have developed cultures of quite other sorts.

CHAPTER III

DESIRE

§1. The nature and modification of desire

I ■ WE consider human beings dynamically rather than mechanically, we discover that human life is directed by thought, which includes purposes and ideals. In many of the situations of life, the most significant features of our responses to the total stimulus patterns are the thoughts which are involved in the response. In many other cases, the thinking which has occurred in the past, and which is not repeated at the time of the response, is the important determinant of the response. The effective, prior thinking may have been ■ any type, but the most important types are those which we have earlier described as anticipatory. We have, for example, thought of the conduct or the response which we shall make in a given circumstance later, when the circumstance arises, the effects of the previous anticipatory thinking are effective, among other factors, in determining the conduct or the response. Such anticipatory thinking differs from other anticipation in an important respect. It involves not merely thinking of something which will occur or which may occur at some time in the future, it includes the thinking of the occurrence as brought about, in part at least, by one's own act. An anticipatory thought of this specific type, we commonly call a *purpose*.

Often, however, a determining thought is a thought of a result rather than of an active procedure or process. We think of something which is to be approved; some condition of affairs, some situation, something which is not yet actual, but without thinking of the means by which it is to be made actual, to be brought about. Or, we think of it as something to be brought about by agencies other than our own conduct. Such a thought-of thing we call an *ideal*. Ideals are influential in determining human conduct, but apparently not so directly influential as are purposes. The important function of an ideal seems to lie in its determination of further thinking and especially the formation of purposes. Purposes, however, may be directly effective

on later conduct, without being repeated, and aside from their effect on the thought of the moment.

Still more influential in the control of responses and conduct are the *desires*. Desires might loosely be described as purposes, but if that description is employed, we must note that they are purposes of a definite sort, and are more than purposes, and are influential in the determination of other purposes which are not *desires*.

Life, in fact, is organized about the desires. The conduct of the individual cannot be understood except through reference to his desires. Group life and group organization are explicable only in so far as we understand the desires of the individuals comprised in the group, and group life can be bettered, group organization made more efficient, only by so modifying the organization and the life as to give more scope and more satisfaction to the desires of the members of the group. Groups, in fact, are organized for the satisfaction of desires. Some are organized about a few desires, and others are concerned with all desires. Only by results of group activity in satisfying the desires of its members, and by the results on the satisfaction of the desires of those outside the group, can groups be evaluated.

Every actual desire is a complex process involving a particular type of thinking, and something more. This something more is as yet but dimly understood, and we have no established general name for it, although in particular cases, we have particular names. In this discussion, we shall employ an arbitrary general name: we shall call this something, which in conjunction with a specific type of thinking constitutes a desire, an *appet*.¹

Desires are not abstractions: they are concrete occurrences, acts, processes—whatever you wish to call them. At the present moment you may desire to rest, you may desire a drink, this desiring is an actual fact of your life.

Every such desire is a desire of something which is not yet actual. You do not desire what you already have, or are now experiencing, you desire only what you have not, or are not yet experiencing. If you are comfortable, and desire to continue comfortable, you are desiring the future comfort, not the present comfort. The important,

¹ From the Latin, *appetere*—to strive after, from which are derived "appetite" and "appetition."

or directive feature of the desire, therefore, is the anticipatory thinking. Unless you think of something which is not yet, you do not desire it.

Every such desire, however, involves something more than the anticipatory thinking. You think of many things as future, without desiring them. The student thinks of the possible failure in the course, and may think of it as inevitable, but he does not desire it. One thinks of the coming day as warm, cool, dry, moist, he may desire the climatic condition, or he may be indifferent to it. Something more than the anticipatory thinking is essential to the desire. This something is the *appet*.

Desires are infinite in variety, yet there are obvious similarities running through the variety, and by the similarities we may usefully classify desires. Perhaps there may be possible a really fundamental classification according to the particular appetts involved. It is quite possible that there are only a few different appetts, and that every desire involves one of these, or perhaps more than one. If that were certified, we could say that there are just as many fundamental kinds of desires as there are different appetts, and could assign the bases of further desires to combinations of two or more appetts. For the present, however, we can have no such certainty, hence any present classification is best regarded as a mere classification of convenience. In the meantime, the classification which is most useful is obviously in accordance with the classification of things which are desired. Each of our classes of desires is made up of the desires of a particular sort of goods, or ends of a particular type. We may frankly admit, therefore, that the classification is primarily teleological, rather than psychological. We may succeed at some time in the future in transforming it into a strictly psychological classification, but this consummation may be forwarded by using effectively the scheme in its present form.

Our classification, however, is not completely teleological. We are not considering what man *wants*, but what he *desires*, that is, what his psychological processes are really directed towards. A man may need various things without desiring them, he may also desire things which he does not need. There is a practical relationship between needs, and desires, but the two are not the same.

Our first distinction is between *primary*, or fundamental desires, and

secondary, or derived desires. This distinction may not be found ultimately to be a clear-cut one, but it offers provisionally a useful method of presenting the problems. The primary desires are those which are important everywhere, and which maintain their general characteristics through the ages. They are desires also which are actually important for the preservation of the life and welfare of the individual and the life of the race. If we trace the relation of desires to needs, we find that the primary desires are those which are most closely connected with man's needs. The list of primary desires does not change. The secondary desires are widely variable. Old desires vanish and new ones arise. On the whole, with the development of civilization, secondary desires increase in number and in variety of types. In considering the living processes of man, the secondary desires may be found to be as important as the primary, but they do not correspond to needs, and are not permanent. The secondary desires are suspected of being modifications or transformations of the primary desires. How these modifications occur, what the nature of the transformations may be, we do not know. Our most important business, in social psychology, however, is with the primary desires.

For the present, desires may adequately be classified under nine headings:

- 1 *Alimentary desire*—The desire for food and drink.
- 2 *Excretory desire*—Kiddie's. The desire to be rid of annoying or unconvertible materials or products.
- 3 *Protection desire*—Desire for shelter from adverse external forces.
- 4 *Activity desire*—The desire for motor performance and occupation.
- 5 *Desire for rest and relaxation*.
- 6 *Amorous or erotic desire*—Desire for stimulation by, and association with, an individual of the opposite sex.
- 7 *Parental or philoprotic desire*—Desire for the protection of children.
- 8 *Desire of preeminence*—Desire to be a leader, or a focus of attention and interest.
- 9 *Desire of conformity*—Desire to belong to a group, and to participate in the group characteristics.

The first five of these desires may be said to be individual, since their satisfaction does not depend essentially on the activity of other persons, or on the presence of other persons in the environment. Practically, however, the satisfaction of these desires have become

group matters, and all five are of great significance for group life and group organization. The last four desires, are doubly social, in that their satisfaction requires social relations.

In discussing the primary desires, it is necessary to take note of several important features: 1, The organic basis. 2, Relative degrees of importance, including insufficiency and excess of desire. 3, Perverisions, or direction of desires to substitutes for the normal objects. 4, The relation of the primary desires to secondary desires.

1. For some of the desires, the organic basis is fairly clear, the "appetite" being capable of identification with conditions or processes in particular bodily tissues. In regard to no desire, do we have full information as to the exact tissue conditions, although the tissue itself may be determinable. For some desires, we cannot even assign the tissue of basal importance. In some cases, popular notions, which have been taken over into some psychological discussions, are obviously erroneous. This is a field in which persistent psychological investigation should ultimately supply information of great usefulness in explaining both personal and social life processes.

2. Excesses and deficiencies are recognized in all of the desires, and some of these conditions have well-established names. The exact nature of an excess, however, is often in doubt. What passes as an excessive desire is in some cases the excessive gratification of a desire which is otherwise normal. Excessive gratification, however, may lead to an abnormal development of the desire itself, although on the contrary it sometimes leads to a reduction in the desire. Lack of satisfaction similarly leads in some cases to the reduction or even abolition of the desire, in other cases it leads to the enlargement of the desire, even to pathological proportions. One important condition of these changes is the forecasting of satisfaction at a definite future time, or the absence of such foreknowledge. An urgent desire for food may be temporarily allayed by the announcement that dinner will be served in half an hour. The knowledge that the food supply is exhausted and its replenishment uncertain or hopeless may greatly increase the desire. Amatory desire is especially subject to diminution and increment from expectation or non-expectation of satisfaction. Here we must distinguish between immediate and delayed effects. Expectation of satisfaction within a short time may either increase or decrease the desire, but expectation pointing to a period not too far

distant may, over a course of weeks or months, make the desire less urgent or less frequent in its appearance.

The postponement of satisfaction may produce in some cases tissue-changes which modify the desire in a direct way by changes in the appet. In the early stages of starvation, the desire for food increases, and with further starvation, may be abated and finally disappear. Unsatisfied thirst may be similarly augmented and then diminished. Prevention of the normal satisfaction of the nest desire through sleep may have somewhat similar effects. Prolonged failure to satisfy the amatory desire may completely and permanently abolish it, particularly in the female, but usually modifies it essentially without abolition. Amatory desire is peculiar in that its heightening, depression, and preservation depend on a multitude of factors.

Some of the difficulties in estimating the strength of desires, and modifications in their strength, are due to the fact that under the one term "strength" we really include a number of different characteristics. (1) The intensity of desire at any given moment. This may be a matter of intensity of the appet, but more often is a matter of concentration of attention, that is, a dominance of the particular thought-complex proper to the desire over other thought processes. With this goes a dominance in perceptual patterns of objects and events which have a direct relation to the desired object. The hungry man not only dwells in thought on food and eating, and on matters connected with these, but is especially subject to noticing restaurants, signs indicating food supplies, other people going to meals, etc.

(2) The frequency of occurrence of the desire. If the desire recurs at infrequent intervals, in any given strength of the moment, we are apt to say that the desire is "weaker" than if it recurs more frequently.

(3) Under some circumstances the desire is more certain to be acted upon and satisfied than it is at other times. A desire which, from logical considerations, is evaluated as one which should not be indulged, may be resisted at one time, and yielded to at another, although the desire in the two cases may not in itself materially differ in strength in the two cases.

3. Perversions of desires are well recognized, and there are established names for some of the more common perversions of each of the primary desires. In perversion, the desire is satisfied by some process or materials which are not normally satisfying. The line between

a normal modification of a primary desire into a secondary desire, and a perversion, is not clearly marked. Where an individual eats clay or other abnormal materials in place of food, we say the modified desire has become perverted. Where he satisfies his thirst with strongly alcoholic mixed drinks, we call the modified desire a perversion only if we assume that the modification is adverse to the health or other conditions ■ well-being of the drinker. ■ every case, the line is really drawn on some such practical grounds. Modifications which are not unusual to the individual personally or socially, and are not adverse to the interests of society are secondary desires. If the results are injurious in either of these ways, the modification is a perversion.

Perversions occur in all desires, and it is possible that the abnormal conditions which we call neuroses are, in general, founded in perverted desires. From this point of view indeed any perversion would be a neurosis. We cannot go to this length in our conclusion ■ present, although the possibility is an important one theoretically.

Perversions result from various causes. Failure to satisfy the desire in the normal way is in many cases a contributory factor. On the other hand, over-indulgence sometimes leads to perversions. In many cases, failure of adequate satisfaction of one desire leads to perversions in others. Lack of sufficient outlet for activity is a common cause predisposing to the perversions of other desires. Of major importance, in the formation of perversions, is the learning process under the direction of an instructor, or under circumstances which definitely conduce to the learning. Certain sexual perversions or vices, for example, are in the majority of cases learned by one person under the definite instruction of one already perverted, or are learned through association with a number of perverts. In many such cases, deprivation of normal satisfaction or excess of satisfaction predisposes the pupil to the learning, but is not an essential condition.

4. The formation of normal secondary desires, that is, modifications which are beneficial or non-injurious, usually occurs through a learning process, and is often predisposed through lack of satisfaction of the normal kind, or lack of satisfaction of other desires. With increase in leisure, the activity desire in particular seeks new outlets. In general, where new desires can be formed without the repression of other desires, there is the tendency to form them. From this point

of view, the difference between a normal modification and a perversion would be that the perversion interferes with the adequate satisfaction of one of the primary desires, or reduces the normal desire in strength or in frequency, whereas a normal modification has no adverse effect on any of the primary desires or their satisfactions.

§2. The spreading of desires

One of the ways in which desires are modified, perhaps the most important way, is through the regressive spread of desire from that which is primarily desired to that which is thought of as a means to the primary end, and is therefore desired. A sportsman, on a fishing trip, may not primarily desire to get up early in the morning, to be wet, to paddle a canoe against a head wind. He does desire to take fish, and because these other procedures are means to that end, he desires these means. The desire to catch fish, however, is not in all cases the primary desire, but may be the result of a spread from some more fundamental desire, perhaps the desire to excel among his group, or at least to be on a level with other members of his group, or to secure fish for food, or even to please a mistress. The primary desire, which transcends the various means to the ultimately desired end, may be therefore a desire of preeminence, or of conformity, or alimentary, or amatory. It might indeed be a parental or an actively desire.

The transcendent desire is in a certain sense the cause of the various secondary or immanent desires of the sorts we have described. From an immanent desire itself (as for example the desire to arise early in the morning) and from the activities in which the desire eventuates, we cannot simply infer us to the nature of the transcendent desire. The same immanent desire, so far as the closest analysis goes, may be the resultant or modification of any one of several of the primary desires. That the transcendent character of the desire makes an actual difference in the immanent desire, and in the activities which it motivates, we can hardly doubt. The determination of these differences eludes us, however, in most cases.

The term *motivation*, which we have just used, is correctly placed. A *motive* is strictly a transcendent desire, considered in relation to the immanent desires which derive from it. It is still a "motive" when considered not in relation to the immanent desires, but in relation to

the activities involved in satisfying or attempting to satisfy the desire. We may properly say, for example, that the fisherman's "motive" for early rising is his desire to impress his fellow clubmen, or to win approval from his masters. It is also proper to say that the ultimate or transcendent desire is the "motive" for his actions in early rising, including the setting of the alarm clock the evening before. This dual usage implies that the transcendent desire may at times function in producing the activity appropriate to the immanent desire, without the actual presence of the immanent desire itself. That implication is undoubtedly valid. The habits of action in accordance with desires may be formed, and the desires themselves become less essential, although they recur when it is important to reinforce the habit.

Where a chain of regressions is involved, so that a given immanent desire is the result of spreading from a still further desire, any desire in the chain is properly described as the motive for the desire derived from it, that is, the desire which is one stage lower in its ultimacy. A motive can be defined, accordingly, as any desire from which there is spread to a contributory desire. In other words, in any regression of desires, every desire can be considered as the motive for the desire or desires which are a stage below it in respect to the transcendent desire, and as being motivated by the desire which is a stage above it. The "ultimate motive" in any such chain is the transcendent desire.

Manifestly, the ordering of desires, and the transcendent desire or desires involved in any course of conduct, can be identified only by ascertaining the actual thought-processes of the individual and the processes of habit formation through which he has gone. The spreading of desires is fundamentally a matter of thinking. In order to desire a means, the individual must think that it is a means to an already desired end. The spreading then occurs regardless of whether the thinking is logically valid or not. The operations of the savage medicine man are as really desired as if they actually contributed to the realization of the desired good which the medicine man claims he secures for his client. The client thinks the medicine man's performances are efficacious, and accordingly he desires to have them performed.

54. The primary desires

1 Alimentary desires

Desire for food and desire for drink are conditioned primarily by hunger and thirst. These conditions are, in the main, connected with two definite tissue structures, hunger with the walls of the stomach, and thirst with the mucous membrane lining the upper part of the gullet and the posterior part of the mouth cavity. The primary appeta for these desires may be said to be either conditions in, or processes in, these tissues. It is possible that secondary appeta may arise in other tissues, but if so, these are not important for ordinary life.

Thirst is a condition of relative dryness of the epithelial cells of the mucous membrane in the region indicated. When these cells contain less than their normal amount of fluid, the sensory endings of receptors terminating among them are stimulated, and thus afferent currents are sent to the brain stem, resulting in a response, or the modification of a response in a particular way. It is possible that the actual stimulation is through the absorption, by the dry epithelial cells, of water from the receptorial nerve cells, but this is not yet certain. We do know that thirst can be temporarily alleviated by wetting the mucous surfaces, the epithelial cells absorbing the water from the surface, although no change in the general hydromstatic condition of the organism is effected. Conversely, by temporarily drying these cells, thirst may be created, although the bodily tissues in general may be normally supplied with fluid. Hunger is definitely a condition of the stomach, but we are less well informed as to the exact nature of this condition than we are in regard to thirst. Following the work of Cannon and Carlson it was supposed that hunger is the contraction of the empty stomach. Some persons have hunger of a rhythmic character described as "hunger pangs," the hunger appearing, increasing in intensity, then shortly decreasing and completely disappearing for a few seconds or minutes, the whole cycle being then repeated over and over. By experimental registration of the rhythmic contractions which are characteristics of the empty stomach, it has been found that in such persons the beginning, rise, decrease and end of "hunger pangs" coincide with the beginning, rise, increase, decrease and end of the contractions. These muscular contractions are theoretically

capable of exciting the sensory receptors which terminate among the cells of the connective tissue layers of the coats of the stomach.

Unfortunately for this theory, many individuals do not have hunger of the rhythmic pang type, but do have hunger which remains fairly constant over a considerable period, as thirst does. We have no reason to doubt that these persons have the normal rhythmic contraction of the empty stomach. Furthermore, by actual experiment, hunger has been found to be present in certain sections when there are no stomach contractions, while in others, strong contractions are found with no hunger. The most reasonable supposition therefore is that hunger is a condition (chemical perhaps), of the epithelium or lining of the stomach, but this supposition has not as yet been positively confirmed.

There may be also a hunger of the duodenum or other parts of the alimentary canal. It is possible that when the water content of the body is generally and seriously depleted, thirst of tissues other than the epithelium of the gullet may occur. These possibilities do not affect our general view of the alimentary desires. Hunger and thirst obviously occur in times when there is no desire of food or of drink. The appet is present, but the ideational setting is not. Conversely, in the absence of the appet, food purposes may occur, and of course habits of eating and drinking may persist. Many times we eat when we are not hungry, or drink when we are not thirsty, proceeding on habit, or directed by mere purposes, often the purposes being reinforced by other desires, conformity, activity and amatory desires being the conspicuous reinforcers in these cases.

Deficiencies in alimentary desire are frequent among civilized peoples. The continued absence of the appet, the absence of the ideational factor, or a deficiency in either of these, or the occurrence of the two essentials at too infrequent intervals, are medically combated by physiological remedies designed to increase the appet. Psychological means are employed to systematize the ideational processes, and through the fostering of other desires to motivate or strengthen food purposes. Persistent weakness of alimentary desires is always a disadvantageous condition, for which adequate relief should be sought. In the training of a child, development of the food desire in adequate directions is one of the points of solicitude in the nursery school.

Excessive food desire is popularly called *gluttony*, although there is no clear differentiation under this term between actual excess of desire, and the over-indulgence of the desire. Excessive desire for drink is sometimes indicative of an abnormal organic condition, the appet being at fault. In characteristic cases, a slightly modified desire for certain drinks, such as alcoholic beverages, may be conspicuous. Such excessive desire is *alcoholism*, etc. Alcoholism, apparently, may be based on tissue conditions due to the previous use of alcohol, but in most cases this is only a minor cause, the maintaining causes being non-satisfaction or perversions of desires other than the desire for drink. Whether the more usual or "normal" desire for alcoholic drinks is a perversion or not depends upon the actual results of drinking, and on the point of view of the critic. It is possible that the collecting mania, with greediness and avarice, are perversions of the alimentary desires. The desire for tobacco smoking has also been looked upon as an alimentary perversion, but this desire may possibly have other origins.

Simple modifications of alimentary desires are numerous and familiar. Foods which do not satisfy come to be satisfactory, and foods once satisfactory become unpalatable. The child apparently has to learn to like every new food, although the habit of taking what his guardians offer is of major assistance in this process. When learning to appreciate types of food distinctly different from those habitually eaten is deferred to adult life, the learning is sometimes relatively difficult. The variety of foods that can be adopted and desired through persistence in the learning process is apparently limited only by the injurious effects, and not always by that. The durian is an excellent illustration of foods which are repugnant to the adult on first introduction to them, but for which a keen desire is nevertheless developed by practice.

The alimentary system is important further in that our feelings of pleasure and "unpleasure" seem in large measure to be fundamentally functions of the alimentary canal and its accessory organs, and our feelings of approval and disapproval (with the extreme of disgust) and combinations of these, such as pathetic feeling, seem entirely dependent on this mechanism. The only externally recognizable signs of pleasure or approval (aside from words, or other conventionally developed signs), are given by the facial muscles surrounding

the mouth, muscles which are primarily developed for the function of seizing food and preparing it for ingestion. Although the muscles surrounding the eyes are popularly supposed to give some indication of pleasure or approval, experiments show that they do not. Laughter, which involves the respiratory mechanism as well as the mouth, is the expression of an emotion of a rather complex sort, not of mere pleasure. Displeasure and disapproval are expressed less clearly by the mouth muscles, but nowhere less. Disgust has a more profound expression, and involves the slight antiperistaltic action of the gullet and stomach, and may go over into actual retching.

Approval, apparently, involves slight swallowing movements, as of food which is accepted. Pathetic feeling, which is analytically a combination or conflict of approval and disapproval, involves the conflict of swallowing with retching which produces a relaxation of the gullet.

While pleasure is obviously dependent upon the alimentary canal, we cannot as yet say that all pleasure is alimentary. This may indeed be the case, but it is difficult to obtain data competent to decide the question. With this reservation, we can say that pleasure, unpleasantness, approval and disapproval, are bound up with the alimentary desire in dependence on the alimentary canal and its immediate accessory organs.

A considerable variety of other feelings are apparently dependent upon functions of the alimentary canal. In certain types of fear, the functions of the stomach, and of the glands of the mouth are affected. In other types of fear, the rectum is affected. Tender feeling is probably in part alimentary. The development of religion is so closely bound up with food considerations and solicitude for food, that it may reasonably be suspected that the "crises" of the feeling complexes involved in religious experiences are alimentary.

2 *Excretory desire*

Excretory desires, like alimentary desires, constitute a group for which there is no single appet. We may well consider that these appet are conditions or processes of the rectum and the urinary organs. These appet exist at times when not organized into desires, and are then popularly described as the "call to defecation" and the "need for urination." Pressure-stimulations of the nerve endings in the wall

of the rectum and of the nerve endings in the walls of the bladder and the walls and muscles of the urethra, are apparently important in producing these "feelings," although it is not yet certain that other stimulations may not be involved. By processes of modification, these desires come to be directed towards any inconvenient, annoying or harmful factors which are conceived as proceeding from our own activities or as being in any other way personal possessions.

Deficiency in the excretory appetit occurs under conditions of bad hygiene, and involve consequently deficiencies in desire. To a certain extent the excretory functions proceed usefully under the stimulation of the appetit alone, but if the ideational factors, and thus the desires, are allowed to disintegrate, the excretory process, especially the rectal, tends to become disordered. Excessive strength of the appetit, and probably excessive desire due to undue brightening of the ideational factor, occurs, but we cannot say that these excessive developments are of any considerable importance, although they are extremely annoying. With regard to perversions of excretory desire we have little information, although over-fastidiousness, whether about sanitary matters or in other affairs, and wastefulness (in so far as it is not mere conscientiousness) and extravagance of some sorts are apparently perversions of this class. The fastidiousness characteristic of women in regard to menstruation, which extends to the mention of or allusion to the process is in part "aerial," in the restricted significance of the term, but it is in large part due to a modification of the ordinary excretory desires, dependent directly on the rectal and urinary organs. It is possible that aversions to contaminations or impurities of a religious sort are modifications of excretory desires. In laughter, as an expression of the comic, the urinary organs are commonly affected, and in sudden merriment, discharge of urine occurs in many persons. The connection between these processes and the phase of the comic which consists in the degradation of some person or some thing in some way is well worth looking into. The associations between the excretory processes and expressions of contempt, scorn, and triumph are prominent in the vulgar idioms and pantomimes of all peoples.

3 *The protective desire*

Organically, the protective desires are dependent upon conditions in the skin, brought about by heat, cold, wet and dry conditions, and

by abrading, and puncturing agents. Primatively, therefore, the desires are directed towards protection from the elements, and from inert or living agents which threaten the integrity of the skin. Animals which bite, claw and crush, insects which bite or sting, thorns and sharp rocks which scratch and puncture, human enemies which by teeth, nails, fist or weapons offer damage to the skin, are examples of such agents. It is to be noted, that such agents are dangerous only if they penetrate or bruise the skin. The effects of climatic conditions are not so conspicuously determined by their action on the skin, but even here, it is the skin and mucous membrane which are first affected by extremes of heat and cold, moisture and dryness.

The protective desire leads to the formation of habits of avoidance and habits of protection. The building of huts and houses, and the earlier seeking of caves and rock shelters are directly due to these desires. Methods of active protection, by clothing, weapons, and organized group activities as in fighting, building of fortifications and lookouts are organized about these desires. The ramifications of these protective devices and protective activities in modern society are very extensive.

The motor expressions of the protective desires involve the skeletal musculature extensively, conspicuously the musculature of arms and legs. One type of expression is withdrawal or shrinking, which in an extreme form involves running away, and which, as a discernible expressive movement of shrinking or cowering, is carried over into some of the remote modifications of protective desire. Another expression is catatonic, marked by immobility.

Deficiencies of protective desires, such as foot-hardness, excesses such as cowardice or "yellowness," and perversions in the form of various phobias (agoraphobia, claustrophobia, etc.) are well recognized, although they have not always been clearly recognized as modifications of protective desire. Some of the aversions which would seem to be direct manifestations of, or perversions of, other desires, such as the aversion to exercise, the aversion to persons of the opposite sex, aversion to certain sorts of foods, etc., are more probably perversions of the protective desire. The aversion to, and avoidance of, poisons and deleterious food substances which are not directly unpleasant, is clearly a modification of the desire for protection. Moral aversions and moral impulses are probably throughout modifi-

cations ■ the protective desire, or habits based on such modifications, as religious aversions and avoidances certainly are. Not without interest in this connection are certain skin phenomena which are conspicuous in "fear," that is, in situations where the life or well-being of the individual are threatened, or where he supposes that they are threatened. Among these are the production of "cold sweat," and "goose-flesh." Shivering, which is the result of cold, or of "fear," is a muscular phenomenon, but produces strong dermal stimulations.

Protective desires are conspicuous in the child in the early years after infancy, but on the average seem to lessen in the later years of childhood and early period of adult life. Both recklessness and courage are characteristic of the youth, and as we pass through middle age to old age we become more cautious, more conservative, more cowardly.

4. *The activity desire*

Desires for motor activity, which are the primary forms of activity desires, are very probably dependent on conditions in the muscles themselves. The aversion to muscular activity (desire for rest or inactivity) is founded on fatigue (a muscular condition), and we may reasonably assume that the positive desire is founded upon muscular conditions reciprocally related to fatigue, although this must remain for the present a matter of hypothesis. These appetites may produce or contribute to the production of activity even when there is no desire, but in the healthy individual, the presence and stimulatory activity of the appet arouses the ideational factor which completes the desire and powerfully contributes to the arousal of activity.

In a primitive state of man, it may be that the activity desire is of little importance. The satisfaction of the other desires calls forth enough activity, we might suppose, to make an activity desire superfluous. Under civilized conditions, however, muscular activity may be, as fact commonly is, insufficiently stimulated by the other desires, or the motor activity is highly specialized, as in the case of the skilled workman. Here, the activity desire is highly important, and promotes activity of various sorts, including play. In the child, for whom, in the optimal cases, food, shelter and protection are adequately provided and in whom the awareness desire has not yet developed, the activity required for him is not sufficient to absorb his available energy, and hence the desire for activity is conspicuous. The young

animal of many species shows play tendencies which would seem to indicate a similar condition.

Modifications of the activity desire are numerous in civilized life, and aside from play, subject activity of various non-muscular sorts. Mental labor of all sorts, including professional labor, is stimulated in part by this desire, which reinforces the modifications of the other desires which lead to labor, and may operate independently of them, as in the case of the man who continues actively in his profession or trade or art, although every other desire is abundantly satisfied without recourse to labor. In general, the activity desire is the reinforcer of all other desires.

Perversions of the activity desire are frequent, although these perversions which lead to the engaging in activities of valueless sorts, or unimical sorts, are most often difficult to distinguish from perversions of various other desires, which in fact they reinforce. Excessive activity desire is frequently found, as is also deficient desire, leading to listlessness and inefficiency in satisfying the other desires, although these desires themselves may be keen. This deficiency of activity desire is not to be confused with excessive desire for rest.

5 *The desire for rest*

The desire for rest, as we have noted above, depends on an appet which may be reasonably identified with fatigue (which is to be distinguished from mere exhaustion and from adaptation against stimuli). Fatigue, apparently, is due to the waste products of muscular action. These waste products are poured into the blood stream, and are probably by oxidation converted into further forms of waste products which are eliminated by the organs of excretion, principally the kidneys. Normally, therefore, fatigue is produced by muscular action, and is removed when the waste products are destroyed. Failure of proper metabolism, however, may cause fatigue all out of proportion to the muscular action. It seems possible that the waste products of the activity of nerve cells are essentially the same as those of muscles, although they may be even more effective as stimuli, hence there may be fatigue from nervous activity, as in mental work, where the muscular activity is but slight. The removal of mental fatigue is apparently assisted by the inducing of muscular fatigue, which most effectively induces the process of disposal of waste products. It is possible,

that among primitive men, mental fatigue was hardly appreciable, since muscular activity was always considerable.

While fatigue is attributable to conditions set up by muscular activity and by nerve activity, we do not know where the receptor terminations which are stimulated by the fatigue products are located. They may be in the muscles themselves, this view seems at present probable, but on the other hand, terminals in connective tissue may be the ones which are involved.

Desire for rest is normally directed towards cessation of muscular activity, and towards muscular relaxation, or towards cessation of the neural activity which may have been the cause of the fatigue, or towards muscular activity which shall assist in the removal of the fatigue substances. In a modified form, the rest desire may become a desire for sleep, which is a condition in which restoration is most effective. The desire for rest is accordingly antagonistic to all other desires, just as the activity desire reinforces other desires.

Modifications of the rest desire probably occur, but are not clearly distinguishable from the diminution or perversion of other desires. Insufficiency of the desire is an unusual condition, and excessive desire is *sluggardly, sloth, and laziness*. It seems probable that some drug habits are founded on perversions of the rest desire, and the alcoholic habit certainly is so founded in some cases.

6 Amatory desire

Amatory or erotic desire, in its basal form, is the desire for stimulation by a person of the opposite sex, or for association with persons of the opposite sex. Popularly, this is often called "sexual desire" since it is, in its normal form, conditioned by sex differences, and heterosexual adaptations. The confused and vague meanings which have been given to the word "sexual," and the necessity of distinguishing amatory desire from parental desire, both of which are frequently confused under the term "sexual," compel us here to avoid "sexual" as a distinguishing term, and employ the less confusing term *amatory*.

The words "sex" and "sexual" are used in popular and pseudopsychological discourse in four distinct senses. (1) To refer to everything which is involved in or dependent upon the division of the species into two sexes. This is the proper use of the term. (2) In a

narrower sense, to designate everything which has to do directly with reproduction. *Reproductive* should be the term employed here instead of "sexual." (3) To refer to the specific "sex organs," i. e., the organs which are most nearly specialized to the functions of coitus, or sexual union and reproduction. These organs are technically the *genitals* or *genitalia*, and the proper adjective is *genital*. (4) As equivalent to "erotic" or "amorous." Neither reproductive nor genital processes are necessarily involved either in erotic processes or erotic responses. The definite relations of amorous desire to amorous feelings and activities makes it necessary that we should digress somewhat to discuss and further differentiate the sexual from the reproductive, and the amorous and the genital from the merely sexual.

(1) In the broad sense, everything connected with human life (we may leave the lower animals out of the present consideration) is, of course, sexual. Every human being is either of the male sex or the female sex, except for the relatively few euters. Every human activity is the activity of males or females or both, and therefore literally sexual. Every object of human interest is in the same sense sexual; that is, it is the object of interest for a person who has sex. When we have admitted this however, we have admitted nothing but the definitional classification of individuals into two sexes. We have said nothing about reproductive processes, genital processes, or amorous processes. To go over at once to the assumption that everything in human life is genital or amorous is merely to proceed by illicit or non-Aristotelian inference through using the same term to mean different things. Unfortunately, such illicit inference is by no means rare, even in text-books whose authors might be expected, because of their official positions, to know better. For example, one author says: "To love a baby is to fondle it, or at least to assume the attitude of fondling it in a lover-like fashion. This is an abridgement of the complete set of responses which afford the full emotions of sexual love." This statement is of course sheer nonsense. Passing over the misstatement that love (which is a sentiment, involving the whole gamut of emotions, not a single emotion) is manifested merely in fondling the baby, the only "sexual" feature of the fondling is the fact that the fondler belongs to one of the sexes, and that baby also is either male or female. In the same sense, your indignation at the neighbor's boy who throws a dead cat into your yard is "sexual indignation," prob-

ably "abridged." What the author obviously wishes the reader to accept, however, is the assumption that either genital or erotic processes of the adult are involved in the feeding of the baby. When explicitly stated, however, this assumption is rejected by the reader, pending proof which is not forthcoming. Many other important sounding statements in the literature would collapse at once if the authors were compelled to use "sexual" only in sense 1, above, and to use the proper terms for 2, 3 and 4.

(2) *Reproduction*. In general, reproduction is the fertilization of the ovum and the gestation and birth of the child. Normally, this fertilization is the result of coitus, or "sexual union."² For clearness' sake, we should not call this the "reproductive act," unless it is both engaged in for purposes of reproduction, and results in fertilization. If only the first condition is present, we might speak of a "reproduction attempt." It is no secret, however, that coitus, as is the vast majority of cases today, neither engaged in for reproductive purposes nor is productive of fertilization.

(3) *Genital processes*. When we speak of the "sex organs," the term "sex" is combined with another term which makes the meaning strictly specific. In the broad verbal sense, every organ of the animal body is a "sex organ," but fortunately, we have not yet used the term in any but the narrow specific sense. The term *genitalia*, although equally broad in verbal significance, is, in actual use, exactly synonymous with "sex organs." We may use the adjective "genital" as mainly referring to the genitalia.

Genital stimulation, and genital response of the male are of course essentially involved in sexual union and coitus, and in amorous feeling and amorous behavior of both sexes in certain other cases. But in other types of amorous response, genital process may be lack-

² For convenience, the term "sexual union" is employed to designate the anatomical connection of male and female, whether or not the orgasm occurs in either. "Coitus" is the appropriate term for sexual union when the orgasm occurs in the male at least. Fertilization occurs frequently as a result of coitus in which there is neither orgasm, nor genital stimulation, nor any erotic process on the part of the woman; it may result from mere sexual union, (i.e., without orgasm) in either male or female, and it may even occur without actual union, if the male sexual secretions come in contact with the genitalia of the female. Further, "artificial insemination," that is, the instrumental introduction of the spermatozoa into the genital passages of the female, has been extensively practiced during the past century.

ing. This is a fact which some of our wilder theorists have deliberately overlooked. On the other hand, both genital stimulation and genital response may occur when no amorous process is aroused at all. This is a fact of extreme importance for the various problems of individual development and social adaptation which involve amorous feeling and behavior, and especially important for those adaptations which are involved in the adequate reproduction of the species. In order to analyze this factor one of the vital situations, and to understand it, it is necessary to inquire just what these stimulations and responses are.

Normal genital stimulation is of a narrowly limited type. It is stimulation through contact or pressure, or friction, and these are, in different circumstances, equivalent stimulations addressed apparently to a set of receptors of functionally a single type. Abnormally, other types of stimulation (electrical or chemical), may occur, but are not pertinent to our main problem.

Sensitivity to, or responsiveness to genital stimulation is *genital sensitivity*. This is an important term, and we should be able to use it exactly. It does not mean merely sensitivity of the genitalia, but sensitivity of the genitalia to stimulation of a specifically exciting sort. It is as if there were, in addition to ordinary receptors for touch and pressure, receptors of a different sort. This may not actually be the case, but we may speak in these terms. Certain individuals have sensitivity of the genitalia similar to that of the skin of other parts of the body, but no genital sensitivity. In many women, genital sensitivity develops only through a process of repeated stimulation under favorable amorous circumstances. This seems to be against the literal assumption of special receptors, but is not conclusive in this respect.

Among the effects of genital stimulation is genital response, which is response eventuating in processes in the genital organs. This however is not the only result. Far-reaching effects on the entire organism are the usual result. It is worthy of note, however, that in many circumstances, the general organic results may be produced without any genital response. It is further notable, that the genital response may occur without the general organic results. Moreover, the customary general response to genital stimulation may occur without any genital stimulation, as a result of the general organic processes, and in fact, more often occurs that way than otherwise.

The genital response, in both sexes alike, is of three sorts: glandular,

vascular, and muscular, involving accessory glands, blood vessels, and muscles of the genitalia themselves. There may be increased secretion, often copious, of the primary and accessory genital glands; dilation of special blood vessels causing turgescence or characteristic enlargement of the tissues in which they are contained; and finally, the rhythmic contraction of a complicated group of muscles, which constitutes the orgasm.

Now these genital processes are sexual in the broad sense of the term, if anything is sexual. But in many cases they are not sexual in the sense of being amorous, or in the sense of being reproductive. The vascular response occurs in male infants in the early weeks, sometimes the early days, of life. Undoubtedly the same response occurs in normal female infants, but is less conspicuous. The infant however has not as yet developed anything that can be called "sexual" in the amorous or reproductive sense. The genital mechanism is being developed, and will eventually form a part of the reproductive and the erotic mechanisms. But so the walking, talking, grasping mechanisms are developing, and these too will form parts of the reproductive and the amorous mechanisms when these develop.

These statements apply to the normal child, but of course there may be abnormally developed children. Whether there are any "inborn" tendencies to the pathological development of amorous mechanisms or not cannot be said. But certainly, by definite stimulation, a pathological development may be brought about. Even here, it is not probable that anything which could intelligently be called either erotic or reproductive can be developed until the later years of childhood. What can be precipitated in infancy, and sometimes is precipitated, is a pathological development of the genital mechanism. This is not intelligently described as the "sex mechanism."

(4) Amatory processes. These may be feelings, desires or responses of other sorts. In a "primitive" society, perhaps the amatory processes were always involved in or led to sexual union. But we are not primitive, and it would be garbling the facts if we should assume that amatory acts in general always have this end, either in thought or actual result. A vast amount of amatory discontent and amatory behavior today is not related to coitus either in thought or result, although in other cases the same type of amatory feeling or amatory behavior may lead to coitus.

A single instance will suffice for illustration. Dancing of a certain conventional type is distinctly an amatory process. It may lead to sexual union. In fact, these types of dancing were originally related to sexual union both in purpose and in result. This has been significantly the case where the dancers are exclusively female, and the spectators male. The dancing has the effect not only of arousing the appetite of the male, but also of carrying the female actually through the phases of excitation necessary for her participation in the act of coitus. This is, however, not generally the case in paired dancing, although even in the most conventional waltzing it may occur. Rather, in the majority of cases, the amatory results of modern dancing are in the opposite direction. Mixed dancing is sexual, of course, the partners are of opposite sex. But it is not necessarily reproductive. It may not even be amorous. Many a man dances with a woman who is repulsive to him, and *vice versa*. Where it is amorous, it does not necessarily involve either ideas of or tendencies towards sexual union. It is based on mechanisms, and fundamental responses which under other conditions do have more practical relation to union, and this relation is important. The distinction, however, is even more important, because less obvious.¹

Amatory desire has so many variant forms, that it is impossible to pick out any one and say "This is the basic form, the other amatory desires are modifications of this." From one point of view, the most fundamental form is that which, in later discussions, we shall designate as *specific*, namely the desire for coitus. This desire, as we shall see, has its particularized and its non-particularized forms, and it is impossible to characterize either of these as more fundamental than the other. Moreover, the development of amatory desire in the individual, beginning in the earliest years, does not proceed from either of these, but attains to these through other forms.

¹ A somewhat analogous situation occurs in border or trade as related to fighting. Trade sometimes leads to combat. In fact, it often does. Both, too, are based on the same human mechanism. It would, however, be absurd to attempt to evaluate or explain peaceful border as forms of fighting. The practical points to be considered are whether trade or custom sorts *down* or does not involve ideas of fighting, or does or does not result in fighting. Just so in the domain of sex, the actual relation of different process is enormously important, and their determination is made impossible if the factors we wish to relate are initially confused.

The various forms of amatory desire are distinctly different in their intentional features. We class them together, and consider them as fundamentally related, but not merely because they are, in the more basal cases, desires which involve persons of the opposite sex, that is, are "sexual." This would in itself be no ground for a useful classification, since many sexual features would not be classed together for any psychological purpose. The real reason for our classification of various desires together as amatory is that they involve the same appet, or at least appetis which are organically closely related.

Let us consider the ranges of amatory desire. There is of course the desire for sexual union with a particular person. There is the desire for sexual union without definite thought of a particular person. There are the desires for stimulation from a particular person, or a non-particularized person, of the opposite sex. This desire may not involve, and in a vast number of cases does not involve any thought of coitus. These non-specific desires are further of various types. There are tactual desires, desires to touch or be touched. There are muscular desires, desires to press, to hold, to enucleate, and to kiss. There are visual desires and auditory desires. There are also olfactory desires. Any of these may occur with no feature of the others, although frequently they are combined. These desires, also, may be particularized or they may not be, that is, they may be desires directed towards a particular person of the opposite sex, or they may be desires towards any representative member of the sex, or towards a member of a particular class included in the sex.

For purposes of economy of discussion and reference, the various forms of "normal" amatory desire, that is, desire dependent upon a person of the opposite sex, may be classified as below, and perverted desires may readily be subsumed under the same classification.

A Generalized amatory desire. Desire for stimulation by, association with, or activity towards an individual of the opposite sex, where the fact of sex difference is an important element in, or determinant of the desire, but where the desire extends to an indefinite number of individuals of the other sex in a more or less equivalent way.

B Particularized amatory desire. Amatory desire which is directed towards, and is to be satisfied by, a particular individual.

a Personalized amatory desire. Amatory desire which is directed towards an individual or individuals as a person or persons. That is

to say, the desire is directed towards no single aspect or function but to the individual as a total.

b. Specific amatory desire, or copulative desire. Desire for coitus specifically with an individual or individuals of the opposite sex.

In addition to these types, there are non-personalized desires, which are not specifically copulatory. These are desires for limited aspects or expressions of the individual, such as visual, tactile, or the sound of the voice. In normal cases, these non-personalized desires are merely transient phases in what is in its more important phases a personalized desire. In pathological cases, they are fetichisms, or substitutes for specific desire.

These classifications are relatively, not absolutely, independent. Generalized desire may be either personal or specific, and particularized desire may have either the personal or the specific form.

Both generalized and particularized desire may have either the personalized or specific form. It is to be understood, of course, that the categories represent extremes, and between the extremes of any pairs there are intermediate conditions. Furthermore, the coexistence in the same person of contradictory patterns is to be admitted.

Upon what organic features, what process or condition of what tissues, or organs can these diverse desires be founded? We do not know. An easy assumption, determined by the confusion in the loose use of the word "sex," is that the essential organic process or conditions are in the sex-organs. In genital excitement, the genitalia of both sexes become *immensely* engorged with blood. This, in fact is usually the only definite indication of genital excitement. The variability of engorgement is conspicuous. It suggests that any "mental" effect of genital excitement is due to these changes. Then by confusing amorous processes with genital excitement as so defined, it is easy to conclude that the basis of amorous desire is to be found in this local process, or in some process or condition associated with it. Several popular and pseudo-scientific discussions of the psychology of sex have been based on this assumption.

We have definite evidence, however, that this particular assumption is false. Amatory desire, and amatory procedure, at times produce vascular changes in the sex organs. In other cases, however, no such changes are evident, and cannot be assumed to be present. From

more specific observations we are certain that while amorous procedures and amorous desires may give rise to definite changes in the sex organs, neither amorous desire nor amorous procedure is based upon them. Local changes may occasion amorous desire, it is true, so may any stimulation whatever, in particular cases. Even when the amorous desire is brought into action by association with local sex-organ conditions, these conditions are not the basis of the desire, and they are not essential.

The best guess we can make at present as to the organic basis for amatory desire is that it is dependent on changes in the circulatory mechanism, changes, that is, somewhere in the system which includes the heart, arteries and veins. In what particular part of this intricate system the appet is to be found, is something we are unable to decide. Popular psychology, crystallized in the mother tongue, considers amatory desire a matter of the heart, we cannot, however, localize so definitely. The cardio-vascular disturbance tends of course to involve the sex organs, and if amatory stimulation is prolonged, it characteristically produces the vascular changes in the genitals which we have noted above. The most intense and prolonged amatory desire, even in its specific form, may occur, however, with no vascular change in the sex organs. Manifestly, the essential vascular changes are elsewhere.

Deficiency of amatory desire is frequent in women, and may occur in men. More often, the deficiency in women is in some particular form of the desire, although in other cases it may be comprehensive. Many women, for example, desire cooing but do not desire union. Thus *frigidity*, as it is called, is often associated with lack of local sensitivity of the genitals, and with lack of development of the reflex muscular functions of these organs. There is no doubt of the importance of the physiological development of the sex organs for the complete development of amorous desire. There are puzzling cases, however, in which it may be suspected that the causal relation is the reverse, and that the failure of development of local sensory and motor function are due to failure of complete development of amatory desire. Frigidity is a factor of disturbing importance in family relations. There have been numerous theoretical solutions of the problems involved, but it may reasonably be suspected that these theories are all based on lack of acquaintance with the full range of facts.

Aside from frigidity, variations in the strength of amatory desire are of frequent occurrence and are wide in range. In some cases, the desires cover the whole amatory gamut but are throughout weak. In other cases, there may be conditions which are the reverse of the common type of frigidity, in that they involve strong specific desire, but little general desire.

Excessive desire in the male is technically called *satyriasis*, and in the female, *nymphomania*. These terms, however, imply pathological conditions, and hence are unsatisfactory for general application. There are many women, for example, in whom the strength, (both intensity and frequency), of amatory desire is so great that their condition is hardly comprehensible to less amorous women. Yet these individuals are normal in every other respect, being often supernormal in mental and physical abilities. We cannot even rate them as abnormal in the amatory respect, except in the lateral sense of abnormal, namely, deviating from the average.

There is a strong suspicion, among those who deal with erotic and reproductive problems, that strength of amatory desire is on the whole a mark of mental superiority. There are, of course, sharp exceptions, but it is believed that the correlation between strength of these desires and general mental ability will be found to be high. Feeble-minded persons, contrary to the popular supposition, are not usually individuals of strong amatory desire, although they are lacking in inhibition of sex activity.

Amatory perversions are unfortunately prevalent. Under this heading we should perhaps include salacity and obscenity, and the opposite features of phobias and squeamishness, both genital and reproductive, because all such topics have at least an associative relation to amatory desire and amatory response. While propriety in such matters is to be commended, because there is a time and a place for all things, extreme avoidance of genital and reproductive matters, and the tendency to be shocked or embarrassed by reference to such, is undoubtedly founded on an amatory perversion from which possibly the majority of people suffer. In all attitudes towards genital and reproductive topics, we are somewhat more reasonable, or "normal," in these days than we were twenty-five years ago. This improvement is not due to the spread of the Freudian interest in "sex," but to progress which was well under way before the Freudian misfor-

tune descended upon America, and the improvement has been hindered rather than helped by Freudianism.

Among the most serious perversions of amatory desire are *autoeroticism* (manifested in masturbation), *homosexuality*; and *fetichism*. Masturbation is the stimulation of an individual's genital processes by himself. It does not involve, necessarily, the carrying of the genital motor processes to completion, although this is the usual course, but it does include the production or evocation of the sex organs, although not necessarily through their direct stimulation.

Homosexuality is the amorous desire for a person of the same sex, and the amorous and genital stimulation of a person of the same sex. Fetichism is manifested through an abnormal interest in some object associated with persons of the other sex, and the desire for stimulation by these objects. It may result in genital excitement, and in the extreme cases, the individual can attain to genital excitement only through such means. For example, some men are abnormally interested in women's shoes, or women's lingerie, and are genitally excited only by viewing or handling such objects. Obviously, there is no clear line between this perversion and the common and normal interest in whatever is directly associated with an object of amorous desire. The term "fetichism," accordingly may well be restricted to the cases in which the modification of desire has reached such a stage that the more usual or "normal" processes of desire and stimulation are interfered with.

Sadism is a term much misused in popular and pseudo-scientific discourse at present. Strictly, it designates the tendency to injure or hurt the person who is the object of the sadist's specific amatory desire. In mild forms, it signifies verbal abuse, or in actions which injure the feelings. In more extreme forms it goes to beating, mutilation and murder. Obviously, such perverted procedure is based on a perversion of the amatory desire. Mere cruelty, or the tendency to be cruel, not directly connected with amatory desire or satisfaction is not properly called sadism.

Masochism is the desire to be hurt, or made to suffer in some way, by the person who may be the object of the amatory desire of the masochist. In basic cases, the masochist requires to be whipped, struck, or insulted in order that he may become genitally excited.

Here again, there are no sharp lines between the tendencies of per-

lently normal people and the perversions of the sadist and the masochist. "Cave-man tactics" are valued by many normal women, even when these tactics involve a surprising amount of roughness. A similar tendency on the part of the male is less common, but frequently occurs in minor details. These normal people are not however to be described as "sadists" and "masochists," because the injuries are incidental, and are not accompanied by perverse emotional attitudes. Where hurts or injuries are serious in their effects, and are not accidental, sadism or masochism may be suspected, but the mere infliction of bodily injury in amorous activity is not proof of perversion.

Autoeroticism and homosexuality are much misunderstood, and their importance demands some further explanation. Masturbation is almost always a result of genital acrobidity and amatory desire which have no normal outlets. Such normal outlets through amorous and genital processes is by no means necessary for the mental and physical well being of the individual, but the absence of the outlet gives room for and encouragement to the development of the perversion. As regards the results of the practice, there have been two extreme opinions. One is that it is seriously damaging, and to be held in great abhorrence. This is wrong, in part. The other opinion is that it is entirely harmless and even commendable. This is also erroneous. The valid point of view lies between these extremes.

The majority of boys, and a smaller percentage of girls engage in masturbation at some period. In most cases it does no great harm. There is no point in being shocked or alarmed by it. On the other hand, there are serious physical effects if the practice is begun in early childhood, or if continued into late youth or adult life.

The physiological effects of masturbation in the male include an acceleration of the motor part of the genital process, an acceleration which lies at the basis of marital maladjustment in a vast number of cases of married pairs. This abnormal condition of the male prevents the female from obtaining satisfaction in sexual intercourse, and often develops in her frigidity, repugnance to coitus, and in some cases a definitely neurotic condition. Even where the situation is not extreme, it is a basis for instability in married life and family disharmony, and is a frequent predisposition to adultery. Some forms of masturbation, again, produce pathological changes in the motor processes of the male which may be a permanent damage. That there are

possible effects of an adverse sort on the functioning of the prostate gland of the male has been alleged, but it is not completely demonstrated.

The physiological effects of masturbation on the female are uncertain. The conditions are quite different from those in the male and the evidence for effects which are apt to be permanent or persistent are not conclusive. We really know very little about this side of the problem, and urgently need more definite information.

The effects of autoerotism on the social adaptations of both sexes are undoubted. The normal psychological conditions of erotic excitement are perverted in autoerotism. The attention, which, in any erotic circumstance, should be strongly directed towards another person, is turned inward upon the autoerotic individual himself. Not only is the future amatory adaptation in marital relations prejudiced, but the present social adaptations, especially to persons of the other sex, are interfered with, and the individuals' social development may be seriously retarded.

These prejudicial effects are minor and transitory in the majority of cases. In many cases, however, they become major and permanent. There is especial danger where autoerotism is continued through the later period of youth, and if continued into adult life, there is no doubt of the evil effects.

The young person should be brought to look upon masturbation not as a sin or form of immorality, or as something shocking or disgusting. He should be brought to view it as a procedure which is a perversion of the normal sex behavior, founded on a perversion of sex desire, which may not have produced serious effects, but which has that distinct potentiality. It is seen then as a habit which should be broken as soon as possible, in order that needless risks may not be assumed. For the breaking of the habit safely and without disturbing emotional upsets, the youth may need to seek the assistance of an expert psychologist. The assistance of a person who does not thoroughly understand the situation and the technique of unlearning the habit is of little use, and in many cases is a further misfortune.

Homosexuality is a matter, unfortunately, in regard to which many young persons are seriously ignorant or confused. Still worse, many self-appointed advisers of youth, and some official advisers, seem grossly ignorant of the conditions concerning which they advise.

The word "homosexual" might be literally but loosely interpreted to mean pertaining to any relation or combination of members of the same sex. In this sense, when two men are talking together it is a homosexual conversation. If a group of women take luncheon together, it is a homosexual luncheon. Technically and correctly, however, the term has a meaning which is quite different from the literal one. It designates amatory desire and amatory procedure directed towards a member of the same sex. It should never be understood or employed in any other than this strict significance.

Unfortunately, confused thinkers employ the term in both the loose literal sense, and in the proper technical sense. Pointing out the wide range of social relationships between persons of the same sex which do not involve the amatory factor, and emphasizing the normality and value of such associations, they describe them as "homosexual." "Homosexual relations" and "homosexual practices," they then generalize, are normal and valuable. Using the term later in the proper sense, to designate amatory relationships, they then conclude that these homosexual relationships and practices are normal and to be approved. This of course is flagrant illicit or non-Aristotelian inference. Players who are themselves homosexually perverted use this same line of argument to justify their own practices.

We must be precise. For the general class of relations, practices and social activities between or involving persons of the same sex we may have no technical term, but they are sharply to be distinguishable from really amatory relations. The specific class of amatory processes to which we apply the term "homosexual" are not normal, nor harmless. They are unmistakably perverted, and constitute one of the gravest social menaces with which we have to deal today.

Individuals may indulge in homosexual acts sporadically with no apparent harm. In the majority of cases, however, the harm is apparent. Where homosexual acts are repeated regularly the habit becomes quickly confirmed, and the amatory desire becomes perverted. In the adolescent period in especial, homosexual perversions are readily established. The results are serious. Rarely does a man or woman who has had even brief homosexual training in youth make a successful adaptation in marriage, although many marry. Normal marital relations are not satisfactory to the homosexual,⁴ and fre-

⁴ There are of course striking exceptions to this rule, but the condition seems so nearly general that the formulation may be allowed to stand.

quently the homosexual is incapable of normal coitus. Aside from this, even if his perversion is not known to his associates, the homosexual is prevented from forming normal social relations either with persons of the same sex or the opposite sex. As the perversion becomes more firmly entrenched, concealment becomes more difficult, and the individual displays his amatory interest in members of his own sex more openly.

Many homosexuals abandon the attempt to maintain normal social relationships, and join social groups formed exclusively of homosexuals of their own sex. These pervers are the least dangerous to society, since their lives appear at once as pathological, and their situation as a misfortune into which the normal person sees no attraction. The homosexuals who succeed for a time in concealing their perversion are a more serious danger. Young people are brought into contact with these concealed homosexuals in schools, colleges, business houses, school administrative systems, and religious groups. The homosexual is in most cases a persistent seducer of youth, and many youths, girls particularly, become enamored in their teens before they fully understand what it is all about.

Young persons who have been seduced, become active centers of infection of other youths. This occurs more commonly in the adolescent period, and sometimes whole boys' schools become infected, practically every boy in the school becoming homosexually perverted. In girls' schools, the infection usually spreads slower, and the infected groups are usually smaller units, as girls are more apt to be secretive about such matters, and the homosexual group very cautious about inducting new members.

In colleges, the groups are usually small and carefully concealed, and the spread of infection slight, unless a member of the faculty is a member of the group. In business houses and religious groups the infection spreads generally from homosexuals in positions of authority to those subordinate to them. There are however innumerable other conditions under which training in the perversion is administered.

The expert in dealing with cases of these sorts can usually detect the confirmed homosexual prior to any open scandal. To detect those who are relatively novices in the perversion is more difficult, as the forms of abnormal social behavior resulting from homosexuality may be very similar, in the beginning, to forms of abnormal behavior due

to other cases. While no general rules can be given by which the layman can pick out the dangerous pervert, and it is perhaps not advisable that such detection should be possible, there are certain points to which every one responsible for the training and guidance of youth should give particular attention. The man who puts his hands on adolescent boys or puts his arms around them, who talks sentimentally or mushily to them, who gazes over them, should be watched. He may be merely a fool, but more often he is homosexual. Similarly, the woman who courts women younger than herself, who sends them flowers, and fondles them, who seeks eagerly the society of particular younger girls, who shows jealousy of them, needs to be held under surveillance. As regards persons who display amorous signs towards persons of their own age, the discrimination is still more difficult. Friendship and chumming are not homosexual. Even where jealousy is evident, there may be no homosexuality, but merely conditions favorable for its development.

Here is one great practical difficulty. Close friendship and comradeship between boys and men of the same age, and between girls and women of the same age, is of great value and to be both approved and encouraged. Yet when amatory desire enters into the situation, the entire situation is changed, and a benign relationship is transformed into a malignant one. Here is the reason why attempts on the part of the public to detect homosexual signs are destructive. Every intelligent young man and young woman should understand the nature of homosexuality, and be able to detect overt advances from homosexual persons. Yet there should be no attempt to critically inspect the friendships and associations of other persons, and decide which are homosexual and which are not. The sufficient rule of conduct is: avoid anything in your own conduct or attitude towards persons of your own sex which is plainly amorous. There is no need to worry about your attitude, if it is amorous you will know it. When advances are made to you which are suspiciously like those an individual would be making normally to a person of the opposite sex, when one of your own sex assumes a possessive, or too protective attitude, or displays jealousy of you, or seeks to put you under needless obligation to him or her, withdraw from the relationship while it can be done without friction. These are the common signs of the homosexual seducer. In particular, to indicate an extreme case which perhaps

hardly needs emphasizing, in any form of "petting" between members of the same sex is a bad procedure, and may be a bad sign. If you must pet, pet some one of the opposite sex, and preferably ■ your own age-group.

The causes of homosexual perversion are of course complex. Enthusiasts for the old falacious concept of heredity have insisted that it is a fatally hereditary tendency. This is true only in the sense that sex is inherited, and any one of normal genital and amorous development may become homosexual under the appropriate conditions. Some theorists hold that engaging in occupations conventionally appropriate to the other sex is an important disposing cause. This may well be doubted. One of the most striking descriptions of the life of woman homosexuals, *The Well of Loneliness*, presents the homosexuality of the central figure in the story as due in part to prenatal influence (which is more nonsense), and in part to her girlhood training as a tomboy. The implication is further developed that the women who volunteered for "men's work" during the war, driving ambulances, etc., were homosexual. All this is absurd. Tomboys are the least apt to become homosexual, and the women who take to outdoor life are in general our most normally female women. A pervert such as is described in the book mentioned could be developed only by training administered by a woman already perverted, such as the nurse who cared for her in her girlhood, and who is actually suggested as a homosexual.

Learning from other homosexuals is the main and almost exclusive cause of homosexuality. In some cases, however, two boys or two girls develop a mutual homosexuality together. A normally developed amorous desire and amorous and genital responsiveness, with conditions repressing normal heterosexual amorous expression is the favorable ground for the development of homosexuality. In fact, such perversion is an almost certain sign that the individual antecedently was sexually normal. Something more is necessary however. This is usually the activity of an already perverted person, but may be the association of two individuals under socially unhygienic conditions. This may begin as too great dependence of the pair on one another. Other forms of social isolation may be the unfortunate factors. Sleeping in the same bed has been disastrous to many such pairs. Although the majority of young men and young women who

have been subjected to the unhygienic institution of the double-bed may pass through it unscathed, it is unjust to subject any young person to it.

The cure of homosexuality is a particularly difficult matter, partly because the perverts become quickly adapted to the pathological condition of life and do not seek assistance to escape, partly because of the social stigma which leads to concealment, and builds up a defensive attitude even on the part of those who make the deprivations to which the perversion subjects them. Where the perverts admit a desire to escape, and seek competent assistance, relief is always possible, being fairly simple and rapid in some cases, but more difficult in others. One thing the homosexual should fully understand is that attempting to engage in normal heterosexual relations before being relieved of the perversion will usually not effect a cure, but makes a bad matter worse.

7 *The parental or philopædic desire*

The parental desires are sometimes described under the name of "reproductive" or "procreative desires." These terms however, are misleading, since they refer to processes through which fertilisation occurs and a new individual is generated. Desires for procreation do occur, but they appear to be imminent desires of secondary sort, determined by more fundamental or ultimate desires. Amatory desire may involve the desire of fertilisation and conception, but it may also on the contrary involve thoughts of the prevention of such results, and more frequently has no reference to generation whatever. Amatory responses may directly lead to impregnation and conception, but the amatory desire is within the source of the procreative desire.

Primary and secondary desires covering a wide range do furnish the basis for reproductive desires in various cases. The most important basis, however, is the desire to possess, that is, to control, dominate, care for, and associate with, children. This desire may also lead to a variety of secondary desires other than the procreative. In certain circumstances, it may determine the desire to adopt children, and has still more important consequences in the desires to act *in loco parentis* to children which are not ones own either genetically or by adoption. The social attitudes of philopædia, of interest in, solicitude for, and protective care of children generally, whether in

one's own control or not, are direct results of the philopædic or parental desire. The term "parental," therefore, since it carries the implication of genetic paternity, is not truly descriptive of these desires, to which the term "philopædic" desire strictly applies. The term "parental" is however in wide usage, and may be employed in understood in this definite sense.

The organic conditions of parental desire are not assignable. They are not genital, i. e., not conditions or processes in the primary sex organs, and they are certainly not determined by the conditions of amatory desire, since parental desire, although acquiring important associations with amatory desire, is seldom derived from it. There may be, however, important physiological associations between the conditions of the two desires. An indication of this might be found in the alleged difference between the paternal and the maternal parental desires, differences which, if real, may be dependent upon general differences in physiological organization of the two sexes, but which may be dependent upon specific differences in primary or secondary anatomical sex characteristics.

The outstanding anatomical characters of the female are the breasts or mammary organs, which are physiologically and psychologically directly connected with the genitals. That they have other psychological functions is not improbable, and the importance of the milk secretion for the primary care of the infant suggests that the mammary glands may be involved in maternal desires. The fact that the infant's food supply is the primary feature in provisions for him, suggests that the conditions of parental desire are otherwise localized in the alimentary canal of both sexes. These assumptions would provide a basis for the alleged differences between paternal and maternal desires, but the whole matter is conjectural.

There is considerable importance in observing the sharp distinction, amounting to almost total separation between the amatory and the philopædic desires. This distinction is important for the understanding of both savage and civilized life, and may have been even more important in the case of primitive man. The amatory desire is conspicuously present in the majority of individuals at various times without the presence of the philopædic desire. It may occur intensely in individuals who are totally devoid of philopædic desires. On the other hand, philopædic desire is strongly developed in some individuals

who throughout life have an amatory desire whatever. ■ many of the lower animals, it seems probable that amatory desire is present in the mating season, and is replaced by philopædic desire after the young are born, or during pregnancy in the female. In the cases of birds and some mammals, both desires seem to be present during the mating season, although many birds show persistence of the amatory desire and engage in copulation, during the winter months, when perhaps the philopædic desires are in abeyance.

In the normal human being, the philopædic desire is present in early childhood, before amatory desires have developed, and may occur in the later part of life after amatory desire has disappeared. In certain periods of adolescence, on the other hand, amatory desires seem to be highly developed, with distinct reduction or even complete temporary loss of the philopædic desire. The absence of amatory desire in adults may be suggestively designated as an "infantilism," the persistence of or the reversion to a condition which is appropriate to the infant or young child but not to the adult. The presence of amatory desire without parental in the adult might correspondingly be designated a "paraadolescent issue" a trait appropriate to adolescence but continued throughout a later period. In spite of the frequent dissociations of genital, amatory, and philopædic functions in individual cases, and the probable time differences in development of these functions in childhood and youth, there are strong suggestions of interconnections. It is suspected that persons whose amatory inclinations towards each other are especially strong, and whose genital processes are strongly developed, have stronger philopædic desires than do those less amorously and genitally developed. On the other hand, amatory frustration and starvation often seems to strengthen philopædic tendencies. The whole matter is more complicated than it seems on the surface, and it may be that the concomitance of amatory and parental feeling is illusory. Certainly, many individuals of high amatory development are apparently subnormal in philopædic feeling and response.

It is sometimes supposed that girls are more prone to develop philopædic response and feelings in early life than are boys. Girls do play with dolls more commonly than do boys. The cases in which girls disdain dolls, preferring more exciting or intriguing toys, and the cases in which boys play with dolls as fully and as enthusiastically as do

girls, lead us to suspect that these particular developments are broadly determined by the environment, physical and social. The actual interest in, and affection for, babies, and the solicitude for their welfare, and the protective behavior, is certainly as early developed in the boy as in the girl. In the post-adolescent stage, in the social attitude of the group does not prevent, the boy usually makes a better nurse than the girl, and the young man is characteristically profoundly interested in babies and children, however much he may dissimulate, while the young woman, prior to bearing her own child, is less so. The fact that babies will go to young men more readily than young women is an index of this, for babies are strongly responsive to the subtle behavior which expresses real interest and affection.

Parental processes are not dependent upon the individual's physiological parentage of the child, although the knowledge of parentage in many cases intervenes the parental feeling, and supports the parental behavior. Adopted children are usually "loved" as profoundly as are personal progeny, and more often than not, the affection determines behavior more favorable to the child's development, than in the cases of personal progeny. The importance of group reference, and susceptibility to conventional opinion, is shown by the fact that the child which only the parents know is adopted has a more favorable situation than the child which every one knows is adopted and by the care with which foster parents guard the secret. Often the secret is guarded from the child, from a fear that the attitudes of others, generally expressed, will react unfavorably on the child's attitude, even if the group are not aware of the particular situation.

In every way, the relative independence of the parental attitude and the physical facts of sexual union and reproduction is demonstrated. Among the lower animals, the situation is much the same, but the separation is not so complete.⁵ Modifications of the philopatric desire are apparent in the interest in dolls in childhood. A familiar

⁵ Parental behavior is much more closely dependent on parental sentiment than it is on parental feeling. Parental feeling, like all feeling, is a matter of immediate self-gratification, motivating to encourage, and other expressions of tenderness, often to the detriment of the child's welfare. The tenderness and the resultant treatment of the child is up to a certain point important. Still more important, however, is the willingness to make sacrifices for the child, which is the measure of the parental love.

perversion is zoophilia: an abnormal interest in and solicitude for animals as substitutes for children. It is not easy to distinguish between zoophilia and a normal modification in this direction, which may concur with a normal non-modified parental desire. Among certain tribes of the Malay peninsula, women make pets of pigs, and nurse them at their breasts during the period when they are nursing their children. Civilized humans also may have a keen interest in animals while maintaining a strong normal philopatric desire. Zoophilia is a perversion only when the modification interferes with the direct manifestation of philopatric desire, or is a substitute for it. In the cases of the women who solitarily care for, and caress dogs, the perversion is evident. It has been asserted that the backbone of the anti vivisectionist movement is furnished by individuals with perverted philopatric desires. These persons are not interested in the prevention of cruel treatment of animals generally, and show no solicitude for most food animals,⁴ and little for fur-bearing animals, the classes which in general receive the most cruel treatment, their interest centers on the cat and the dog, principally the dog. If the physiologists would agree never to experiment on the dog, and to respect property rights in regard to cats, the anti vivisection movement would be dissolved, its object having been accomplished.

3. *The presumptive desire, or desire to be conspicuous*

Very generally, men desire to be preeminent, and the types of preeminence which are desired are of great variety. One man desires preeminence in a small group, another in a large group. Conspicuous positions in the village business or social life, in the local church, the local political organization, in the lodge, are the aims of some, but others aim in preeminence in the nation, the larger church, in national politics. Usually, when a man has succeeded in attaining power and position in the smaller group, his ambition broadens to larger groups, but this is not always the case.

⁴ The domestication of animals occurred as a means to the satisfaction of the food desire. Even the dog was at first reared solely for food, and still is an important food animal among some savage races. The transfer of parental desires and associated interests to domestic animals came much later as a result of domestication.

One man desires preeminence in literature, another in art, another in science, another in crime, and another is satisfied if his picture appears in the paper. One desires to be a leader, to control or influence men, another wishes to be admired or envied, another would be satisfied by being widely condemned or hated. The woman of many "social" engagements, the fastidious dresser, the man who drinks heartily but "holds his liquor", all these seek conspicuousness by different routes. The stage and the cinema have strong attractions for multitudes of young women. Contests of all sorts, athletic or non-athletic, bring out estrays who hope for nothing but public attention and commendation. According to newspaper men, almost every person is eager to have his picture in the paper, and multitudes are daily attempting to get their pictures published on a variety of grounds.

Another expression of the desire for preeminence is the effort to identify one's self with a conspicuous class, even where individual conspicuousness may not be obtainable. One's book may have small effect in itself, but by publishing it, one becomes "an author." In the same way, to be "in society," to be well dressed, to wear the badge of a fraternal society, to march in a parade, may not make one conspicuous as an individual, but it at least puts one in a conspicuous group.

In the nature of the case, satisfaction of the preeminence desire is difficult for the majority of individuals. One result of this difficulty is the apparent suppression of the desire in many individuals. Some, through prolonged failure to satisfy the desire, are finally convinced that satisfaction is impossible for them, and lose the desire itself. Others, equally persistent, keep the desire alive but concealed from the observation of their fellows.

Another result of the difficulty in satisfying the preeminence desire is the progressive substitution of one form of the desire for another. The individual who fails steadily to attain conspicuousness through one line of endeavor, drops this line, and enters another in which the chances of satisfaction seem better.

The assignment of the appet for the preeminence desire can at present be only tentative, but observation of man and the lower animals establishes a plausible basis in the muscle-patterns which practically tend to make the individual conspicuous. The human being, when self-confident, alert, and aggressive in an open way, tends to

erect the body, throw out his chest, and hold up the head.¹ On the other hand, to escape observation, the individual crouches, and when conspicuousness is really unpleasant, tends to assume the attitude of anterior concavity. The crouching of lower animals when seeking obscurity, and the prancing attitude when inviting scrutiny are matters of common observation. The apparent exception in man and animals are the postures when inviting pity, reproach, contempt, or punishment. These occasions may indeed be occasions of seeking pre-eminence, in the human cases, at least, but they offer no great difficulty in the present problem. The desire is undoubtedly not involved in the performance in these cases, but has preceded it, and has predetermined the momentary desires which more directly control the conduct. The desire for pre-eminence is, in such cases, the ultimate motive, or transcendent desire.

In many situations in which desires of various sorts determine conduct, the ultimate motive is the pre-eminence desire. Apparently, almost any of the human desires, even the sensory and food desires, and more obviously the activity, philopatric, and excretory desires, may be motivated by the pre-eminence desire. The desire for rest and protection are possibly exceptions. On the other hand, it does not appear that the pre-eminence desire can be motivated by any desires other than the primary ones. These considerations, in addition to that of the present universality of the desire, are sufficient to refute claims that the desire for pre-eminence does not belong in the list of primary desires. Furthermore, the desire seems to extend ethnologically into the most remote history of the human race, and we are therefore not at all inclined to assume that the desire is merely a perversion of some other desire or desires.

Perversions of the desire for pre-eminence are indeed conspicuous. One peculiar condition is that in the *paranoic*, whose desire has been so modified that it is satisfied through ignoring facts. Desiring pre-eminence, he satisfies his desire by the assumption that he is indeed an illustrious scientist, inventor, writer, or what not, when as a matter of fact he has no such competence. In more pathological forms, the individual is satisfied through the delusion that he is Napoleon, Bismarck, or a fried egg.

¹ The same physiological postures which intensify the aspect of the pre-eminence desire obviously occur without the mental thought-factor constituting desire, in pride, straggling, and other allied emotional states.

In other cases, the dream may be somewhat differently modified. The paranoiac individual realizes that he really has not achieved the preeminence he desires, but achieves satisfaction through the thought that he merits it, but that the preeminence is withheld through popular unintelligence, or through the machinations of particular individuals or groups. From this complex of thoughts that he has merited preeminence but has been prevented from obtaining it, arise the delusions of persecution.

Still different perversions of the desire for preeminence arise through disappointment in seeking notoriety through useful activities, and the consequent substitution of useless ones. The individual then becomes a collector. He has not the normal desire to possess books motivated by desire to read them, but he has the desire to collect them, motivated by the preeminence desire. He may collect anything which will make a showing, either because of its monetary or artistic value, or because of its bizarreness. He may collect cigar bands, or lead pencils or Corcoran, or Ming porcelains, or labels on wine bottles. The list of objects which are actually collected is astounding. This sort of collecting on the part of adults is not to be confused with the collecting habits of boys and sisters, which are based, apparently, on modifications of the food desire.

Where the modification of the preeminence desire leads to the achieving of conspicuousness which is objectionable or annoying to other people, we have still different types, many of which are clearly perversions, and perhaps all of which should be so considered. Among the manifestations of these we list exhibitionism, which is the displaying of the sex-organs in order to attract attention.³ This perversion is more frequent among men, but occurs sometimes in women. Another perversion of this type is manifested by loud talking in public places. In these and other cases, the individual, unable to attract attention by ordinary means, selects the means which will attract attention.

Still other perversions of the preeminence desire are manifested in what are colloquially called frankishness or eccentricity, and flashiness. The individual who cannot obtain public attention by the ordinary

³ While this is sometimes called a "sex-perversion," and perversion of sexual desire is involved in many cases, the motivating desire in every case is undoubtedly the desire of conspicuousness.

lines of respectable endeavor, and who has scruples against exhibitionism, may still succeed, by bizarre behavior, or by striking an unusual costume in occupying the limelight. Devotion to strange cults and striking reforms is sometimes due to the same motive.

9. *The desire of conformity*

Almost every human being desires to belong to a group, to assume the characteristics of the group, and to share in the group consciousness and group sentiments. This is not to be confused with the preeminence to be attained by belonging to a class, although the two desires are often both satisfied through the same alignment. This is the most important of all desires for social organization, since without this desire there would be no social organization above the crowd level, and there would be no leadership.

The primary nature of the conformity desire is indicated by its universality and apparent primeval nature, and by the facts that like the preeminence desire it is an important motivator for a vast number of secondary desires and is apparently not motivated except by other primary desires. The appet cannot be conjectured either as a negation of or as complementary to the preeminence appet, in any complete sense, but it seems probable that whereas the preeminence appet is involved largely in patterns of extensor muscles, the conformity appet is involved in patterns which are more flexor in their makeup. On the other hand, the strength of the one desire in an individual is not necessarily a limitation of the strength of the other in the same individual. This may consist, however, in occurrences of the two desires at different times.

The conformity desire varies in strength in different individuals. Some seem to be so low on the scale as to be weak units in the social structure. Others carry the desire to heights which approach the ridiculous. We are tempted to describe certain types of conformity, such as affectations, as manifestations of perverted desire, but they may equally well be described as merely extreme forms of modification.

14. *Social control and the balance of desires*

The life of a group is determined by the integration of desires of the members of the group. In some groups, the agreement of desires is the paramount factor in promoting group life. This, for example,

is the characteristic of the religious group. However the members may differ in respect to various desires, there is agreement in some desire, which may be a primary desire (such as desire for food) in the case of early religion, or a derivative desire (such as the desire for justice, or for immortality), in the case of modern religion. In other groups, the harmonization of different desires of the various members is more important, the materials and opportunities not being sufficient for full gratification of the various desires of all members. Under the usual social conditions, the members of a political group must regulate their desires, or their satisfaction, in diverse ways. A few expand their elementary desires and enlarge their gratification, while others either repress the desires or gratify them sparingly. Amoruous desires are likewise cultivated and gratified intensively by some, and entirely repressed by others. For the majority of the population, age and class limitations apply.

The stability of a group depends on the preservation of an established balance of desires. If all members of a civic group enlarge and attempt to fully satisfy any of the fundamental desires, chaos results.

More deprivation of satisfaction of desire produces an instability both in the life of the individual and the life of the group. The essential condition is the reduction of the desires to the levels of their possible satisfaction. No exact principles on which this reduction can be accompanied have been developed but certain expedients have been found practicable. Among these, the substitution of desires, and the substitution of objects of desire, are apparently the most effective.

We have seen that the individual who despairs of satisfaction of a desire in a certain objective, such as preeminence in a certain line, may substitute a new objective, and obtain satisfaction for what is essentially the same desire. This substitution of objectives is a universal feature of life, occurring in all desires. There is, however, the possibility of substituting one desire for another, that is, of enlarging and promoting one desire in such a way as to facilitate the repressing or diminishing of another desire.

The substitution of objects in the same desire may be illustrated by the man in love with one woman, and later in love with another woman in the same way. The desire now for strawberries and cream, now for liver and bacon furnishes another illustration. Some changes,

however, are *simultaneous*, as in the case of the boy who desires a bicycle, works and saves for it, and is broadly motivated by the desire in other ways, and later desires a saxophone, and is as strongly motivated by that desire. It is difficult to determine whether this is a substitution of objects, or a change in the desire.

In many cases, however, the rise of one desire at the expense of another is obvious. The desire for activity, or any other desire, may temporarily displace the food desire, and the effects of amorous desire in supplanting other desires in a more permanent way are commonly observed. Preeminence and conformity desires, when they enlarge, are always apt to enlarge certain desires which they can motivate, and depress other desires.

The problem is complicated by the fact that several different transcendent desires may motivate the same immanent desires, and the same activities, conjointly or in succession. The wolf, chasing the rabbit, may be motivated by food, parental, or activity desire. Back of the desire for clothing of a certain type may lie the protection, conformity, preeminence, or amorous desire, or a combination of these. The child begins its school career motivated by activity and conformity desires, later his desire to learn his lesson is secretory (ridicule) and protective, and still later in life, amorous, food, parental, and many other desires furnish motivation for work of the same sort.

A large part of education consists in the tracing of connections, real or alleged, between definite courses of action, and definite results, and thus enchainning motivation. Most proverbs are illustrations of this. If you want to gather moss, you must want not to be a rolling stone. If you want to win a fair lady, you must want whatever will stave off a faint heart. In physics, philosophy, civil government, and wherever cause and effect are treated, we train youths to think of certain things as conditioned by certain others, and thus supply the motivation we think is adequate. The motivation usually called "religious," linking certain courses of action causally with objectives of immortality, or the avoidance of divine wrath, has been an important social stabilizer in the past, the objective being magnified and the belief in causal relation inculcated by educational guidance.

Other ways of regulating the desire of a political group are the promoting of certain primary desires and their satisfaction, in order that there may dwarf other desires which are not so readily satisfied.

In general, it has been accepted as a maxim that if the food desires and amorous desires are well gratified, they may be made so dominant over other desires that the population may be controlled in spite of the lack of materials and opportunities for the satisfaction of other desires. Modifications or perversions of desires (alcoholism, opium addiction, homosexuality) have also been fostered as desires readily capable of satisfaction, and permitting the minimizing of the satisfaction of other desires through the dwindling of the desires themselves.

The interrelations of the several desires of the same individual are obviously such that the pattern of desire is the important consideration. In each individual, one primary desire, (or a small number of desires), dominate the pattern, so that the life of the individual is organized around this desire, and all other desires and their satisfaction are of minor importance. A theory of the proper integration and balance of desire is directly or indirectly the topic of all "moral" instruction and projects for "self-development", but unfortunately, the topic remains largely in the theoretical stage. We are fairly well agreed that the most abundant life is that in which as many desires as possible are abundantly satisfied. When we come to the necessity of repressing one desire, in order to give more scope to another, we have no sound principles of evaluation and selection.

CHAPTER IV

SEX DIFFERENCES

§1. Anatomical and physiological sex characters

THE organization and function of any group will be determined, in part by the characteristics of the individuals making up the group. Human groups are made up of individuals which, with few exceptions, are of two sexes, that is, which fall into the two classes of male and female. Men differ widely among themselves, and women differ widely among themselves, but there are nevertheless important respects in which man, as a class, differs from woman as a class, and these class or sex differences are of high importance for social life. There are also other respects in which it is conjectured that men differ from women, but in which the evidence is not conclusive. In so far as differences can be established, they are directly important, and conjectural differences are points of departure for problems.

Sex differences are minimal in infancy, and increase through childhood to adult life. Certain differences appear early in life, certain others appear later. Certain differences may lessen when old age is reached, certain others do not lessen so long as the organism remains normal. Some of the differences are in anatomy or structure, some are in physiology or detailed bodily function, some are mental, that is, are differences in type of response. The anatomical and physiological differences, however, are important factors in the determination of the mental differences.

There are a few anatomical and physiological characters in respect to which all men differ from all women. These characters are in fact the basis for our classification of human beings as male and female. It is customary to speak of these characters as the *primary characters of sex*, and we speak of differences in respect to them as *primary sex differences*, these two expressions, when unqualified, being always understood as referring to anatomical and physiological characters and differences.

The primary differences between men and women are on the sex

organs. Included in these sex organs are characteristic glands: the pair of ovaries in the female, and the pair of testes in the male. Certain groups of cells in the ovaries produce the eggs, or ova, and certain groups of cells in the testes produce the spermatozoa, whose function is to fertilize the ova. But in both the male and female glands there are other cells (the interstitial cells) which secrete substances called sex hormones directly into the blood stream, and these sex hormones produce far-reaching effects upon the organism.¹ The greater development and lactal function of the female breasts are sometimes classed as primary sex characters, but more usually are included with other differential features of the male and female which are not essential to reproduction, as *secondary sex characters*. We shall consider these secondary characters before discussing the primary characters further.

Secondary sex characters differ for different racial groups and there are no adequate data, on the basis of which we might determine these characters for the human race as a whole. Hence, in discussing secondary characters and differences we must limit our generalizations to particular groups. In what follows, we are concerned with the peoples of Western Europe, and the representatives of their stocks in America, and it would be unusual to extend our conclusions to peoples of Africa, Asia, or the islands, or even to all of the peoples of Eastern Europe. Such extensions could properly be based only on measurements or careful observations on a large scale, and such measurements and observations have been made for relatively few stocks.

In general details of form and structure, the adult human being stands between the human child and the ape, the woman nearer the child than is the man, and therefore farther from the ape. The child has a long body, short limbs, large head and brain, and rounded bodily contour. The ape has a short body, long limbs (especially the fore limbs), small head and brain, and prominent skeletal and muscular development. In the proportions of the main parts of the brain, and the relative sizes of the viscera, the same relation of babe, woman, man, and ape holds to a certain extent. In the external structure of the cranium, between the ridged skull of the ape and the smooth skull of the babe stand the skulls of the adults, the man's more like the ape's.

¹ Because of their discharging their secretions into the blood stream, such glands are called endocrine glands, or glands of internal secretion.

In one important proportion the woman deviates markedly in most races from the man and the baboon and the ape, namely, in the width of the hips. In woman the hips are wide, often wider than the shoulders, but in man, as in the baboon and ape, the hips are relatively narrow. In greater size the buttocks woman is again different from man and the ape, but not so different from the baboon.

The larynx is larger in men than in women, and situated lower in the throat. The vocal cords are larger and thicker and these differences are responsible for the differences in pitch and timbre of the adult male and female voices. The protuberance of the male larynx known as the "Adam's apple" is not developed in the female.

In many minor details the bodily structure women differ from men. The thigh bone is shorter than in men, the proportions of the chest, and of the spinal column are different, the arm is flatter, the index finger is larger, and the thumb shorter, the thigh is greater in diameter and more conical in shape, the pelvis is, of course, larger, the legs slant inward more from hip to knee, many joints are differently formed, and there are various other characteristic differences.

In absolute height and weight, and in size of skull, man surpasses woman in most racial groups. The average height of adult males in the mixed English population is about 67 5 inches, of adult females, about 62 7. On account of the great variety of racial groups in the United States, no representative means are available. Other European groups furnish means showing similar sex differences.

Adult weights are comparable only within the same age groups, but where such groups of the same stocks, in statistically important numbers, have been weighed, the average male weight has been found to exceed the average female weight by about 20 per cent.

The proportion of fat to other tissue is greater in women than in men, in which respect again women resemble baboons more than do men, and resemble apes less. The excess female fat is distributed in the breasts and buttocks, and in the tissue just beneath the skin, and it is the subcutaneous fat which gives the softness and roundness to the female figure.²

In respect to absolute brain weight, men rank higher than women

² On account of the relatively great amount of fat, and consequent lowness of specific gravity, women swim more easily than men, and on account of this fat also, bodies of women are said to burn more readily on funeral pyres.

as might be expected from the larger male skull. The brain measurements so far made have not been numerous enough, or fairly enough selected, to have much statistical value. Obviously, measurements can be made only on such brains as are available in the dissecting room, or which are donated by their erstwhile owners. But it is evident that the adult female brain of European races is somewhere near 10 per cent smaller in weight than the male brain. Various average weights which have been observed for females have ranged from 1200 to 1250 grams, and the corresponding averages for males are from 1350 to 1400 grams. But the average weight of the woman's body is from 15 to 18 per cent less than that of the man's, so that her relative brain weight is actually greater than the man's. Furthermore, when we consider that fat constitutes a greater per cent of the woman's total weight than it does of the man's, we see that the relative brain weight is still more in favor of the woman. For, of course, the function of the brain is to "control" the muscles and glands, and the reserve of fat does not enter into the mechanism directly. In ratio of brain weight to body weight women is again closer than man to the babe, and farther from the ape.

Attempts have been made to show that woman's brain is inferior to man's in depth of convolutions, in number of nerve cells, and in the proportions of the frontal lobes and other portions of the cerebrum, and in the proportions of cerebellum and brain stem to cerebrum. More careful and recent investigations show, however, that there are no discernable sex differences in these respects.

The blood of women has been found to contain more water, and fewer red corpuscles than that of man, in which again she would be nearer the babe than is man. The approximate number of red blood corpuscles has been estimated as 5,000,000 per cubic millimeter in men and 4,500,000 in women. These estimates, however, are not final, and it has been claimed that the blood-count for women varies with the menstrual cycle. No difference in number of white corpuscles has been discovered.

A striking difference between adult men and women is found in the hair. The hair on the man's face tends to grow rapidly, and to become dark and coarse, forming a beard. The same tendency is shown by the male body-hair also, notably on the chest, abdomen, arms, and legs, sometimes forming an ape-like fur over considerable areas. The

face and body-hair of the woman, on the other hand, retains its infantile fineness and unobtrusiveness in the great majority of cases. The pubic hair on the woman, however, is characteristically more luxuriant than that of the man.

With regard to the hair on the scalp, there is some doubt. It has been maintained that the cranial hair does not on the average grow as fast or attain as great length in the male as in the female, but this has not been adequately demonstrated. Women are apparently not as subject to baldness as are men, although the number of women who conceal baldness under wigs is not inconsiderable. It is now suspected that such sex-differences in cranial hair as occur may be due to differences in the hormones of the sex-glands.

It has been maintained that women see fairer of skin than men of the same race, but it is not certain that such is the case when both are equally exposed to the weather. The more uncertainty applies to the observation that the hair of women is darker than that of men, since the sun demonstrably bleaches hair. There is more reliable evidence that the eyes of women are darker than those of men of the same race, but this cannot be said to be an established fact.

The thyroid gland is not only relatively but also absolutely larger in women than in men, and diseases of the gland are far more common among girls and women than among boys and men. This gland is closely associated with genital functions. Concerning the other glands, the information available indicates that the stomach and kidneys are relatively larger in women, and possibly the liver also, these again being infantile characteristics. The bladder also is larger, or rather more distensible, but in this respect women is farther from the infant than is man, for the infantile bladder is relatively small.

Among the functional or physiological characteristics of women as compared with men, the menstrual cycle is most conspicuous. The average duration of the cycle varies from two weeks in some individuals to as much as eight weeks in others, but in the majority, it approximates to a lunar month. Hence the term "menstrual," and hence also the identification of the changing moon as the virgin goddess. In few women, however, is the cycle exactly uniform, and some women never menstruate, although healthy and bearing children. The menstrual cycle is not a mere recurrent episode, but involves, in many women at least, a complicated series of changes in vascular and

motor functions, involving very serious emotional modifications, which extend throughout the month. ■ soon, certain observers have thought that cyclic changes occur, but these observations have not as yet been generally accepted, and there is reasonable doubt that a male periodicity similar to the menstrual cycle exists.

The female adult heart beats faster than the male, approximately 3 to 10 beats per minute faster under the same conditions.

Among civilized races, men are muscularly stronger than women, both absolutely and in relation to body-weight, and have greater physical endurance than women. This is apparently not the case among primitive races, although we have not very reliable evidence concerning them. The weakness and rapid fatigability of civilized women may be due to their environment, training, and methods of life. At any rate, it is interesting to note that year by year, as girls and young women go in more and more for athletics, sports, and outdoor life, the track, field, and strength test records for women approach nearer and nearer to those for men. Laboratory records will probably show that the resistance to fatigue of these harder women approaches male standards. No one can say confidently that in a few years women will not measure up to male standards in resistance and in strength-weight ratio.³

The secondary characteristics of sex are not present in early infancy, but begin to develop just before, or during puberty, which occurs normally between the ages of ten and sixteen. Puberty is the functional development of the primary sexual characters, especially of the ovaries and the testes, and the development of those glands exercises a powerful influence upon the development of the secondary sex characters. ■ the testes are congenitally absent in the male, or if he is castrated in infancy, many of the male secondary characters do not develop at all. The voice does not "change," but becomes feminine, and the beard does not grow, the body develops in form somewhat (but not greatly) like that of the female, and acquires the feminine superfluous layer of fat. Many observations have been made on *munches* (i. e., males who have been castrated) so that we have a considerable degree of certainty on these points.

We have no direct data on the effects of *ovariectomy* (removal of the ovaries) from female infants, but judging from experiments which

³ Subject to variations during the menstrual cycle.

have been conducted on animals, and from the effects of ovarian degeneracy, one may safely conclude that such removal would have little effect on female structural development, although it might have a profound effect on functions. Where the ovaries have been removed from adults, menstruation ceases, and the general cyclic changes connected with the menstrual phases are also abolished. Castration or ovariectomy of the adult does not uniformly abolish amorous desire or genital sensitivity, but this desire and sensitivity do not develop in the eunuch castrated in infancy, and probably would not develop in the female if ovariectomy were performed in infancy.

Experimental castration and ovariectomy have been performed on many animals, and such experiments are adding to our knowledge of human sexual development. The most striking experiments have been the transplanting of ovaries to the castrated male, and testes to the ovariectomized female. In such cases, the animals take on many of the anatomical characteristics of the other sex, and some of the important psychological characteristics.

Pubertal development in the female is considered to be complete when the menstrual flow first appears, but the girl at this time has not reached full development either anatomically or physiologically. Many of the characteristic body changes, such as the broadening of the hips, the full development of pubic hair, and the development of the breasts, are not completed for some years after the first menstruation. Full stature and strength are, of course, attained still later, and full emotional and intellectual maturity is probably not reached until about the age of twenty-five. The chief significance of the first menstruation is that ovulation (the ripening of an egg) has occurred, which means, of course, that the girl has become able to conceive. It is by no means certain that eggs are not produced a number of months before menstruation appears in some cases, especially those in which monthly nose bleeding has preceded the first menstruation. Cyclic changes in blood pressure similar to those of the menstrual cycle in women have been detected in girls prior to the first menstruation.

In the case of the boy, there have not been demonstrated symptoms of the development of mature spermatozoa comparable to the girl's menstruation, hence, it is very difficult to compare these phases of maturity in the two sexes. It is popularly believed, and taught by many texts, that girls as a rule "mature" earlier than boys, but the

significance of such statements is as yet conjectural. Even if it is true that as a rule, mature ova in the female appear at an earlier age than that at which mature spermatozoa appear in the male (and we do not yet know this to be true), the fact means little. "Maturity," or the more limited "sexual maturity," is a complex matter of which we know little. Girls may "mature" in some details earlier than boys, and boys may "mature" in some details earlier than girls. Emotionally, it is possible that men mature earlier than women, but even of this we cannot be certain as yet.

The physical growth of boys does not keep pace with that of girls. Although male infants are on the average larger and heavier than girls, girls exceed boys in absolute stature and weight during the pubertal period, and are again exceeded by boys from sixteen on. In relation to the norms for the adults of both sexes, however, females are taller and heavier than males during both infancy and the pubertal period. Adult stature is attained by females at about twenty, by males at about twenty-three. The decrease in weight, however, is said to continue until the age of forty in men, and fifty in women, although this difference may be due to accumulation of fat by the woman between forty and fifty.

It has been very commonly supposed that males are more vulnerable to diseases than women, but this now seems to be doubtful, although it has been claimed that women recover from injuries, wounds, and surgical operations better than men do. The formerly assumed greater variability of males in respect to stature, form, and other anatomical and physiological characteristics, is no longer accepted.⁴

§2. Mental sex characters

Because the mind is a function of the organism, we might reasonably expect to find that men and women should show mental differences, since they show such well marked organic differences. Certain im-

⁴ Variability depends on age levels. On account of the irregular development of various characteristics, we may expect to find that at a certain age girls will be more variable than boys in a certain respect, and at an earlier or later age the reverse may be true. In respect to any characteristic, the greatest variability will occur during the period in which the most rapid changes in that characteristic are taking place.

portant mental differences we do indeed find: differences in amatory desire, amatory interest, and genital sensitivity, which may well be called *primary psychological characters*. There are undoubtedly also important secondary mental characters, but we must admit that at present we know little about them, and we must look with great suspicion on the extensive mass of allegations in popular literature concerning the secondary mental differences of sex. We shall discuss the putative secondary differences first.

In surveying mental functions it is useful to distinguish between *capacities* and *performances*. High capacity for discriminative judgment, for example, does not necessarily imply that the individual will use this capacity with a high degree of efficiency. Emotional tendencies, desires, and general integrative tendencies, as well as environmental conditions, cooperate to determine the actual performance. Especially in the field of specific mental functions must we avoid the easy confusion of capacity and performance. Moreover, since tests measure performance only, the evaluation of capacities is a very difficult matter.

In attempting to evaluate mental capacities it is useful to distinguish (a) sensory capacities, (b) intellectual capacities, (c) capacities for sensory and intellectual discriminations, (d) capacities for learning, (e) capacities for recall, (f) affective (feeling and emotional) capacities and tendencies, (g) capacity for accuracy of reaction, (h) capacity for speed of reaction, (i) capacities and tendencies of desire, and (j), general integrative tendencies. These divisions are not strictly coordinate, and they overlap somewhat, but they are practically justifiable.

In respect to sensory capacity, few sex differences have been made out. The probability is established by the fragmentary experimental work so far done, that, except for "pain," male sensitivity is slightly higher on the average than female sensitivity. These findings are complicated by the fact that in smell, taste, and sight, sensitivity differs individually according to the quality of the stimulus, and perhaps there are sex differences in this respect. It is probable that for certain odors and certain tastes, the males are more sensitive, and for certain others, the females, but this has not been made out with certainty.

There are apparently more "color blind"¹ and "color defective" males than females. Aside from color blindness, men are in general more color sensitive, although it seems possible, in view of recent tests, that women average lower in sensitivity to blue, and men in sensitivity to red. Such an indication appears, for example, in the cases of men to whom a very dark red appears black, and the cases of women when a very dark blue appears black. Color deficiency and color blindness are not entirely a matter of sensitivity, for some of the individuals who are most defective in discrimination of colors, are at the same time exceptionally sensitive to the stimulus.

Blindness (other than color blindness which is not really "blindness" at all) is more frequent among men than women, but since the greater part of blindness is due to venereal diseases, or to injuries received in industry or war, the comparisons here do not have significance for our purposes. Dioptric defects of vision, especially myopia, are much more frequently reported among women and girls than among men and boys.

In respect to "cutaneous pain" aroused by pressure on the skin, women and children are more sensitive than men, so far as observations go. In how far the thinness of the skin and the softness of the subcutaneous connective tissue and the fascia, more effectively transmitting the pressure to receptors in deeper tissue, is responsible for this difference, we cannot say. Comparative experiments upon men, and upon women who have been toughened by manual labor or athletics, have not yet been performed. When electricity and other forms of pain stimulation are applied, no definite sex differences are found.

In regard to sensory discrimination (such as patch discrimination, weight discrimination, etc.) males are superior to females except in respect to tactual acuity (measured by the normal perceptible separation of two points applied to the skin), in which women excel. These conclusions are tentative only, since measurements have not been made upon large groups in ways which would exclude differences due to the toughening of the skin by exposure to the weather and contact.

¹ "Color blindness" has been supposed to be a specific defect, hereditary, and following a simple Mendelian law of heredity. Recent investigations show, however, that there are continuous gradations of deficiency between "normal" color vision and extreme "color blindness." Obviously, the assumptions as to the laws of inheritance of "color blindness" must be revised.

with rough objects and differences due to practice, and practice effects are large in the field of sensory discrimination. In regard to intellectual discrimination we have no evidence bearing conclusively upon the point.

In learning by simple association, girls and women seem to be quicker than boys and young men. Such learning is tested by "immediate memory" (that is, immediate repetition of the words, numbers, or other material learned). For this reason, girls excel in "substitution" and "cancellation" tests (which are both tests of simple associative learning). Curiously enough, girls excel also in the avoiding of forming associations, as in the "color-naming" test. In retention of what has been learned over short periods of time, (one or two days), females are also superior to males. But for longer periods of retention, the sex differences seem to disappear.

In logical memory (as distinguished from rote memory), where the significance of what has been studied is to be retained, regardless of form, there is no clear differentiation of the sexes, although it is sometimes assumed that males are superior in this. Women may be relatively deficient in the application of what has been learned, if this were true it would explain their inferiority to men in the solving of problems, in arithmetic as in other matters, which has been reported by some experimenters. Girls are said to find geometry relatively harder than algebra (as compared with boys), presumably for this reason. In schools and colleges, women seem to do best in linguistic, literary, and historical subjects, where memory (not necessarily rote memory) is the important factor, and they are said to be at a disadvantage in mathematics and scientific topics in which problem-solving is involved. The fact that in vocational schools and colleges girls and women have in certain cases made better average grades than boys and men, has been said to be due in part to the predominant selection of languages, literature, and history by the females, and in part to their more serious application to the curriculum. It is probably true that until recently the male students have been more distracted by school and college "life" and by other extraneous activities, although the female students are rapidly growing toward the same neglect of the curriculum as has been characteristic of the males, and perhaps in some institutions have outstripped the male students in this respect.

In regard to comparative speed of reaction we have no data of statistical importance. Such data as have been obtained seem to show that women are quicker, provided the reaction is one that has been thoroughly learned, but that they fatigue more rapidly than men. In speed of tapping, for example, women are found to be faster than men on short records, but slower on long or repeated records. Where choice or discrimination is involved in the reaction, it is possible that the males are speedier, but data on this point are insufficient. Concerning accuracy of reaction requiring fine coordination we have no reliable evidence, although this is a very important topic.

In considering the affective characteristics of the sexes we must revert to a consideration of primary psychological sex differences, since these are found in the fields of feeling, emotion, and desire. The profound changes which take place at puberty, and which significantly differentiate the male from the female in so many anatomical details and in important physiological respects, are controlled by the hormones of the testes and ovaries. This control is exercised in part through other glands, the thyroid, pituitary, and adrenal, and perhaps others, upon the functions of which the products of the genital glands exercise an influence. It is possible that the whole glandular life is influenced by the sex glands, and it is at least certain that the important endocrine glands above named are affected. Further, we know that endocrine glands in general, and especially the ones named, exercise a powerful effect on the general emotional life of the individual. It is, therefore, extremely probable that along with the differentiation of growth and function controlled directly and indirectly by the sex glands, there is also a differentiation in the emotional life of man and woman, but our experimental knowledge is at present not sufficient to indicate the details of this differentiation, hence we must depend on more general information, which is, frankly, more suggestive than reliable.

We have reason to assume that the sensory desires and emotions and the genital sensitivity of the man and woman (the primary mental characters of sex) are different. Aside from their intrinsic characters, the sensory desires and emotions differ in their excitability, and in their temporal courses, and these are highly significant differences.

In the chapter on Desire we have pointed out the two-fold classi-

cation of amatory desires, and their typical occurrences as generalized personal, generalized specific, particularized personal and particularized specific. The sentiment which is built around the second of these is commonly called *infatuation*, the sentiment surrounding the third is *sexual love*, and the sentiment appropriate to the fourth is usually designated as *lust*. These three types of amatory desire grade into one another through many stages. The individual whose personal desire is generalized, particularizes, of course, during the time when an individual of the other sex is available, but the particularization endures only while he or she is stimulated by that individual, and any one of a large class of individuals may be substituted one for another. He desires to dance with, talk to, or otherwise associate with the particular woman who is available, but would be just as desirous of and just as well satisfied with any one of a number of women of the same general type, and sometimes of a wide range of types. In some cases where there is actual particularization of a more personal sort, the particular desire is little stronger than the general: the man, for example, is *somewhat* in love with one woman, desires her more strongly than other women, and derives more satisfaction from her society, yet his desire for any other woman of the same general type may be nearly as strong.

Finally, the personal desire shades gradually into the specific and *vice versa* in a temporal way, and there is a gradation of blends of the two at definite times. Very often, the particularized desire begins in the personal form, and grows in time into the specific, and frequently that which commences as relatively specific desire for a given individual grows in time into a comprehensive personal desire.

The most important sex difference in desire is that in the man it is more uniform in type, so women more diverse. The difference may best be brought out by describing male desire.

In man, amatory desire is frequently present in a highly specific form without any particularization, and with a minimum of even generalized personal desire. In such cases the desire may be intentionally vague, with no thought of definite object or means of satisfaction, although affectively vivid, and is usually called *sex excitement*. Moreover, personal amatory desire in man passes very easily and quickly into the specific form, without requiring intermediate activities, such as caressing. Furthermore, man seldom loses the general

desire for long periods of time, but is during most of his life, no matter how definitely he particularizes, "amorphous" to women generally. There are, of course, individual variations in these respects, and a few individuals may differ widely from the general type, but the overwhelming majority of men differ only mildly in type of desire, however much they may differ in respect to its gratification. Finally, the liability to amatory desire of the several types is constantly present, subject to no times or seasons, although it is possibly a little greater in the spring and early summer than at other times.

In women, on the other hand, there is a wider range of types, and the great majority of cases differ markedly from the male type. In these cases, specific desire is less apt to arise except from the particularized personal form; in many cases it seldom or never arises except in this way, and is less apt to occur in the vague specific form. Moreover, personal desire does not pass so automatically into specific but requires the intermediate stimulation of coexisting. The woman, in many cases, must have personal desire for the man, involving finally the desire to be tactually and kinesthetically stimulated by him, and these stimulations arouse the specific desire.

When the woman's personal desire becomes particularized, although the general desire is seldom completely lost, it lessens or decreases more markedly than it does in man, to a degree so small usually that it precludes her particularisation upon another man until she loses her particularisation upon the first man.

The preceding description applies to a certain range of types of women only, although that range probably includes the majority. There are others who are in type like the average man, and still others who go to the other extreme of never having any specific desire: an extreme which is seldom if ever approximated by any man except he be mentally or physically defective, or seriously diseased. Between these two wide extremes all gradations in feminine type are represented.

In many women, and perhaps in all, amatory desire is dependent upon and varies with the menstrual cycle. At a certain phase of the cycle, it is less easily aroused, and at another phase is much more easily aroused, or occurs spontaneously in the specific form. In other words, there is in the human female an estrous cycle, like that of the lower animal female, and with the same period as the menstrual cycle.

It must not be supposed that on the average the amatory desires of the man are any stronger than those of the woman, although the conditions of arousal may be different. It is even possible that the reverse is true, and it is certainly true that in very many women the desires, when fully aroused, have a violence far surpassing that of the average man. This is a point which it is especially important that the woman should know for her protection.

The development of amatory desire in the woman is far more a matter of education, through erotic stimulation and amatory experience, than is the case with the man. In many women the desire is very slight until developed by repeated stimulations and experiences, and may there after be powerful and easily aroused. In many others the desire is never developed to a very high level, even though they may be married for years, and to some of them sexual intercourse eventually becomes intensely repugnant. In most of these cases, the conditions of intercourse have been abnormal through absence of the appropriate psychological details, frequently because of the dense ignorance of the husband.

As regards amatory emotion and feelings aside from desire, there are definite differences between men and women which it is not important to discuss here. There are also definite differences in sexual sensitivity, which are tied up with the differences in desire and emotion. We have gone far enough into the subject to show that extreme and important affective differences probably exist, and exist in a reality which we know to be of great consequence for the entire emotional life. For we know that changes in the erotic affective life influence profoundly the whole emotional life: witness the changes in moods, in excitability, and in general emotional responses which occur conspicuously in the menstrual cycle of some women, and probably of many.

If the total emotional life of man differs profoundly from the total emotional life of woman, then, in spite of equality in perceptual, intellectual, associative, and reflective capacities, it cannot be expected that the two sexes will perform alike. Their interests will be different, and their distribution and fixation of attention will perhaps be different. And if such were not the case, it would seem that the family, the most important of all social groups, and the most coherent, would not be possible.

The cyclic variability of woman's emotional life (which is true on the average although it may not be true of all cases), and its greater personalization, are the most important points in which it differs from that of the man. The variability undoubtedly interferes severely with the success of many women in vocations in which initiative and self-direction are required, and may be the basis for her lesser aptitude for problem solving. Business and professional life offer their opportunities and make their demands without regard to the lunar month, and the woman is sometimes in the mood to respond to them, sometimes not. Hence, "woman's work" has been predominantly along those lines which offer no progress, and which, like house work, can be periodically neglected, or which like stenography, are so standardized that the routine requirements are definite, and have to be met, moods or no moods. For, where there is an objective requirement which must be met, and is not too severe, the individual will by extra effort measure up to it for a short time regardless of mood and lowered vitality. The woman can force her work, just as the drunken man, or the asphyxiated or drugged man, can make for a short time as good a record on many mental and physical tests as he can normally, because the task is mechanical and he feels the need of accomplishing it. Yet, it is probable that just as tests have been designed in which the deficiencies of those individuals can be shown, so tests can eventually be applied to the woman which will show her cyclic variations in initiative due to the emotional cycles.

The personal tendency of woman's emotion has also its effects in her performances. It has many times been said that woman fails as a surgeon and succeeds as a nurse, because of her personal solicitude and sympathy for the patient, and this impression is doubtless correct as far as it goes. The successful surgeon must remove the appendix from his patient as impersonally as he cuts a bone out of his steak. But, of course, in view of the extreme variability of woman, we may expect to find some who are as impersonal in their affective life as the most impersonal man.

According to popular belief, woman differs from man in an important affective respect, namely in type of esthetic process. It is supposed that esthetically, woman is more imitative, less creative than man. It may be that woman is less prone than man to distinguish what is intrinsically pleasant and appropriate from what is merely

conventionally correct or *à la mode*. "Beauty," made from "style," may be less real for woman, on the average, than for man. The habits of women in respect to decoration offer some support for this view. That which is in "style" is admired and enjoyed today, reprobated and condemned tomorrow when it is "out of style." This applies to form as well as to color.

In art, woman, it is said, to a greater extent than man, learns the rules and applies them, sometimes with great skill, but she never creates a new phase or type of art. It is believed by some extremists that the great majority of women have no intrinsic æsthetic appreciation at all, but are merely appreciative of set standards. On these matters no conclusions can be reached until adequate experimental determinations have been made.

The fact that æsthetic standards have been created almost exclusively by men, and adopted by women, may be in part responsible for the fact that, in so far as personal beauty is concerned, both men and women are predominantly interested in female beauty. But, in larger part at least, this striking fact is due in a more direct way to the primary psychological differences of sex.

Man needs but little stimulation of his amatory interests, and this stimulation the normal aspects of woman's form and coloration and action is competent to supply. Woman, on the other hand, needs to be more directly stimulated and needs to have, therefore, the aspect of form and coloration and action which will incite the man to "make love" to her. Hence, man is abundantly interested in beauty qualifications in woman's form, and so is woman. To man they are direct erotic excitants, to woman they are something to be imitated, or, if that be not possible, something to be wished for. The woman, therefore, in viewing the presentation of female characters or female activity on the stage, projects herself into the part for the time being, she is dancing, posturing, or being kissed. Man has much less tendency to project himself into male parts. The direct enjoyment of the presentation is generally sufficient for him. This projective tendency of woman broadens out into all dramatic fields, including those in which there is no question of "beauty", but it has its basis in the primary sex attitude.

Of course, it is not to be denied that woman has her conception of "beauty" as applied to the male. Large stature, vigorous muscula-

ture, strength of movement, thick curly hair (to run her fingers through), and suggestions of virility; but these mean far less to the man himself than feminine charms do to the woman, and any deep consideration of them on the part of the male is commonly considered a matter for ridicule or contempt.

The amatory desires are not the only ones in which men and women differ. The desire for conformity seems to be greater in women. Man of course has this desire strongly, but not so strongly nor so comprehensively, on the average, as has woman. Man conforms in many respects, because he must, or because he sees it is advantageous to be inconspicuous, but swardily rebelling. Or, he conforms to an old order because change is troublesome or disagreeable. Woman, however, seeks keen satisfaction in conforming. This comes out clearly not only in the matter of styles and fashions, but also in the greater suggestibility of woman (if it be true that she is more suggestible). Woman, it is claimed, tends to perceive and to think, that which is suggested to her, in so far as the actual environment or her pressing needs will let her. She has been called the "imitative sex" and the "docile sex," and the theory of greater suggestibility fits in with these ascriptions. Here also, women would stand nearer the babe, and farther from the ape, than men.

Yet, one must not forget that there are wide ranges of suggestibility in both sexes. Many women rival or exceed in independence of thinking the most original and unimitative of men, and that many men fall far below the average female level is easily shown by any street procession of a fraternal society. Female non-conformists are, however, more generally condemned or derided, especially by their own sex, than are men.

On the subject of general integration there is at present little data. As a matter of fact, adequate experimental methods for the determining of the ability to sustain and distribute the attention have been but little employed, and have not yet been applied to this field. It may be that there are important sex differences here. If there are differences they are certainly of high importance.

What has been said already about the variability of anatomical and physiological characters in the sexes can be used even more positively in regard to mental characteristics. The old notion that woman is the "less variable" sex is without foundation. The most

reliable experimental data on variability in mental characteristics shows that the variation from the class-average is little different from the variation of men, but that in so far as there is any difference, women are more variable. This agrees with and confirms what we have said about the greater variability in feelings and in desires. Woman is really the "variable sex" both in regard to the temporal changes in the individual, and in regard to individual variations in respect to the average.

§2. The status and performances of women

It is obvious that woman as a sex can never be on a footing of economic equality with man, because of the handicap of woman in the reproductive function. There is no reason why the class of women who do not bear children should not be on economic equality with men, unless they are hindered by the menstrual cycle (as some are) or prevented by the effects of the psychological differences we have pointed out. But for the majority of women the conditions are inescapable.

Economic inequality does not necessarily involve political or social inequality, but practically it contributes powerfully thereto. And even today, the women who are economically men's equals, so far as their capacities are concerned, are at an economic as well as social and political disadvantage because of the economic disadvantages of the larger class. The labor of the larger class of women is cheap labor because of their handicap, which make them take what they can get, and the cheapness of their labor cheapens that of the others.

Nowhere, and in no time, have women been socially and politically the equals of men. As a sex, they have fallen pretty generally into two classes: private property and public property. Women as private property have been legally classified as wives, concubines, and slaves. Practically, however, they have been classified as drudges, mostly serving a double function of servile labor and of gratifying the

¹ Some women have, indeed, had enormous political control. Kings have been made puppets by their mistresses, and in the United States generous to the granting of suffrage to women, officers of state have been influenced by women to a greater extent than shows on the surface. But these women have not operated as man's equal, but have swayed men through the appeal of their personal charms. So also slaves have dominated kingdoms, but have not been the equals of their royal owners.

lusts of their masters, and as playthings, ranging from the hounds of "pampered mistresses" on the one hand to "adored divinites" on the other.¹ The public women, a class peculiar to "civilized" society, not to savage or "primitive," have usually been held a public necessity, but despised and maltreated for their services. In some cases, however, the public women have been held high in personal esteem.

Within modern European society the beginning of a new era has been made. A new class of women has arisen who first achieved social equality, and showed that economic equality with men is possible for those who are willing to forgo child bearing, and then achieved a growing measure of political equality for women of all classes. It is beginning to be realized that woman has legal rights to her person, to her property, and her vote, and more right to her children than has their father. But these are great and radical innovations and are none of them fully conceded, even where legally guaranteed. Even so far, the change is the greatest revolution ever effected in social conditions. While men generally still look on women as property, and large numbers of women are quite willing to be so regarded, the time is rapidly approaching when both these attitudes will completely disappear.

That the greatest handicap of woman is maternity, and the liability of maternity, and not her *essential* characteristics, has been shown by the fact that it has been the class of celibate women, or women otherwise free from the claims of motherhood, who have been able to organize and carry through this revolution.

Obviously, the environmental features are not yet such that we can see what the full performance of women will be. Girls are not trained either physically or mentally as boys are trained. They still look on a fortunate marriage as an escape from work, and consider such a bargain commendable. Opportunities in professions, trades, and industries are not open to them as they are to men, and they still are treated with "chivalry" which is, to a large extent, an elaborate condescension to their assumed inferiority.

¹ Neither position is tolerable to the intelligent woman. Men, whose romantic tendencies are seldom understood by women, learn with difficulty that the woman who is worthy of worship is just the woman who does not wish to be worshipped. And in curing her of that romantic tendency she frequently cures him of romance altogether.

Hence, the fact that women has accomplished little in the world does not mean a great deal. It may be true that in no profession has she yet made a high mark as a sex, although a few individuals have succeeded. Informal statistics have been gathered to show that in spite of the great number of girls studying music and arts, only a few pianists, composers, and artists, and those not of the first rank, have appeared. The extremely small number of women who have attained to moderate eminence in law, medicine, science, and literature has also been pointed out. And it has also been pointed out that even in those lines which in the Western world have long been considered woman's work, namely, cooking, dressmaking, and the care of children, men have taken first rank over women when they have gone into these lines. It is even said (and it may be true) that the dire inefficiency in European and American housekeeping is due to the fact that men have not yet taken it up and put it on a modern basis.

All these matters are really important, but even if the statements are true, arguments based on them are unconvincing. It would be rash indeed to predict what woman's achievements will or will not be after the social equality of the sexes shall be complete.

In spite of the revolution which has taken place, many changes remain to be made, among which are the abolition of prostitution, with all that it entails upon the virtuous woman, the putting of "sex morality" on an ethical basis, the separation of sexual relations from a basis of financial compensation, within marriage, not merely outside it, the purification of marriage from its present degraded condition by the evolving of a reasonable divorce system, the education of women to broader views of life, and better cooperation with one another, all these must be done before the social power of the past will be swept away, and the conditions for the development of women be met. Yet, in spite of these considerations, of two things we may reasonably be sure, because they are based on physiological and psychological facts. First, that there will always be a large class of women who will devote themselves primarily to maternity, and whose achievement in the world will therefore be entirely incommensurate with those of men. Second, that whatever may be the achievement of the class of women who eschew maternity, they will not be on the whole the same as those of men. It is unfortunate that with the

difference in emotional organization, and the difference in desire, they should sufficiently want to do the various things that men must do, and should have the emotional persistency in all these to reach success equal to that of men in all of them.

The real question is whether women will find some things which they so much want to do, and which their emotional nature will so dispose them to do, that they will do them better than men do, just as men will do some things better than women do. For one thing is certain; no one reaches major success in a profession or line of work when it is undertaken merely as a woman. Footballers are never masterpieces. The undertaking must be fascinating and desired in itself, and for its own success, or it will not reach the heights.

§4. The problems of sex education

The differential psychology of men and women presents a series of problems which are of importance for pure science, and which also are of serious practical consequence. The information to be gained by the solution of these problems is needed for the guidance of individual development of character, and for the harmonization of the interrelations of men and women in social progress, which depends so largely upon the improvement of marital relations and the complex social relations of the sexes which contribute to and depend upon marital relations. Marriage is far more than a physiological pairing, and the development of its psychological possibilities requires training of the individuals in practical matters as well as the inculcation of ideals. Even physiological mating among the higher animals is far from being the simple "instinctive" process it has sometimes been supposed to be, and the more complex psychological adjustments of human mating require a definite, and sometimes lengthy learning process. Many cases of marriage failures come to the psychologist for adjustment; cases in which in spite of the real attachment of husband and wife, and the desires of both to realize a spiritual union, the union is not attained and the family has begun to disintegrate. In these cases, the one outstanding fact is ignorance of the psychology of sex, and the work of the psychologist in adjusting these families is largely the teaching of simple facts in regard to the mental sex life.

Unless both the man and the woman understand the essential emotional differences between them, the chances of successful mar-

riage are small. Very often, both mates learn with sufficient rapidity during marriage, but very often also a family is wrecked before the knowledge has been attained, although in some cases both mates learn enough from the first marriage to make a second one successful. Disaster can often be prevented by giving proper instruction before marriage, or during its early stages, instead of leaving everything to the troublesome, and frequently unsuccessful, "trial and error" method. In many cases, errors learned by erotic experience before marriage are the source of the marital failure, unless counteracted by adequate knowledge later acquired, and many individuals are denied the chance of marriage because of earlier ignorance. Obviously, when fuller scientific information concerning the psychology of sex is available, including information concerning cognitive sex differences, vastly more can be done educationally, but it is important that the fundamental facts now known should be intelligently applied.

Much of the widespread misinformation concerning the psychology of women, and much of the injustice to which women are subjected is due to the failure to understand the difference between the development of genital responsiveness and of amatory desires and emotions in the two sexes, and the greater rôle played by education in the woman. The man's desires and responsiveness develop more spontaneously, that is to say, the internal stimulations and the common types of social stimulation to which men are rather uniformly subjected develop a responsiveness and type of desire which vary somewhat from man to man, but are sufficiently well developed in all but a very few individuals. On the other hand, although the variation in women is greater than in men, for the larger group of women, neither internal nor general social stimulations will develop either responsiveness of desire in its characteristic form without more specific types of stimulation supplied by the male. In such cases, the erotic responses are of the general personal type, and amatory desire is limited to that category, until more specific desires and responses are aroused through caressing. Many women of profound passionate capacity live half of their lives without realizing the tendencies lying latent within them, and are astounded at the revelations which even these preliminary forms of amatory experience bring about. Some women even do not develop their full capacities until several years after marriage

has been entered. Whether this significant difference between men and women is really essential, or whether it is due to the differences in the training of boys and girls from childhood up, remains to be determined. The important fact is that the differences exist at present, and must be taken into account. Many curious and conflicting misstatements concerning the differences in the erotic desires of men and women have undoubtedly been based on data obtained from small numbers of women in one or the other of the stages of sexual development, in which mere chronological age plays a minor part. But undoubtedly also, the individual variations in women, under the same conditions of experience and training, are very great.

After the psychological sex life of the woman has been once developed, she is a different person, and her personal problems, previously rather simple, become much more like those of the man. The woman, therefore, who achieves her erotic education without marriage is in a peculiarly unfortunate position, a prey not only to the enormous force which has been liberated in her life, but a prey also to the large group of males who constantly seek to play upon these forces. The attitude which men frequently take towards the inexperienced woman, namely, that the responsibility for her actions rests upon her alone, if she consents to sexual union, can therefore have no palliation except on the assumption that such men are densely ignorant of the psychology of woman, and the fact is that in few cases can she possibly know before hand the consequences of the step which she may contemplate. It is not necessary to assume anything essentially wrong in erotic acts, or even in promiscuity, the serious ethical problem grows out of the psychological facts, together with the fixed definite conventions of the social system from which no individual can escape.

On the other hand, the more fully the woman or girl understands this situation, the more capable she is of protecting herself. Knowing that once having entered upon a new realm of experience, no return to the former security is possible, and that the complexities of the new life are such that she cannot evaluate them in advance, and that society is so organized that woman is put at every possible disadvantage in dealing with these complexities, she is not apt to entertain lightly an experimental attitude. Further, the young woman should know the awakening of her amatory desire is a smoothly progressive

process, beginning in details that may seem to her not the least dangerous, but grading by small steps to a culmination in which she has no further control, and that she cannot foresee the point at which control will be lost.

It might seem, therefore, that while it is immensely important for the young woman to understand these matters as fully as possible, it is inadvisable to present the information to young men, lest it add to the advantage which the male has over the female. Unfortunately, at the present time there is better understanding of these points among the more unscrupulous men than among those whose justice would impel them to protect women. Practical safety is to be found in the education of both sexes, but special attention should be paid to the education of girls and young women.

The differences in the details of the temporal development of amorous desire in the man and woman, even after the woman's training and development have been fully achieved, are of vital importance in married life. These differences are much better known to wives than to husbands, among whom, as a class, an astonishing amount of ignorance prevails on this subject. The better education of women in these details is, however, an important matter, in order that they may more effectively assist in the education of their husbands. Instruction in the details of erotic life which go beyond those it is possible to present here should be given to unmarried women both as a preparation for marriage and for their protection before marriage.

For both men and women it is important that the emotional changes, other than changes in desire, which accompany the menstrual cycle should be understood as fully as possible. The woman should know that even if not ill at the menstrual flow, she is irritable, and tends to be unreasonable, in the few days just preceding it, and that the benefits of her kindness, generosity, and tenderness throughout the greater part of her life may be lost through failure to guard her expression and her judgments during these recurring brief periods. The man should know that she merits especial tenderness, consideration, and forbearance at these trying times. And this is true not only in the marital relation, but in every circumstance in which men and women are brought into social relations.

It is obvious that education is needed, not only in the physiology of

genital processes, but also in the psychology of amatory life. The repression of the understanding of the laws of the total sexual life not only leads to serious evils through ignorance and misinformation, but also by relegating the most important sexual matters to the domain of the shady and furtive creates a realm of obscenity and of unduly heightened erotic values which has very serious detrimental effects. The realization of these facts has brought about a great improvement in frankness and seriousness in dealing with these topics and has brought about a change of attitude in regard to the education of young women, for it is no longer held that they should be kept in dense ignorance of the matters which men are allowed to know. But with these changes have come both benefits and damages.

There can be no doubt that preoccupation with erotic matters may in itself constitute erotic stimulation, and under modern social conditions increased stimulation is not needed. Not only the presentations of the stage and the screen, but the general conditions of social life contribute an abundance of erotic stimulation of a general sort, all we need to know thus if possible. Many of those who are seriously advocating the censorship of literature, the screen, and the stage, are quite correct in their general position, and wrong only because they do not see that the kind of censorship which they advocate, and which is to some extent, unfortunately, put into practice, does not attain its object, and only increases the evil.

In the problem as it concerns printed materials, the books, articles, and pamphlets which presumably constitute serious educational material in the "psychology of sex" need serious consideration. It can be shown that to many readers these materials constitute stimulations of the sex tendencies and impulses which fan into flame the amatory passions in an undesirable way, and that both men and women have been made emotionally unstable and intellectually disintegrated by preoccupation with them. The disintegrating effect of Freudian literature on youths of college age has been strongly evident. The recognition of the need for sex education of children also has led to unfortunate consequences because some reckless persons have leaped in wildly where intelligent persons have trodden fearfully. There is especial need in this field for the consideration of Solomon's maxim that there is a time for all things.

To a large extent the flood of books for the young: "What a boy

ought to know?" "What a girl ought to know," etc., has been mere pornographic literature, in so far as they have not been mere frauds, purporting to reveal something erotic, and revealing nothing. And many of them are obviously written merely to sell on the advertising value of the subject. Verbal instruction has also been the medium for both charlatanism and mistaken zeal. Special lectures on sex are advisable for adults and for late adolescents, if these are accurate and authentic. But much that is presented on the topic of sex psychology is not well founded. For children, special lectures on sex are not justifiable, and are frequently had in effect. Sex instruction of the young can be safely carried out only by two methods, first, by giving it as a normal, unemphasized part of biology and physiology and psychology, second, by answering truthfully any question the child may ask, but without impressing on the child information unasked and beyond the stage of his needs. There is a middle ground between the still too common practice of lying to the child on the one hand, and deliberately awakening and increasing his erotic curiosity on the other.

CHAPTER V

MARRIAGE AND THE FAMILY

(1. *Essentials and forms of the family*)

IT is commonplace to remark that the family is the oldest social group, so far as our knowledge of the past extends. It is also the most intimate of human groupings, combining men and women, adults and children in peculiarly close and complex relations. The family, moreover, is in an emphatic way modified by every variation in the characteristics of the individuals which compose it, and reciprocally, has a profound influence on the lives of the individual members.

Historically, the family has been an ever changing structure, and its functions have changed in accordance with the physical and social conditions in which the family has been organized. In the process of evolution, endlessly diverse forms of the family have emerged, and although these forms may be readily classified in a simple tri-dimensional scheme, such a scheme does not fully represent the actual variations.

The family today, among civilized peoples, is not stable; the evolutionary process is still in progress. Attempts to evaluate family and family life on the basis of an assumed permanence of a single type, and especially to crystallize the type without reference to changing social, biotic and economic conditions, has been a signal failure. Unfortunately, these ill-considered attempts have been successful in retarding the legal provisions for marriage and divorce, so that they are anachronistic in many countries, and particularly in the United States, and a serious impediment to morals and human welfare.

No evaluations of the family, or particular family conditions, can hope to achieve usefulness, unless based on some knowledge of the anthropology of marriage and the family. The relations of marriage-forms and types of family organization to human needs and human desires is not even intelligible, unless we have some understanding of the diverse forms and functions as they exist today among different peoples, and some inkling of the processes of development. With the

increase in this anthropological knowledge, and the adequate psychological interpretation of the data, the interest of the student in the study of the family problem as a problem of the adaptation of an institution to changing human and environmental conditions, as well as a problem of the adaptation of the individual to inevitable institutional conditions, becomes an enlarged interest which protects him against both hide-bound conservatism and stupid radicalism.

Marriage is primarily a social process, which makes of a man and a woman a small social group. The organization of this group, the family, is determined largely by amatory desire, and is directed towards the end of amatory satisfaction. Secondly, parental desire enters into the determination and objectives of the organization. The actual functions of the family, however, include at various times and in various places the satisfactions of all the primary desires, and ■ a vast multitude of derivative desires.

Marriage and the family are not strictly necessary for the satisfaction of any desires. Amatory desires are satisfied by many persons without anything which could properly be called marriage. Reproduction and the care of children could be arranged for on a plan such as that which Plato suggested in his *Republic*. As for the other desires, although in many societies the basic provisions for their satisfaction are almost exclusively family matters, the trend of progress in civilized countries shows clearly that these matters may very well be arranged otherwise. Whether reproduction may or may not be eventually taken out of the family, remains to be seen. The question whether the higher forms of amatory satisfaction may be obtained without the family is a more serious one.

The functions of marriage and of the family life, are dependent, in the first place, on the selection of the men and women who are to be mated in marriage. This selection obviously is dependent for its adequacy on the characteristics of the family they are to form. Further, in marriage as in all human relations, adaptation or learning is involved in a seriously important way. The specialization of function in the marriage state goes beyond mere anatomical and physiological traits of sex, and this specialization must either be fully prepared before marriage, or acquired afterwards. Into this adaptation, conscious purposes of the man and the woman enter in an essential way, but the biotic and economic conditions surrounding married

life are equally important. Finally, since no selection, and no processes of adaptation will be one hundred percent successful, the conditions for the termination of an unsuccessful marriage, and the social machinery for separation of mates must be an integral part of the whole social scheme of marriage.

The introduction of children into the family, either by birth or adoption, introduces new relations, not only the relations of parents to children but modified relations of husband to wife. These must be considered in the total scheme of problems.

In all these considerations, it must be recognized that in a complex social system some of the desires upon which the particular family may be founded are directed exclusively towards satisfaction through the family. The restaurant or the tribal feast supplement the family larder and kitchen. So with the processes of satisfying other desires. Parental affection is lavished on one's own children, but also on other children. Amatory satisfaction is widely found outside the marital relation by vast numbers of conventionally, and really, married persons. In each of these circumstances, however, the supplementing of the family function by other means, constitutes an essential modification of the family organization, and of the marital relation.

It is practically impossible to define the family except in an arbitrary way. In one of its characteristic forms, the family consists of a man and a woman (husband and wife), with their joint children, living together in a common domicile during the period of minority of their children. But we must not forget that this is but one form of family, and that even this form has many and wide variations. There are families without children, or with adopted children, families in which the man does not live in the same domicile with the woman and children, families in which grandfathers and grandmothers, or aunts and uncles, or grandchildren, are actual members, families in which there is more than one wife, or more than one husband, or several of both, and different ones of these forms may be the standard, or the exclusive forms, in different communities.

The only common feature of these various forms of the family is sexual intercourse at some time between certain adult members of the group, these adults being designated as the husbands and wives. While coitus normally results in the birth of children, the advent of children is not essential to the institution of a family. The family,

moreover, once constituted, persists after custom between husband and wife has ceased. A widowed mother, with her children, for example, still may constitute a *deus fide* family. While we might, and sometimes do, extend the definition of a family to include such groups as a single woman who has adopted children, it is more logical, when accuracy is desired, to call such a group a *quasi-family*.

It is necessary to distinguish between the legal family and the *de facto* family, because in some cultures both forms exist side by side. In most of the United States, for example, a family is not legal unless the husband and wife have complied with certain formalities, usually including the obtaining of a license and the acknowledging of each other as husband and wife before a minister or priest, before an audience (according to the Quaker mode), or before a judicial officer. The family, furthermore, is not legal if either the man or the woman is already a legal husband or wife. Yet many families exist without legal sanction,¹ and the *de facto* husbands and wives of these are not precluded from forming other families legally.

Marriage is the process by which a man becomes a husband and a woman becomes a wife, and obviously there is both legal marriage and *de facto* marriage. But marriage does not always constitute a family, since it may occur within a family already constituted. In the patriarchal family, for example, the husband of the oldest generation with his wife or wives, and his children by these wives (and even by secondary wives, classed sometimes as his "concubines"), together with the wives of his sons, and their children, and children's wives and children, constitute the family. One of the sons may marry, but the new wife becomes a member of the family of which the husband is already a member. But although a marriage does not always constitute a new family, every family is constituted by a marriage.

In some cultures, the distinction between legal and *de facto* families and marriages does not exist. In many so-called primitive cultures, (which are really not primitive at all), this is because there is no legal definition of marriage except through the *de facto* relation. A

¹ The case is not infrequent, in which a man maintains in one place a legal wife, and in another a woman who there passes for his wife. If not legally married to the second woman, he is not legally a bigamist, and the man and the second woman constitute *de facto* a family just as really as he and the first woman do. And if this second family be kept secret, it may be no less a family.

man merely takes a wife, with no formality other than her consent or the consent of the family of which she is already a member, (or even without this consent), and by having coitus with her legally consummates the marriage. Two conflicting tendencies which are recognizable in early phases of our civilization are manifest today. One tendency is to define marriage in a formal legal way, while recognizing various extra-marital types of sexual union, and debarring both parties to an extra-legal union from establishing any equity in respect to the other party. The other tendency is to obliterate the distinction between legal and *de facto* marriage by legally recognizing, as far as possible, any *de facto* marriage, even those consummated in defiance of the laws governing the choices of husbands and wives. In several European countries the "illegitimate" children of a married man by an unmarried woman are now recognized as members of the family, having rights to support and inheritance, and the legitimizing of "illegitimate" children is being strongly urged in the United States, where it has long been done in one particular state. The children of a married woman by a man other than her husband are recognized by the English common law as being rightful members of the mother's family unless they are "illegitimized" by specific legal procedure, and the statute laws in the United States are rather liberally interpreted in favor of the child's legitimization.

Coitus does not in every case constitute a *de facto* marriage, but the lines between *de facto* marriage and mere coitus are exceedingly vague and variable. In general (but not always) marriage involves the consummation of the sex relation over some considerable period of time, and the assumption by a man of private property rights in the woman. In almost all civilizations and in many uncivilized cultures, men are legally permitted to have sex relations outside of marriage, and in the United States, where such relations are not legally permissible, custom nevertheless does very generally permit them. By large classes of the population they are not considered scandalous, and the laws prohibiting them are seldom enforced against men.* Married women, however, are very generally denied such

* In American practice it has even been frequently the case that an officer of the "vice squad" has induced a woman to have sex relations with him, and then held her to court for punishment, his testimony against her being accepted, and he being allowed to go free.

permissiveness, both by law and custom, and women who offend in this respect are punished in various ways. Coitus of an unmarried man with an unmarried woman who is otherwise chaste is popularly regarded in the United States as establishing an obligation on the part of the man to marry her legally if she so wills. If it can be established that her consent was obtained through promise of subsequent marriage, the man may be legally compelled to contribute to her support through the assessment of "damages" by "breach of promise." In certain parts of the United States and Europe where courtship regularly involves coitus, the relation can, without public condemnation, be broken off if no child has resulted from the union, but in case of pregnancy, public opinion demands that the *de facto* marriage be made legal.

Women, because they are property, in actual treatment if not in admitted theory, are everywhere at a disadvantage in the sex relation, and their rights in and to the marital relation are very seriously prejudiced by concurrent or previous coitus with other men. The "loose" woman, whether actually a prostitute or not, (and the lines between looseness and prostitution are very vaguely drawn, both legally and in public opinion), establishes no rights by coitus, unless a child results, because she is virtually public property, and private property rights in her and the consequent responsibility for property, cannot be established except voluntarily through the form of legal marriage. In many societies, a man, by having coitus with a previously chaste woman, and refusing subsequent responsibility for her, at once placed her in the prostitute class. Hence, the laws against seduction which have grown up, but which are lazily enforced.

We see then that marriage involves social, if not legal responsibility, and where there is not responsibility, whether enforced or not, there is no marriage. The exact nature of the responsibility varies from place to place and from time to time, and its limits cannot readily be drawn even at a single period of time, and in a single place.

Recognized marriage takes four main forms as to persons involved, and two varying scales of forms as to strictness and duration. It also has varying forms as to permanent conditions. Further discussion of the social conditions and results of marriage is much simplified by a consideration of these forms.

I. *Monogamy* of various types is by far the most prevalent form of

marriage, and has been as firm as long as history and tradition afford any evidence. Monogamy is the marriage of one man to one woman, and is the only legal form in most European countries and countries which have been colonized by Europeans. It is, however, not the only actual form even in the countries specified.

II. Polygyny is the marriage of one man to two or more wives. Polygyny is legal in most Asiatic countries, and is socially approved and accepted by many "primitive" societies in Africa, America, and the Pacific Islands.⁴ Polygyny is by no means prevalent in any country, however, both on account of the expense of maintaining wives in those communities in which the wives are not economic assets, and on account also of the fact that the proportions of the sexes are everywhere very nearly equal. Plurality of wives is the privilege of the small class of wealthy men, or of the ruling aristocracy, and the great majority of men must practice monogamy. Competent observers have declared that *de facto* polygyny is as prevalent in most European countries as in Arabia or any other country where polygyny is officially recognized. In the form of concubinage, open polygyny is still permitted by public opinion to kings and lords, and in certain countries has been legal, the ruler being allowed a "morganatic" wife or wives, in addition to a queen. It must be remembered that the difference between a kept wife and a kept mistress is purely legal, and frequently the mistress of a king has been *de facto* more of a wife, both personally and nationally than has his queen.

There is no doubt that inequality of number of the sexes has some effect on the marriage system. Reduction of the number of males by wars, or by the hazards of hunting and fishing, probably predisposes a society to polygyny. It must be remembered that for purely reproductive purposes, the number of available women is alone important, so long as the number of viable males is not too small a fraction of the number of females. If the females were four times the number of the males, and perhaps if they were ten times the number, with free polygyny, the rate of reproduction would be the same per female, as if the numbers of males and females were equal, provided the economic conditions were as favorable. But, if the number of men is not great enough to provide an adequate food supply, and to

⁴It is legally recognized in South Carolina, which permits no divorce, but recognizes the children of a married man's concubine.

properly care for and protect the women, then the rate of reproduction will decrease.

In some societies, a man who marries an elder sister may marry all her younger sisters also, even those which are not born until after the marriage of the first. This condition has been confused with the *sororate*, which is a system in monogamous or polygynous marriage in which a man has the right or even the obligation, in the event of his wife's death, to marry her next younger sister. The actual extent to which the *sororate* has been in vogue is obscure, and generalizations concerning it in any society are to be viewed with suspicion.

III. Polyandry is the form of marriage in which one woman has several husbands. Polyandry has perhaps existed in the past more widely than at the present day, but is still prevalent in certain parts of Thibet and Southern India. Three principal subforms have been distinguished. (1) In Thibet, the elder of a group of brothers takes a wife, but his younger brothers are her husbands jointly with him. This type of marriage has been supposed to be maintained because of the excess of males, and the necessity of most of the males of the family (who are in Thibet principally herdsmen) being away from home a great part of the time. This type of polyandry is called *fraternal* and *Thibetan* polyandry, although it exists in places other than Thibet. (2) In some places, the joint husbands are not brothers, but are severally chosen by the wife. (3) In one form of non-fraternal polyandry, the several husbands are chosen for different days of the week. The wife will have one husband for Mondays and Wednesdays, another for Tuesdays and Thursdays; etc.

Polyandry must not be confused with the *levirate*, which is the system under which, in monogamous or polygynous marriages, the widow of the elder brother may, at his death, become either the legal or the *de facto* wife of the next younger. If the widow becomes the *de facto* wife, her children by the new relation are claimed as children of her first husband. In some places the man has been obliged to take the deceased elder brother's wife, in other places he merely has the option to do so.

In polyandrous systems, the paternity of the children is variously determined. In the Thibetan system, all children are ascribed to the oldest living brother. This means, of course, nothing more than that he is the head of the family. In the other systems, the paternity of each

child is voluntarily assumed by one or the other of the husbands, by going through certain ceremonies, or else a regular method of ascribing children to the fathers in certain order is employed. In these cases there is no family head. In no case is any attention paid to the physiological paternity, which, of course, could not possibly be determined in most cases.

Polygyny and polyandry are both forms of *polygamy*, a term which is sometimes incorrectly applied to polygyny alone.

IV *Group marriage* is the marriage of several men to several women. While this institution has really existed in several parts of the world, and exists today in certain parts of India, it has never been wide spread, and has probably never been the predominant form of marriage in any community.

Most frequently group marriage is merely an extension of the third type of polyandry, so that while each woman has two or more husbands, with specific time allotments, each of the husbands also has several wives with complementary time allotments. In some cases, however, group marriage has apparently existed without any formal temporal arrangement.

Any of the four forms of marriage may be of longer or of shorter duration. The theory of western monogamous marriages is that they are terminated by death only, but divorce has been allowed for various causes, and the movement of progress today is in the direction of greater freedom in divorce. Among oriental peoples in general, divorce is legally much freer, and is actually more openly practiced. It is to be remembered that among western peoples *de facto* divorce, without legal formalities is frequent. At the other extreme from the life-long unions are the trial marriages, undertaken for a specific term of years, and the *wifw* form of marriage common among early Arabic tribes, in which the union was explicitly temporary, frequently for a few days, and often for a single night.

While the actual duration of marriage does not necessarily alter its form while it endures, the premeditation of separation unquestionably does modify its important psychological factors, since the attitudes of husband and wife towards each other are of especial importance. The conditions surrounding trial, or term marriages, are therefore quite independent of the conditions of divorce, where the assumption is in favor of permanence.

The restrictions laid on divorce are sometimes supposed to be due to the need of protecting women, and women are undoubtedly in need of protection in divorce. The advent of children, the suppression during married life of preparation for an occupation by which a woman might support herself independently, and the rapid decrease in sexual desirability of women with increasing years, so that the chances of remarriage are progressively diminished; all make it necessary that wives should not be discarded without adequate provision for their maintenance and the maintenance of their children. That these considerations have actually had much weight in the formulation of present day restrictions on divorce is, however, rendered quite improbable by the fact that it is usually more difficult for a woman to obtain divorce than it is for a man, whereas the contrary should be true if the restrictions on divorce came about primarily for the protection of women.

Those marriage systems in which marriage is easily terminated are conventionally termed *brittle*. The effect of a brittle marriage system on the average duration of marriages is undoubtedly apt to be overestimated. Successful marriages are seldom terminated, however brittle the system may be, and the actual proportion of unsuccessful marriages which would be terminated if our system were more brittle is probably not large. Where the system is less brittle, the proportion of *de facto* divorces is larger, and extra-marital relations more prevalent, and those individuals who are determined to secure divorce will go to greater lengths to do so. In New York State, for example, where divorce is not allowed except for adultery, or other scandalous conditions, those requiring divorce readily secure legal evidence of adultery, even without actually committing it. More severe legal restrictions on divorce among those peoples who permit it freely might produce fewer legal divorces: but that marital conditions would be improved thereby has not been established.

Regardless of the form or brittleness of marriage, its actual conditions vary between extremes of *strictness* and *looseness*. In strict monogamy, there is no extra-marital coitus: there is no sexual intercourse before marriage, and intercourse only between husband and wife after marriage. Such marriages do occur, and frequently, but the actual proportion is not large in any so-called monogamous civilized country. Among "primitive" peoples, strict monogamy has

been far more common, in some cases even having been the prevailing system.

The most common loose form of monogamy is that in which the woman alone is monogamous, but the man is permitted extra-marital relations before and after marriage. This is the predominant system in both Eastern and Western civilizations, and, of course, necessitates a large class of prostitutes, either of female slaves or else of loose women, apart from wives and future wives. Another loose form, more common among so-called primitive peoples, but not infrequent in civilized communities, is that in which both sexes are permitted freedom of intercourse before marriage, and conditions are strict after marriage. This is, of course, by far the less vicious system, since it does not involve prostitution, and the attendant evils of seduction. This system is far from primitive, but is probably the result of a very long course of social progress. Whether the savages who attained to a real monogamy passed through this stage or not cannot be determined.

Among some "primitive" people, even among tribes where marriages were otherwise strict, a certain degree of extra-marital intercourse was allowed both men and women at stated times during the year, at which times festivals (corroborees) were held. But coitus at these times was not promiscuous, being restricted by the same incest regulations which governed marriage, and sometimes being still further restricted to more limited groups. Among the ancient Romans the Saturnalia were festivals of that sort, although greater freedom of choice of temporary mates was allowed than has been customary among savages. The midwinter and springtime festivals of the Druidical people, from which our Christmas and Easter festivals have come down, are also alleged to have been similar festivals.

The lending of women has not been considered an infraction of marriage by savage and ancient people generally, but rather the highest form of hospitality. This does not include any element of freedom for the female, since she is considered property, and loaned exactly as a domestic animal might be. The woman might be held extremely culpable if she escaped from bonds and indulged her desire extra-maritally, and the man who took possession of another's wife without his consent might also be held gravely culpable; in both cases the husband's "honor" and dignity have been violated. But

if the husband voluntarily turns the wife over to the other man, neither is culpable, and the husband's "honor" is not injured. The condition would be precisely the same in regard to the use of his saddle horse by another man.

Extra-marital intercourse has among various peoples been prescribed to women under religious auspices, without interference with her status in an otherwise strict (that is, strict for women), marriage system. It is recorded that every woman in Tyre was required once in her life to prostitute herself in the temple of Mylitta, as a religious act. This requirement was undoubtedly in the beginning a provision of hospitality to strangers. Among many ancient civilisations, barren wives had recourse to the aid of the God, as represented by the priest, that she might conceive, and the God's blessing in some places was invoked in every marriage in the same manner. Later, the rite was modified as in Rome, so that an image of the god was substituted for the priest in the marriage ritual.

Religious indulgence by men in extra-marital intercourse was characteristic of all the ancient civilisations, and the temples of the great goddess Ishtar, under her various names of Astarte, Ishtar, Aphrodite, Venus, and Mylitta were in reality vast houses of prostitution. Some of them contained several thousand "female votaries" (harlots). Intercourse with married prostitutes is a religious rite in certain places in India today.

Polyandrous, polygynous, and group marriage systems vary greatly in strictness, but apparently where polyandry is practiced, marriage is far more strict than it is on the average where monogamy and polygyny are official systems. This condition has been ascribed to the greater power and influence of women in polyandry, and this ascription may be correct. The influence of women, where she attains to more than the class of property, seems to be on the side of strictness and regularity in marriage.

III. Family relationships and lineage

In the Western world we are familiar with the patrilineal and patrilineal systems, in which the wife and children take the name of the husband, and all individuals are reckoned as belonging to the families of their male descent. In many of the so-called "primitive" cultures the opposite plan (matrilineal and matrilineal) was pursued,

the children taking the name of the mother's family, and belonging to her family, but many of the matronymic systems are not completely matrilineal, male lineage also being reckoned, and being important in determining eligibility for marriage, and in various other ways. So also in our own system, we do not completely ignore relationships in the female line, although they are reckoned as less important than the male relationships.

Consideration of the existence of the matrilineal systems and matronymic systems led to a curious theory of primitive society having been matriarchal in its organization and control. In this theory of the "matriarchate" the women were supposed to have been in control in the early stages of human societies, and to have later lost this dominance to the males. It was assumed that the mother was the actual head of the family, as the man is among us, and that for this reason her children took her name and reckoned their lineage through her, disregarding the subordinate father.

This theory has been abandoned, because it has been found that naming and tracing lineage have very little to do with the dominance or control of either sex. In all known forms of family organization, the men control, even in those tribes in which name and lineage are traced through the mother. The head of the family is not the mother, but her brother, or if no brother lives, some other male member of the family. In fact, it is not the name of the mother which is given to the child, but the name of the mother's family, which is quite a different matter.

A more plausible theory of the origin of matronymy is that it is due to loose marriage systems, in which the paternity of the child was uncertain, while the maternity is, of course, always known. This theory is weakened, however, by the fact that even under the patronymic system, the physiological paternity of the child has not always been considered a matter of importance, the child here also being really ascribed to the family to which the father belongs. Furthermore, there is sufficient reason for the existence of the patrilinear system where it occurs, and the matrilinear system where it occurs, in the regulations concerning marriage and descent without resorting to this theory at all.

[3. Exogamy and Incest

Among most peoples there are definite restrictions on the choice of mates, either in marriage or in extra-marital relations, quite aside from the restrictions of wealth and social caste. Among Europeans, mating of brother and sister is abhorrent, and usually illegal. Among some peoples, mating of first cousins, even sometimes of cousins once removed, is banned, and the mating of uncle with niece or aunt with nephew is also prohibited. In England, until a few years ago, the marrying of a deceased wife's sister was also illegal. Marriage or coitus within the prohibited degrees of relationship is recent, and incest is everywhere more strongly repudiated than any other form of sexual irregularity.⁴

Among many primitive peoples, incest prohibitions have apparently nothing to do directly with blood relationships, although there are indirect bearings of one on the other. No one can marry a direct descendent (son or daughter), in any case, but aside from this, the prohibitions are so complicated, and vary so from tribe to tribe that they were at first puzzling to the anthropologists. In some cases, first cousins can marry, in other cases, not. Sometimes, crossed cousins can marry, but parallel cousins could not. More extraordinary still, double crossed cousins (e.g., where the woman's father is brother of the man's mother, and her mother a sister of his father) can marry, although the children of two sisters could not marry, whether their fathers were brothers or not. The same confusing variations of regulations existed with regard to uncles and aunts, sons and nephews. Among some peoples, moreover, the only prohibitions were against individuals of one totem marrying individuals of the same or of certain other totems. Men of the opossum totem could marry women of the kangaroo totem, and vice versa, but neither could marry into the owl totem. None could marry within their own totem. Apparently, (and actually), blood relationship was quite ignored.

The most plausible explanation of all these and other confusing regulations is really quite simple: Incest is intrinsically the marrying of two persons brought up together in childhood, or who are otherwise domiciled together as housemates. Blood relationship is un-

⁴ Witness, among us, the crimes of which the plots turn about spreading incest, which the dramatist must prevent at any cost.

portant only because it does determine homemates, but variously under various marriage systems. Since under modern living conditions, cousins are no more intimately associated than are less closely related children, marriage of cousins has ceased to be incest. Since the custom of a younger sister living with a married sister has largely passed into desuetude in England, marrying a deceased wife's sister is no longer incest there. If there are real foundations for traditions which tell of peoples among whom brothers and sisters marry, we may be sure that among these peoples brothers and sisters were not brought up in the same household. Half brothers and sisters by polygynous marriage cannot mate, where the wives live in a common domicile, but in a country where polygyny were the custom, and each wife had a separate domicile, there would be no such objection to the marriage of half siblings.

Among some ancient peoples, the husband became a member of the wife's family. This was the case with Jacob, who lived with the people of his wives until he made bold to run away with his wives and their goods by night. Among other peoples, the wife became a member of the husband's family, as Rebecca did of Isaac's. Under either of these systems, mates could not be chosen from the same family (and it must be remembered that the family sometimes includes first cousins and sometimes second cousins also, but sometimes does not extend beyond siblings), and this necessary regulation was the only regulation necessary for the choice of mates. Under either system, if a brother and sister of one family marry a sister and brother of another, the son of the one couple is free to marry the daughter of the other, for they are brought up in different families. But under the first system, if two sisters in one family are married by two brothers from another family, or by two men from two different families, the children of these two sisters may not marry one another, because they are home-mates. The children of two brothers, however, who marry into different families, are free to marry one another. Under the second system, the conditions are reversed. As families increase in size, and break up, but still continue to live in close proximity, forming gentes, clans, or tribes, the regulations applying to the original families will necessarily apply to the tribes or clans descended from them. Individuals may not mate within the tribe (or clan or gentes), for they are still home-mates, but must find their mates outside the

group. If the families descended from the original families separate and clans are not formed, the family rule may still hold. If the two original systems become mingled, so that within the same families, the wife sometimes joins the husband's family, the husband sometimes the wife's, the same incest regulations still hold, only in such cases the results as regards blood relationship will vary, according to the system followed in the particular cases. But the blood relationship is not intrinsically a matter of importance.

In the social growth of some peoples, an intricate system of social classification has grown up: the tribe has divided into larger groups (commonly into halves which the anthropologists call "moieties") and these groups are divided into smaller groups, variously described as "clans," "gentes," or "totems." In some of the matrilinear systems (that is, where the children belong to the "totem" of the mother) the husbands also, at marriage, join the wife's totem. In other matrilinear systems the husband still belongs to the totem of his birth. Similarly there are two forms of the patrilinear system.

In some cases, the tribe is divided into several totems which are named each for some animal or plant, giving a descriptive name, and the child belongs to neither the totem of the father or mother. Suppose there are four totems called (1) bat, (2) kangaroo, (3) snake, (4) opossum. A snake can marry only a kangaroo, and a bat can marry only an opossum. But the child of the male bat and female opossum is a kangaroo, the child of the male opossum and the female bat is a snake, the child of the male kangaroo and the female snake is a bat, and the child of the male snake and the female kangaroo is an opossum. But the same incest regulations hold for the children and hence some mates cannot marry.

It is difficult to explain the development of this (and of other still more complicated systems), but it may have arisen through the change from an original matrilineal and matrilineal system (on which the husband went to live with the mother's people, and children took their mother's totem), to a patrilineal system (in which it is actually found). ■ a matrilineal system with four totems the marriage of sisters' children would of course be forbidden. A change to a patrilineal and patrilinear system would permit the marriage of sisters' children, if the simple rule of not marrying into the same totem were retained. The more complex rule, however, would prevent violence

to the established prejudice, since it would prohibit marriage of children of two brothers, as well as children of two sisters, and permit marriage of crossed cousins as usual. It would, moreover, make the transition to the patrilocal system easier, since it would not so much outrage the dignity of women to have the child take a totem different from both mother's and father's as to have it take the father's totem when it had formerly taken the mother's. Even if there had been, under the matrilocal system, but two totems, and hence marriage of both types of parallel cousins already prohibited, the division of each of the original totems into two, and the institution of the new rule would make the transition to the patrilocal system simple.

But all suggested classification systems are highly conjectural. The important matter is that practically all of the local prohibitions work in the same way: they eliminate the marriage of home-mates.

The custom of marrying outside one's family, clan, tribe, or totem, is called *exogamy*. Several theories have been advanced to account for exogamy, but the more widely held theories are obviously inadequate.

One theory is that man early noticed the ill effect of inbreeding, or mating of close blood relatives, and provided against it. This theory falls down on the fact that the commonest incest systems of primitive man, as have been explained above, pay absolutely no attention to blood relationship in mating, and that such prohibitions as apply to blood relations are purely incidental. Furthermore, there is no evidence that primitive man ever noticed, or supposed, any ill effects of inbreeding. In fact, it is by no means certain that the ill effects are not more than set off by the beneficial effects, so far as the direct effects on the progeny are concerned.

The theory that exogamy is the social habit resultant from an earlier general custom of wife capture, is also without effective foundation. Woman-stealing from enemy tribes has always occurred, especially in time of actual war, but there is no reason to suppose that it was ever more prevalent than it is today. Wife stealing within the tribe or family would not lead to exogamy, and besides, like the stealing of foreign women, was never more than accidental. The notion of primitive man customarily obtaining his wife by knocking her down and dragging her to his den belongs only to comic operas and the comic strip. There is no reason to suppose that love-making among primitive man was not of the same type that it is today among civilized man, apes, and the lower animals.

The symbolic form of capture occurring in many marriage ceremonies has been pointed out as a survival of actual wife capture at an earlier time, but there are other interpretations of this symbol which are more plausible, and moreover, if it were interpreted as a survival, it would obviously be a symbol of capture within, and not without the group.

A third theory, that there is an "instinctive" tendency to be repelled by a homo-mate, or at least not to be actually attracted by her (or him), and that out of this "instinctive" tendency grew the habit of seeking mates outside the home, is a purely arbitrary assumption, *ad hoc*, with definite evidence against it. It is a fact that close association of males and females from childhood up, is frequently marked by lack of erotic stimulation, but this is true only of the cases in which the incest prohibition is thoroughly accepted. It is a result of the incest regulation, and not a cause. Between brothers and sisters who are thoroughly trained in the convention that siblings do not mate, there is a minimum of erotic stimulation, but where this convention is not thoroughly inculcated, the stimulation and sexual intercourse do occur, and the great number of such cases is well known to social workers. Even with the best of training, erotic stimulation is sometimes too strong to be withstood by convention.

Conversely, there is no more sex attraction between cousins brought up in separate families than when brought up in the same family, if the convention has been well taught them. Among savages also, the force of the incest inhibition does not depend upon the closeness of the actual association, but upon the convention itself. The prohibition against marrying a member of the same group has the same force in large groups as in much more closely associated smaller groups, although in the large group many of the individuals who are prohibited from mating may not be intimately associated. From all these considerations it is evident that the inhibition of the erotic impulses is not the primary factor, and the cause of the convention, but that the convention is primary, and the cause of the inhibition, and that the convention is necessary just because there is no natural inhibition.

This conclusion is strengthened by the many other measures taken by savages and civilized folk which have the object of the prevention of sexual intercourse between the boys and girls. Among some tribes,

different territories are assigned to them, within the camp and outside of it, and attempting by a boy or unmarried youth on the territory of the maidens, or *vice versa*, is severely punished, death often being the penalty. Among other tribes, the girls are confined in cages from an early age until married. Among some peoples the infibulation of girls, that is, the fastening of metal rings through the genital labia, is practiced as a mechanical preventive. Superstitious fear of the effects of intercourse by a youth before elaborate rituals of initiation into manhood or womanhood are also widely inculcated. Many other types of deterrent, including the civilized system of chaperonage, and the inculcation of ideals of chastity, and punishment for violations, are also employed.

The incest convention serves as a represent of the sexual excitability of adult housemates also. The man is less stimulated by his niece, or sister-in-law, or other female housemate whom he has been trained to regard as not a potential sexual mate, than by women outside the particular incest convention which he accepts. The various other devices which savage and barbaric people use to inhibit the ordinary sorts of social intercourse between men and women associated in the same household must be interpreted as means to the same end. For example, where the mother-in-law and son-in-law are prohibited from speaking to or looking directly at each other, we can be reasonably sure that the regulation has arisen from conditions in which the two lived in the same household, and is a method for the lessening of erotic temptation.

It is inevitable that males who are closely associated with intrinsically desirable females should be erotically stimulated by them, and should have their attitudinal desires aroused thereby. The converse is true of the females, with due regard to the differences in the excitability of the two sexes pointed out in Chapter IV. The closer the association, the greater the tendency to sexual intercourse, if specific precautions are not taken against it. The incest conventions are such specific precautions, taken by the group against the most dangerous of the sex situations, that of adolescents.

Among the lower animals, erotic impulses are directed towards the nearest member of the opposite sex, and coitus occurs whenever genital excitability develops in both. Among domestic mammals, the male is excitable as any male, after a certain age, and will attempt

intercourse with any female who is excited. But the females of these species are excitable only at specific periods, and the male cannot effect coitus without her consent. Among wild animals, the males also are excitable only during certain seasons (mating seasons), during which they engage in sex activities to the full extent of their opportunities. By these seasonal limitations, animals are in general guarded against danger from excessive erotic activity, and during the youth of the male he is protected by the superior competition of the older males, who keep him from the females. The female is always protected by the shortness of her periods of oestrus (genital excitability). It is quite possible that the really primitive human beings were protected in the same ways. Human beings, however, have progressed to a stage in which the male is continuously excitable, and the female also is nearly continuously so, although her excitability varies greatly during the menstrual cycle. Under these conditions, with boys and girls in close association, and no other restrictions, sexual intercourse would begin early, and would, in general, be dangerously excessive. The effects on the individuals would be such that the race would soon die out, or remain on a low plane of development if the environment were not too unfavorable.

The manner in which the protecting incest conventions grew up is a matter for conjecture. While we can be certain that if they had not arisen, civilisation would not have arisen, we cannot be sure as to the details of their rise. Unless man, in passing from the oestrus stage to the present sexual condition, had developed the capacity for the easy control of desire by ideas which now characterize him, the transition would have been fatal to many stocks, and perhaps only the strains which actually made the two transitions simultaneously have survived. But it is not necessary to suppose that the convention was developed primarily through analytic reasoning and generalization. Perhaps in its earliest form the convention was largely a matter of prejudice based on experience but vaguely analyzed. Certainly, as the conventions have existed in their final forms they have been almost entirely matters of unreasoned prejudices, their real bases quite misunderstood, so seriously retained because society does not function adequately without them.

Exogamy is sometimes contrasted with endogamy (marriage within the group) but the two terms are really not opposites, but

relative terms. A society may be exogamous as regards the subdivisions, such as totems, or families, but at the same time endogamous as regards the larger group. In some cases a religious group, such as the Jews, may be endogamous, not taking mates from other groups, although exogamous (in the blood relational sense) otherwise. Among primitive peoples, in some cases endogamy of the larger group is rigidly prescribed, along with the exogamy of the smaller subdivisions, in other cases, endogamy may be the general rule, but larger exogamy permitted. Some groups, like the Israelites in their early period, may prescribe endogamy for the women, although allowing exceptions for the men.

Among civilized peoples, and probably also among early peoples, certain types of racial exogamy may be forbidden although otherwise racial exogamy is permitted. Thus, among the whites of the United States there is free racial exogamy, although mixture of Jews and Gentiles is not generally approved, but intermarriage with negroes is forbidden in almost all states, and there is strong feeling against mixture with the yellow races, although such intermarriage does occur.¹

Regarding extra marital-relations, the rules of "inferior" peoples are practically the same as for marriage. The savage cannot form liaisons with any person of the opposite sex who is not by clan or other relationships eligible as a husband or wife. Among the "superior races," however, such is not the case. In the United States, although liaisons between white women and negro men are generally reprehended, even among prostitutes, the converse relation is very common, and is not strongly condemned. In some parts of the country, in fact, it is assumed as the normal practice for males generally. The extensive practice of this miscegenation is evidenced by the rising flood of mulattoes, quadroons, and lighter mixtures, which constitute the only real "negro problem."

The tendency of the males of the "superior races" to promiscuity with females of the "inferior races" has been well marked wherever two such groups have been in contact, and has been strongly defended as promoting the improvement of the inferior type without weakening the stronger, provided legal marriage between the two groups is prohibited, since the superior type is maintained pure, and the fertilizing

¹ Intermarriage of the white and yellow races is forbidden by law in California, for example.

of the inferior females extra-maritally need not interfere with breeding of children from the wives of the superior males. As a matter of fact, this argument is fallacious, since the mixed blood always eventually flows back, and the two groups become amalgamated.

This is beginning to happen between the white and colored groups in the United States, because there is now a large and rapidly increasing number of persons with negro blood who can ~~not~~ be distinguished from whites, especially the whites of certain of our numerous later immigrant stocks. It is only a question of a short period, if the present relations of white men and negro women continue, until these two populations will be completely amalgamated.

Aside from the merely genetic effects of extra-marital relations between white men and negro women, (and of promiscuity between superior males and inferior females as general), the psychological effects on the families of the superior groups is a matter for serious consideration. When wives are merely property, and the personal attitude of the husband towards his wife and towards prostitutes differs only in that the former is his private property, and the latter are not, family life remains on a low and gross plane, and miscegenation matters little. The higher forms of family life, however, cannot develop under such conditions, and with the rise of woman to the position of a person, with full personal rights, the revolution against prostitution as well as against miscegenation has commenced. Her sexual nature, as described in Chapter IV, is such that she strongly demands the higher type of marriage, and opposes the conditions which prevent its being obtained. Promiscuity of other types, whatever the objections to it, does not have the destructive effects on the family which miscegenation and prostitution have.

14. The origin of the family

Concerning the origin of the family there has been much speculation. The theory which has the most extended vogue, although it is now largely discredited, assumes that the most primitive mating system of the human race was *promiscuity*, in which every male member of the group mated at will with any female member who might be willing, with no restrictions even of moest.⁶ Theoretically, every

⁶ The views of Lubbock and McLennan, which are summarized in the text, were evidently derived from those of Bachofen, whose book *Das Mutterrecht*,

noble female in such a group would be the wife of every potent male, although in large groups every male might not actually mate with every female. The theory further assumes that from this state of promiscuity polyandry developed in some cases, and polygyny in others, with incidental monogamy, and that with further development of the polygynous systems, monogamy became more prevalent.

appeared in 1861. Bachoven seems to have based his conclusions on the fact that among many peoples kinship was traced through the mother alone, as if the fathers were unknown. From the system of matriliney (or matriliny) Bachoven argued to a primitive "matrarchate" in which women were in control. The fact that matriliney has also existed among races whose patriarchy was perfectly well known, and that the system of naming is not conclusive as to systems of kinship, and the further fact that under either matriliney or patriliney, and under both matrilineal and patrilineal systems, the family head is always a male, have exploded Bachoven's theory.

Morgan developed independently the theory of primitive promiscuity from his study of the "Malayan System" of kinship among the Pacific Islanders, in which only five classes of consanguinity received names, as follows:

(I) Brothers, sisters, and cousins of the speaker. (II) Father, mother, and their brothers, sisters, and cousins. (3) Grandparents, with their brothers, sisters, and cousins. (4) Grandchildren, and their cousins. (5) Grandchildren, and grandchildren of the brothers, sisters, and cousins of the speaker.

For each of these classes, there was only one name, so that the same term was applied to father, mother, uncle and even, for example. From this Morgan inferred that there was no distinction for brothers and wives, so that one could not possibly distinguish one's actual father from one's aunts, and since one's aunts were equally with one's father along with one's actual mother, there would be no point in a distinction between them. The obvious fact that in a system of promiscuity such a system could not possibly exist, since one could not thus distinguish one's cousins from one's aunts and uncles, or one's children from one's half sisters, did not occur to Morgan. Moreover, since the same name was applied to father and mother, Morgan could just as well have argued that the primitive peoples were unable to distinguish males from females.

From the theories of the promiscuity school still more absurd doctrines have arisen. One theory which is still frequently advanced is that man, even up to a relatively high stage of social development, had no notion of the function of the male in procreation, in other words, that he did not know that conception depended on sexual intercourse. Mark Twain's satire on this theory in *Adon's Diary* is no more humorous than the notion itself.

The evidence recently gathered by Malmowski from Malenian groups, is so obviously self-contradictory that it has not decreased the more critical anthropologists. Malmowski accepts without the question the paradoxical situation in which the natives claim that there is no causal relation between coitus and procreation, but according to their own evidence are carefully using contraceptive measures.

The causes assigned for the development of polygyny from the alleged primitive state of promiscuity have varied somewhat. Two important theories have been advanced, in both of which woman stealing and female infanticide have figured prominently. According to McLennan's theory, female infants were killed, because of the limited food resources as the population grew, the males being preserved because of their being an asset in fighting strength, and in getting food through hunting. The resulting relative shortage of women, and quarrels over their possession, led to the stealing of women from other tribes. This system had the advantage of relieving the tribe of the care and feeding of the females during infancy.

In the assumed primitive stage of promiscuity, there would be, of course, no private property rights in the women. But with regard to women captured from other tribes, the situation would be different. The man, or the group, which died by force of arms, or by cunning, captured a woman, could claim her for their exclusive possession. Private property is always more highly valued by the individual than as community property, in which he has merely an individual share, and since, moreover, the captured women could be completely dominated by their captors, they were valuable also for the work they could be made to do. Hence, the captured women were more valued than the tribal women, and the possessors of them were objects of envy. This situation would both incite other men to capture women for themselves, and also place the tribal women in the inferior position of being less valued. As the institution of private wives grew, it led to the assignment of the tribal women to private owners, a result agreeable not only to the males who were unable to capture wives, but also to the women themselves, since it relieved them from a disagreeable position of inferiority, and the women not assigned, but remaining "common," lost their original rights to tribal support, and became economically dependent on their individual bargains with the men: i. e., they became *prostitutes*.

The other theory of the rise of marriage from promiscuity held by Lubbock (Lord Avebury) assumes that marriage by capture first arose, and then female infanticide arose because of the surplus of females due to capture, since the two sexes are everywhere born in nearly equal numbers. In other respects, the two theories agree, and may be treated as one.

McLennan's arguments for this theory were drawn from the widespread occurrence of dramatic representations of capture in marriage ceremonies which he assumed to be symbols, or survivals in form, of the earlier actual capture habit. But although the capture of women, as has been stated in Section 3, has been indulged in always by conquering warriors, and by stronger tribes or groups who have lived in convenient proximity to weaker peoples, and may have forced certain weaker tribes into polyandry, there is no evidence that it has in general preceded monogamous and polygynous practices.

Lubbock's arguments were based on details of marriage ceremonies which were interpreted as symbolizing the relinquishing, by the males of the group, of sexual rights to the bride.⁷ He assumed that these symbols were survivals of earlier ceremonies by which actual rights were relinquished when women, previously common property of the men, were assigned to the exclusive possession of individual men. Some of these ceremonies have survived to our times in the very much softened forms of the kissing of the bride by the male guests, the functions of the "best" man, the "blessing" of the wedding by the priest, and the "charivareing" or "rough-housing" of the bridal couple. Additional evidence was drawn by Lubbock from the practice of wife

⁷ Lubbock referred to customs by which all the male guests at a wedding had the right to coitus with the bride before she became the exclusive property of the groom. This custom became reduced to the form in which one man only, as the representative of the other men, exercised this right. In a still further reduced form of this ceremony, the "best man" enters the bridal chamber with the groom, and performs a certain ritual of assisting the groom, but does not actually have intercourse with her. At the present day the functions of the "best man" are still more limited. The most democratic custom still persists in many localities in the form of the right of the male guests to kiss the bride.

In other circumstances, the priest as the representative of the god blessed the marriage by preceding the groom in sexual union with the bride.

In early Rome this custom was modified by substituting an image of the male deity, with which the bride had coitus publicly.

In medieval Europe, the feudal lord is believed to have claimed and exercised the rights of the first night (*jus primæ noctis*) with the brides of his subjects, but that this custom was very general is now denied.

Lubbock saw the same symbols of relinquishment in the honeymoon, during which the groom avoids the males of his own group, in the mock fights which are a part of some marriage ceremonies, in the making of gifts to the ushers by the groom, and in the charivari and similar raucous and boisterous entertainment with and pranks played upon the newly married couple.

lending, which he supposed to be a survival of primitive promiscuity, and from the polyandrous form of marriage.

It is admitted that the symbols of the marriage ceremony are of great interest, and do point in some cases to earlier (and ruder) conditions of society. But the specific interpretations placed upon these symbols by McLennan, Lubbock, and others, are not convincing. The ritual of capture has been more adequately explained as a symbol of the natural sexual behaviour of man and woman. The consummation of genuine marriage by sexual intercourse can take place only through the mutual desires of the man and woman, and typically, as has been explained earlier, the specific desires of the woman must be aroused through the love making of the male. Metaphorically speaking, the male always must "pursue" the female: hence, the symbol of capture. However, it seems probable that in some cases actual fight and pursuit is a direct erotic stimulant to the female, provided she be already predisposed towards the pursuer, or towards sexual union. If this be true, the symbol of courtship is general as itself an actual method of courting.

The symbols of relinquishment alleged by Lubbock are more adequately interpreted not as indications of an earlier period in which all the males of the group had actual marital rights to the woman, but as expressions of a degree of civil organisation, over and above the family, which grew up relatively late. Primitively, marriage would be an arrangement between the families to which the bride and groom belonged, an arrangement which did not concern other families. But as the state, or civil organisation began to develop, it became necessary for the community to take cognisance of marriages, and to assert its rights to control them, as the state has more and more done up to the present day. The rituals referred to would, on this interpretation, be the acts by which the men of the community demonstrated that the marriage was an affair of the community.

The lending of wives, and concubinages and unnaturalities may have grown up in a variety of ways, and are not any more indicative of an earlier sexual promiscuity than is prostitution, and prostitution is a relatively late growth in any society.

More significant than the other possibilities in the way of explaining the rituals and customs, is the fact that no evidence has been found, aside from these symbolic interpretations, that a primitive stage of

promiscuity ever existed anywhere, and as before explained, the facts concerning the lower animals are all against such an assumption. We must for the present assume that monogamy, polyandry, and polygyny were the most primitive forms of human marriage, although they may have been quite brittle, and that prostitution, and promiscuity and the looser forms of marriage are a relatively late development. The earliest of these three forms may have been monogamy, or may have been polygyny of the stronger males, with calibacy enforced upon the weaker males, as among seals and wild cattle, or with polyandry developing among these groups of enforced "bachelors" who, by joining forces, could succeed in obtaining possession of a woman. It is possible, however, that monogamy and polygyny developed simultaneously, as they exist today in so-called "polygamous" countries. While there seems to be some evidence that polyandry in its systematic development as the substitution of a whole tribe on a race has been brought about by the scarcity of females, due to the persistent capture of their women by stranger tribes or races, the system preceding polyandry in those cases might have been the usual mixture of monogamy and polygyny, or might have included polyandry also.

§5. The diminishing functions of the family

We may distinguish the social functions of the family, which are by no means separable, as (1) genetic, (2) economic and marital, (3) educational, (4) political, (5) religious, and (6) psychological. The relative importance of these various functions varies from time to time, from people to people, and between individual families. A family can exist without the second, third, fourth and fifth of these functions, provided either the first or the sixth be represented, but it must have either the first or the sixth even if it has no other functions. As a matter of fact, a family could hardly have the first function without having some degree of the sixth, but many modern families are entirely devoid of the first function, and the importance of this function is diminishing generally, while the importance of the psychological function is increasing, and the function itself is becoming more complex.

1. *The genetic function of the family.* The family has been a mechanism for the generation of children and their protection and nourish-

ment during the period in which they are unable to look out for themselves. This function of the human family has paralleled a similar function in the family among the lower animals. Among birds and mammals generally, the cooperation of the father and mother in rearing the young is evident. Among insects, and many other orders of life, there is no family, the cooperation of the male and the female ceasing with the fertilization of the eggs, and the activities of the female in behalf of the young ceasing before the eggs are hatched. In the human species, it is reasonable to suppose that the family has been the most primitive means for both generation and rearing of young, and no substitute for it has yet been found. Even such proposals as that of Plato in his *Republic*, which would entirely supplant the family genetically, have not, so far as we can infer, arisen until a late stage of civilization has been reached. No indications of such proposals, to say nothing of actual attempts to carry such into effect, have been discovered among savages.

If it were not for the problems of nurture, the family might not have had any genetic function, and might easily be supplanted now. There would be little difficulty in the generation of children, if they took care of themselves from the beginning of embryonic development as easily as does the young mosquito. But the dependence of the child, both before and after birth, has made necessary a social organization for his care, and the family, in the past, has been that organization. This dependence makes the needs of the child social from the early stages of conception, and no social organization which might supersede the family in supplementing those needs has yet been developed, in spite of the theories of Plato, Bellamy, and others. The assumption that primitive man had such a social organization, which the highest development of civilization has been unable to attain (an assumption involved in the theories of McLennan and Lubbock), is no less than ridiculous. Yet the prediction that such a mechanism will not sometime be developed is a mere guess without foundation. In such a case, the family would be entirely superseded genetically: that is to say, it might entirely lose its genetic function, but that does not mean that it would disappear, for the family without genetic function might become even more important in other respects than it now is.

2. *Economic and marital functions.*⁴ Economic activities include

⁴ The term "economic" is here used, not in a technical sense, but in a strictly lay or popular

those which result in, or contribute to, the supplying of food, shelter, and amusement (in so far as the amusement is not of a purely social nature). We assume that among primitive man economic activities were covered by hunting, fishing, a rude agriculture, consisting at least of the gathering of seeds, fruits, roots, etc., and rude industry, consisting of the elaboration of simple products such as tent covering, garments, arrows, and knives from the produce of the hunt, stones, and plants. Later, the manufacture of pottery, textiles, and better tools and weapons was introduced. From these points, the economic activities have progressed until we have reached the present complexity of production, including razor blades, saxophones, canned salmon, and face powder. From the very earliest times, dolls, balls, and other implements for games, musical instruments, and pictures, have had their economic place.

Whatever else man does, he must live, and he must reproduce, or the race dies. If the genetic need had not been present, man might have lived individually. But, since for genetic reasons he had to live socially, the genetic unit, naturally, was the economic and marital unit. Since the children must be fed, (and in some cases clothed), and protected, the economic needs of the husband and wife could not be separated from those of the children, and as the family grew, from those of the grandchildren. Having these interests in common, warfare, both defensive and aggressive, was naturally a family affair.

Under modern civilization, the marital function of the family has almost entirely ceased, its last remnants appearing in the vendettas and feuds of Corsica, Kentucky, and some other localities. War is now a function of the larger group, and has become differentiated into the functions of warfare proper, and police power, neither of which may be taken over by individuals or by families without conflict with the state, except in those places to which the power of the state does not extend, or in which it has signally failed.

The economic functions of the family have also suffered serious reductions, and have changed their forms, but have by no means lapsed. Few families in civilized countries are now economically self sufficient. The days in which a family produced all its own raw materials and manufactured from them its own food supplies, clothing, shelter, and weapons and tools, are long past. With the rise of barter and commerce, families began to specialize on a limited range

of production, and to exchange these for the needed products of families elsewhere. With the larger use of money, and the formation of guilds and other industrial communities, extending thus the scope of commerce, specialization became intensified. Some families produced nothing but a certain kind of cloth, others only cheese, others lace, wathen, and so on. The rise of the industrial system, which took the principal manufacture almost entirely out of the family, has swept family industry almost entirely away, but has not changed the economic basis of the family except by still further specializing it.

The weavers no longer carry on weaving as individuals (or families), selling the cloth; they now work in weaving mills, but their wages are used for family support, just as before. And so with all other industries which have been put in a factory or shop, instead of on a family basis. The specialization of workers by separating administration, mostly of buying and selling, etc., from technical labor, has not changed in any wise the economic basis of the family.

Agricultural production, in the broad sense, has changed least of all. Although the industrialization of farm products, especially as concerns the great staples, beef, wheat, cotton, etc., has commenced, yet farming is still a family occupation and probably will continue to be so for a long time.

Through all these changes, certain minor occupations have remained persistently in families. The making of women's and children's clothes remains there to a large extent, although the making of men's wear is almost completely industrialized. Laundry work, and cleaning of various kinds are predominantly family occupations today, but here also industrialization is rapidly taking place.

The one great occupation which has passed very little out of the family, namely, *feeding*, including the processes of preparing, cooking, and serving food, and the universally detested consequence, the washing of dishes, is man's work in some parts of the world, woman's in others, but it is everywhere family work, except among certain uncivilized tribes, and among a very small class of civilized people, who live in hotels or patronize community dining rooms. The retention of the feeding on the wasteful and inefficient family plane has not been due to lack of desire to industrialize it, but because no competent industrialization has yet been worked out. The attempts made on a small scale have either been too expensive for people in general, although

approved and patronized by the wealthy class; or else have been unsatisfactory in results. The main difficulty seems to be, that from a public dining room, patrons demand service far superior to that which they accept in their homes, and service is the expensive part of the feeding industry. Furthermore, service must be paid for in a public dining room, but may be the unpaid labor of women at home.⁴ That the problem will be solved some day, and the present system of home feeding will be superseded, there is no reason to doubt.

The entire routing of industry from the home, however, makes no change in the real economic basis of the family. And in this direction there has been no large change, except in allowing married men and women to own private property, and in providing for the severing of children from family responsibility at the age of legal maturity. Old age pensions and state aid for mothers are minor steps in the same direction.

Schemes of individual economic independence, of course, have been proposed: schemes by which the state should be the economic unit, and individuals economically responsible to it, and it should be responsible for the individuals. In such schemes the wife is not economically dependent on the husband, and we owe, and the children are not dependent on either. On small scales, communities have tried such plans, but their failures are without significance, since an industrialized community could not be expected to succeed surrounded by a larger community on a family basis. The truth seems to be that we do not want to abolish the economic aspect of the family, although there is no evidence that abolition would injure any of its other functions.

If we consider the function of the family from the point of view of desires, it is obvious that the satisfaction of the desires for shelter, for food, for recreation, for rest, and for activity, are, under the family system, tied closely up with the satisfaction of sexual desire. Apparently, these desires have been better satisfied when satisfied in conjunction; and this fact is explicitly recognized in a variety of ways by people in general, and the recognition embodied in our literature is manifold. This recognition is so general that there is a widespread indisposition to countenance the separation of these satisfactions, lest

⁴ It must be remembered that in not more than 5 per cent of American homes are servants employed.

they be in some way interfered with. There are many who fear even that public feeding would have that effect, and the fear that the declining of the general economic functions of the family would do so is widespread.

3. *The educational functions of the family are, in course, rapidly declining.* In primitive society, practically all that a child learned he learned from his father, mother, uncles, aunts, and other male and female relatives. Under civilization, up to a relatively recent date, industrial and technical education was still a family affair, apprenticeship being regularly taken into the family by the masters, and learning their trade there. The industrial system shifted this instruction to the factory and shops. The greatest blow to family education came, however, from the institution of schools. Schools were at first private, and relieved only the families of the upper, affluent, class of a large part of their educational functions. The advantages of the school system were, however, so obvious that the institution of public schools, open to all classes, came about as a natural consequence. At the present time the school system is extending its functions in two directions, not only taking over the vocational functions of preparing for trades and industries, but also taking over more and more the domestic functions. Courses in cooking, sewing, etc., are regular features of our public and private schools. Aside from what is taught in schools, young people today obtain the larger part of their actual training from friends and associates outside of their home.

Theoretically, the family retains as its last educational function, what is vaguely described as "home" influence, which includes training in morals, manners, and matters of taste. But it is becoming evident that except in a very small percentage of families, "home influence" is inferior to good school influence, and not only are the sports and recreations of the young being more and more guided by the schools, but the "all the year round" school is rapidly being developed to keep the children away from "home influences" as much as possible. The time is rapidly approaching when the educational functions of the home will be as far as possible reduced to the first few years of childhood, and very greatly restricted and modified even there. This system is very generally employed now by those wealthy enough to afford it, and its extension universally is only a matter of time.

4. *Political functions.* The family necessarily exercises full politi-

cal functions until a definite community organization comes to replace it. Primarily, not only fixed rules of action, and of individual duties, privileges, and responsibilities, but also public opinion and force to sustain these, are family affairs. Even the duties of hospitality and the rules of warfare with other groups are family rules. With the rise of the state in its various forms, whether formal or by informal agreement, the political functions of the family have become restricted to a minor point.

According to a commonly stated opinion, the family is the unit of state organization, when the state arises. Undoubtedly, this has been true to a certain extent. Suffrage, taxes, and many other civic functions have been, until recently, the roles of heads of families. Even in this respect, matters are rapidly changing, and the assertion that the family was ever the exclusive unit in political organization has been seriously disputed by anthropologists who hold that from the very start the individual as well as the family has been a direct unit in such organization. That the family, as such, will eventually cease to figure at all in the organization of the state, although it will continue to be an important parallel organization, may reasonably be predicted.

5 *The religious function of the family has suffered a great decline, as every one knows. Religious education in the civilized family is approaching the condition of the market in Ireland. So far as the religious rituals and other social religious functions are concerned, the function is rapidly being turned over to the church. Among protestant families, family prayer, and the family pew in the church, the last holds of family religious observance, are decidedly old-fashioned.*

In some savage cultures and early forms of civilization, religious activities were primarily family affairs. The father, or the male head of the home, or some designated male in the more complex families, was the priest. Even when the church came, it recognized the family heads as priests, although strictly limiting their functions. That the church should entirely supersede the family in religious functions is as inevitable as that the state should supersede it in civil functions. Both church and state are specialized organizations, grown probably out of the family, to assume these specific functions.

16. The complex psychology of the family

The psychological characteristics of men and women so far discussed are matters upon which data are available from some scientific studies, from observations and personal reports which are obtained without great difficulty, and from the study of the stage. Normal men and women, even the most refined and modest, can be induced to discuss the intimate details of their lives, when these are matters of serious interest, and when there is confidence in the integrity and decency of the one with whom they are discussed. The presentations of the stage for the most part revolve around the various aspects of the erotic life, and the audience's understanding and appreciation, or lack of appreciation of the situations and problems which the playwrights have constructed, gives us an index of their own attitudes and their own desires and tendencies. When we depend on these sources, rather than on the data compiled from pathological cases, and interpret cautiously, we are not so much in danger of going astray in our conclusions.

There are, however, many matters of profound importance in the psychological interactions of men and women concerning which conclusions are difficult, and indeed dangerous, both because of the difficulty of collecting data, and because of the difficulties in the analysis of such data as can be obtained. The psychologist must depend here on the results of his work on the adjustment of family relations in the cases constantly brought to him: cases in which there is no question of serious personal abnormality of either husband or wife, but in which ignorance has prevented the establishment of the normal psychological relations between them. In these cases, one must be constantly on the watch lest one commit the "pathologist's fallacy" which has been so prevalent in the study of individual sex characteristics. Yet this pitfall may be avoided if one analyzes carefully, for the subsequent course of the family, after adjustments are made, gives an indication as to whether the trouble was really in the maladjustment, or was due to pathological traits in the husband or wife. Mere ignorance, we should not count as pathological in this important sense of the term.

The needs of man for woman in the lower forms of emotional life, (commonly called "carnal" in contrast to "spiritual"), are obvious. The man whose emotional life is not developed by association with

women in a variety of social ways is a narrow, frequently a warped, individual, ignorant, not only of half of humanity, but ignorant of himself. The converse is equally true of women. Into the complex development of life and character which comes through associating with members of the opposite sex, auxiliary experiences enter as constructive details when in proper relation to the general association, but are destructive if out of proper relation. Here as in so many phases in psychology, we deal with details whose particular import is modified by the pattern of the whole, and it is in its place in the pattern that each detail receives its maximal importance.

Full emotional development is a progression in which every stage depends upon preceding stages. Amorous experience achieved too early undoubtedly checks and distorts the development. So does amorous experience achieved at a later age, without the proper emotional foundations of general association, and adaptation of the personality of the individual to the personalities of many individuals of the opposite sex. Just as youthful promiscuity is destructive of character, so also is the upbringings of youth of either sex in social isolation from the other sex, unfortunate, and for the same identical reasons. And it is for the same reasons that it is only in marriage that specific sex relations form the capsule of a development of character which has such significance that only those who have experienced it can fully appreciate it.

The structure of a successful married life can be laid only on the foundations of personal interest, personal respect, and actual personal acquaintance. For this reason, hosts of marriages have small chance of success, and marriages between persons who may have been acquainted for a long time, but who have had little real association with members of the opposite sex, frequently fail to reach a high state of development psychologically, although they may be successful materially.

It is well known that intense and lasting intimate friendship between a man and a woman is practically impossible without specific sex relations. Normally, such a friendship ripens into marriage (legal or illegal) or else succeeds, since no such friendship can reach its full development except it eventually is marital relations, and the tendency towards development cannot be held static after it reaches a certain point. The proper setting for both sexes, therefore, is many friendships of moderate intimacy, until one finally ripens fully.

Moreover, an intimacy which has reached the point of specific sex relations in its normal course cannot be immediately interrupted without disaster to both parties. There is even danger in the interruption, if the intimacy has reached the point at which marriage is the next step. The general opinion that intimacies between the sexes must stop short of carnal union, unless marriage is intended, is extremely well founded, and the regulation of the social intimacies between the young must be carried out with this in view.

Social separation of the sexes, chastity before marriage, purchasing of wives, and "arranged" marriages, therefore, tend to a low order of civilisation, and fundamental social progress is away from them. Such aspects of savagery defeat the primary psychological function of marriage, which is the development of character and its functions in the most complete satisfaction of amorous desire in a synthesis of its specific and general forms. In low forms of marriage, desire fails to reach its full personal development.

From the data so far considered, we should expect to find that neither man nor woman would reach his highest state of psychological development except in the closest possible association with one of the opposite sex. The universal conception of "perfection" as involving the sexual union of the male and the female is undoubtedly founded on fact; for in vital respects, the two sexes are complementary psychologically as they are physiologically. The psychological adjustments of man and woman, however, are not made either "instinctively" or even suddenly, except in the occasional case, but require time for learning, either by trial and error, or by observation, analysis, and instruction. Extensive and prolonged social adjustment between the sexes is an indispensable means of learning, as we have already pointed out, but even this may be quite inefficient if observation is faulty or guidance defective. Premature sex relations are apt to be destructive rather than helpful to the learning process, since they establish habits of superficiality in interest and in emotional development, and habits of checking the normal development which otherwise tends to take place. The finer adjustments to the opposite sex are the most difficult things which man has to learn, and can be learned only through long continued and completely uninhibited devotion to a single member of that sex: that is, through monogamous marriage. Once learned in this way, however, the knowledge is capable of ex-

tesion, and the widespread belief that the widows and the widowers who have been really monogamously married for a term of years make superior husbands and wives upon remarriage, is apparently based on fact. The problem of divorce is, therefore, quite distinct from the problem of promiscuity and "sexual immorality," although the two are often confused by those who have violent prejudices on the divorce question.

On account of the wider range of variability of women, the effects of promiscuity, and the effects of a first marriage are not the same in man and in woman. What a woman learns about one man, is true of all men to a very large extent. What a man learns about one woman, on the other hand, is far less true of all women. For this reason, the widow attains on the average greater success in second marriage than does the widower, and the effects of sexual "immorality" are probably less serious on the woman than on the man, as regards its effects on subsequent marriage relations.

The fact that psychological understanding and adaptation between man and woman cannot easily be obtained without normal physiological sex relations, that marriage in the spiritual plane cannot be fully attained without physiological marriage, is what we should reasonably expect from the close interweaving and interdependence of the amorous desires and feelings and the more complex sex feelings, and the complementary relation of man and woman, and may hence be accepted. In families in which the essential differences in erotic desire and sensitivity are not understood, spiritual estrangement of man and wife is the common thing, no matter how complete the devotion may have been in the beginning, nor how much both may yearn for the fuller spiritual married life. On the other hand, the more complex differences between man and woman (which may be inescapable, or which may, so far as we know now, be largely matters of training), if not practically admitted and made full use of, also destroy or wreck the higher development of marriage.

We must remember that woman, because of her general organization, is on the average more self-centered and more introspective than man. She notices and appreciates her own situation in her surroundings relatively more than she notes the environmental details themselves. Or, put in other words, it is the environment as its relation to herself and to her child in which she is keenly attentive. Man, on the

other hand, is on the average more attentive to the environment; and is attentive to himself in so far as he must attend to himself in order to deal with the environment. And we must not overlook the fact that woman is the most important detail in the masculine environment. The farmer saying in the effect that for woman the world revolves about herself, for man it revolves about woman, is not devoid of practical significance.

The introspective tendency of woman is clearly expressed in the tendency to project herself into dramatic situations, a tendency to which we have earlier referred, and is clearly evident in her desires. In the total desire of the man, the thought of the object tends to be dominant over the feeling of the appet, as compared with the woman's desire, in which the awareness of the appet is relatively more vivid. In less accurate language man tends to be more attentive to the means of satisfying the desire, woman to the feeling which forms the organic kernel of the desire. This relative situation is obvious in the amorous life, as indicated by the typical courses of desire and excitability which we have pointed out, but it seems to extend over the larger aspects of life as well. There is therefore an especial need in marital life for the husband to adapt himself sagaciously to the particular emotional moods of the wife, and to regulate his behavior by them rather than by his own moods. He cannot expect as full adaptations to his own moods, particularly to their subtler features. A certain amount of concealment of the husband's emotional life, and a development of joint life on the basis of the wife's demands, is continually necessary. Beyond this, the moods of the wife may be adapted to the husband's requirements by indirect means rather than direct. In some cases the husband may successfully adopt an exacting attitude, but usually this prevents the development of the mutuality of life which is the important feature of successful marriage.

Of course, there are many exceptions. In the most significant cases, the wife learns to adapt herself to her husband's affective life, and becomes intimately responsive to his subtle expressions thereof. In other cases, the wife has from the beginning the attitudes which on the average are characteristic of the man. Sometimes, of course, the man is exceedingly effeminate, self-centered, and unsympathetic. In an appalling number of cases, the husband is crude and ignorant, although fundamentally well-meaning, and needs simple instruction in

psychology. In many other cases, the husband builds up a protective mechanism of brutality and unfeelingness because he cannot fully adapt to his wife, and knows nothing else to do. Of course, among large sections of the population, the emotional responses of both husband and wife are of a low primitive order, into which these considerations hardly enter.

In the civilized world at present, which is so largely over-populated that the genetic function of the family is negligible, the real field for the development of the family and the reason for its preservation is in the progressive development of its spiritual¹⁸ functions. Man has reached a stage of evolution in which his needs for sympathy are pronounced; and no form of sympathy is so strong or so satisfying as the sympathy between man and wife. For the man, at least, the exquisite relief of sharing his disappointments and sorrows, and the glowing satisfaction of sharing his triumphs and successes, can be reached only when he shares them with the woman to whom he has become spiritually and carnally adapted through a lengthy learning process. There need be no fear that the family will cease to be needed, whatever economic and general social changes may occur, and there is hope that the family will eventually become quite monogamous, if society takes a rational attitude towards the education of women, divorce, and the other "family problems" of today, and does not try to force the outworn methods of a crude and savage social culture upon us.

§7. Bargain and sale in marriage

In early civilizations woman was apparently free. She was a member of a family group, amenable to its rules, and under the control of the family head as were the men also. Her property was really property of the group, and the group was responsible for her children. She was free to choose her husband, as he was to choose his wife, and either could withdraw from the marriage if it was not satisfactory. The husband usually became a member of the wife's family, and acquired certain rights and responsibilities as long as he remained, losing them if he was divorced. But the woman might have a husband from a family or tribe of enemies, who might visit her by stealth, at

¹⁸ The term "spiritual" is here used in its customary sense of including the more complex, and in a developmental sense the "higher," emotional aspects of life.

risk to himself, but not to her. Whatever the form or term of marriage, there was no element of purchase or sale of sexual relations involved, nor was the woman's labor purchased.

With the change to patrilocal conditions, a change in woman's freedom and a debasing of the attitude towards sexual relations occurred. Wives began to be the property of husbands, and to be purchased like any other commodity. Perhaps slavery contributed to this change, even among matrilocal peoples, for a captured or purchased female slave would have no choice in regard to sex relations with her master. Along with the purchase of wives, prostitution also grew up, both as the sale of her sexual services by a free woman, and the rental of an owned woman by her master.

The subjection of women was materially assisted by the development of the notion of female chastity, which Voltaire has designated as man's greatest invention. Beginning first as a restraint upon married women, it was extended to unmarried, and the value set upon virginity has played an important part in social relations since. The demand of married chastity undoubtedly resulted from several factors, among which was the growing importance of paternity. Where children were family or tribal charges, actual paternity was of no importance. But with the growth of private property, the parents became responsible for their children, and with male ownership and responsibility developed, men were unwilling to be charged with other men's offspring. But exclusiveness of possession, in regard to wives as well as tents, horses, and weapons, began to have value, and contributed to the demand for female chastity in marriage. Sexual jealousy of another sort perhaps also contributed.

The growth in the value set upon virginity was a natural consequence of the convention of female chastity. Exclusive possession is enhanced in value by first hand possession. Moreover, the paternity of the first child of a marriage is in doubt, if the wife has been sexually free before marriage. It may also be true that the need of retarding the increase in population, keenly felt by primitive and later people,¹¹ may also have been a factor in the development of the value of virginity, but then a suspicion.

In this development, there was no notion of chastity as important

¹¹ Expressed in practices of abortion, infanticide, and deforming infants, found among many early peoples and many savages.

for the male. Adultery (union with another man's wife) was frowned upon, since adultery is the theft of another man's property. But sex relations with unmarried women were forbidden only when, on account of the market value of the virgin, her seduction became a property offense against her father, or other owner before marriage. Intercourse with "strange women," that is, women who were the property of non-members of the family or tribe, was not adultery, since males were not bound to respect property rights of outsiders, whether they were actually enemies or not. As regards prostitutes, no restrictions were laid on males.

The notion of chastity as a masculine virtue would have seemed utterly ridiculous to ancient peoples. The purchaser may demand certain standards to which the purchased article must conform. But the purchased commodity can make no such demands in regard to the purchaser. The would-be buyer of a horse may reject a lame animal, but the horse may not reject a lame purchaser. The ideal of masculine chastity arose first in the Buddhistic teachings, as a grace to which some men might attain, but not necessary, or even commendable for all. The ideal was embodied in the teachings of Jesus, and emphasized by Paul, but has not been treated with much respect since, until relatively recent times.

Male slavery has passed from the institutions of civilized peoples, but women are regarded as marketable property today, and regard themselves in that light. Although no price is paid for a bride, the common ideal of women is a marriage in which she receives her support, in luxury if possible, without labor, as the price for her sexual features. Seldom is the ideal achieved, and many women expect to earn their bread as marriage, as most women do. But they do not consider this an ideal situation. In deciding between suitors, the man who can offer "keep" without labor has the decided advantage over the suitor who is not so well situated economically. Even where there is no consideration of children, the situation is the same, and the childless woman expects to be kept as well as, or better than, if she had children.

Until recently, woman had but two vocations open to her, both involving her sale or rental of herself, or her sale or rental by male owners. On account of her rapid decline in value with age, the best bargain for her was sale as a wife. Prostitution, her only other possi-

bility, was a poor business arrangement so far as she was concerned. Her chances of being a wife depending upon her virginity, and the permanence of the bargain upon her chastity, these conditions were enforced upon women with comparative ease. The attitude of virtuous women towards prostitution and unchaste women generally in our society is really the same as that of union labor towards those who work for lower than union wages. The unchaste woman is regarded as a scab, and any increase in her numbers threatens the maintenance of the higher price.

The increasing economic independence of women has initiated a revolution in our marriage system. Women are no longer limited to their sex functions as a means of support, and it is not at all improbable that eventually prostitution will be abolished, and that in marriage women will not select their mates on the basis of economic compensation. Already the single standard of sexual chastity, applying to both males and females alike, is being substituted for the ancient double standard.

16. Education for monogamy

What we have said earlier concerning the danger of assuming fixed hereditary tendencies which operate in independence of training is illustrated in the various theories concerning the erotic tendencies of men and women. It has been assumed that men are "instinctively" polygynous, and that attempted restrictions on this tendency are bound to be unsuccessful as concerns the mass of males, and harmful to the individuals with whom they succeed. Theories that women are also polyandrous by nature, and opposing theories, that women are unlike men in being instinctively monogamous, have also been promulgated. Such theories require much more proof than they are able to bring.

The form of amorous tendency is determined by the environment, including all the social conditions which educate the individuals. To speak of either monogamous or polygamous instincts, or innate tendencies, is unfortunately confusing. Consideration of the monogamous tendencies of some of the lower animals, and the polygamous tendencies of others, gives us little information concerning man, except to show us the powerful effects of the condition regarding food, enemies, and other environmental factors. The conditions of

the association of animals together in herds or flocks seem to be the most powerful determinants of these tendencies. These conditions are relatively permanent among wild animals, but are radically changed when they are domesticated, and among the human animals these conditions are changed from age to age among some races, but become static among others.

In our own society, the same individual may have polygamous tendencies under certain social conditions, and strongly monogamous tendencies under other conditions. Among both men and women the cases in which an individual shows one of these tendencies for a long period, and then displays the other, are too frequent and too striking to allow us to believe that either is "inherent." Actually the mating tendency is more fundamental and general than either, and the particular form it takes is determined solely by social conditions.

Among these social conditions, status is important, but expectations, purpose, and conformity are still more important. The individual, especially in youth, is profoundly influenced by considerations of what is done by his leaders, especially when the leaders constitute a large group. The attitude of the boy and the girl in matters of sex is predominantly controlled by the opinions and attitudes of the adults to whom they look for models. The consideration of these attitudes inevitably influences the expectations and purposes of the young. A boy brought up in a social group in which the universal assumption is monogamous, expects to be monogamous himself, and opportunities and stimuli of a contrary sort constitute no temptation. The convention that a certain thing is to be done, and that a certain other thing is not, is the most powerful of controlling forces. Conversely, the knowledge that certain things, which are officially prohibited, are nevertheless done by those whom he implicitly considers as leaders, not only removes the force of the prohibition, but raises expectation or consideration of possibilities for his own actions which constitute strong controlling forces.

Many a man reaches adult life with no sexual temptation, and therefore no struggle to be monogamous, because he has never considered the possibility of being promiscuous, and then later considering that he could be, and could get away with it, changes his "tendency." And the same thing applies to women.

Habits once established tend to persist. But erotic tendencies are

no more fixed than any other habits. The monogamous habit may be broken, and so may the polygamous, if the environment is sufficiently favorable. You may bring up a child in the way he should not go, or in the way he should go, and when he is older he may depart from it. But even here, expectation is a powerful factor. Men "sow their wild oats" and then "settle down" because from the beginning they have expected to settle down. Women have more generally refrained from the wild oat business because their training has been such that their expectations have been different. If there is any change in practice among young women today it is because of change in expectation, not of change in innate susceptibility.

Assuming that the most successful marriages are truly monogamous, it is then obvious that both men and women may attain to it in spite of unsuccessful matings, if they profit by their unfortunate experiences. Admitting the adverse effects of such affairs, they are matters which society should be primarily interested in helping the individual to escape from, not in trying to lay them down to their mistakes. And this consideration applies to divorce also. Although an unfortunate marriage may be the permanent ruin of the individual, it is not necessarily so, and many succeed in escaping from one, having learned enough about themselves, and about the opposite sex, and about marital ideals, to make a second marriage a spiritual success. Here, again, society punishes itself if it condemns individuals to suffer by their mistakes irretrievably, instead of assisting them to profit by their experiences. If we define intelligence as the ability to profit by experience, we must admit that many people today hold the unfortunate belief that there is no scope for intelligence in marriage.

Undoubtedly, many mistakes may be prevented by proper education, and the education of the young in matters of sex should include much more than the merely physiological matters in which "social hygiene" is interested. The trial and error method of learning is unjustifiable, when it can be avoided, but where errors actually occur, their correction is imperatively needed.

The proper attitude towards divorce is therefore clear. Improper marriages should be prevented in so far as society is able to do so. But where society has failed in this respect, there is nothing to be gained, and everything to be lost, by insisting on clinging to its failures. The only proper interest of the state in the case of a family

failure is to make proper provision for the children. The justifiable judicial function is to determine the conditions of divorce: we cannot officially declare a marriage a success when it actually is not, without making the judicial function ridiculous.

In very many cases of unsuccessful marriage, the interests of the children require that the parents sacrifice their own interests, including their chances of attaining the highest goal of the human species—a successful marriage. Many marriages which are spiritually failures are maintained for these reasons, because husband or wife or both are willing to make the sacrifice. The fact that the state will grant divorce, does not change the determination of such people. On the other hand, where they are unwilling to sacrifice themselves, the state cannot make them do so, and chaining the husband and wife together makes matters worse for the children.

Monogamous marriage, and its continuance maintained on a high psychological plane, is an ideal towards which men and women actually strive in so far as their intelligence and their knowledge permit. To this ideal they are willing to sacrifice every other human good, and towards it they struggle in spite of failure and disappointment. Nothing else in life has such claim to be considered as an absolute good, an end and not a means. To subordinate this ideal to lesser ones, to brand monogamy as a punishment or restraint, rather than a reward, is to oppose the highest interests of humanity.

(9). The future of marriage

No one can predict that marriage, as we know it, will continue as a permanent social institution. We have noted the dwindling economic and educational function of the family, and have pointed out that reproduction and the care of children may nowiseably be provided for without the family. Any scheme for political control of breeding probably involves the reduction in the number of breeders, and the sharp separation of marriage satisfaction and procreation. The number of breeders has already been reduced through late marriage and contraceptive measures, and the movement to sterilize objectionable individuals is a slight move in the same direction. Further increase in the numbers of non-breeders may present urgent reasons for a more adequate social selection of breeders.

The rise of nursery schools may be another step towards the removal

of children from family care. Nursery schools, at present, are available for a negligible fraction of the infant population, and do not provide for the first year of life, nor for the whole day. The beginning of 24-hour provision for infants from birth, however, as an aught, and the success of the schools with the infants of the favored few is an unmistakable portent of the eventual provision for the whole population. The uniform principle of program in group provision for individual needs is that it begins with the wealthier classes, and is ultimately demanded by the masses.

The alleged disadvantage of socialized reproduction which looms largest is its failure to provide for the satisfaction of parental desires. At this distance this does not seem an insuperable difficulty. Recalling that the desire to beget children is a secondary desire, and that the primary desire is philopædic, that is, a desire to associate with, and care for, children, it does not seem impossible that a socialized reproductive system, which would give fuller scope to philopædic desire than our present system does, might be evolved. The elimination of the feature of ownership of children would be a valuable achievement, in the interests of both children and adults.

The most vital problem of the family for the future is not the problem of reproduction, but is the problem of sexual love. The Utopian scheme contemplates the reduction in number of breeders, and the number is even now being reduced. But that does not do away with the need for marriage. Marriage is sought as actively by the non-reproducing as by the reproducing, and its extinction would involve a radical change in amorous desires which we have no present reason to anticipate. Today, as in the past, men and women have amorous desires which are satisfied by casual sexual intercourse, and casual sex association. These casual desires are perhaps more normal to certain ages of individuals than to others. We have little real information on that point. They may be pathological manifestations due to our grossly inadequate social provisions for normal sex life of the majority of individuals. We should not forget that point. The important fact, however, is that in spite of the promiscuity which occurs, and in spite of the occurrence of thwarted promiscuous tendencies, men and women quite generally seek to form permanent alliances, and find their greatest amorous satisfactions therein. It is true that alliances entered upon with the belief that they will be perma-

ment often dissolve. Far greater significance attaches, however, to the vast number of cases in which two people entering under the spell of a casual impulse, find themselves caught in the meshes of sexual adaptation, and are astonished to find that what they entered upon as casual, rapidly becomes permanent, and reveals to them heights of which they had not dreamed.

Marriage (whether legal or not), provides many things. It provides continuous opportunity for sexual intercourse and we should not minimize the importance of this. Further, it provides for the proper development and use of all the attendant preliminaries and embellishments of sexual union, which aggrandize its psychological benefits and remove the dangers. Further, permanent relations, in marriage, contribute to a moderating of amorous ardors and amorous anxieties which is of veritable benefit. However important amorous stimulation and amorous gratification may be, there is a great deal more in life, and the proper balance of desires is fundamentally important. The unmarried are much more apt to suffer from hypererectum than are the adequately married. There is concern on the part of many people over "mental excess." There is such a thing, but it occurs but seldom, and is easily corrected where it is not due to other mental maladjustments.

Amatory satisfaction, in its highest success, involves a great deal more than transitory sexual relationships, and involves an adaptation of man and woman which requires care and effort. The separation of carnal love from spiritual features is in fact a perversion of a serious type. The greatest evil of promiscuity, however, is the constant unrest into which it plunges the individual, and the continuous erotic preoccupation involved in the unending competition for mates. An integrated life is possible only through the complete monastic abandonment of the amorous life or through a stabilized sexual adaptation.

We have indicated monogamy as the highest form of marriage, in that it provides the most complete satisfaction for the whole range of amorous desires. This conclusion does not apply to enforced monogamy, however, but only to monogamy attained through the individual's own initiative and efforts. It may well be that certain individuals can not attain this ideal condition, but may reach a highly satisfying adaptation in polygynous or polyandrous marriage, and that the system of the future therefore will leave individuals maximally

free to form whatever type of matrimonial alliances are most advantageous to them.

The foregoing presentation deals with only the most general condition of marriage, and necessarily omits many points which are of the most urgent importance to the welfare of society. The choice of mates, the values in physical and mental privacy, the balance of individual and joint social relation, and of joint and individual interests, the reduction of infidelities to the least harmful status, the determination of when advice should or should not be sought, the method of developing adequate general response and mutual amorous satisfaction, the adaptation of practical requirements to antiquated social convention, and the improvement of these conventions: these are examples of the topics with which the psychologist must deal in undoing and preventing marital wreckage in innumerable cases, but which can be presented only in a lengthy and specialized treatise on marriage and the family.

CHAPTER VI

THE CHILD AS A MEMBER OF THE GROUP

THE advent of a child in the family, whether by birth or by adoption, is an event of no small consequence. The economic change in the family is, in most cases, an important matter, and has its profound psychological results. The redistribution of the family budget, and the new demands on the time and labor of father and mother, not only modify the relations of the family life to outside social situations, but also modify the relations between husband and wife. Aside from the economic results, the amatory relations of husband and wife are inevitably changed, on both carnal and spiritual aspects. The new interest in the new member of the family reacts on the interest of the two parents in each other. Amorous desire and amatory behavior are not necessarily lessened, and in fact usually there is an increased attachment, interest and desire. Often an incipient rift in marital relations may be healed under these circumstances. On the other hand, the economic stresses brought about by the child, or the unswerving exclusiveness of interest in the child, or attempts at exclusive control, by one of the parents, may lead to the widening of a separation which was previously real, but not of obvious consequence. New adjustments of husband and wife are required in any case, and the attitudes of devotion and self-sacrifice which are essential to successful family life become of especial importance during the early period of the child's membership in the family.

The child is primarily a possession of the family and a charge upon it. It may be regarded as a delightful luxury, or as a source of a real hardship. The important thing is to recognize the child as being from the start a *de facto* member of the family, although its responsibilities as a member are not yet actual. It is moreover, in modern civilization, a member of the larger social or political group and may be a member of the religious group. The state recognizes the child both as a member of the family, and also as an individual member in the state, entitled to protection by the state both through the family, and independent of the family, although not subject to political duty.

The child's life as a member of society in this complex way begins during the period of gestation, as soon as impregnation is assured. The state may therefore intervene to protect the foetus from abortion, and from injury through malnutrition, or through any other preventable cause. The interest of the state in the unborn child is founded also on the fact that the period of gestation is important in the determination of the future place of the child in the social group, particularly, whether it shall be an asset or a source of trouble.

The major determinant of the welfare of the child during the gestation period can be summed up in one word: *nutrition*. The additional factors of disease and injury, and the prevention of these, complete the total environmental situation for the child. The nutrition of the unborn child is dependent on the nutrition of the mother, and through her metabolic processes is affected by her feelings and motor activities. The child is affected only by the metabolic processes of the mother, as affecting her blood stream, and through it the blood supply to the foetus. The cognitive processes (perception and ideas), of the mother are of no importance, except in so far as these affect the chemistry of the mother's blood. Since cognitive processes produce waste materials from muscle and nerve, which enter the blood stream, and since otherwise these processes affect glandular secretion and other metabolic processes, the total amount of mental activity of the mother may be important, but the character of the cognitive processes can have no significance for the unborn child.

Certain features of the child appear to be so fatally determined by the constitution of the fertilized egg from which it develops, that little variation is produced by such variations in the nutritive conditions as can occur without termination of the life of the foetus. Among these features are eye color, hair color and form, and many other details of bodily structure. How far stature and the patterns of organic function which constitute strength and weakness of various sorts are determined by prenatal nutrition, we do not yet know. As regards the effects of prenatal nutrition on mental capacities of various sorts, including sensory capacities and the four sorts of "intelligence" commonly described, our lack of information is complete.

The period of approximately two years following birth is the most important post-natal period as regards the determination of the child's nature. Whether this period is more important than the prenatal

period, or the prenatal period is more important, is a question not readily settled, and perhaps is not a logical question. The important point is that the prenatal period is immensely important, and that if the results during this period are average or better, the next two years largely determine what the individual shall be in later life.

The infant, shortly after birth, appears to be simply a vegetative being, and somewhat later he appears to be in the condition of an infra-human animal, but these periods are of brief duration. Very shortly, the infant is at the height of its intelligence, a height from which it will decline through childhood and youth. This is especially evident as regards the sort of intelligence which we describe as learning ability. Although the amount the infant learns in its first year may be in absolute amount small, relative to the infant's stock of performance the learning is very great. Moreover, during infancy the individual acquires the responses which determine its whole future learning and which are the basis for its life. Slight changes in the course of this development determine vast differences in the individual's later capacities, character and nature.

During the last forty years, and preceding the advent of scientific child psychology and scientific nursery schools, there has been a trend towards a pseudo-scientific system of rules for the treatment of young infants which contravened many of the established rules of praxis which had grown up. These arbitrary psychological rules were associated in books and verbal instructions with excellent prescriptions for the feeding and physical hygiene of infants, and hence were supposed to be equally scientific in their foundation, although in reality they were nothing but speculative theories, the applications of which have been followed by disastrous results. Scientific child psychology and the nursery school technique has enabled us to sweep away many of these nostrums, and provide sound principles for infant training.

The infant should not be left too much to itself during its waking periods. In particular, it should not be allowed to cry itself to sleep, or to "cry itself out" unless careful analysis of the particular situation of the child indicates the necessity of such drastic treatment as a step in a more comprehensive handling of the situation. In cases of doubt—and most cases are of this kind—the best advice is *don't*. In most respects, leaving the child to "cry it out" is on the same level as physical punishment. Rcklessly applied it may produce "good" children

who are easy for parents to cure for, but is productive of dire results later. Under such treatment, the infant often develops thumb-sucking, which aside from its immediate bad effects on the conformation of the teeth and jaws, is an important symptom of unfortunate psychological habits, which are being learned even if the particular vice of thumb-sucking does not appear.

The infant needs to be treated as an infant, and not as a responsible adult, or as a small animal. Harsh measures are always detrimental. For example, The neglected child, which has been forced into self-dependence and self-interest, with a stoical ability to conduct itself in the way which gives the least trouble to its parents, is prone to maladjustment in adolescence and in later life, and has difficulty in establishing proper social relations. Many parents, ■ rearing infants under the principles of harshness and neglect which they mistakenly suppose to be "scientific" have merely created problem-cases which are difficult of salvaging if not treated in the pre-adolescent period. Much can be remedied, however, if the child is placed in an adequate nursery school before the age of four.

The infant is in especial need of social stimulation. In some cases the mother alone can supply this, but the best conditions are supplied when there is an adequate supply of grandparents, uncles, aunts and others,¹ who keep the child interested continuously. The infant should be accustomed to a variety of people, and should be much "played with." Of course, over-excitement, and interference with proper sleep and diet, should not be allowed, but these are quite other matters. It is axiomatic also that relatives and others should not kiss the child, or otherwise expose it to infection or definitely harmful stimulation, but these matters again are beside the point. It is also true that the infant should not be beaten, but this does not preclude its being handled with appropriate vigor.

Some forms of play which have been arbitrarily banned have apparently been wrongfully tabooed. Jumping the child up and down violently is one thing, but vigorous firing movements are perhaps useful for the visceral and emotional development. The rocking of a

¹ This does not imply that it is best for grandparents, uncles, and aunts to live in the same house with the child. In most cases, they are best apart from the domestic establishment. In any case, authority and control over the child must be vested in the parents and other adults must not meddle.

child to sleep is harmful chiefly to the parent whose time it occupies, and may otherwise be an exercise of considerable usefulness. Of course, the child should be trained to play by itself, but this is a secondary training, not proper for infancy. It should learn to go to sleep automatically when placed in bed at the regular time, but in training it to do so, rough treatment (including making the child cry itself to sleep), are slightly less than criminal. The pattern to which the child is to be trained for sleep is the position in a certain bed at a certain time. The training consists in whatever gentle stimulations such as patting or oscillation of the bed, is effective. In so far as this procedure succeeds, the accessory stimulation should be systematically minimized, to prevent it from becoming the assumed pattern. In any case, periods of wakefulness in bed are to be avoided as the pestilence.

The same type of procedure should be carried through all training. Violence and unpleasant emotional reactions are to be avoided. This program, is, of course, a laborious one, but hard labor is involved necessarily if the child is not to be ruined. From the very first, the attitude of the parents must not be that of the disciplinarian, or mechanical director, but that of an instructor, engaged in training the child to take his part as an active member of a cooperative family.

The social stimulation of the infant begun with adults, but should by no means end there. Social training provided by individuals of his own age-group should be supplied as soon as the child is of age to profit thereby. This training should normally begin in the first years of infancy, and should not be postponed beyond the second year. In the era of large families, this training was to a certain extent supplied in the home. Now, however, this is largely impossible, and the nursery school is becoming an imperative necessity.

The period of infancy is not a period of mere bodily growth. Or rather, if it is made such, the whole future development of the individual is thwarted. The normal infant is in a period of intense mental activity, and this activity requires copious materials for its operation, if it is to be utilized to the full benefit of the individual. These materials include varied stimuli, suited to the stages of operation, and varied objects upon which the activity can expend itself in motor ways. The development of perception is a process of integration of stimuli of various sorts into patterns adequate for the situations from which

the stimuli arise. It is a further a process of integration of responses, by which the actions of complex muscular systems become unified. Along with the integration process goes the process of reduction of response, by which limited action-patterns efficiently replace gross extensive systems. The early perceptual reactions are actually total reactions. The infant perceives with the arms, legs and trunk muscles. Gradually these general systems are reduced to patterns involving a fewer muscles. The baby responds to the colored ball by movements of the total organism. This is modified into a mere grasping movement. Then when language is learned, the response is transferred into a vocal pattern of saying "ball." Still later this pattern may be still further reduced, so that perception occurs with no overt response at all.

The integration-process is equally important. The visual effect of the ball is first little more than that of color. To this are added tactual and muscular perceptions, and eventually the visual stimulation alone produces the perception of the ball as a concrete object, including the features previously revealed only through the other senses.

Space relations constitute another field in which the infant is making progress. Not only must the relations of distance and direction be learned experimentally in terms of intricate movement systems, first of the arms, and later, of the whole body in creeping and walking, but these relations must be integrated with the visual impressions. Not for nothing does the normal infant grasp, move about, drop on the floor, pick up, and seek to recover, objects of various sorts. Through these experimental procedures he is learning space perception. Time relations are learned by relating the serial occurrences of his daily life to his organic conditions.

The child, moreover, must learn to discriminate, that is, to make definitely different responses to objects and situations which differ in practically important features, no matter how much they must be alike otherwise. Enormous progress is made in the development of perception during the first year of life, if the infant is provided with adequate and varied stimulations, and with appropriate outlet for the responses. It is safe to say, that under adequate conditions, more is acquired during this year than during the remainder of life. If the acquisition is perverted or distorted, it is doubtless true that the

effects of such mal-development have a serious deterrent effect on all further learning. In learning to perceive, the individual is at the same time laying the foundations for thinking, as well as actually beginning the thinking processes which are well under way towards their major development in the second year.

The adult differences in intelligence, in discrimination, in intellectual apprehension, in perceptual keenness, may in part be due to what is popularly called "heredity," that is, to the constitution of the fertilized egg from which the individual develops. It is safe to assume, however, that they are in far larger degree due to the type of stimulation and consequent type of mental development during the first year of life. In this total stimulation, social stimulation (the stimulation afforded by other persons) plays a large rôle. There is even some ground for suspecting that the progeny of two feeble-minded parents, brought up from birth by normal people under adequate conditions of stimulation would approximate towards "average" mental level, and that a child of normal people, brought up for the first year by feeble minded foster parents would be permanently handicapped mentally.

As the child becomes more active and reaches the age of understanding, due to the acquisitions he has made, self direction and independence must be emphasized. Obedience is to be fostered only as a reasonable adoption of opinions and rules which the child himself can recognize as formulated by adults who have experience in the fields he is entering. If the rule cannot be made to appear reasonable to the child without resort to mendacity, the social situation in the family is not conducive to proper development of the child. In especial, the child must be trained to disobey at points where the parents' prevision breaks down. This is a hard matter, but of enormous importance. Otherwise, the child will become a psychopathic being, obeying in his later years conventions which he knows are wrong, or else, in breaking over into disobedience, he will lose the very social attitude towards parents which is most valuable for his later youth.

If the child's relationship to the family group is to be beneficial to the family, including himself, the sphere in which he makes his own decisions must be a continually widening one. He must acquire progressively the individuality on which alone adequate family relationship can be based. Accordingly, his opinions, his judgment, and

his privacy must not only be increasingly respected but actually promoted. The frequent cases in which youths are dominated by their mothers or fathers in the selection of their clothes, their games, and their general interests and activities, to the extent of becoming incompetent both socially and individually, if not actually psychopathic, are too frequent to be ignored. Domination in such details as these, however, are but symptoms of a more profound dominance which spans the life of the child. Not only narrow parents, but especially parents who are extremely wise and competent, need to guard themselves against this evil attitude, for it is the really competent parent who is most apt to put the dominance over on the child. "Good" mothers probably do far more damage than "bad" ones, as these terms are popularly understood.

Increasing freedom for the child means of course constant liability to errors. This is inevitable. Risks must be encountered, or mental stupefaction follows. Even in regard to physical risks, it is important that the child should take risks, which is the parent's function to minimize, if possible, without suggesting that the child refrain from activity because of the risk. In no other way than this can the child be trained to guard against danger, moral as well as physical. But the training² should involve the consideration of what is a reasonable risk, and what is foolish. Individuals who are not trained to make that discrimination, through the acceptance of reasonable risks, will either turn out "yellow," or else will persist in making foolish ventures throughout life. In every respect, the emphasis should be on the intellectual calculation of risks, and the accepting of risks, when judged reasonable, without emotional attitude, and the rejecting of risks without fear.

The correct balance between privacy and collective life in the family is difficult to prescribe. Every child should have space of its own, in which he can be free from physical interference by the parents or other children. He should have mental privacy also. In certain things he should not be required to take anyone into his confidence. At the same time, he should participate in the common problems, common culture and common life of the family. He should do certain things of himself and by himself. Certain other things should be

² "Training" is here used in the general sense, not in the sense of enforced discipline. The child cannot be forced or ledged into independence.

done with the family, as family matters. In social relations this need is not to be overlooked. So far as possible, the child should have his own social circle, and he should not be forced into all the social acquaintances of his family, yet in certain social relations he should take part, as matters in which the family is concerned, and for which therefore, he, as a member of the family, is responsible. His responsibility, in other words, should be not to the individual parent, but to family as a unit.

In the same way, parents should have privacy from their children. Certain matters of importance may be kept from the children's knowledge, solely on that ground. These matters are private matters of the parent, or of the parents together, and the child readily understands that they have such privacy, just as he has his.

Punishment has its function in the family group, just as in other groups, and probably has as little efficacy. Unless the punishment is a logical result of the error, it has little value for either parent or child. The conditions in which punishment inflicted by the parent benefits the child are not far different from those in which punishment inflicted by the child benefits the parent. Repentance and forgiveness have no place whatever, but are pathogenic factors. The damage due to revengeful punishment may be repaired, the damage due to the high and mighty attitude of forgiveness can never be undone. Any delinquency may be made the basis for better understanding of conditions, and purposes of better behavior in the future. Forgiving a delinquency puts it at once in the field of revenge, and like repentance, makes, of what should be a past event, a present source of weakness. From an early age the child should understand that what is done is done, and can not be undone, and is therefore a matter neither for forgiveness nor unforgiveness, that its only importance is as a guard against error in the future.

A strong parental sentiment, and a strong filial love, are ends in themselves in life, and are essential promoters of family organization. Unbalanced sentiment, in which tenderness, or sympathy, or dependence, is exaggerated, is a source of weakness. The evil effects of such unbalance are apparent when it comes time for the child to loosen family ties, through preparation for marriage. In many cases, unfortunately, the child is swayed against his own interests and the interests of his parents, through such unwholesome clings on the part of either

parent or child. Where such dependencies have been built up to the danger point, actual rebellion, sometimes roughly expressed, is often necessary, as the most abrupt method of breaking a pathological tie is often the kindest. Where children have reached the age of discretion, and rebel finally after due consideration and advice, the result is usually highly pleasing to the parent after the first shock is over. The independence and competence which the parent had tried to obstruct become sources of additions to the pride in the child and the parental feelings concerning him. Similar rebellion against the dominance which a child has acquired over a parent is equally satisfactory in its emotional results. Unfortunately, children not early trained to independence and reasonable disobedience seldom succeed later in effecting successful revolutions without the aid of outside instruction and advice.

Veracity and honesty are essential features in building up the family. Children may lie to their parents without being found out, but parents seldom lie to their children successfully. Parents who constantly lie to their children and then are perturbed by the discovery that their children have returned the compliment are deserving of no sympathy. They reap what they sow. Yet parents often compel their children to lie through their equivoqual system of making the children account for themselves in minor details, and through their invading of the child's privacy in various other ways. Even in major matters, calling a child to account is a procedure to be carefully weighed, lest it merely result in inducing the child to lie. Accusation of lying is of course a fatal procedure in almost all cases. The assumption that the child is telling the truth, even when the parent suspects deception, is in general the most hygienic procedure. When a child is caught in lying, the occurrence must be clearly analyzed without any implication of being shocked or wronged, and when fully presented, dismissed for good and all. Scolding, and nagging, in this or any other delinquency are the worst possible procedures, and lengthy discussion also builds up resistances and self-justifications. The parent must assume honesty and fairness on the part of the child, regardless of past events, and if there is any hope for the child at all, the child will respond.

The regression of the educational and cultural functions of the family, already summarized, is not due solely to general social and

economic changes but is fostered by the growing recognition of the inability of the average home to supply adequate conditions for child development. The home still supplements the school, as a group from which, in general, the child issues in the morning and to which he returns at night. It is well recognized that, on the average, boarding schools are failures, but it is also apparent that a few are successes, and that the possible approximation to the ideal supplies better conditions for general development than does the average home. Experts in psychological guidance find it necessary in many cases to recommend the placing of children in institutions in order that they may be removed from pernicious home conditions, and the number of such recommendations would be enormously increased did economic conditions permit it.

The rise of modern nursery schools is beginning to take care of the children during the day from the period at which walking and talking are well established. There can be no doubt that these advantages will be generally available in a relatively short time, and that the lower age limit will be still further reduced. The introduction of sound psychology into boarding schools will ultimately make them more adequate substitutes for the combination of home plus day school, and the tentative "summer camps" will fair to develop into institutions of a somewhat different character, providing for child development during vacation, and quite aside from formal education.

Another function of the nursery school is rapidly increasing, however, and will surely be extended to the schools and institutions for child care at older ages. This is the training of parents in the proper psychological attitudes towards their children. With the improvement in home influence which this procedure may ultimately bring about, the home may again become an institution of maximal importance, in cooperation with the institutions, accomplishing that in which it has failed in the past through the lessening of its field of labor and through scientific cooperation, and giving scope for parental satisfactions far beyond that of the past.

The child, in short, is properly an actual member of the family group, and not merely a piece of family property and a family care. The child is also a direct change of the larger or political group, even in his prenatal period, and progressively through childhood increases his political connections towards the status of full citizenship, and the

directness of political relationship increases from generation ■ generation. Nevertheless, for the infant and child, the family relationship is, and will for a long time remain, the most important group relationship. Independence and responsibility must therefore be assigned to the child in the family on the same basis as to other members, namely, with due regard to his physical and mental status, his needs, and his desires, as these develop. Otherwise, not only the welfare of the child, but also that of the family group is jeopardized, and this constitutes a double risk of the future welfare of the larger group.

CHAPTER VII

RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATION

31. The nature and origin of religion

MANY theories as to the origin of religion have been constructed, and many definitions of religion have been formulated in agreement with the theories. It is a significant fact that these definitions have in general been failures, that no definition has been offered which has met wide approval, but each of the many definitions has its own group of partisans. This fact should make us skeptical concerning the corresponding theories of origin. By way of illustration it will suffice to refer briefly to four of the most important theories as to the nature of religion which involve or imply definitions of religion.

The origin and nature of religion have been referred to "sex" in a loose way, emphasizing the rôle of the genital organs and reproductive processes in the rituals and language of religion, and assuming on this account that religion arises out of *amorous* desire, and more particularly, out of the thwarting of *amorous* desire, and the inhibition of *amorous* activities by social conventions and rules. This is an ancient theory, which has often been revived, and which has been in recent times popularized by the psycho-analysts. This is a confusion theory, which becomes inconsequential as soon as we consider the total range of desires which enter into religious development, and the rôles which reproductive notions have actually played therein.

Religion, again, has been defined in terms of God or gods, and its origin attributed to the belief in such a being or beings. This theory is perhaps nearer to the truth than is the "sex" theory, but our acceptance of it is checked when we consider the existence of religions held by millions of people into which the conception of God does not enter at all. It may be claimed that these godless religions are formed from religions which began theologically, and lost the divine element in the course of progressive transformations. But this uniform development has not been proved, and even if true, it would still not make it possible to define religion in theological terms.

Belief in individual immortality of some sort, either the post-mortem continuation of a ghost, or a double of the deceased individual, or of the "man himself," has been assigned as the source of religion. It has been pointed out that this conception, in one of its forms, has been widely held by ancient peoples, and that the so-called worship of ancestors implies the belief that either the ancestors themselves, or some vestiges or representatives of their objective personalities, still exist. This sort of belief may perhaps have preceded the rise of religion in certain uncivilized cultures, but the universality of such a development is rendered improbable by the types of religion which reject ghosts and their ilk. In the religion of civilized cultures, the ghost belief has played a part, but apparently not an essential part.

A theory which is often confused with the ghost theory, and in fact is seldom clearly distinguished from it by proponents of either, has held that the conception of an indwelling "spirit" or daemon is the point of departure from which religion has developed. Calling this indweller the "anima," the theory has received the name of animism. It is pointed out that many savages and our own cultural ancestors have believed in spirits inhabiting not only men, but also animals, trees, and inanimate objects such as stones, springs, rivers, and mountains, in addition to free-living spirits corresponding to the angels and demons of medieval Christianity.

The animistic theory assumes that not only the further beliefs of religion, but its entire structure and organization arise from this more primitive belief. The fact that such a belief is a highly developed one, and must have developed from more really primitive foundations, would cause us to hesitate, even if there were no evidence inclining us to a different theory. That a belief in spirits would inevitably, when it arose, be absorbed into the religious system, we can well understand. It theoretically is possible, even, that certain religions of uncivilized peoples have arisen around the daemon belief. On the whole, however, it is impossible to escape the presumption that in any case, before the spirit-conception had developed, religion would have arisen. Whatever the rôle which daemons assume in a religion, the sources of the religious notions about them form the major problem for the social psychology of religion.

It might be claimed that no conception of religion, and no course of religious development is universal, but that some religions are of

one nature and origin, other religions of other natures and origins. This claim would overlook the fact that we have always called these things all *religion*, and have unanimously felt that they should be classed together, although we have not been able to formulate a definition which would include them all. And we find uniformly in these matters, that collective judgment on total situations has something reasonable at the bottom, not to be swept away by theoretical analyses of the same situations. If we accept the fact that there is a common factor in religion, and then seek for that factor, we will be pursuing the course which has the greatest probable value.

The only theory of religion which today seems to have value as a scientific working hypothesis is the theory that religion has its origin and its support in *dissatisfaction* with life, resulting from reflection on the failure of life to satisfy the primary desires of man.

Man desires food, shelter, protection, rest, activity, progeny, and sex gratification, as well as conformity and preeminence. If he did not consciously desire these, but merely had a mechanical tendency to seek the corresponding gratifications (which he has also), it is inconceivable that he would develop religion, although it is quite possible that magic and ethics, which have commonly been associated with religion, might have been developed. It is possible that the lower animals are in this condition of possessing satisfaction-tendencies, without desires. But such a supposition is needless, both because one cannot conclude that certain animals, such as apes, are entirely devoid of rudimentary religion, and also because there are still other necessary conditions of religious development.

The essential condition, beyond the occurrence of desires, is that those desires shall not be abundantly gratified, and that this failure shall be reflected upon. An animal possessing highly conscious desires, but whose desires are abundantly gratified whenever they arise, can possess no religion, except as he adopts it by "imitation" or "suggestion," (terms to be explained later), from fellow animals who have developed it. An animal whose conscious desires are very inadequately satisfied will not develop religion, unless he is conscious of that lack of satisfaction, not merely in each particular case perceptually, but by thought-consciousness, through which the particular lacks of the past and the present are brought together in a general view.

Man possesses all these qualifications. He has vivid, not to say violent, desires, they are to a very large extent ungratified, or their gratification is delayed, and conjoined with the compensatory loss of gratification of other desires, and man thinks, and thinking, he is conscious of his deficiency of satisfaction. Hence, man pretty uniformly is religious.

Associated with man's desire of conformity is a tendency of thought and action which may for convenience be called *vicarism*¹. This tendency comes to the front in many forms, but it comes forth characteristically in a tendency to accept dissatisfaction of desires, without protest, provided some one, in some class, whom the individual accepts as his superior, but with whom he forms a close group in the superior-inferior relation, has his desires abundantly satisfied. Dependents, serfs, slaves, retainers, and a host of inferiors whom it is difficult to name, are in many cases content with limited satisfaction of their desires, provided such humiliation contributes to the fuller satisfaction of the desires of their leaders, lords, chiefs, and owners. In other words, these individuals obtain *vicarious satisfaction*. The sex desires are the most difficult to satisfy vicariously, but even these are in many cases amenable to the same treatment. This tendency ■ *vicarism* is obviously a specific form of the more general tendency ■ *conform*, based on the desire for conformity.

The vicarious tendency of man has not seriously interfered with the development of religion. Although large numbers of the less fortunate of the race have been reflectively content with their lot, and have assumed it to be "natural," others have been less desirous of conforming, and have not been vicariously satisfied. The leaders, again, have themselves seldom been completely satisfied and have tended to develop religious conceptions. Religious notions, developed by any member of a group, tend to spread, and have a very profound practical effect in promoting the very vicarism which might inhibit the formation of the notions by the group of inferiors. Leaders have not been slow to take advantage of this practical result, and a very great incentive to the promotion of religion has been the use it serves in keeping the less fortunate class content with their lot.

Dissatisfaction with life has produced two religious tendencies

¹ The term is not an accepted usage, but is here introduced because we have no other abstract substitutive term corresponding to the adjective *vicarious*.

which have largely been cooperative, although not always combined. First, it has given rise to social attempts to circumvent the dissatisfaction of life, and to supplement the *praxis*, or practical procedure, through which man normally satisfies his desires incompletely. Second, it has given rise to the conception of gods, demons, and other superior beings, who enjoy the fuller satisfactions desired but not obtained by man. The satisfactions ascribed to the gods are various. Sometimes the desire most emphasized is the desire for rest, sometimes desire for activity (play), very often the desire for food, or sex desire, and always the desire for preeminence. Universally, the desires which are least gratified in the human race are those which the gods (or demons) gratify most abundantly.

Man, in other words, derives vicarious satisfaction from the satisfaction which he ascribes to his divinities (whether gods, devils, or both). But always these divinities must be *his* divinities; he must identify himself with them as belonging to a closely organized social group.

Third, by contemplating the failure of life as man knows it, he comes to the consideration of *another* life for himself. And at this point his conclusions separate into two opposite types. In one case, the intensity of his desire leads him to believe that another life, in which desires will be fully gratified, is possible; and having accepted this view of immortality, he is more content with his life here. This is another point of advantage which crafty leaders have not been slow to grasp, and on account of which they have greatly promoted the spread of religion among their unfortunate brethren whom they have wished to keep unfortunate.

The full satisfaction of desire in another life might theoretically be obtained by retaining the desires in vivid form, and providing abundant means for their gratification. On the other hand, in a future life, the desire may be reduced to zero, in which case also, satisfaction is complete, because there are no desires to satisfy. This is the solution adopted by the Sankhya system, and by many others.

But man may conclude that no life with full satisfaction of desires is possible. He accepts the doctrine that life, as he knows it, is typical of all possible life, here or hereafter, that where there is life there is desire, and that desire can never be adequately satisfied. Hence, he consoles himself by concluding that life may be terminated

at death, and distracts his attention from the sorrows of life by busy-ing himself with rituals by which he believes he can obtain permanent release from it. Thus, the adherents of many Hindu religions work for "salvation" through annihilation or absorption as industriously as adherents of Western religions work for "salvation" through entering Heaven.

These two elements of religion, the purely selfish one of "saving one's soul," and the relatively social one of vicarious satisfaction, are intermingled in various religions in various proportions. In none of the great religions of the world is either entirely absent. Even in the Mohammedan religion, the vicarious enjoyment of the believer of the superior positions of God, his prophet Mohammed, and Mohammed's numerous family is an important matter. Among the Jews, although the Sadducees are reported to have eliminated the element of salvation entirely, other classes included it.² In Christianity both factors are prominent. As regards savage religions, we can be less definite, as we are concerning every thing else among savages, but apparently the God-element has occurred among some groups without the immortality element.

The God-element in religion, obviously, makes it at once social. Man is united to man through his relation to a common God or group of gods. The social organization of religion has its foundation in this religious element. But the social factor has also been strongly developed in concurrence with the immortality element of many religions, through the introduction of ethical means of obtaining salvation, as well as through the rituals designed to assist or control natural forces.

Returning now to the animistic theory of religion we see that animism needs another element before it can become religion, and that this element can be accounted for only on the grounds we have outlined. Even if animism had preceded religion in order of organiza-

² The Jewish religion in its final form, as represented by the Psalms, includes some magic, that is, the intervention of the other-worldly power in the affairs of this world, but is essentially the expression of the God-idea, with little or no idea of salvation. Man is not to be rewarded for his adherence to his divinity, the adherence is an end in itself, through which he attains the satisfaction of conforming to the greatest social group and social leader of which he is able to envelope. Into the long history of development of the Jewish religion, from female worship to male worship, many other factors undoubtedly entered.

tion, it would not of itself have become religion, but would be absorbed into religion only when the conviction of this life as a failure should have arisen.

Furthermore, since modern man accepts animism only because he has been taught it, or because of his religious desire, and since we have no reason to assume that the situation was different with primitive man, we are forced to assume, tentatively at least, that religion arose before animism, and that animism developed from religion, or within it, with far-reaching effects on the total religious system. This assumption is strengthened by the existence of religious quies free from animism.

§2. Religion and magic

Magic and religion have been closely associated among all peoples, religious beliefs and practices being so intimately mingled with magical beliefs and practices that to the casual observer they have often seemed to be the same thing, and it has even been supposed that religion has developed from magic. An examination of magic and its differentiations from religion is profitable because it leads to a definite conception of the nature of religious activity, and through that conception, to the conception of the nature of social religion.

Science and magic alike attempt to discover the laws of causal succession in nature, and by making use of these to control the course of natural phenomena. Having found the efficient cause of a phenomenon, it is readily conceivable that the phenomenon can be produced if the cause can be set in operation, or that the phenomenon can be inhibited by obstructing the cause. If it be true that the secretion of the thyroid gland causes certain phases of physiological development, and that the absence of this secretion results in cretinism, or the absence of such development, then, obviously, by feeding thyroid extract, or thyroid glands, to children who tend toward cretinism, normal development can be produced. This is science and its application. Obviously, also, if tying a red string around the neck of a child has causal efficiency in warding off nose bleed, then the thing to do for a child subject to nose bleed is to tie a red string around its neck.

The results which should follow the operations of the scientific man and the magician are capable of being checked up to determine

whether alleged causal sequences are real or fictitious. Science makes such check experiments, and accepts no hypothesis which is not shown by such means to be valid. Magic makes no such checks, and this is the decisive difference between magic and science. Science, therefore, differs from magic not in intent or purpose, nor in fundamental presuppositions, but in method and thoroughness. The barbarian, and the superstitious civilized man, are satisfied with a plausible rule. The scientific man puts the rule to the test, or demands assurance that other scientific men have made the test by full scientific method. Magic is really due in part to lack of imagination, of which science makes more abundant use, both in thinking of manifold possibilities, where magic thinks of but one, and in planning the ways of putting these possibilities to the test.

The savage medicine man attempts to produce rain, to ward off disease, to cast out "devils," to attract a herd of game, to give himself or his clients maximal strength in battle, or in the chase, to kill his enemy surreptitiously, to increase the fertility of his fields, and so on through a long line of practical matters, and he uses means which he believes will accomplish these results. But his belief happens to be erroneous, and he holds to it because he does not check up on his operations to find out errors. Some of these results which the magician aims at are actually accomplished by applied science, and many more will be accomplished eventually. But the accomplishments of science are due to its more careful observation, and its system of experimental tests through which the false theories are discarded and the true ones retained.

In some cases magic hits on true causal relations. It would be strange indeed if man in noticing what seem to be causal relations in the world did not notice some sequences which are actually causal. In other cases, a crude form of scientific observation by trial and error has undoubtedly developed within a system of magic. In the case of the savage "medicine man" it is frequently impossible to determine which process has resulted in the selection of valid means, where these valid means have been attained.

The use of actual poisons to kill an enemy, and the use of charms, such as mistreating a clay image of the enemy, or engaging in other rituals and incantations, are frequently viewed by the savage in the same light. He believes in the one method as in the other, and has

no reliable evidence that the one works better than the other. Both, therefore, are really magical, although science knows that one technique is uniformly efficacious and the other works only when "suggestion" operates. On the other hand, the prevalent use of poisoned arrows and the dependence on the poisoning rather than on the use of magic rites for the charming or "blessing" of the weapons, is probably due to the cumulative observation that the one method works better than the other.

The truth of the matter is, that magic and religion both arise out of what (or what is a better word we may call *praxis*) prior to the rise of science, man slowly develops ways and means of obtaining the materials and creating the opportunities for satisfying his desires. His development is made by a combination of trial and error, fortunate guesses, and crude analytic thinking.

The evolution of the making and use of stone implements, of spears and bows and arrows, of boats and carts, of huts and houses, of clothing of various sorts, of pottery and metal wares, of social organization, of the myriads of detailed processes of primitive life as even the cruder cultures, has not been a scientific procedure, and it has not been in the main religious or magical. Yet science, magic, religion, all are efforts still further to better or to extend the common praxis.

Civilized man has frequently underestimated the success of savage and "primitive" science because of its admixture with mere magic. Yet savages and primitive civilizations are not without their crude scientific attainments. Perhaps the most striking illustration of the knowledge of actual cause and effect which scientific men treated with contempt, was the discovery, apparently by the Arabs, that malarial fevers are transmitted by mosquito bites. Captain Burton, usually so appreciative of barbaric attainments, set this down as a magical belief, and it was not until half a century later that civilized man applied scientific methods to test it.

It would be a mistake to suppose that magic is largely restricted to uncivilized or "primitive" peoples. Magic flourishes throughout all civilization, and is rampant today. Vast numbers of superstitions, such as those involved in using a red string to prevent nose bleed, carrying a potato in the pocket to ward off rheumatism, avoiding thirteen at the table, and communicating venereal diseases to a virgin to cure the diseased person, is a very frequent cause of the rape of

young girls), are held and practiced by "civilized" people. The extensive patronage of palmists, clairvoyants, astrologers, sooth-sayers, seers, prophetesses, character analysts and psycho-analysts, and the eager interest in telepathy, spirit photographs, "ectoplasm," and other spiritualistic phantasies, shows clearly that so far as magic is concerned, the Hottentot, the Malay, and the Louisiana negro have little on the white man.

The history of "medicine" in the modern sense of the term is an instructive illustration of the slow growth of science as a magical system. Until the last generation, fearful and wonderful doses were poured into patients under the supposition that they produced this, that, and the other effect, although there was no scientific evidence for the truth of these theories, and many of them were grounded on error. "Regular" medicine is by no means free from this system of magic even today, although its *radicula ad absurdum* in homeopathy, New Thought, and Christian Science led to the rapid growth of a really scientific medicine. Between the magic of the Christian Science practitioner who reads a few pages from "Science and Health" over the patient, and that of the old school doctor who poured a miscellaneous assortment of drugs into him, there is little to choose, except in the fact that the drugs taste worse.

It has been pointed out by a number of authors that magic bases its beliefs and practices largely on observations of similarities and partial identities, and on the efficacy of contact. Things which resemble each other must be causally related, it is assumed. Otherwise, why should they behave? Perhaps a fallacious notion of reversibility of causal relations is involved also. The image of the enemy resembles the enemy, and there is a cause for the resemblance, the savage fails to see that this causal relation runs only in one direction, that the actual characteristics of the enemy determine the characteristics of the image through the reaction of the maker of the image, but that the reactions expended upon the image will not so simply affect the enemy.

The simple inference from resemblance has been clearly exemplified in savage therapeutics, and has not been absent from more civilized medicine. A plant whose leaf, flower, or root resembles the liver, the heart, or some other human organ, must, it is assumed, have some effect on the corresponding organ when administered. The resem-

stances upon which dependence has been placed have not been form, or in visible characteristics. Eating the flesh of a powerful animal or of a valiant enemy should give strength or courage to the eater. If it is assumed that courage has its seat in the heart, then eating the heart of the courageous animal or man should do the trick. Animals or plants whose odors resemble the odors of certain human secretions have been widely credited with power to influence these secretions when eaten.¹

The efficacy of contact is easily observed. In order to move a stone, you place your hands upon it, or use a stick in contact with your hands and with the stone. A weapon, in order to wound a deer or leopard, must come in contact with him. Poison must be swallowed, or rubbed on the skin, to be deadly.

Far more important is contact between human beings. Hence, something which has touched the enemy, a bit of his clothing, or a stick he has held, if worked into the clay usage or other means of working magic upon him, makes the charms more efficacious. Still more effective are actual parts of the enemy: the parings of his nails, a lock of his hair, or a piece of his skin or flesh removed in ceremonial mutilations. Hence, the extreme care which savages use in disposing of such trappings, as well as of cast off clothing and ornaments lest they fall into malevolent hands.

But magic is not based exclusively upon the exaggeration of the importance of similarities and contacts. As an illustration of other important factors, the power of names will suffice. This again is an assumption due to generalization of real observed causal relations.

Knowing the name of another person does give you real power over him. You can compel his attention, and this compulsion frequently leads to significant and important consequences. If you want to make another man do something for you, you must first get his attention. Hence, the practice of having a secret "real" name, known only to

¹ The belief in the causal efficacy of resemblance carries over, moreover, into the still prevalent superstitions of the "transmission of acquired characteristics" and "prenatal influence." Not only popularly, but by certain scientific men, it has been believed that certain agencies acting on parents may produce on their children effects which resemble the putative causes. In the typical experiments to test the "transmission of acquired characters," the experimenters have usually been so completely under the influence of the magical doctrine that effects must resemble their causes, that they have looked for no effects other than the magical ones.

trusted friends, and the existence of many taboos or prohibitions guarding the use of names.

The beliefs of science and those of magic are all practical. Ultimate religion, unlike magic, does not involve practical beliefs, and its activities aim at no practical results. By "practical" we mean here, literally, beliefs concerning actual causal relations within the mundane realm of nature, and activities intended to produce effects within this realm. The effects postulated by magic are capable of test by experiment and observation, the effects postulated by religion are in the "other" world, and cannot be subjected to tests. The beliefs of advanced religion are beliefs concerning the "other" world. Science, therefore, can never have any such bearing on religion as it has on magic. Whatever success may sometimes attend the efforts of the psychic researchers, (and none have so far been demonstrated), can have no effect on religion, unless to demolish it, by demonstrating that the supposed "other world" is really a part of this mundane realm. But the results of psychic research so far are wholly in the field of magic, and it is highly improbable that it will ever succeed in destroying religion.

The emergence of religion from the same praxis from which also magic arises, involves the necessity that in the proto-religious stage just before it becomes religious in the proper sense (through the incorporation of other-worldly beliefs, it is not sharply distinguishable from proto-magical systems. Further, it has been inevitable that religion itself should for a period retain in its organization a mass of magic, as well as of non-magical praxis. We find all religions except certain very modern cults are concerned with economic and social processes and results in this world, and exclude attempts to attain these results by magical means in many instances.

As soon as there arises a conception of another world in which superior powers reside, this conception is seized upon by magic. The missing link between the magic ritual and the desired effects is assigned to the other-worldly powers, and magic thereupon faces about from the line of development into science.

For modern evidence one may look at prayer and divine healing. Prayer, in the religious sense, is the establishment of a rapport with the power of the other world, often merely for the strengthening of the social bonds between the human individual and an other-worldly

person, but frequently for the protection of the individual's other-worldly salvation. But prayer, once admitted as an effective contact with superior powers, becomes a magic rite for the production of mundane effects. The priest prays for rain, for the relief of disease, and for the success of his people in war. All such effects are theoretically capable of scientific tests: that is, they are magical. The use of rituals, medals, charms, amulets, prayer wheels, and "religious" ceremonials of various sorts today, is far more magical than it is religious.

But that magic, even among savages and barbarians, is very frequently free from this religious element there is much evidence. The theory of much magic comes under the concept of *mana*, or power of a natural sort residing in objects and persons in this world. Just as the electric coil has the definite power (*mana*) of shocking another animal, and phosphorus has the power to ignite, and certain plants have the power to kill those who eat them, so many other objects, in magical theory, have resident powers *mana* which science finds non-existent, but which the savage believes to be as real as heat, light, and electricity. The relation of magic to science comes out clearly in these cases.

The *mana* attributed to persons, and to personal acts, is apparently in its origin not conceived anatomically, but in the same way in which the *mana* of inanimate objects is conceived. The power of the king's touch to cure scrofula or "king's evil" is like the power of the touch of the hangman's rope to cure barrenness in women. The baleful power of female "ceremonial incantations" and the closely associated power of the "evil eye" are like the power of vegetable and mineral poisons. The method of man making a vogue in Java (two men thrashing each others' backs with rods until the blood flows), does not differ essentially from the method in vogue in Australia (throwing pulverized quartz crystals over the women), or that in vogue in Maryland (hanging up a dead snake by the tail).

⁴ Dr. Macht has shown that the geomancers and seers as well as the local discharge of menstruating women actually do contain forces. Thus another kind of magic has been shown to be based on correct observation. But such scientific verification of magic beliefs does not mean that magic is to be accepted. It merely shows that all practical beliefs which have been widely held are worthy of scientific examination, if there is the ground of possibility of any truth in them.

Not only has the development of religion contributed to magic, but magic has made its contribution to religion. The magic efficacy of contacts is utilized in the "laying on of hands" for religious purposes. The mana of medals, baptisms, and blessings, has its function in assisting the soul's salvation. And the magic importance of the name has become invaluable in many religions. The names of the gods or of the demons are of great aid to magicians in invoking their assistance, and the secret of the god's true name is often jealously guarded in order that unauthorized persons may not use this powerful manu. Even in prayer of a purely religious nature the name of the divinity addressed gives the petitioner a powerful claim to his attention.

3) Personal religion and social religion

We have seen that religion as an individual affair begins in dissatisfaction with the mundane system, and is completed in the belief in an extra-mundane world. This extra-mundane realm may be a realm of more abundant life, (more abundant satisfaction of desires), to be attained by man after death, it may be merely a realm in which superior beings live more abundantly than is possible for man, or it may be merely a continuation of the mundane life, and therefore to be avoided if possible. Any system of belief which fulfills one of these conditions is by common consent classed as a religion, and such classification is fully justified. It is not essential that each individual should take a pessimistic view of life before accepting a religious belief, and in the vast majority of cases the reverse is true, the individual accepts the belief in the other world during the optimistic period of youth, before the dissatisfactions of life have affected him. He is taught the religious belief which has been handed down from the past, and he is therefore already prepared for the intellectual and emotional syntheses when the conviction of evil finally strikes into him. This is the "conviction of sin," which plays such an important part in the transition from the faith that has merely been taught, to the faith that is personally accepted.

That pessimism in regard to life as well as high universal is easily demonstrated. Ask an adult what he would choose if he were offered the alternatives of total annihilation, or of beginning his life over again, living it up to the present moment exactly as he has lived it,

to face again the same alternatives. Make it clear that he is not, in his second life, to be allowed to profit by what he has experienced in the first, and the answer almost always is that he would choose annihilation. In other words, all life that has been lived is unsatisfactory, and man wishes to live because he hopes that the future will be different. Alexander Pope expressed this fact very neatly in his well-known lines: "Man never is, but always to be blest."

The individual effects of personal religion are chiefly emotional. The person who has the faith in the God, or in the spiritual order, which will right his wrongs eventually, takes a different attitude towards the world from that of the man who has not that faith. The calmness or heppaness, and the greater power of endurance, which comes from the life of religious faith is well known. A similar ease, and heightening of passive endurance come to the man who accepts the oriental religion of salvation through the cessation of the "wheel of life." But the total emotional effects of the Western and Eastern religions are not the same. There is less passivity, more initiative, resultant from the Western. In both, however, the emotional situation resulting from religion does increase the tolerance of suffering and deprivation, and hence religion of all sorts has been deliberately inculcated in the populace as a means of keeping the less fortunate classes patient and subservient, and thus maintaining the advantages of the more fortunate. Religion has been called the great "social opiate."

There are profound personal effects in the way of repentance, conversion, and so on, which vary from religion to religion, depending upon the subsidiary doctrines indicated by various religious systems in connection with their *modus operandi*, or techniques of salvation. These phenomena of individual religions have their social aspects which are important matters for investigation, but not in connection with religion directly.

That there are, aside from the well marked phenomena mentioned, powerful effects of personal religion on the individual is evident from the extreme sensitiveness which almost all religious persons show in all matters connected with their religion. You cannot discuss the religious beliefs of the religious person in his presence, or in any way touch upon them, without eliciting some emotional response. It can safely be predicted that if a man or woman were so harnessed up

that his breathing, blood pressure, pulse rate, and skin moisture were accurately recorded, (leaving out the far more important changes in other glandular and muscular systems), from changes in these alone we should be able to detect the presence or absence of real religion. If such a one, for example, should pronounce the solemn words of the Apostles' Creed, and his pulse, blood pressure, breathing, and skin moisture should remain essentially unchanged, or changed only as the speaking of meaningless words would affect them, we would be certain that the formula has for him no religious aspect at all.

It is probable that social religion begins with the recognition of the community of life. When one recognizes that his lot is the lot of all, and his chance of salvation the chance of all, he has attained to one of the fundamental factors in social life, the *social consciousness*. And this, because of the emotional foundation of religion, usually takes on an affective tone, the "group feeling," or "sympathy," as the older writers termed it. The recognition of the brotherhood of man is by no means essential to religion, but religion strongly tends to engender it. In many religions, this consciousness and this emotional attitude are deliberately intensified. In other religions they are deliberately limited to the special group, race, or fellowship which adheres to the religion, and their extension beyond these limits is inhibited. In some religions the *group spirit*, (as the consciousness of the group and group feeling together are called), is developed into an ethical system, in which *duty to one's fellow* is involved. But ethical considerations are not constituents in religions generally.

Social religion cannot be defined in terms of belief, or faith, for faith is on the personal side of religion. Social religion can be defined only in terms of feeling and action, and action is the paramount factor. In its finally developed form, religious faith, since it is extra-mundane in its application, is non-practical. That is, it is a faith in extra-mundane things, and it is a faith which can in no wise be verified or checked up by the methods of science. The purposes involved in religion are also extra-mundane or non-practical. One does this or that, not in order to accomplish something in this world, but in order to achieve salvation, or to placate the gods in the other world, or to establish a social rapport with the extra-mundane order. The purpose to lead a holy life, for the sake of the peace of mind it might bring, is as distinctly practical and non-religious as if the purpose were

to gain admission to a society chapel, or election to the legislature, through the same means, and the results of such activity can be checked up as practically as can the results of *doing* to grow this. It would ■■■ believe in the efficacy of the means which would lead a man to adopt any of these courses, but it would not be religious belief.

Similar considerations apply to all religious activity in the higher stages of religion. So far as this world is concerned, religious activity has no purposes beyond the activity itself. One does not go to church for the sake of the effects on this life's affairs, or rather, one frequently does, but such attendance is by common consent non-religious. One goes to church religiously for the salvation of one's soul, or for the establishment of a comany with the extra-mundane realm, or one goes for the pure sake of going, and this latter purpose is distinctly religious in the social sense, if not in the personal.

Social religion, in short, consists in the seeking of common stimulations, of common feelings, and of common activities, with nothing further in view, except perhaps the purposes of the personal religion already described. Social religion is non-practical social experience and social activity.

It must be understood that this classification of activities as practical on the one hand, and non-practical on the other, is based on purposes or intentions only. It is a teleological principle ■■■ psychology that no activity, and no experience, (for experience is after all a form of activity), is devoid of consequences in the further life of the individual. But even these consequences are determined in part by the intentions or purposes involved in the activity. Whatever the effects any religious observance may have on the individual's further life, it is obvious that the effects will not be the same on the man who engages in the observance for religious reasons and the man who engages in them for business reasons, or because he dares not refrain, or for other practical reasons.

The distinction between "practical" activities and "non-practical" is, therefore, a vital one, and it is essential to an understanding of religion. If we should omit purposes from consideration we would have no occasion to discuss religion at all, and to a really "behavioristic" psychology "religion" is merely a name to be explained away.

In respect to religion as in respect to every other phase of life, we must distinguish between *mediate* purposes and *ultimate* purposes.

The child in school, for example, may have at a given moment the immediate purpose of finishing a certain arithmetic problem, but he has also the ultimate purpose of going out to play, and must finish the problem in order to carry out that ultimate purpose. The ultimate purpose is not continuous, when we say he has the ultimate purpose, we mean actually that he has had it, but that the effects of the ultimate purpose persist in the immediate purpose. The actual continued persistence of ultimate purpose would interfere with the execution of the purpose through interference with the immediate purpose.

In the same way, the religious purpose may be the ultimate one, seldom occurring, but determining and strengthening certain other purposes which maintain the religious activity. It is not to be supposed that every time one goes to church he has in mind the purposes which have in the past determined him to the religious life. We have here one source of the endless and sometimes perplexing mixture of purely religious and semi-religious purposes and activities in the religious life. Although mundane satisfaction and happiness have in part as religious purposes, they are frequently experienced as a result of the carrying out of religious purposes, and may even be the objective of the immediate purposes which are dominated by ultimate religious purposes. One man, for example, derives great satisfaction going to church, another does not. The source of the first man's satisfaction is in the ultimate religious purpose of attending church for his soul's sake, and is the normal satisfaction of the various desires involved in the carrying out of a planned course of activity, the other man having no such religious purposes, is merely bored by the dull sermon and discordant choir.*

Ultimate purposes and immediate purposes alike contribute to the formation of habits of action which function subsequently in the achievement of the purposes. We need not be astonished when we find that the religious life, both social and personal, is in all cases predominantly a matter of habit, into which purposes enter but seldom

* Not all persons find happiness in religion. Many religious persons of what James calls the "ardently ascetic" types (the long faced, sour discountenanced kind), carry their religious observances conscientiously, and such happiness as they find in life is entirely apart from their religion, and even such happiness they deplore as being sinful, since it involves the temporary forgetting of the generally unsatisfactory nature of mundane life, that is to say, the ignoring of the foundations of religion.

after they have done their work. Furthermore, we should expect to find, and do find, many persons of well developed religious habits, who have never had any religious faith or religious purposes. For these habits are usually inculcated socially, prior to the arousal to the faith and purposes, through the routine of home and school training. Such persons are by no means hypocrites, for they are not pretending. They are, in fact, socially religious, although not personally so.

Religious activities may be classified roughly under three heads: (1) the seeking of common stimulation, (2) general motor activities, (3) complex systems of action and inhibitions.

1. Common stimulation is an important aspect of social religion. For such purposes scenes, as of drums, cymbals, devil-devils, bull roarsers, organs, orchestral instruments, and human songs, lights, as of candles, torches, sacrificial fires, stained glass windows, and more complicated lighting systems, along with the gleam of gold and jewels, odors, as of incense, the smell of burnt offerings, and the flavors of wine and foods are employed. Beyond serving the purposes of being subjected to the same stimulation as which the others in the group are subjected, many of the stimulating objects are symbolic, and the human speech employed is directly significant, so that common ideas are aroused by the common stimulations. Through these ideas, and also through the stimulations more directly, common feelings and emotions are aroused, and these are perhaps the most important results.

Even the sermon, in church religious ceremonies, has its powerful function in the arousing of common emotions through common ideas, and so far less an extent the function of teaching, or developing the religious ideas. The most successful sermons are those which are made up of phrases which are entirely familiar to the audience, and which have acquired the power to arouse certain types of religious feelings, often with little of the ideational meaning which the language originally had. Yet, the educational function of training the audience to form ideational and emotional habit is at times an important function of the sermon.

2. Under the head of more general motor activities, we include dancing, genuflecting, bowing the head, making the sign of the cross, and a long line of definite acts in savage and civilized religion which derive their importance wholly from the fact that they are common

activities, that others of the religious group are engaged in them, or will engage in them, or have engaged in them in the past. The psychological value of a ritual which has been used for ages and is used throughout great areas of the world is enormously important. Applauding a speaker by the ejaculation of "amen", for example, is of religious value only in those groups in which it is commonly done and has long been done. The ejaculation of "atta boy" would hardly serve the same purpose at present, although in the course of time it might become perfectly serviceable.

3. Among the complex system of activities and exhibitions we have a vast group of observances of high religious significance. The building of churches, monasteries, and shrines, is a very significant religious activity, occupying sometimes long periods of time, an activity the significance of which transcends the mere obtaining of the completed edifice. The various systems of religious bodily mutilation produced throughout the savage world are important primarily as social activities, and the scars resulting from these mutilations are important as signifying that the activity has been carried out. Among many of the tribes of Africa and the Pacific Islands, who circumcise males, and sometimes females, and perform other mutilations of the body as symbols of entrance into tribal fellowship, the mutilations are but parts of an extensive ritual which accompanies them, and the scars are badges indicating that the individual has undergone not only the surgical operation, but also the other rites. The records of baptism, confirmation, and other ceremonies of the civilized churches serve the same purpose. Among the savages generally the various bodily decorations and ornaments employed in addition to scars are badges indicating the social status of the individual which has been conferred or recognized through the ceremonial activities which he has carried out, and indicating also the activities in which he is thenceforth entitled to carry on systematically. The question as to the extent to which these classifications are socially religious and the extent to which they are otherwise social, is one not easily solved in any society.

Social religion everywhere has involved complicated systems of acts which may not be done (which are taboos), and acts which are obligatory, extending through the spheres of everyday life, quite outside of specific religious observances. In certain religions, one may not labor on the seventh day of the week. In certain religions

the flesh of this or that animal may not be eaten. In certain others wine may not be drunk. In some religions one must always execute certain ceremonial acts before eating and drinking. To varying extents in different religions, religious activities and inhibitions are commingled with the various practical activities of life. These systems are modified by the more independent rituals above mentioned. Foods, for example, which are tabooed to the young boy may be permitted after circumcision, or other initiation ceremonies, and the acquiring of higher badges of rank usually involves the assumption of further obligations of a religious nature.

Because of the imperatively social aspect of religion everywhere, there has arisen a theory that religion is in its origin purely social, and that the personal elements were later added, a theory promulgated (although perhaps not originated) by Robertson Smith. According to this view, first comes the ritual social actions which have no practical purpose. Then the ritual is given an interpretation, and as the interpretation becomes standardized and accepted, belief is thereby added. While it seems improbable that ritual could have actually arisen in this way, it is probable that through a process of progressive reinterpretations of the ritual, the original purposes may be lost sight of, and the beliefs essentially changed, or that the personal side of religion in which it originated may largely disappear. Certainly, in many savage religions, and in the religions of the ancient civilizations the personal element is reduced to a minimum. In these religions it makes little difference what the man *believes*, it matters much what he *does* religiously. Shaw has expressed this forcibly in "Androcles and the Lion," in which the Christians are told that they need only burn a little incense to the gods, that no one cares what they *believe* about them.

44. Religion as a determinant of group character

Particular religious systems are sometimes called "cults," thus recognizing the fact that these systems include much more than the strictly religious beliefs and rituals, and constitute in the complexity of their interweaves of other features, actual "cultures" in the anthropological sense of the term*. The importance of the religious feature

* "Culture" as the term is technically employed in chapter II, is distinguished from the more popular usage in chapter IX.

in determining the total culture of a nation, people, or racial group has not, in general, been sufficiently emphasized. We are prepared to realize that the vaguely identified mental characteristics ascribed to different racial groups, are, in so far as they are actual differential characters, cultural, that is, they are heretic rather than biological in their basis. We have failed, however, to realize the import of the religious organization ■ these cultural traits.

The outstanding illustration is furnished by the people called "Jews." As is well known, these people do not constitute a nation, and are not in any sense a race. They are citizens of a wide list of states, and are of various racial extraction and mixtures. The only Jewish group (the Jews of South-eastern Europe) which have a considerable racial unity are distinguished thereby from all other Jews. On the other hand, the fact that a number of individuals, who have abandoned the Jewish religion, are still by almost unanimous opinion claimed as "Jews" has perplexed many people as to what the group characteristics of "Jews" really are. If we admit, for the sake of the argument, that there really are Jewish traits, it is obvious that they must ■ sought in Jewish culture, which is in reality a distinctive culture of wide scope, organized about the Jewish religion. In abandoning the specific religious creed, however, Jews do not throw off the total cultural features which have been impressed upon them. The culture would disappear if the religious core vanished, but so long as the religion is kept alive, and the total culture thereby maintained, its influence will still be strong on those subjected to it, even if they abandon the core.

Various other religiously organized cultures in the modern world set aside classes of individuals which cut through racial and national boundaries. The most influential is the Roman Catholic culture, the distinctiveness of which is well understood by its adherents, but very little by Protestants. Protestant cultures, in the main, are slightly developed beyond the essential beliefs and rituals, yet there is a discernible difference in wider aspects, in areas of the United States where one or another sect is largely predominant. In Europe, the puzzle of mental group characteristics is amplified as soon as we pay less attention to variation in racial mixtures and more to variation in religious cult.

§5. The language of religion

Among the stimulus patterns which are efficacious in arousing common ideas, common perceptions, and common feelings, we may distinguish three types, although these three shade into each other.

We have first the stimulation addressed to the various senses, which are primarily impersonal, and more or less directly efficacious in arousing feelings without the interpolation of ideas. Such stimulations, for example, as the odors of incense, the sounds of drums, musical instruments, and chimes, the dim radiance of candles, the glitter of brass, gold, silver, and gems, the richness of stained glass, and the glare of electric lights, and even many tactual and muscular stimulus patterns are widely used by religious organizations.

In the second place, the sight, sound, and frequently the odors, which emanate from other members of the group are profoundly efficacious. Concerted action in singing, bowing, and performing similar ritual acts contributes strongly to the social consciousness. The sounds of the voices of others repeating the same words, the sounds of their breathing, and the subtle "human odor" even in the cleanest congregation, all contribute. If one should study analytically the behavior of other members of the congregation, one could make many inferences as to their loves, habits, feelings, attitudes, but without this analytical attention, emotional effects are produced through the mere perception of activities connected with common beliefs and feelings and actions.

These two classes of religious stimulation are, however, but elementary forms. A still more powerful type of stimulation is found in language, including spoken, written, gesture, and symbol language. Without entering at this point into a discussion of the origin and development of language, we may describe language as made up of acts, and the effects of acts, to which intentional significance has become attached through a learning process. Among language-acts we include such things as nodding and shaking the head, the speaking of words, and the gestures of the deaf mute and other sign language. Among activity-effects in language we include written language and various types of pictorial and plastic representations which are called symbols.

Religion makes use of all these means of communicating ideas, and, through the use of the ideas, of communicating feelings. It

even goes back and attaches identical significance to the stimuli in the first class mentioned, so that the incense, the choir, the drums, and the contacts with the priest, become symbols of this, that, and the other phases of religious doctrines. The use of symbols of the pictorial and plastic types is of special interest because of certain features of religious symbolism which have been used by theorists in interpretation of the psychology of religion.

The interrelations of verbal language and symbols are close and complicated. The representative principle involved in the two is obviously the same, and written language in fact had its beginnings in pictorial symbols. The symbolism developed in pictorial and plastic representations also resorts to ordinary language as a means of presentation, so that verbal or other language reference to the symbols serves in place of the symbol itself. The cross, for example, may be utilized in the form of the actual cross, of wood or of metal, or a picture, or the gesture of making the "sign" of the cross, or through the mere oral or written word "cross." In highly developed religions many symbols are presented almost exclusively in linguistic forms. But apparently, in earlier developments, the picture or object symbols predominated.

Many of the ancient symbols of religion, some of which have been handed down to Christianity through the Greek and Roman religions, are drawn from reproduction and genitalia. Designs such as the "American" cross, the ankh,⁷ the inverted triangle, the pointed oval, and the crescent, each of which signifies the female principle, and therefore the female divinity, designs such as the tau cross, the stable triangle, the fleur-de-lis, the spear or arrow-head, signifying the male principle or male divinity, and conventionalized representations of certain obviously distinguishable features of the human male and female have been widely used. Many natural objects were similarly utilized because of their resemblances in form, growth, or odor to details of sexual nature. Thus the dolphin and fish, the pomegranate,

⁷ The ankh, or "key of life," as found in Egypt must be distinguished from the similar symbol found in Asia, which may have had a different origin, and has received at least a different interpretation. It is certain that the Egyptian ankh was not used as a symbol of coitus, a quite different symbol having been used for that purpose.

the palm tree, the dove, the garden, the moon,³ and the earth are symbols of the female, the goat, the spear, and the sun are symbols of the male.

Symbols of "perfection," or the highest form of life, are uniformly conventionalized representations of coitus, hence they are also mystic symbols ■ "union." Frequently these symbols are constructed by mere combination of male and female symbols. the six pointed star is the combination of the male and female triangles, the five pointed star of the female triangle and the arrow (head). Sometimes, however, the symbols are more directly constructed, ■ in the case of *tah-gook*,⁴ ■ Korean origin, which represents "perfection" or the "generative power of nature" through two fish spawning, the *swastika*,⁵ the development of which is not so obvious, the Egyptian sign of coitus, and others which are still more naive and unmistakable.

The understanding of these symbols invests with significance a vast range of ancient tradition and religious ritual, as well as a mass of still prevalent superstitions, such as that concerning the "evil eye," the "horse-shoe," etc. A superficial understanding of the subject, however, has led many people to suppose that the ancient and primitive religions were especially salacious or even obscene, and has led certain ancient and modern theorists to suppose that religion had its origin exclusively in amorous desire. Both of these suppositions are quite erroneous.

We have shown that religion has its root in all the desires of man, and the symbols of religion clearly exemplify this origin. In the Christian religion for example, although many of the symbols are erotic in their origin, the range of symbols is comprehensive ■ we consider lilies, snow, leaves, the anchor, rowing and reaping, the path, the crown, the cross, the tree of life, Gethsemane, the Lamb of God, the purifying blood, baptism, the Eucharist, the flaming sword,

³ The moon is usually a female deity, because of its monthly period, as well as its softer, feebler light as compared with the sun. Its later development as religion, it becomes the virgin goddess (since only the virgin, in early civilization, shows the recurrent period), distinguished from the love-goddess, and symbolized by the crescent.

⁴ The *tah-gook* has as some of its components the sign of the two fish represented, which makes its intent unmistakable.

⁵ The *swastika* has lost, in more recent times at least, its high significance, and has become a symbol of mere "good luck" (the vernacular expression for coitus).

the rock, the ark, the fire, the Lamb of Judah, the ark of the covenant, the water of life, and an innumerable number of symbols, we find that some of these are erotic, but the vast majority refer to other desires, and only an ingenious sophistry can give a sex interpretation to them. And the same principle applies to every religion which uses symbols extensively.

The importance of the symbols drawn from sex characteristics and genital functions came about through the emphasis which religion universally places on the ideas of creation and origin. This is true of the atheistic as well as the theistic religions. The notion of a power above the world upon which man can depend, as a means through which he can attain to the other life or escape from this one, is inevitably connected with the conception of the power which maintains and rules this world, and which perhaps creates it. Worship, or other activity having reference to creative energy, whether personal or not, is accordingly characteristic of religion almost universally.

For primitive man, and for man not so primitive, creation (or even maintenance) is always a vital process. That which becomes or is transformed, either grows vegetatively, or is produced through animal activity. Vegetable growth, and animal reproduction are the striking examples of creation, and it is natural that man should think of both of these in connection with the problem of ultimate origin. Notions drawn from the observation of both animal and vegetable reproduction have actually played a large role in the development of religion.

The primary importance of creative power, and therefore of the reproductive process, for man in earlier times has been derived from his solicitude for his food supply. We have our food problem now, but it is not a problem of production, or of transportation, or of storage. It is solely a problem of distribution. In early periods, however, the production, and storage, problems were acute. The domestication of animals, and development of horticulture and agriculture aided man greatly in solving his food problem, and it is about these developments that religion had its most important growths.

For man in a crude stage of existence, depending on wild fruits, berries, roots, and the vermin and game he can catch with few weapons, life is in the best a succession of periods of relative plenty, and starvation. Fruits are seasonal, and even if abundant, are available

for short periods only, until man develops systems of drying them. Acorns and nuts are easier to store, and many groups of men have depended heavily on them. Acorns, however, are not of much value until methods of roasting, fermenting, or otherwise removing detrimental features are discovered. In various years, moreover, the crops fail, and famine results. Rents are seldom abundant, and peoples who have depended largely on these have led meagre existences. Ants, lice, grasshoppers and other types of vermin have been widely gathered to supplement diets. Snakes of various types have been plentiful and easily caught in some regions, and have been in many places an important food. Every bird and animal which could be trapped or snared, including owls and skunks have been utilized. All of these foods sources are still important to savages.

The development of weapons and devices for taking fish and larger game greatly assisted man in his struggle for food. Fish, however, are seasonal, or wary, or subject to unpredictable absence from the customary waters. Game is subject to the variation of seasons, and droughts may drive the game out of the hunting area, or a simple run of bad luck in hunting may entail disaster on a group. Meat will not keep for long periods unless carefully prepared by drying or salting, and these techniques are not always effective.

The domestication of food animals is a great step in advance. Tame dogs, sheep, goats, pigs, camels, and cattle may be kept on hand for slaughter when needed. The cultivation of wheat, barley, dates and olives marked still greater advances. As animal industry and agriculture develop, the food supply becomes more dependable.

The storing of grain and dried foods for future consumption is a serious problem. Rats, mice, weevils, moths and various other animals and insects, have apparently always been sources of trouble, and floods also have to be considered. Flocks and herds are subject to depredations from wild animals and other men, and devastating diseases occur. Droughts may be fatal to the domestic animals, as well as to cultivated trees and plants, and hence the development of means of irrigation has been extremely important for the development of civilization.

It is not strange then, that religious ceremonials and religious beliefs have developed about the plants and animals which have provided stable or dependable food supplies and about the techniques of hunt-

ing, animal breeding, horticulture and agriculture. Where food has been plentiful, and its provision and preservation have not been problems, there has been but slight religious development.

Man's intense interest in creative power, and therefore in the reproductive process, has been due to his concern for his food supply. The inception and development of rituals have centered about food plants and food animals, and the important religious conceptions developed with the rituals. Modern types of worship still bear the imprint of Ishtar, the date-palm, with her numerous derivatives of similar names (Asherah, Ashtart etc.), of Hathor the cow, who later became Isis, of Athena the olive tree, Zeus the oak, Ceres the barley, and of still more numerous fish divinities. These divinities, and almost all others were at first female, since in reproduction of food animals, and in the bearing of fruit it is the female that is of maximal importance.

The changes from male to female were in some cases gradual, and in other cases abrupt. At first the divinities were associated with the earth and the focus of the immediate atmosphere, but eventually they leave the earth for the skies, and acquire additional symbols drawn from the heavenly bodies. Later divinities assume the symbols of the old, so that the latest tend in their symbolism to include the whole history of their development. "Nothing is lost in religion," according to the generalization of Robertson Smith. In the more ritual forms of Christianity, the fish, the dove, the palm, the crescent moon, and many other symbols of ancient divinity still linger, and the rules of the Virgin are exactly those of the great female divinities of the past.

The earliest representations of the ceremonials from which modern formal worship descended are on Mesopotamian monuments. Here we find the date-goddess represented by a conventionalized palm-tree (the Asherah), with the king doubly represented, on one side in royal capacity, in the other as high priest. He offers to the divinity a frond of pollen from the male date tree and he wears on his arm a bag, like those in which the pollen fronds are actually carried. The whole ceremonial is derived directly from the process of artificial fertilization of the date blossoms, which is practiced today as it was in ancient times.

Various details of the modern religious language are drawn from

the cults of other food divinities, and from certain other ritual systems, the connection of which with food is less direct. Water, used in baptisms and sprinklings, is of importance not merely for the direct slaking of thirst, but for the life of the plants and animals. Blood, for early man everywhere "the life," or more thoughtfully, the life principle (the *psyche* of the Greeks), was something which was absorbed into and made effective through the blood. Drinking of blood, and washing and sprinkling with blood are features of many rituals. In sacrifice, the blood was allowed to run into a pit in the earth, to give "life" to the earth.

Animal sacrifice developed about many conceptions of divinity. Probably, they were fostered by an acute priesthood, as means of conserving the supply of food animals, for definite restrictions on the slaughter of these animals are essentially involved in the sacrificial codes. It is to be suspected that even human sacrifices were first developed as a means of restraining the slaughter of human beings, especially children, for food.

There are many symbols of divinity, but the divinities themselves are properly to be regarded as symbols. Worship did not arise about divinities, but divinities arose from worship of biotic objects and processes. The ceremonies developed as means of increasing the food crop, and consisting of acts representing in a maximally impressive way processes of actual importance in agriculture, horticulture, animal breeding, and hunting, gave rise to conceptions of powers or forces which controlled the growth and reproduction of the particular foods of importance, then of all foods. The transition to the conception of this same power as affording protection is simple, and eventually it is the superior power in all things. The particular plant or animal about which the ritual centered is for a time merely a representative of this power. The individualization, and finally the humanization of the power come later. Although in some cases the multiplication of divinities may have been due to independent developments of different food cults in the same place, and among the same people, in most cases, polytheism has been due to the importation of the divinities developed in other places.

The history of the development of uncivilized religions seems to have been, in some cases, similar to that of the religions of civilization. In other cases, it is possible, the course of development has been very

different. The particular course of development sketched above can be considered in no wise as fatal, or as the only possible course. It is merely the course which has actually been followed in the development of civilized religion. So close is the relation of the food supply with religious development, that wherever we find a sacred plant or a sacred animal, we can be almost certain that the ancestors of the group maintaining the cult depended upon the plant or the animal as an important factor in their food supply. There are some exceptions, as in the case of plants used for incense, or as a source of incense, but the exceptions are not numerous.

The production of food, whether in the animal or the plant sphere, is readily observed as sexual reproduction. In the animal world, and in the date palm, the sexes are separate, and the importance of the fertilization of the female by the male is unmistakable. It is not difficult to note the same sexual process in other plants. Creative power, apparently, is expressed most significantly in sexual union, and it is not surprising, therefore, that genital organs and genital processes have been widely adopted as symbols of creative power, and subsequently of sustaining and protecting power. In the generation of a new human being, man himself participates in the supreme creation, and hence the most impressive symbols are drawn from the human genital functions. The characterization of sexual intercourse as "knowledge" in ancient literature is no mere accident.

The language of religion, adequately understood, shows us the primary origin of religion in the food desire. It shows us also, religion, as it develops, embracing in its scope all of the primary desires: Protection, activity, rest, parentality, preservation, and conformity with human objectives which religion, once organized, rapidly undertakes to help man to attain. The excretory desire is represented in religion less directly, through the religious concern with "uncleanliness," and sin, and their removal through purification.

56. The social value of religion

It is apparent that social religion, as above described, is not sharply distinguishable from social play. Both are activities engaged in primarily for their own sake, although various other motives are interwoven with both groups of activity. Individual religion, and individual play are distinguishable, it is true, but it is not clear that

social religion and social play can be definitely distinguished except on the basis of their individual correlates. Certain types of social religion can be described as play determined by, or developed by, religious faith. Perhaps our concept of social religion might be restricted to those forms. On the other hand, it is difficult to draw the line between social religion and the play embodied in the rituals and symbolism of modern secret societies, organized athletic institutions, and many other formally and informally organized social groupings. The persistence of social religion after the loss of the personal element, and the existence of play organizations in which definite elements of religious faith are involved, seriously complicate the problem of distinguishing play and religion in their social form, which is perhaps after all a problem of definition. When we speak of the practical values of social religion, therefore, we must consider various social forms of play as well, as the distinction is not of paramount importance.

Social religion has two sets of values. It enlarges the means for the satisfaction of certain desires, limited as to their gratification, especially the desire for conformity, and the desire for preeminence. In addition to positions of importance in the public gaze attained by priests, medicine men, and other varieties of the clergy, and by the various types of "church workers" in the occidental churches, there is in the more complex religions an abundance of opportunity for individuals to attain preeminence through the holy life, as pilgrims, penitents, dervishes, religious recluses, conspicuous church attendants, and in a still simpler way as patrons, and donors of stained glass windows, charity funds, and other appurtenances of ecclesiastical organizations. The conspicuous uniforms of the Salvation Army and of the monastic orders, the green turbans of the descendants of the Prophet, and the titles of nobility granted by the papacy are not simply means of binding the individual to the organization, they are also rewards for his adherence. The lack of sharp distinction between religious and play organizations is illustrated by the similarity in the types of decorations and titles of rank conferred by the ecclesiastical hierarchies and by various modern "fraternal" or "secret" societies.

In earlier civilizations, religious organizations were important in the amorous gratification of the males, prostitution having been fos-

tered first as a religious institution. Later churches, while abandoning prostitution, have never relinquished their claims to the regulation of erotic desires, and to the confirmation of marriage as an ecclesiastical function, although the state is slowly limiting the church in this respect in Europe and America.

The desire for activity has an important rôle in all social religion. Outlets for activity through worship, rituals, and various church functions are offered to those whose activities in other respects are limited largely to tedious routine, and this opportunity is of great value to many individuals. With the greater organization of other play activities, the church is seriously affected, and has not been regardless of its own integrity in setting its face against them.

In addition to the furthering of individual satisfactions, which has, of course, further influence on social relations, religion has a direct social value of great importance, in its contribution to the formation of group consciousness and group spirit. When the same group is organized both religiously and economically, or religiously and martially, the group consciousness engendered by social religion carries over directly to the other organizations of the same people, and makes them more effective in war or in industry, as the case may be. Even a family, divided in its religious observances, is not so strong a family in other regards as the family united in a common worship. Furthermore, the training in subordination and cooperation, so essential to the efficiency of any large group, may be assumed to carry over from the religious organization to the practical ones, without contradicting modern conclusions regarding the transfer of training. Political imperialism and ecclesiastical hierarchy have always gone together, and although we may assume that both are the results of the same causes, rather than either the cause of the other, yet we must assume that each influences the other. Loosening the ecclesiastical bonds always accelerates the democratization of government, and vice versa. The antagonism of the Russian Soviets to the old Russian church is at least an intelligent antagonism.

At the present time the socializing function which was formerly so predominantly exercised by the church is to a large extent exercised by play organizations. Football as an organizer of a college group-consciousness, and the Rotary Club as organizers in a wider field, are perhaps the most striking illustration of these agencies,

but organizations of many sorts are at work in the same way. The Ice-man's Hall, and the all-day carcass of the Federated Butchers, exercise what have been in other times and other places ecclesiastical functions, and the churches are forced into competition with their rivals even to the extent of installing dance halls and billiard parlors.

The fostering of ethical conceptions and ethical attitudes has been one of the methods used by the Christian churches and by some of the more ancient churches in the higher development of group consciousness, and morals undoubtedly have been advanced somewhat by this connection. There are, however, two grave social dangers in the tying together of morals and religion, one of which concerns social religion, the other, personal religion.

A changing social religion offers an unstable basis for morals, and the morals involved in a fixed social religion are necessarily fixed also. The rapid overthrowing of the morals of a savage or barbaric society which adopts European customs is too well known to need description. Very frequently the change in religion is first accomplished, but the morals of the new religion do not get established before the old system is lost, so that the whole social fabric is wrecked. The converse proposition may be more difficult to establish, but it is a fact that moral progress everywhere is always opposed by established religious organizations, as the emancipation of women is opposed by the Moslem Church, and divorce-reform is opposed by the Christian Church. The tendency, where social religion and morals are combined into one system, is for that system to remain static, as the savage and so-called primitive cultures remained for long periods. It would seem, therefore, that there must come a time in every civilization when progress can best be served by the separation of religion and morals.

On the personal side, the union of religion and morals frequently has unfortunate results in a society which is not thoroughly static. Individuals who are taught to respect the rights of others, merely because such respect is commanded by the powers of the other world, frequently feel that the reason for morality is destroyed when their conceptions of the other world change. Many men and women have admitted that they accept moral obligations only because they believe that they will go to hell if they do not; or because they believe that in some other way they will be punished for moral delinquency.

and that if they did not believe in hell or in God, they would have no reason for refraining from any crime they pleased to commit, and would have no compunctions against the commissions. A more damning indictment of religious faith could hardly be conceived. In dealing with college students, even, there is always the very serious danger that in changing their religious conceptions, whether upwards or downwards, one is undermining their morals. Until we can succeed in teaching morals quite apart from religion, the structure of society and the progress of the individuals within it are in serious and continuous danger.

The essential feature of religion, after all, is its social feature. Without definite organization, religion remains a feeble force in man's life, indistinguishable from the mass of superstitions and folk lore. Organized, it develops, and becomes an influential social factor. Organized religion assumes many social functions, and eventually they are stripped from it. It is an important cohesive in the family, but with the organization of the state, family religion recedes. It is in certain stages indistinguishable from the state, and it is impossible to say whether the religious organization exercises political functions, or the state exercises religious functions. Eventually, however, the state takes political control from the church, as it does from the family.

The church controls the conventions and codes of daily life, establishing systems of morals. It dominates economic organization, and controls recreation. The state slowly takes these functions over. The church fights every change in this progression, and apparently the church always wins, but really the church slowly loses. We are witnessing today the losing struggle of the church to maintain Sunday laws, and archaic systems of marriage and divorce.

It may seem that religion is slated for extinction in the not so remote future, when all of the functions which the religious organization has historically had shall have been stripped from it. Apparently, all of these functions will be much better cared for by other forms of organization, unless the fostering of hope in a future life is sufficiently important to furnish scope for its activity and justification for its maintenance. Unfortunately, while religion has fostered this hope and has held out a prescription for its attainment in civilization, in other cultures closely related to ours it has fostered the hope of the extinction of conscious life, and formulated the technique for the at-

tainment of this goal. Apparently, philosophy will have to take over the solution of this problem, as it has unsuccessfully attempted to do during the past ages.

It would be singular indeed if religion, which has possessed such singular vitality, and which has contributed so signally to the development of civilization, should turn out to have been merely a changing synthesis of temporary functions, with no central characteristic differentiating it from secular organization and secular attitudes. If we survey critically the history of religion, indeed, we find grounds for the tentative assumption that there is a basic feature of religion, which differentiates the religious from the non-religious, but which is masked by the picturesquely varied non-essential features.

Whatever the particular form and particular function of religion, it seems always to be concerned with the coordination and development of human desires, and it seems probable that from this point of view we might arrive at a definition of religion which would include all its apparently discrepant types. Religion has concerned itself with the satisfaction of desires, and therefore, with the control of human conduct. This has been contributory to its main function, but it is not the strictly religious feature. In casting off these weights, religion may yet attain to an increased effectiveness and value. Man has attained, as a race, only what he has tenaciously desired, not as an incoherent individual appetition, but as an organized group persistence over long periods of time. The function of religion has been everywhere and in all times to foster, direct, and integrate these desires. What the race may eventually achieve through persistence in desires, may be largely determined through the development of purer religion. It is evident that progress in this direction is actual in certain forms of religious organizations. If this development is carried through, religion will have entered a new phase, in which it is practical, as was proto-religion, and the definition we have tentatively set up here will no longer be adequate.

CHAPTER VIII

POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS

II. The band

IN ANALYSING the nature of political organisation and the relations of political functions to human desire, it is useful to commence with a political group which is important because of its simplicity, its early appearance, and its persistence through all stages of civilization. This group is the *band*. The band may in some cases be purely within the family, but usually it involves members of several families. It may be organized for hunting, for war, for the care of flocks or herds, for the gathering of vegetable products such as bark, nuts, or roots, for fishing, for transportation, or for the migration of the people from one locality to another. In modern civilization it is represented by mobs, hiking and camping parties, and many similar minor groups. The band may be a purely temporary organization which ceases to exist when its immediate function is fulfilled, or it may be a relatively permanent affair, like the Ku Klux Klan, with repeated periods of activity.

Often the band is an almost purely informal organization, with little specialization of function of its members, and so coordination of action except that established in the process of activity. In other cases, there is careful preliminary organization, with functions of leadership and subordination definitely prescribed, and with the activities of the different members carefully planned so that each supplements the other. Thus, in a hunting expedition, there may be some one having general direction, whom all must obey. Of the others, some will scout for game, others stalk or drive it, others attack it, perhaps in further stabilized groups, others will skin and dress the captured game, and still others will act as cooks, carriers, wood-choppers, etc. Each of these specialized groups may have its overseer or foreman, and further internal organization. But, on the other hand, hunting parties may operate as groups without this specialization, each hunter having the same general func-

tion as all the others, subject to informal coöperation at various moments as the needs of the chase require. Martial bands may also operate without formal organization, but they inevitably tend toward specialization of function, including specialization of authority, because a higher degree of efficiency is obtained in that way.

The organization of a band is very similar to the integration of an animal organism, and the progressive development and perfection of band organization and activity resemble the formation of habit in the individual. When a group of individuals have once come together and acted together, it is easier for them to do so again. When specialization of function has developed in one performance of the band, the specialization tends to reappear, and to become strengthened, when the band is again active. Leaders are progressively developed, and with this development, their function becomes strengthened. Individuals who have served in one capacity become efficient therein, and the coordination of their functions with the functions of others becomes perfected, so that the band acts more and more as a unit, and less as a mere aggregation.

Although the band, as such, goes out of existence when its ends are temporarily accomplished, its potentialities are retained in the individuals composing it, just as the potentialities of acting and thinking are retained by the component cells in the individual in the intervals when the acts or the thoughts are non-existent. An Army may disperse at night, and cease to exist as an army, yet, on coming together the next morning, it may resume group action at once, the basis for such action having been acquired and retained by the individuals. In the intervals between band-activities of a certain type, the individuals may have been active in other groups, but this need not interfere with the resumption of the first type of band-action when the occasion arises. Just so, the thousands of individual cells integratively active in a reaction of the animal body at a certain moment, may be involved in many other integrations during the interval between the first reaction and its next recurrence, and yet may resume the former type of integration with little loss of efficiency, if the reaction has been thoroughly fixed through learning.

The continuity of a band is therefore not like the continuity of an individual as a whole, but rather like the continuity of a certain type of function in the individual, such as memory for a particular set of ideas, or the activity of swimming.

Bands are organized through group consciousness.¹ Each member of a band must be aware of himself as a member of the band, and aware of the others as fellow members, or the band cannot function. Common interest and common purpose add greatly to the strength of the organization, but are not essential. Some of the members of an efficient band may be interested solely in the wages they are to receive, and in the specific work they must do to receive these wages. Or, they may be slaves, or drafted men, who serve because they must, and who merely have interests and purposes in their tasks so as to escape punishment, or to get along with the least trouble. Group feeling is also an important asset in a band, but may be lacking in many members.

The desire to be predominant spurs many members to their best efforts in the bands, and the desire to conform to the group organization is effective very generally. Persons without the conformity desire, and without the habits or tendencies based upon it, are disruptive forces in any band, and no band can survive with many such members, unless, under extreme martial discipline, conformity is enforced through the individuals' calculation of results, or through fear. Even then, the band is always in a precarious situation if conformity is largely forced.

In spite of the ability of the individual to function in one group without reference to the organizations in other groups, group activities commenced in the band tend to carry over into many different groupings in which the band as such is not operative. The man who establishes leadership in the hunt or war expedition tends to retain some of his leadership when the band is reabsorbed into the camp. If no leaders are established for the camp group, he tends to become leader there. Similarly, the leader of a larger group from which a band is organized, tends to become leader of the band. Yet, these tendencies may be inhibited by other influences, just as the "transfer of training" in the individual organism may be inhibited, and the accepted leader of the band may not be a leader in the larger group, and vice versa.

¹ By group consciousness is meant consciousness by the individual members, but consciousness whose object or content is the group, that is to say, consciousness in which the individual is conscious of the group. For fuller discussion see Chapter X, §1.

Even when a greater variety of overlapping groups has been established, the tendency to carry over from one organization to another exists. The military leader becomes a candidate for civil office. The business executive receives a military commission when new armies are organized. The man who leads in politics, or in sports, or in military affairs, has a greater chance of leadership in the lodge, or the church. Aside from leadership, other specialized functions may carry over in the same way.

62. The state

Individuals living contiguously are brought into social relations by that very fact. The acts of one individual in a contiguous group affect the activities of other individuals immediately, and the satisfaction of the desires of one is a factor having important consequences on the satisfactions of the others. It is impossible for one individual in a local group to ignore the others; group consciousness is an essential result of contiguous life. Group feeling tends easily to rise, and in many cases becomes superior to family feeling. The group which is constituted primarily through contiguous living is called the political group, or, in its formal aspects, the state. In the further development of political groups, the contiguity-relation may become unimportant in some cases, and groups without contiguity may arise. But these are exceptional cases, and there is no political group, however exceptional, which does not have as its foundation contiguous living.

Contiguity is, of course, a factor in the family, and in the band. Hence, both of these have the germ of political groupings, and in the absence of any other state organization, these are the political groups. But the tendencies in both the band and the family lead to the establishment of a political group superior to both as soon as the population in any area becomes numerous, because the adequate satisfaction of desires cannot otherwise be obtained.

The family ceases to be an efficient means of satisfaction when numerous families conflict in their uses of camping grounds, hunting grounds, and other natural resources. The use of these resources involves the desires of food, rest, activity, emotion, and shelter. Conflicts in regard to these resources between members of a family, and similar conflicts arising from sexual desires, can be settled by

family rules and authority. But conflicts between members of different families, or between families as wholes, cannot be settled by the authority of either family. They can be settled only by war, by treaty, or by higher political organization.

Inter-family war (feud) leads to the subjection of one family by another, or to extermination of one or both, or else to treaty, if the strength of the two is equal. By treaty, a set of rules for conduct is established. This is itself a form of political organization. But the treaty is merely an armed peace; progress is checked. But, the disadvantages of war, and of the constant threat of war involved in mere treaty, inevitably lead to closer political organization if the contiguity of the families is close, and through the state so established, war and feud are avoided. The first state is the tribe. The formation of the tribe may occur early or late in the multiplication of families, depending on the closeness of the living of the several families involved. In some cases, perhaps, the tribe has been formed with little preceding quarreling between the families. A great deal depends on the power of the families involved, which again depends on the resources and the separation of the families, and the length of development thereby permitted before political needs arise. War with an enemy common to all the families, and threatening all, would undoubtedly be a great aid to political organization, even when the contiguity of the families is slight, since the common bands organized for war not only tend to carry their organization over to peace, but also to increase the effective contiguity by increasing social contacts between the scattered families. But a great deal obviously depends on the intelligence, quarrelsomeness, and pride of the families involved.

The fact that families descended from a common stock tend to settle near each other would account for the fact that in most cases a tribe is of a relatively homogeneous racial type, and has a fairly uniform culture. The fact that families frequently migrate far would account for different and separate tribes of the same race. The absorption of contiguous families of other stocks, and the amalgamation of the stocks thus combined would account for the differences in tribes which are obviously of nearly, but apparently not quite, the same stock.

Among savages, the tribes are frequently found divided into

moieties (*halves*), and into smaller divisions, these divisions having different importance politically in different places. In some cases these divisions (*clans, gentes, totems, etc.*), are the forms in which the original family groups persist. In other cases the family groups have become transformed into smaller families within larger groups which serve some of the original family functions. The importance of these subdivisions is in all cases primarily in the religious and family life of the tribe, less in its larger political life, although the political function is sometimes present, as in the cases in which the chief must be selected from a particular family group.

The distinctive features of political organization, which mark it everywhere, in the family, the band, the church, and especially in the state are: (1) Limitation of the activities of the members of the group. This limitation may be either through common consent of the members of the group, or through a specialized inner group called the government. (2) The requirement of certain conventionally or legally stipulated activities of the members. (3) The protection of the group as a whole and its members individually against activities of other groups or individuals. (4) The production, in other ways, of materials and opportunities for satisfaction of the desires of members of the group generally, and for the filling of their needs, so far as these can be determined.

Our examination of the family and the church has indicated that all of these functions are exercised by these groups, although the third function has been minimized by certain religious organizations. To a greater or less extent, in fact, all social organizations exercise these functions, and are therefore political. Political functions, however, have been and still are in process of reduction in the church and family, and these may not be considered as in the class of various other groups which restrict themselves to limitation, protection, and provision in certain particular spheres, under the regulation and permission of the state, which more and more assumes comprehensive responsibility. In especial, the state claims full control of the limitation of the activities of its members, and of requirements laid upon them, and assumes full responsibility for their protection from external agencies, while constantly increasing general provision for the satisfaction of desires and the filling of needs. The activities which are politically limited are primarily those which interfere with the satisfaction of desires by

other members of the group, and secondarily, those which interfere with the filling of the needs of group members. Further, activities which interfere with the satisfactions of members of other groups are the concern of the state, this concern being, however, a direct one only in modern times.

"Personal liberty," or individual freedom of action, can obtain only among individuals living in isolation from one another. When individuals are in contact, so that the activities of one affect the activities of the others, either most of the individuals will retain their personal liberties, and the others give theirs up to a very large extent, or else personal liberty must be replaced by social liberty, which is the product of political organization.

The traffic regulations in force in civilized communities, and the reasons for the existence of these regulations, are clear illustrations of the transformation of personal liberty into social liberty. Obviously, only a very few persons could possibly have full personal liberty to drive their cars as they please. The liberties of other drivers and pedestrians would necessarily be seriously curtailed by the exercise of the liberty of these few. Hence, the rights of drivers are specified by the regulations, and the rights of pedestrians are also specified, the rights of all being definitely limited. Pedestrians may cross the streets only at specified points. No driver may ■ at a speed exceeding certain set limits. A driver under certain conditions must stop to allow another driver to proceed. Cars must be parked only at certain places, and certain times. No driver may proceed if a traffic signal is set against him. And so through a long list of minute regulations which entirely destroy personal liberty in the use of cars, and substitute for it the social liberty which allows every one the fullest possible use.

This supplanting of individual liberties by social liberty, which becomes so complicated in crowded cities, is characteristic of social organizations generally, and it is the political aspect of social organization, and is therefore especially characteristic of the state, which exists for the purpose of carrying out political functions in the most general, but yet most highly specialized way. In the loosely organized state, the transformation may be small, and may affect only a limited group of activities. In the highly organized state, the transformation is extreme and affects every phase of life.

The more crowded the community, the greater the need for transformation, and in general, the state becomes more complex with age. In a large city where there has been time for the minute adjustment of rights, one cannot make a noise at will; one can sometimes not sneeze without holding a protecting handkerchief before the face, one cannot dress in certain costumes, and so on.

The limitations of liberty necessarily bring with it the definition of rights. In a condition of personal liberty, there are no rights. One simply does what one does. But where social liberty arises, rights exist. A right is merely the limit to which liberty is permitted to extend. One has a right to act within the set limitations, and the establishment of the limits automatically defines the rights. At the same time, the negative duty, not to exceed one's rights, is established. But further, positive duties are entailed also, since personal liberties to refrain from acts are also limited. Under personal liberty, I need not clean my sidewalk, under social liberty, I am constrained actively to keep it clean, since to refrain would interfere with the rights of others. So, I must pay taxes, which is a radical curtailment of my personal liberty, but a part of my duty under social liberty.

The organization of the state has proceeded in three different ways, or in ways which are combinations of two of them, and by reflection on these three processes three ideals of the state have arisen. These are the *imperialistic*, the *aristocratic*, and the *democratic* ideals.

The imperialistic theory is the state makes the state itself, as contrasted with the individuals composing it, the center of values. The individuals exist for the state, not the state for the individuals, and their rights are defined and limited, and their duties prescribed, solely with this in view. The individual has no rights to the satisfaction of any desire, except in so far as it is to the advantage of the state that he satisfy it, he has not even the right to live, except it be advantageous to the state that he should live. This theory is at the basis of the Japanese state (under the name of Bushido), and was the theory of the German imperial government, as it is of the present Nazi movement.

The imperialistic theory tends towards the notion that the state is a real entity, over and above the individuals composing it, although this extreme view is not always involved. In strict theory,

it might be made out that there is no practical difference between imperialism and democracy, if imperialism be carried out adequately, since the ultimate advantage of the state may be found in the greatest social liberty of the individuals. But nevertheless, the tendency of imperialism is to heat and subordinate the individual unduly, and to develop the martial and economic powers of the state at the expense of ethical and other social values. With omniscient control, it might make little difference which ideal were held, but since social development, in so far as it is deliberate, proceeds with limited knowledge, and with a great deal of trial and error, the imperialistic plan offers the lesser chance of progress and the greater danger of needless injury to the individuals.

Furthermore, under an imperial scheme, individual and class influences have an excellent chance to undermine the state in their own interests, and to increase the liberty and advantages of certain groups at the expense of the other groups. In all historical instances, a privileged governing class at least, with usually other privileged classes accessory thereto, has existed, and has bent the nominally imperial scheme towards aristocracy.

The aristocratic theory holds that certain classes of individuals, selected either by birth, by wealth, or by intelligence, should have superior rights, and that the rights of other individuals should properly be limited in order to give greater scope to the rights of these classes, in which, therefore, social values are held to inhere, rather than in the state as a whole, or in individuals socially. This theory is not merely that individuals of actual superior value, through heredity or otherwise, who are therefore of superior use in the state, should be guaranteed the right to assert these values, but that they should be given in addition superior political rights. And since aristocracy is always based on classes, and not on individual considerations, it involves the assignment of superior rights to individuals of a favored class regardless of their actual worth as individuals or to the state. Aristocracy, therefore, is the avowed enemy of social liberty.

Imperial states have always been largely aristocratic in theory and in practice, in spite of their imperialism, and democracies are largely tainted with aristocratic institutions and practices, against which they must keep continually struggling. Whatever may be

said about the agreement of imperialism and democracy, if both are omnisciently directed, the tendencies of aristocracy and democracy are diametrically opposed, and the greatest indictment of imperialism is that it uniformly tends towards aristocracy.

Democracy assigns all ultimate values to the individual, and holds that the state is justified only in so far as it secures the greatest social liberty to the individual. Assuming that no state can be omnisciently directed, but that it must proceed in its development by experimental trial and error, democracy insists on the utmost caution in the limitation of individual rights, preferring the chaotic element of personal liberty in details which have not yet been thoroughly evaluated in the light of social justice, to the arbitrary regulation which is ignorant, and, therefore, probably unfair. This is the theory on which the United States was organized, and which it still upholds in spite of continued and serious assaults upon it by those favoring aristocratic ideals.

Democracy does not maintain that individuals are equal in intelligence, in training, or in abilities and achievements generally. The wording of the Declaration of Independence, that "All men are created free and equal" has been very seriously misconstrued by enemies of democracy, and has been made out to be an absurd denial of the obvious fact of individual inequality in capacities. Such misconstruction is puerile, and there is not the least historical evidence that the framers of the Declaration had any such notion. Certainly, Jefferson, the writer of the document, gave no signs that he did not consider himself intellectually superior to many of his fellow citizens, and he obviously believed that his selection for important offices in the state was due to such superiority. The founders of the United States Government were establishing, or hoping to establish, a purely political organization, and the equality which they held as an ideal was, therefore, a purely political equality.

If men were actually equal in capacities, there would be good grounds for arguing that political equality would be needless, or that it would be automatically regulated without difficulty. But, because men are not equal in capacities, it is essential to social justice, and to the development of a strong state, that they shall have the political equality requisite to enable each man to develop his capacities to the fullest point possible and to enjoy the advantages that his natural capacities should procure for him.

It is not true that every citizen of the United States has the capacity to make an effective president. Some are intellectually unfit, some are emotionally unfit, some are physically unfit. Jefferson and his fellows held no belief to the contrary. But they saw that there is no class of citizens, whether by birth, wealth, or social position, which does not include also seriously unfit individuals, and they saw also that individuals fitted by natural capacities may arise in any American class. It is provided, therefore, that politically, any American citizen is eligible to the presidency, provided he has the training which it is deemed to make available to all, and the restriction to American birth and a certain minimal age are justified limitations with respect to probabilities of training. The only fault that can justly be charged to the founders of the United States Government is that they did not carry the theory of democracy far enough, and include "women" with "men." But they went as far as was possible in their era, and their plans are in this generation being extended considerably.

The practical objection to democracy is based on universal suffrage, with certain limitations on age and residence, which are always subject to revision. Theoretically, speculation should be carried out here also, and those who are most fit to make decisions and selections should have charge of these state functions. This may be admitted, and it may be pointed out that democracy necessarily involves representative government unless the political group is very small. Executives, legislators, and judges are selected, and the burden of specialized political functions placed on them. The ultimate decision of all matters, however, rests in the electorate, and this is the great advantage.

Theoretically again, only intelligent and educated men can perform the governmental functions adequately, and only an intelligent and educated electorate can select these officials, and can render useful decisions on questions of national policy. The apparent difficulty with democracy is that it gives the same voting weight to the dull and ignorant as to the intelligent and educated. Here, however, is a point in which theoretical psychology fails to agree with practical psychology. If we analyze the votes in the United States as well as we can under conditions of the secret ballot, we are obliged to admit that on most clearly defined issues, the intelligent and the educated

are lined up with the stupid and uneducated on both sides of the issue. High tariff and low tariff, child labor and anti-child labor, corrupt administration against reform, dry and wet, or simple party division, the alignments are of the same kind. Whatever we may, for the sake of the argument, assume to be politically the right way, we do not find any highly educated and intelligent group unanimously in favor of it unless it is in the private interest of members of that group, against the public interest. This is the *reductio ad absurdum* of the claim that the ignorant and stupid electorate is a menace.

As a matter of fact, it is strongly to be suspected that the ignorant masses more often in their majority support men and policies which later are accepted as sound, than do the majority of the presumably educated and intelligent. The reason being that the "masses" are apt to follow the lead of an exceptionally able minority of the intellectually superior, who would have no chance to lead except in a democracy. A democracy, in short, provides for a progressive improvement in intelligent leadership, wherein an aristocracy seems to stifle efforts at constructive politics.

The justification for this system is that it works better than any other that has been devised. Any scheme that takes ultimate power from the general public puts it in the hands of an aristocracy, and no scheme which will make the action of an aristocracy less vicious than the action of the general electorate has been even remotely suggested. Aristocratic control appeals only to those who hope that they will be numbered among the aristocrats.

The boss system is the acknowledged evil of democracy, but our actual bosses are among our most intelligent citizens, and many of them high in social standing and personal attractiveness. They control the electorate with difficulty, and yield slowly to the demands of social justice, in spite of their own personal interests, because the very unwieldiness of the electorate and its social diversity makes it impossible for them to do otherwise. They know that it is always possible for them to be overthrown because an appeal to the intelligence and moral principle of the group interests of the public is possible, and has always chances of success. Make this class of bosses a political aristocracy and their powers are impregnable. That any political aristocracy will inevitably fall into their hands is demonstrated by their success even under the present adverse conditions.

The enemies of democracy, being intelligent, have concentrated their attacks on the right of appeal to the public, a right which the founders of the United States Government with clear vision put in the forefront. The present demand for "censorship" which is being promoted under various guises is the most dangerous attack which democracy has ever suffered. Censorship of the motion pictures, censorship of books, censorship of the press, censorship of school and university teaching, is being demanded under the plausible pretext of the interests of "morals," "religion," and the "public protection." If any such system of control of appeal is ever established, democracy will not merely be doomed, it will be dead. Thousands of misguided individuals are eagerly forwarding these movements, for their own destruction, with the backing and control of forces which are far wiser, and which aim at the destruction of democratic government.

43. The hierarchy of states

We are so familiar with the hierarchy of states existing in America and Europe, that we are prone to overlook its significance. In Maryland, for example, one lives first of all, in a city, village, or rural community, and is amenable to its rules establishing his rights and duties. He lives also in the county (Baltimore excepted), in which again he has rights and duties. He is also a citizen of the State of Maryland, and finally of the United States. Beyond this, the resident of Maryland is typically a member of a civic group which is not represented in the governmental scheme, but which is nevertheless typical of the groupings out of which our political groups have developed. He is an "Eastern Shore" man, or a "Western Shore" man, or a member of some other group which oversteps the official civic lines, but which influences his political activities to a considerable extent.

Aside from limitations and duties prescribed officially by membership in these groups, and the attendant group consciousness, group feeling is strongly developed. Pride of citizenship in his city or town, in his county, or in his geographical community, and interest in his fellow members is an important part of the Marylander's life. He contrasts his group with other groups in Maryland, and still more strongly with groups in other sections of the United

States, always to the disadvantage of the latter. He believes that his people are the best, his local institutions the best, and his local cookery and products the best. He votes for men from his groups, even against the dictates of larger interests.

The fundamental political groups are the small communities, the most immediate civil organization being of those who live in the contiguity of a village, camp, or other settlement where personal stimulation and personal interference are easy. Rules of life, manners, customs, and laws, grow up to make this close association possible, and the group consciousness and group feeling grow with them. Frequently, the compacting of a community group is determined by, or assisted by, geographical features. On a small island, in an enclosed valley, or on a confined coast line, the isolation of the inhabitants from others, and the resultant intensifying of their internal contacts, cooperate with the interconnection of group consciousness due to the common lot, to produce easily a strong social group. To this characteristic method of grouping, Maryland presents some striking exceptions, of a sort which is not infrequent and which is easily explained. Geographically, the Eastern shores of Maryland and Virginia together with a part of Delaware, constitute a single territory, relatively isolated, and suitable for the inclusion of a civic group through the continuity, isolation, and common economic situation of the inhabitants. Western Maryland and parts of West Virginia and Pennsylvania form another such geographical area, and the Western Shore of Maryland is by location and topographical features distinct from both Western Maryland and the Eastern Shore. Distinct group consciousness and group feeling of these three areas of the state are truly discernible, yet the three are merged in our commonwealth.

This paradoxical situation, and many similar situations have come about through a radical change in conditions of communities. In the period of colonization, transportation by water offered a relatively effective means of communication, and the land-grants and settlements had regard for that fact. With the development of railroads, highways, telephone and telegraph, groups which were earlier contiguous have become relatively less so, and groups formerly isolated have become contiguous.

The social group of geographically non-contiguous peoples, and

the withstanding of the normal effects of contiguity are also evident in the relations of distant colonies to their mother countries, and their antagonism to close-by colonies of other countries. Such conditions can occur only when peoples already numerous, and with strongly established political institutions, migrate to new territories.

In the normal growth of political organization, the community-state comes first. But the same process which leads to the establishment of the community, leads inevitably to the formation of a larger state including several communities, whenever the communities come in contact. Conflict of activities is inevitable, and these conflicts can be settled only by war, with resulting absorption or annihilation, or by treaties establishing a loose organization, or by the formation of a higher state. And as feuds between families eventually must be settled by organization or else by destruction, so war between communities must also eventually. The American Indians in some cases formed confederations of tribes, like that of the Iroquois. In some cases the perpetual warfare between tribes kept the tribes far apart, reducing contacts and minor conflicts, and inhibiting the growth of population. The relatively small population of America at the advent of Columbus was all that it could accommodate under the prevailing conditions of inter-tribal conflict. The colonies of whites established in America had either to limit their groups in the same way, or establish a political union.

When new countries were settled by colonization from old and thickly populated ones, it was inevitable that the hierarchies of states which had been developed in the older countries should be transplanted in the new, and organized without waiting for slow development. This has happened partly because man is a creature of habit, and partly because of the obvious fact that the hierarchal system operates successfully.

With the development of commerce, which is a form of contact between tribes and tribal federations transcending considerable distances, international agreement, which is a form of political group organization, became imperative, and international organization and commerce have developed and waxed together.

Although it is generally true that the closest association of individuals is between those living in the closest contact, and the

associations in the larger groups are less close, the constant tendency is for the larger group to gain in importance, at the expense of its constituent smaller groups, taking over progressively more and more of the political functions, and absorbing more and more of the group feeling and group consciousness. The Carroll Countyman, the Baltimorean, and the Eastern Shoreman, are less strongly these than they are Marylanders, and their rights and duties are to a greater extent prescribed by the state than by the local groups. The same holds for the Yorkshireman, the Londoner, and the Welshman, and will probably some time in the future hold for the Irishman, however much more strongly he may be at present an Irishman than he is a Britisher. In the United States generally, the national ties are slowly gaining at the expense of the local and state ties, and the national government is slowly gaining in power at the expense of the states. The conditions within the several states are obviously due to be modified through the elimination of the counties, which are already outworn political organizations in most states, seriously impeding the efficiency of political action. This progression is inevitable in any federation in which economic improvement, and improvements in transportation and communication are occurring, because these improvements increase and widen the contacts of individuals, and make it less and less possible for local government to guarantee social liberty. A fixed relation, less than the utmost extension of the power and scope of the highest state, is possible only among peoples where economic and intellectual progress has reached a plateau of no further advance, as it has in savage cultures. The only precaution that can be taken is to avoid making the centralization of political organization advance faster than the conditions actually warrant, and not to retard it beyond the actual needs.

The process of federation of states obviously has not reached its limits, even when a system of great nations, each with its inner hierarchies of states, has arisen, so long as these nations are in effective contact, and therefore in conflicts which can be settled only by war or organization. In spite of the disasters of the recent war, and the failure to secure a League of Nations, the same processes which have led to the federation of families, and the abolition of feuds, to the federation of communities, and the federation of tribes, with the abolition of intertribal war, and which have led them federations to

develop into real political organizations, must inevitably lead to world federation, and the abolition of international wars. Social liberty and the satisfaction of desires cannot be attained otherwise, with the population of the world in ever increasing contact.

§4. Industrial organization

Such industrial organization as exists within the family, the state, or the other groups prior to definite formation of specialized industrial organizations, is to a large extent directed immediately to the satisfaction of desires. Animals are captured for food, and for their pelts for purposes of shelter. Bark, nuts, ocher, berries, etc., are gathered with the satisfaction of food, shelter, and other desires immediately in view. Wool and fibres are gathered, spun, and woven with the same directness of interest. The manufacture of tools, weapons, baskets, pots, and other utensils, and the production of ornaments may be a degree less immediate as their application to the satisfaction of desires, but even in these cases, the ultimate use of the articles by the individuals of the group which manufactures them in the process of satisfying their own desires is clearly in view.

This stage of industry might be called "primitive," for it is the form which industry has tended to take in small and isolated communities prior to the development of commerce, and is to a large extent characteristic of savage industry. In the almost complete absence of information as to the lives of really "primitive" men, there is no harm in applying the term "primitive" in this way.

In large well established groups, with commerce between groups, the industrial organization tends to take on another form, that of *corporational organization* which is especially developed in the Western world.

On account of manifold factors, such as the possession of favorable soil and other natural facilities for specific types of production, accumulated skill in technical processes of manufacture, in the handling of certain domestic animals, in the details of capturing fish and game, etc., individuals and groups find it advantageous to specialize in certain forms of industry, not for the purpose of using the products themselves in the processes of satisfying their desires, but for exchange of the products with other groups for such com-

modities as may be needed for those purposes. Whether this exchange is through barter or through the use of money and credits is a matter merely of the efficiency of the general economic system.

When a group engages in industry in this way, the group acquires common interests, and hence group commonness and group feeling to an important degree. It also acquires, eventually, explicit rules and regulations, defining the rights and duties of individuals composing the group, and then substitutes social liberty for personal liberty within the specific industrial sphere, just as the substitution is made in the more general political sphere from which the industrial is only in part separated. One needs only to consider the older trade guilds, the modern labor unions, farmers' associations, chambers of commerce, professional societies, and shippers' associations, to see the nature and system of such development.

But the most intensive development of the economic organization is reached in the corporations, trusts, syndicates, and other extremely definite groups formed and maintained for purely economic purposes. In these forms of organization, and in many less highly organized forms, the final stage of industry is reached, in which the greater part of the individuals concerned do not even produce commodities for barter, but exchange their "labor" directly for the money and credit wherewith to purchase the direct means of satisfying desires.

It is not advisable, in an elementary treatise, to go deeply into the forms and conditions of industrial organization, which, even as concerns the psychological aspects, constitute a highly special subject, which is treated at length in other volumes. But the indissoluble connections between the modern industrial organizations and all other forms of social organization, and the important influence which industrial organization exercises upon other forms, needs to be pointed out.

We have noted already how the modern industrial organization has affected the family, and how closely the forms of family life are dependent upon forms of industrial organization. This, however, is a matter of minor importance compared with the connection of political organization and industrial organization.

Through the system of stocks, bonds, and credits upon which our

economic system is organized, industry has established claims upon all other organizations. Churches, universities, and philanthropic organizations are not exempt, since their funds for the carrying on of their work are largely derived from these sources. Not only is every form of organization dependent, therefore, upon the industrial system and subject to its influence continually, but also the group consciousness of every organization is modified by the economic group consciousness of its members. Industrial group affiliations dominate all other group affiliations, outside of the family.

Moreover, the state is so tied up with business (including industry and commerce), that there are but two alternatives as regard to control: either the state must dominate the industrial system, or the industrial system must dominate the state. No simple (if temporary) solution of the conflict such as has sometimes been attained in another sphere by the "separation of church and state," is possible here. For, not only possession of property, but also the life of the industrial system, is actually guaranteed and maintained by the state, and if the state should cease its active participation in the industrial system, that system should die immediately, and carry the state to death, or at least temporary cessation of function, with it, since the funds the state would be automatically cut off. To give only one instance, but the most important: the rights of stockholders and bondholders are guaranteed by the state, and are protected not only by a vast system of laws, but by the full power of the judicial system, and if necessary by the armed force of the state. Without such guarantee stocks and bonds would be valueless, and the industrial system based upon them would be demolished. The notion that the state could "take its hands off" of business, and let it proceed "unhampered," is the most absurd notion ever promulgated. Business depends on the intimate support of the state, and the actual "regulation" which the state necessarily exercises is no less fundamental than state ownership of industry would be.

It should be noted that the governmentally guaranteed incomes on bonds, and the governmentally protected dividends on stocks, are forms of taxation delegated to private organizations. The holder of bonds, for example, is entitled to his income from the industry the bonds represent, whether his bonds are inherited or acquired by him in return for actual services, and he can be deprived of this

tax-right only by the destruction or crippling of the industry. The enormous volume of stocks and bonds outstanding, in addition to its actual economic function, provides for the maintenance of a leisure class by revenues withdrawn from industry in a way comparable to the support of the medieval aristocracy through feudal rights. So inextricably does the system of securities tie all social classes and organizations together, that no cure for the admitted evils of the system, which would not work other serious injustice, has been devised.

The corporation system of organizations is, moreover, such that mere speculation or gambling is governmentally protected by the same regulations which protect the general economic functions. We must not overlook the fact that the man who makes a profit by speculation in wheat or cotton is exercising a delegated state right to the levying of taxes, which are drawn from the consumers through the industry. Furthermore, the exploitation or "milking" of public service corporations, through methods of financing which constantly increase the "capital" instead of reducing it, so that the part of the income which must be devoted to "fixed charges" is kept large, is made possible by the existing industrial organization and its political support.

From the very nature of things business must dominate the state in its general functions, or else the state must dominate business. Herein lies the greatest social problem of today, and struggles between factions representing various proposed solutions and opposition to solution have occupied the forefront of "politics" for many years. That business, which represents but one part of the general social technique for the satisfaction of desires, will eventually be allowed to dominate the whole fabric, or will be allowed to continue its present relative dominance, is highly improbable, since such an outcome would undoubtedly bring disaster not only to political organization, but to every other form of organization, including business itself. The saying that business, unless under strict political control, inevitably cuts its own throat, probably has truth in it.

15. Secret societies

Organized civic groups of a peculiar type, conventionally designated as "Secret Societies," are found everywhere among modern civilized people and among savages, and have existed in the ancient

civilizations also. The specific details and functions of these groups vary from people to people, but there are certain general characteristics which distinguish them from groups of other types. Secrecy is a common but varying characteristic of such groups. In general, there are matters of more or less importance, usually pretended at least to be important, the knowledge of which is carefully restricted to members of the group. Meetings of the group are in general exclusive, although certain meetings may be held to which the general public is admitted.

Certain of the group activities involve rituals of a formal character, more or less elaborate. These rituals are usually symbolic, or probably have been symbolic in their origin. In the carrying out of the rituals certain costumes, fetiches, and other accessories are commonly employed.

Membership in such societies is customarily bestowed through ritualistic initiation ceremonies. In these ceremonies, and as marks of their fulfillment some savages mutilate the candidate by knocking out or filing the teeth, by slashing the skin in certain ways, by tattooing, etc. Mutilations and disfigurements as initiations into "civilized" secret societies are not unknown, and frequently, where actual mutilation is not practised, it is the custom to "treat the candidate rough." Badges of membership other than mutilations or set styles of hair dressing are commonly employed, such badges as bracelets, ear and nose rings, watch charms, brooches, etc.

Membership is frequently, but not always, attained by *degrees*. The accepted candidate is, by ritual process, admitted to the lowest degree of membership, then after a certain time, he is admitted, if found "worthy," to the next degree, and so on up. Admission to a higher degree is determined sometimes by the choice of those already members in that degree, sometimes by the payment of a fee, which may increase in magnitude with the elevation of the degree; sometimes by the ability of the candidate to "stand an examination" or go through the ritual or certain set tests of endurance to the satisfaction of the group; sometimes by the combination of two or all of these methods. The fees for the higher degrees in some savage lodges are relatively high, so that only the very wealthy can attain to them.

The standing and influence of the member within the society in-

creases with his elevation through the degrees, and his power outside of the group may increase likewise, through the influence of the society in the tribe. The men in the highest degrees of some savage lodges virtually dominate the community, although they may not constitute the legal political authority.

In some savage and civilized secret societies, however, there are no degrees, admission to the society being complete and full in one initiation. Although for the most part, membership in the societies is selective, not all members of the community, tribe, or other civic group being admitted, or even all of the general class of those from whom the membership is selected, there are some savage lodges to which all males of the tribe are regularly initiated upon reaching a prescribed age, unless very serious disqualifications stand in the way, and in these cases, a male of eligible age, not admitted to the lodge, would be a pariah in his general social relations.

In general, secret societies are sex-limited, and are mostly male. In only a few savage tribes are there women's lodges, and these are inferior in power and standing to the male organizations. The growth of secret societies admitting women, and of exclusively female societies, among civilized peoples, is relatively new, and the female lodges are usually subsidiary to male lodges, membership in them being limited to women who are closely related to members of the corresponding men's organization.

Very frequently, both in civilized and savage organizations, the lodge is a means of maintaining male superiority. The tradition that the members of the lodge are in possession of secrets of profound importance is commonly maintained, and among savages, the women are made to believe that the members are wielders of magic power. The prestige of the males is thus heightened, and the savage women are persuaded of the danger of refusing submission to the men, and especially of the danger attending approach to the meeting place of the lodge. Offenders against the rules of the lodge are in some places slain outright. In some cases, the societies resort to trickery to maintain the fearsome traditions. Certain Australian tribes make use of a flat piece of wood (called a "bull-rumour" in the terminology of the anthropologists) which when whirled on the end of a string emits a loud roaring sound. The women and children are told that this sound is made by the gods or demons invoked by the society, and only initiates are allowed to know how the sound is actually produced.

The methods of impressing the women among civilized people are somewhat different, but it is not uncommon for a man to make use of his lodge membership to enhance his importance in the eyes of his family. The use of the need of attending "lodge meetings" in order to effect an escape from family social duties is so common that it has been embodied in popular comedies.

The secret society very frequently has wider political functions, and, among savages, these functions are usually openly defined. In the case of civilized lodges, wider functions are only incidental, and where they exist are not openly declared. Religious functions are frequently exercised, and among some savages the lodge is sometimes the only religious organization or "church," the ceremonies of social religion being carried on by it exclusively. Some civilized lodges have been instituted among adherents of certain religious denominations to inhibit their mixing socially with members of other denominations, particularly to prevent their joining secret societies not controlled by the denomination, and thus running the danger of losing their religious affiliations.

Individual profit, other than the attainment of social rank, is frequently a feature of a secret society. This advantage is ensured sometimes by sick and death benefits, sometimes by obligations to render other aid to fellow members beyond that extended to fellow citizens generally. With these obligations go, by implication, a lessening of the general obligations to non-members, which is again an individual benefit. Thus, members may be under obligation to avoid seducing the wives and daughters of brother members, by which protection for their own families is secured without limiting their personal freedom to gratify their sexual inclinations at the expense of the families of non-members. The establishment of preferential business relations is frequently assigned as the dominant reason for "joining a lodge." Many college and high-school fraternities have as an acknowledged function the promotion of the individual interests of their members in various ways, and some have gone so far as to promote the sexual gratification of their members in very definite manners.

When one sees a savage secret society in function, or reads of its activities and importance, or when one sees a street procession of the Knights of Shambô, or the Order of the Sacred Elephants, in

full and astounding regalia, or sees the college sophomore proudly sporting the badge of Alpha Psi Zowie, one realizes the universality of the tendency which is expressed in secret societies, and that manifestly there are desires in savage and civilized man which are not fully satisfied through other organizations. For it may be accepted as a general principle, that organizations do not persist unless they contribute ■ the satisfaction of desires.

The wider political functions, economic functions, and most of the religious functions of secret societies, and the various individual advantages to members, are incidental to the main functions, for these other functions are not universal. The tendency ■ make use of any organization for personal advantage, and the tendency of a "going" organization to assume social functions not fully fulfilled by other organizations ■ sufficient to explain these variations. The real basis of the secret society must be sought in some function they fulfill universally.

One universal function of secret societies is the satisfaction of the desire for prominence and conformity. The ordinary man cannot attain eminence in political, economic and religious life, but he may attain the distinction of membership in an exclusive organization which sets him apart (above, in his estimation), from the common herd, and ■ can attain distinction within the organization through the attaining of the higher degrees and the holding of office. At the same time, he attains the satisfaction of conformity with the members of his society group. He "belongs." The universal satisfaction taken in the wearing of badges and paraphernalia which signify membership, and in parading publicly, attest the importance of this satisfaction.

But there is another function of secret societies which is perhaps just as important, namely the opportunity they offer for play. While play activity cannot be separated from social religion, and the definitions of the two are the same, not all play can ■ usefully classed as religion, and *vice versa*. Play is free activity, that is to say, activity which has no purpose except itself. It is the fuller satisfaction ■ the desire for activity, not completely fulfilled by those activities directed towards the satisfactions of other desires. The business man, for example, obviously cannot satisfy through his routine activities the desire for activities of all his muscles, hence he must "play"

golf, or some other muscular game. Even that will not give outlet for all his types of activity, although we cannot specify the other types so closely, and he engages in still other forms of play, including the participation in secret societies. It is precisely those men whose intellectual activities are not sufficiently varied who demand the outlet of lodge "work" and associations, parades, etc. Children whose rapidly developing intellectual activities are inadequately provided for by school and home life are especially zealous in this sort of play, so that regatta, parades, and rituals appeal strongly to children.

CHAPTER IX

SOCIAL PROGRESS AND INHERITANCE

§1. Social inheritance and the individual

SOCIAL progress is possible through increase in knowledge of the principles governing social organization, increase in knowledge concerning the facts of individual and social life, and increase in the materials of culture. Along with this accumulation, an improvement in methods of training individuals in habits and ideals, and in methods of imparting information, is possible. The history of human institutions demonstrates the practicability of this method of progress.

The accumulations of learning, culture, and invention are passed on to our descendants as truly as capital and debts are transmitted. This is inheritance in the literal sense of the term. Coming generations will have the telephone, radio, and air-craft which have been produced in the last two generations, just as we have the alphabet and the printing press invented by earlier generations. Philosophy, religion, ethics, literature, and all the other materials of culture are also inherited. English speaking peoples today are especially fortunate in their inheritance from so many ancient and modern peoples.

As a result of social inheritance the child of today attains a vastly different development from that which he would have attained in the environment of Egypt of ten thousand years ago, or in the wilds of central Australia. A hereditary tendency is a tendency to develop into a certain type of individual in one environment, and into an individual of a different type in another environment. Our ancestors' tendencies to develop into nomadic, rude, cruel barbarians were also tendencies to develop into sticklers for civility, kindness, and culture in social environments like those of today. In spite of the rise of various nations and stocks, and the decline of others, social evolution proceeds, provided the social products of each age are preserved and transmitted. The rate of progress, however, is variable, and is maximal when highest social inheritance is in the hands of peoples of the best stocks, peoples, whose tendencies to devel-

opment in the environment afforded by that inheritance are the highest.

A serious obstacle to progress seems to be the fact that each human generation begins exactly where all preceding generations began, with the same tendencies and capacities as their ancestors. With the increasing body of culture and inventions to be communicated, the education of the individual becomes more and more complicated. The period of training required by our children, and the labor involved in that training, are the same as would have been required to train our savage ancestors to the same level of attainments. Our progress in one generation seems to affect the next generation solely by modifying the environment to which the next generation is subjected.

It would seem that more rapid progress, and perhaps progress of a better sort, might be made if we could actually improve the capacities of the individuals in successive generations, so that these individuals would respond to the environment in better ways than their ancestors could have done. Then, instead of starting in each generation at the same level in infancy, and training each to a higher level than the preceding generation attained, each generation would start at a higher level, and progress would be accelerated. Unfortunately, there seems to be no evidence that aside from the effects of training during his lifetime, any individual has greater capacities mental or physical, than had his most remote ancestors of which we have any historical or archaeological evidence. If an individual is superior to some of his ancestors, it is apparently because he has inherited not from these, but from other ancestors, who were just as capable as he is. What may have happened millions of years ago is of little practical importance. A few thousands of years, no appreciable change occurs. For the problem of social organization, what may happen millions of years from now is also negligible. We can usefully concern ourselves only with changes which may be brought about in a relatively few generations. The reasons why there is no appreciable change in inheritable characteristics from generation to generation are set forth below.

12. Heredity and training

We have considered the individual, so far, as an organism which has definite tendencies toward response. Stimulated in certain ways

by the environment, it acts in certain ways, develops certain desires, and has certain types of consciousness. These reactions modify the individual, especially his nervous system, so that the tendencies present at one time may be replaced by other tendencies later. But at any given time, we assume, there are reaction tendencies in the nervous system, which, upon definite stimulation will produce definite responses.

The modifying process through which reaction tendencies are changed are designated as *draping*, *learning*, *acquisition*, or *habit-formation*. The tendencies present at any given time in the individual, we call *habits*, or *acquired tendencies*. But since habits presuppose previous tendencies which have been modified, the question arises as to the "original" tendencies from which the process started. If acquisition, or training is the modification of a previously existing tendency; and if that tendency, if acquired, depends on still earlier tendencies, it would seem that there must have been, in the individual, at some earlier stage, tendencies of an original type, with which the series of modifications started. Such assumed "original" reaction tendencies have been commonly called "instinctive tendencies" or "instincts." On this assumption we have to consider two forces determining the life and development of any individual: his instinctive tendencies, or "nature," and his training, or "nurture."

The human individual, we know, is developed from an original single cell, the fertilized egg, which is formed by the union of two special cells, the egg (ovum), produced from a germ cell of the mother and the sperm cell (spermatozoon), produced from a germ cell of the father. This method of genesis is common to all the higher order of plant and animal life.

The fertilized egg has certain inherent tendencies to develop along definite lines. The egg of the cat develops into a cat, the egg of the human being into a human being. From the egg of blue-eyed parents, a blue-eyed individual develops.¹ Obviously, the egg contains definite developmental tendencies, differing in different eggs, which must have been obtained from the germ cells of the parents. This transmission of tendencies from generation to generation is called *heredity*.

¹ There may be exceptions to this particular rule, but such exceptions, if they occur, are very rare.

The actual tendencies of the fertilized egg are carried principally in the chromatin ■ the cell, or at certain stages of development, in the chromosomes into which the chromatin divides. Further than this, we know little about the mechanics of these tendencies.

■ the mother's uterus the original cell divides into two, these again into four, and so on. A process of specialization of cells appears, and ultimately the cells of different types—muscle, nerve, gland, and so on, are formed, and are arranged in the typical tissues and structures of the human being.

At some time during the development of the embryo, activities of the response-type begin. Several months before birth, coordinated movements of the muscles of the legs, arms and trunk are noticeable, and it is probable that movements of other muscles occur also. At what stage these movements begin, whether they are from the beginning response-movements, and at what moment learning commences, we do not know. But we have no reason to doubt that the remarkably well coordinated responses of sucking and crying which are exhibited at birth are habits, developed by the modifications of movement which have commenced much earlier *in utero*.

Presumably, response cannot occur until the process of growth has perfected structure and their arrangement. Theoretically, therefore, there might be a point in development at which the first, and therefore the truly "instinctive" or original response of the neuro-motor mechanism, or a definite part of the mechanism, occurs. That there is any such definite beginning of response in the ordinary sense of the term may, however, be doubted. It may well be that growth itself is a process continuous with response-modification and subject to the same laws. But whether this be true or not, we may reasonably expect to find that the changes involved in the modification of structures in such a way as to make responses possible, are modifications of essentially the same type as those involved in habit-formation.

For the present, therefore, it is wisest to regard all response-tendencies as *habits*, and to make no assumptions concerning "instinctive" or "original" responses, until detailed investigations of the development of responses in the embryo have been completed. So far as we are now concerned, the only certain "instinctive" response is the first response of the fertilized germ cell to its environment, and the only "instinctive" tendency of which we are certain is the tendency embodied in the structure of the fertilized egg cell itself.

Heredity, then, is structurally the organization of the fertilized egg cell, and dynamically it is the fact that different cells are fitted to respond differently to the same environment. Subject two different fertilized human eggs to the same conditions, during gestation and after, and they will develop into individuals of different types, making different responses to the same stimuli. One may be blue-eyed, fair-haired, intelligent, and gentle, the other, dark-eyed, dark-haired, dull, and vicious. The details may differ slightly in some cases, but greatly in others.

Of course, no two individuals can ever be subjected to exactly the same environment. Even in the uterus, twins cannot be said to be nourished exactly alike, nor stimulated exactly alike. Hence, even identical twins¹ could not be expected to be exactly alike at birth, even if in the beginning of foetal development the two were exactly alike, which, of course, is another improbability.

The developmental tendency is not, however, isolable from the environment. Along with the fact that fertilized eggs differently constituted would develop into individuals with different characteristics, we must consider the fact that eggs exactly alike would, in different environments, develop differently. This is manifestly true in the post-natal life, as is demonstrated by the effects of training on the individual. Some characteristics can be very much modified by relatively small changes in the environment, and others are very slightly modified by large environmental changes, but nevertheless, growth and habit formation are, throughout, influenced by the stimulation applied. The child can be very readily made to

¹ Identical twins are those which develop from the same egg cell, whereas ordinary twins develop from different eggs. Although there is little probability that in the separation of the fertilized egg into two cells, the two daughter cells will be exactly alike in structure, they will be much more alike than two eggs are apt to be.

Hence, it is assumed that twins of the same sex, and quickly alike, are identical. Unfortunately, in the earlier studies of "identical twins," there has been no biological proof of "identity," and these studies are therefore of little value. Yet it is reasonable to assume that, where the resemblance is very close, the twins are identical, although careful examination will stress differences in structure and response in every case. In the scientific study, identity or non-identity is determined at birth, by examination of the placentas or placentas, and the twins so identified studied during their later development. Such studies have been but recently commenced.

show fear reactions to situations which previously did not excite such reactions. Its height and weight can also be modified by control of nutrition and exercise, and even the color of its hair can be changed by exposure to, or protection from, the sunlight.

In the uterine life, there is no doubt that the same conditions obtain. Changes in nutrition manifestly influence the foetal development. If the fertilized egg of Scandinavian parents were transplanted to the uterus of an Italian mother, it would undoubtedly develop into a child which at birth would show general Scandinavian characteristics, but that its characteristics would not in some way, however slight, differ from the characteristics it would have possessed if it had developed in the uterus of a Scandinavian mother, is entirely improbable.

Hereditry, in short, cannot rationally be conceived as a force operating independent of environmental forces, but must be conceived as operating through them, and *vice versa*. A hereditary tendency is a tendency to develop in one way in one environment, in another way in another environment. For some tendencies, wide ranges of environmental variation produce little variation in results. For other tendencies, slight environmental changes produce large results.

It is important to note, however, that designation of certain variations as "slight" and others as "large" is by no means a matter of absolute magnitude. "Slight" variations are merely those which have little importance to our present interests, or are difficult of measurement. "Large" variations are those which we consider important for a variety of reasons, or which are easily observed. What we consider "slight" at present we may consider "large" at some future time, and *vice versa*.

The popular distinction between "hereditary" and "non-hereditary" characters is therefore really a distinction between micro-variability and macro-variability by the environment. Hereditry as an isolable factor is not a useful concept.

53. The modification of germ cells

In the development of the individual animal from the fertilized egg, through repeated cell division, and the specialization of later generations of cells, some cells remain unchanged throughout the divisions, and in the adult body the descendants of these cells, the

germ cells, lives in the testes of the male, or the ovaries of the female, having essentially (but not necessarily exactly) the same characteristics as the original fertilized egg cell from which they and the whole body have descended. From these germ cells in turn, sperm cells or egg cells are formed, and by the union of the sperm cell from one parent and the egg from another, a new fertilized egg cell is produced, and the whole process repeated. Germ cells, in other words, are not produced by the bodies they inhabit, but are the descendants of endless lines of germ cells, which at various points produce animal bodies as side products, the bodies being useful to the germ cells, as houses and mechanical appliances are to men who build them.

As, in the same climate, successive generations of men build houses of the same type, because the men are of the same type, and yet the houses of one generation are not produced by the houses of the past, so the men themselves are alike because their germ cells are alike, and the bodies of one generation are not really descendants of the bodies of the preceding generation.

The fertilized egg cell from which an individual starts is not exactly like the fertilized egg cell from which either of his parents originated. Loosely speaking, half a germ cell from the father's line, unites with half a germ cell of the mother's line, to form the fertilized egg cell from which the child develops. In the process of division of germ cells to form spermatozoa and eggs, no two sperm cells from the father's germ cells, and no two eggs from the mother's germ cells will be exactly alike. Hence, no two of the children of two parents will be closely alike, unless they be identical twins, and in many cases brothers or sisters are very different. These variations are quite understandable in terms of the permutations and combinations of the various characters carried in the germ cells. The fact that characteristics of ancestors which are not apparent in parents may appear in their children is intelligible from the fact that when there are conflicting characters in the fertilized egg cell, derived from two different parents, one of these characters alone may express itself in the individual developed from the fertilized egg cell, but both characters may be transmitted to successive descendants of the germ cell.

If, in successive divisions of a germ cell, all its progeny were precisely like the original germ cell, and if in the division of a germ cell

into spermatozoa or eggs, and the subsequent union of a spermatozoon and an egg into a fertilized egg cell, no changes were made in the characters transmitted, there would be various combinations in the species of the characteristics possessed by the individuals of the earlier generation, but no changes other than these could occur. There could be no further evolution, and the origin of the species itself would be unintelligible.

Mutations, or changes in the characters of germ cells, are believed to occur most frequently at the divisions into sperm cells or eggs, or at the union of sperm cell and egg, but according to recent investigators, may occur at later stages of development also. Variations in the characteristics of individuals would then arise. The other possibility of change, whether of improvement or deterioration, in the germ cell, turns upon the possibility of the modification of the germ cell during its individual life time. There is no inherent improbability in such modification, for the germ cell is a living organism, whose activities are dependent upon its environment, and whose activities may modify its structure, even if the structure be not more directly modified by the environmental forces themselves. That such modifications may occur through changes in nourishment or temperature of the egg, or through chemical changes in its environment, is demonstrated by experimental work. But that such changes are of normal occurrence, or are important in the development of a species, is by no means demonstrable.

It is believed by some persons that individuals who have been trained along specific lines may transmit to their children the results of training as increased capacities for receiving training along the same specific lines. It is held, for example, that the training which a race horse receives not only increases his speed, but that his progeny, begotten later, are thereby given a greater capacity for speed. The studying of mathematics by an individual is popularly believed to increase the mathematical ability of his children. The same type of *transmission of acquired characters* has been assumed for a wide range of training, motor, mental, and emotional, and even for structural changes.

Reliable evidence for such training effects is not at hand. A few startling experiments are on record, but are not generally received as trustworthy. It is inconceivable, moreover, that the structure

of the germ cells could be so modified by specific activities of the organism in which they reside that the same activities would be affected in the individuals developed from them. Mathematical work on a man's part could conceivably affect the nourishment of the germ cells in his testes, but that the effect would be different from that produced by intellectual work along any other line is not conceivable. The only influence would be exerted through materials carried in the blood stream, and the effect, if any, would probably be of a general sort. Furthermore, the germ cells are especially well protected against influence even of the general nutritive sort. And such changes as might be brought about through extreme modification of the blood, by the introduction of poisonous substance, or by the withholding of essential nutrient materials, would undoubtedly be of a general nature, causing deterioration in many characteristics.

There is no reason to suppose that training in politics and in tennis would affect the germ cells differently. But emotional differences, and differences in fatigue might have some effect, in conjunction with the same type of physical or cognitive activities, since emotion and fatigue affect the bodily metabolism, and hence the food supply of the germ cells. But that there are any specifically different chemical results from mathematical labor and the labor in copying manuscript is quite improbable. Musical training, through the emotions aroused, might conceivably have some influence on the germ cells, but there is no reason to assume that the effects on the germ cells would be to create a capacity for musical appreciation on the resultant individual rather than a capacity for interest in international politics. In view of the absence of proof of the transmission of specific acquisitions, the possibility must be considered to be very remote. If there is any effect of bodily processes on the germ cells, it must be very general in its nature, and its existence and importance remain to be demonstrated.

The germ cell in the testis or ovary is literally a parasite upon the organism which supports and protects it, and so is the child *in utero*. "Prenatal influence," in the sense of an effect produced by the intellectual and emotional processes of the mother on the unborn child, can be only a matter of nutrition and chemical stimulation or poisoning. The current tales of birth marks produced by the mother's

fright, or musical talent produced by the mother's application to musical study during the period of gestation, are without foundation in fact. We have no reason for supposing that any activity, or condition, of the mother could be the cause of an effect on the child which would resemble the cause. We have no more reason to suppose that intense application of the mother to any sort of labor would give the child a tendency to indolence than we have to suppose that it would make the child lazy.

The mother's study of mathematics may affect the nourishment of the child. Undoubtedly it does in some way, if it affects the mother's metabolism at all. But there is no more reason to assume that the effect would be to increase the mathematical ability of the child than to increase its generosity or darken its hair. Continual fear on the part of the mother may very seriously alter the child's food supply, and may result in injurious components being added. It is possible that these changes may weaken the child in some respect, but there is no more reason to suppose that the result will be to increase the child's fear tendency than to make it dull and unresponsive, or irritable and quick to anger.

§4. Eugenics

Individual improvement through heredity seems impossible. At least, it is negligible for the present. The training of the individual affects progeny only in so far as it changes the environment of the next generation; of course, the parent is a part of the child's environment. But social improvement through heredity is nevertheless possible. There are many strains in the human family, many strains even in any national group, and these strains differ in their physical and mental characteristics. Some individuals are tall, others short, some thin, others fleshy, some blue-eyed, others brown-eyed, some lazy, others energetic, some highly intelligent, others feeble-minded. Each of these individuals tend to transmit to his descendants the characters which have caused him to develop these characteristics. These characteristics may not be socially of high importance, but if we find that feeble-minded parents tend to "transmit" their deficiencies to their children in a reproducible way, this certainly is socially important.

Obviously, then, if we can increase the reproduction of the stocks

which tend to develop certain characteristics in the environments to which they will probably be exposed in the future, and prevent the reproduction of other stocks which do not tend to develop these characteristics in the same environment, the first stock will crowd the other out. Nothing new will have come into the population, but by increasing the number of one type, and decreasing the number of the other type, the average of the population will have been changed, ■ regards these characters. For example, we might conceive that if the reproduction of the more feeble-minded be decreased, or the reproduction of the more intelligent be increased, the average intelligence of the total group will be raised in succeeding generations. This average improvement or eugenic effect through the suppression of undesirable types, or the prevention of the deterioration or dygenic effect, which would occur if the more desirable types were allowed to decrease, is the program of *negative*. The two problems of eugenics concern, therefore, the repression of the reproduction of the unfit, and the increase of the reproduction of the fit, and the immediate concern is with methods by which these results may be brought about.

The most vital questions for Eugenics are, therefore. First, whether we can predict the future environments for human beings in their determining features, and therefore, the development of present stocks in the future centuries. Second, assuming that we can predict the environment, whether we can select the stocks which will, in those environments, produce the most socially desirable individuals.

To the first question there is no answer: this would seem to make any eugenics program meaningless. It is usual, however, to assume arbitrarily that the human environment will not change in its more essential features, and we may then tentatively discuss the programs of eugenics on this assumption.

The answer to the second question. "Who are the eugenically 'fit', or the 'fittest'?", receives the almost universal answer, "We are!" "We" being the race, class, or group giving the answer. Fortunately, this answer is not quite unanimous. As concerns the migration problem, this answer is satisfactory. We, in the United States, have certain average characteristics and average ideals, which are somewhat like the average characteristics and ideals of the peoples of Northern and Western Europe. We, or the majority of us, propose to maintain this average, and in pursuance of this purpose, to exclude those whose

presence would materially change the average. The majority rules in a democracy, and we have an undoubted right to self-determination, whatever other peoples may wish to change our average.

The American Indians, first in possession of the country, undoubtedly had the same right to exclude the undesirable aliens who would modify the average characteristics and upset their culture. And they made the attempt to assert this right, but unsuccessfully. That situation has vanished, and we do not want what happened to the Indians to happen to us.

But this answer is not satisfactory for eugenics. If we want to maintain an average within a population, we must know what that average is, and if we want to raise the average we must agree upon what we shall consider an improvement. If this agreement cannot be reached by the majority, any further discussion of eugenics is futile. We must therefore consider the possible answers to the question.

1. *Racial stocks.* With the possible exception of the blacks, each group considers itself the best. We are familiar with the conceptions of "Nordic" superiority as held by those who consider themselves representatives of that rather indefinite group of races. Within that group, the Germans, the English, and the Scandinavians have little doubt as to the superiority of their own owned groups. On the other hand, the Irish, the Dutch, the Scotch and the Italians are just as certain of the exceeding value of their own particular stocks. And the Greeks are convinced that they are the best people. Among the Hindus, the Arabs and the Turks, the same conceptions prevail. There is no hope of unanimity of opinion concerning any of these stocks, and the only solution of the rivalry is through one of them becoming powerful enough to crush the others out. We must admit that the one which succeeds is obviously the "best."

Theoretically, measurement of the native mental characteristics of these racial or national groups should furnish the basis for a decision. In view, however, of the actual complexity of stocks of each such group, and the important differences of their cultures, psychologists are deeply pessimistic as to the practicality of this approach, even on the assumption that we know what to measure and how it might be measured.

Our problem, therefore reduces to that of determining the fittest

stock within a population of a fairly uniform general culture. The possibility of solution of this problem turns upon financial status, social standing, intelligence, other mental attributes, social contributions, sanity, morality, and physical characteristics.

2. *Judgment by financial status* at first seems reasonable. Our successful citizens are obviously fit for their environment, otherwise they would not succeed. Moreover, they are actually leaders in accomplishment. One capitalist of industry and finance may be morally reprehensible, but they are men of ability who have contributed very greatly to national progress. They correspond to the barons and dukes of older times who grasped and wielded power through their personal ability, and they compare very favorably with these noble lords.

The greater number of wealthy men today, like the majority of the nobility, are not men who have attained their status through their own efforts, but are those who have inherited their advantages, and who, for the most part, show little evidence of having inherited the personal characteristics which made their progenitors great. Instead of contributing largely to social progress, they are merely parasites upon the social organism, and without value to it. Obviously the possession of wealth is no index of social value, and the ability to acquire wealth, if transmissible, is not linked necessarily with any socially valuable qualities.

3. *Social standing.* The indefinable, but real, characteristic called "social standing," as distinguished from the wealth, title, or accomplishments which sometimes determine it, is sometimes seriously proposed as a mark of social value. But here also the characteristics which gain standing must be distinguished from the standing itself, the latter being frequently inherited without the characteristics. As concerns the personal characteristics which gain social standing, these are best considered apart from the standing itself, which is a badge of such doubtful meaning.

4. *Intelligence.* It is argued that the more intelligent persons are the better for stock purposes, since intelligence is really hereditary. This may be true, and we might even persuade those who are low in intelligence to agree to the proposition, if we could agree on the definition and determination of intelligence. Intelligence is, however, a term covering a wide range of characteristics, according to various definitions.

In its most important, and most generally accepted use, intelligence means *capacity to learn*. There are various forms of learning, variously measurable, and we cannot assume that a certain grade of learning ability in one line would necessarily involve equivalent ability in other lines of learning. For many practical purposes, therefore, we measure the capacity in several lines, and averaging the capacities as measured, arrive at what is arbitrarily called a measure of "general" intelligence, without making any assumption as to the existence of a real "general" capacity. The capacities are actually determined by measuring, or rather by sampling, the acquisitions of knowledge, that is, what has been learned along the lines selected. The measurements as thus carried out are called "intelligence tests."

In intelligence testing by the conventional method, we are dealing with complex conditions. The actual acquisitions measured, or sampled, obviously depend on the interest the individual has taken in the sampled line of investigation, and "learning capacity" really covers this complex of capacity and interest. The acquisition depends, moreover, very distinctly on the opportunities for acquisition which have been offered. If, for example, we measure the acquisition which has been made by two individuals in arithmetic, the differences may depend upon actual differences in learning capacity, upon the interest taken in, and application to, the subject, and upon the actual extent and nature of the course in arithmetic, or other arithmetical training to which the individuals have been subjected. In all comparison of individuals with regard to intelligence as tested, therefore, we must assume that the opportunities of the individuals for acquisition have been equal, or else make direct corrections for the differences in opportunity.

Obviously, then, intelligence testing is useful only when the tests are devised specifically for the classes of persons to whom they are to be applied, and the more generally applicable the tests, the less useful they are. College matriculants, having been subjected to courses of training which are essentially similar, (high school training), and being about to be subjected to conditions in college essentially similar, may be tested with a high degree of efficiency in result of prediction as to their success in college. But even so, the actual differences in high school and home training introduce serious

difficulties into the use of test scores, and differences in college conditions may operate to prevent a test which has good predictive value for one college from having the same predictive value on another college.

If the intelligence test designed for college matriculants is applied to men of a quite different class as regards training and professional requirements, it may be of little value. Experimentally it has been found that the same tests may be used with equal advantage on freshmen and office clerks, (although not as adequate for either as specially designed tests for each), but fail completely with business men, (other than clerks), upon whom the requirements of practical success are different, and who require apparently different training, or else a different kind of "intelligence."

Although paradoxical in form, the statement that tests of "general intelligence" are efficient in proportion as they are made special, is true enough. For use on children, the tests are made special in that they are not really applicable to adults, but general in that they involve knowledge that the average child may have been expected to have acquired at certain ages. But even with these special tests for children, the results are useless unless interpreted with reference to the special training of each child. For adults, "general" tests which may be applied to various classes of persons indiscriminately are successful only in so far as very rough divisions of the groups are required.

So far as present means of grading intelligence go, we can do no more than to pick out the individuals of very bad stock from the larger group. The individuals who show up as exceptionally high in intelligence tests may be good breeding stock, or they may be bad. It is impossible at present to determine this point.

3. *Records of contributions* which individuals have made to society, quite apart from the wealth or social standing which may be attained by these individuals, have been assumed to be evidence of "fitness." Statesmen, authors, inventors, organizers, scientists, and men and women of many other classes, make important contributions to the social inheritance of mankind, and the multiplication of men of genius and exceptional ability is certainly desirable. These persons are unquestionably "fit" in one sense of the term, but that they are the fittest from the eugenic point of view is not so certain.

Sometimes the son of a man of exceptional ability is one of these

specialised lines of endeavour has as great ability as, or even greater than, his father. Occasionally, the grandson may also show a high measure of the same ability. But these are, after all, exceptional cases, and in the great majority of instances, the immediate descendants of exceptional men appear to be of only mediocre ability.

This failure of genius to reproduce itself may be due in large part to the chances of mating. Brilliant literary men, great scientists, and geniuses in other lines, do not usually marry women of ability in these same lines, and the children may inherit from either parent in regard to the characteristics in question. It ought to be maintained, therefore, that if male geniuses were mated with female geniuses, the children would tend to be geniuses. On this theory, the child of a man and woman of exceptional mathematical ability, ("native" ability, not training), would be a mathematical genius in a far greater proportion of cases than would the child of parents of whom one or both were of only average mathematical ability. We have to admit the theoretical possibility, but there is not at hand evidence to substantiate it, or to contradict it. Many cases would have to be analysed, and means found for the determination of capacity in various lines, in cases in which this capacity had not been developed. For it is obvious that so far as transmission of genius is concerned, it makes no difference whether the individual has the capacity developed by training, or has it entirely undeveloped and indiscernible by ordinary means of observation. The "miserable Milton" could transmit literary ability to his posterity as readily as the Milton who had published renowned volumes. Many "ordinary" women mated with geniuses may be the possessors of latent genius, but latent genius would be as transmissible as the developed, if genius is transmissible at all.

Studies have been made of noteworthy families, extending over many generations, in the attempt to show that genius is transmissible. It has been shown that in certain families, generation after generation, men of exceptional ability have appeared, the proportions of genius to the total number of the family being far greater than in the population in large.

Many difficulties are found in the interpretation of these genealogical studies. In the first place, the later generations of the same "family" are, of course, the descendants of many other "families" also. The great grandson of Ebenezer Smith may belong to the

"Smith family," but he has four great-grandfathers and an equal number of great-grandmothers: a total of eight different ancestral lines in the third ascending generation, with as great probability of inheritance from any one of these as from any other. If he happens to bear the name of "Smith," or for other reasons ■■ classed in the "Smith" family, rather than in one of the others, that does not in the least affect ■■ biological inheritance. But it may affect his social inheritance: an important matter.

There is no doubt that there are often practical advantages of "belonging" to a distinguished family: advantages sometimes in education, sometimes in other practical matters, so that the one who "belongs" has a better chance to make his mark on life. Beyond this, the social inheritance of culture in the family is valuable, and the traditions and prestige are powerful stimuli to accomplishment. The remarkable thing would seem to be not that in a few families a certain percentage of successive generations "live up" to the families' reputations, but rather the fact that it occurs in so few families.

On the other hand, in the families with "traditions" of exceptional ability, it is apparently seldom that the exceptionally able individuals in successive generations are lineal descendants. Instead of father, son, grandson and great-grandson appearing as exceptional, we find rather often such relationships as uncle and nephew between the geniuses of successive generations. In such families, a stock of moderate ability puts out offshoots of genius, generation after generation, the geniuses of one generation rarely descending from the geniuses of the preceding. From this point of view, it would seem that genius is an evidence, not of fitness of the individual for producing progeny, but of fitness of the stock from which he is an offshoot: that the preferable line of breeding may go around him and not through him.

The situation is still further complicated by the fact that "families" may flourish generation after generation, showing no exceptional abilities, and then begin to produce exceptional men. Most of the "exceptional" families in America which rose in colonial times can ■■ traced back to nobility of attachment in the British Islands. Obviously, either the proper combination of various stocks, which eventually occurred, was a necessary condition to the production of genius, or else the opportunities and stimuli of a changed environment must

be held accountable. Which of the hundreds mediocre "faculties" of today will produce the geniuses of three or four generations hence, we cannot at present determine.

Recent observations of children who are classed, somewhat arbitrarily as showing "genius," have not thrown light on the situation. Aside from the increasing doubt as to whether the children selected for these much advertised studies are turning out "better" than the average in any way, the problem of their value as breeding stock is still open. Aside from the difficulty in diagnosing it in childhood, exceptional mental ability cannot at the present time be assumed to be a sign of eugenic "fitness." We cannot even be certain that it may not be a sign of eugenic "unfitness."

6 *Physical superiority* is more plausible, at present, as a sign of eugenic "fitness," than is mental superiority. The stock which degenerates physically is lost, no matter how high its mental attainment in the meantime. It is, however, in the complex of physical and mental characteristics which are commonly classed as "beauty" that the greater hope lies eugenically. Not mere strength of bone and muscle, and vigor of vital processes, but balanced, coordinated structure and strength, together with organic vigor and resistance, with accuracy and fine control of movement, are important characteristics of "fitness," whether they are the most important or not. These are subsumed under the general attribute of beauty, which includes not merely approved form of body and texture of skin, and similar structural characteristics, but also grace and vigor of movement, and poise in repose as well. Some of the accepted standards of beauty, e.g., smallness of ankle, may seem irrelevant to eugenic fitness, but these details are demonstrably inheritable, and undoubtedly do contribute to efficiency of movement.

Grace, poise, and accurate coordination of movements are in themselves to be classed as mental rather than physical. And they are probably indices of still higher mental reactions, or at least of the possibility of development there. It is highly significant that among the efficient tests of mental deficiency today, tests of motor coordination have a high rank, and that the carriage, general movements, and facial expressions are useful, although not infallible evidence on the same traits.

35. Sexual selection

Among human and some lower animals, mates are chosen more or less deliberately, from among a number of possible mates. Of course, the choosing is limited in many cases, and in most cases is largely determined by chance, propensity, and economic considerations. Sometimes religious restrictions or class restrictions are imposed, and racial limitations are frequently important. But in spite of these limitations, the man usually chooses for a wife the woman he prefers from among a number of women, and the woman likewise exercises a certain amount of personal preference. Not infrequently, personal preference is strong enough to cause the limitations of class, race, or religion to be broken. The question has been long since raised, whether or not through this *sexual selection*, the characteristics of a group might not be appreciably changed, at least in the average. It is conceivable that whatever the characteristics, or group of characteristics, in respect to which mates are selected, successive generations of such selections might cause these characteristics to increase in the group, either by increase in the number of individuals possessing the characteristics, or by a general change in the direction indicated. For example, if blue-eyed mates were preferred, and more sought than brown-eyed, might not, in the course of generations, the relative number of blue-eyed persons in the population increase? Or, if the tall are preferred and more sought than the short for mates, might not the general average of the height of the population slowly be raised? The actual effect of such sexual selection has been, and still is, a matter for debate.

In order that sexual selection might produce any change in the population, in regard to the characteristics for which selection is made, two considerations would have to be satisfied:

1. *The standards of selection must remain constant for a number of generations.* Assuming, for the sake of the explanation, that selection based on preference for slender mates, or for fat mates, could produce a change in the average plumpness of the population; no important change could be produced unless the preference remained the same a number of generations. If plump mates are preferred and selected in one generation, and slender mates in the next, and so on alternately, it is not conceivable that any appreciable change in the average plumpness of the population would be produced.

2. *The effects of sexual selection must be such as to modify the relative numbers of progeny of individuals differing in regard to the characteristics by which selection is made, or else some other means of selection must be added to the sexual, if the average of the stock is to be modified.* The change in reproductive ratio might be brought about by failure of certain individuals to mate at all, or by change in the number of children per family, but if the various types of individuals, under a selective mating system, have the same average number of children as they would without the selection, it is difficult to see how, in the long run, the average characteristics of the population could be modified by sexual selection alone. However, it is possible that sexual selection might assist the application of other selective measures, as will be indicated below.

In order to analyse the possible effect of sexual selection it is necessary to consider its operation in the several historic forms of marriage, for it could not be assumed that the effect would be the same under all systems. It is necessary also to consider the possible effects when one sex alone is selected by the other, and when both sexes are selected for the same characteristic.

A Sexual selection in monogamy. In normal circumstances, the number of males is approximately equal to the number of females. If all mate, the average of the population in respect to a given characteristic will not be affected by any system of mating, except in so far as a recessive characteristic may be hidden, while still "carried" in heredity.

With double selection, as when, for example, both males and females prefer the taller of the opposite sex, the preferred will mate with the preferred (taller with taller), leaving the non-preferred (shorter) of the one sex to mate with the non-preferred of the other. This is *assortative mating*. The average thereby will not be changed, but the height will eventually be more uniform in each of various stocks, and the height of future generations of specific families will become more closely predictable. If a weakness, such as mental defect, were selected against, in this assortative mating, the lower grades of defect might become concentrated in certain family stocks, and this might be an advantage in handling these types by sterilization or segregation (as described below). But aside from the effect of such measures in addition to sexual selection, the average of the population would not change.

If, however, the less favored of both sexes, being rejected by the more favored of the opposite sex, tended not to mate with each other, the reproductive ratios would be altered. Unfortunately, this seldom happens unless compulsion is used. Even the congenitally deaf mate with the deaf, and the deformed with the deformed, although rejected by the normal, unless forced by the larger group to refrain.

If selection is single, one sex being selected and the other not, the conditions are not essentially different. If, for example, men prefer and choose, if possible, blue-eyed women as against brown-eyed, but women have no preference in respect to male eye color, the more fortunate blue- and brown-eyed males will secure the blue-eyed women, but the residual blue- and brown-eyed males will mate with the brown-eyed women. The average heredity will not be changed, unless the brown-eyed women are so disliked that the males refuse to mate with them—an improbable situation, not only in respect to eye color, but in respect to all characteristics which might be bases of selection.

Under certain conditions, such as prolonged warfare, the males are relatively fewer than the females. In monogamy, therefore, a certain proportion of the females will not be able to mate. If there is definite selection of females, the less desirable will be unmated, and the cutting off of their progeny may conceivably raise the average of future generations with regard to the selected characteristics. Warfare may have had an important effect in modifying the characteristics of the human races, and its possible benefits along that line have not heretofore been given sufficient consideration. On the other hand, with female infanticide, the females being fewer, a certain proportion of the males will not mate. If the females are given opportunity of selection, the less preferred males will be unmated, and here also there is a chance of modifying the future population in respect to the selected characteristics. In general, however, women in monogamy have had little opportunity to exercise sexual selection, so that this method of human improvement has probably been negligible. Selection occurs in such circumstances, but it is economic and political rather than sexual, the wealthier and most powerful (socially) males being the fortunate ones. In so far as personal characteristics have made the male wealthy or powerful, economic and political selection probably does modify the average of the population in the direction of these characteristics. But this selection is not "sexual" in the proper sense of the term.

Monogamy, however, has not been strict among any civilized peoples, but has always been largely tempered by prostitution. Since prostitutes as a class produce relatively few children, a modification of the characteristics of the population is quite possible. Prostitutes are consistently selected, or selected against, with regard to any specific characteristics.

In modern civilization, there is some evidence that the less intelligent and less personally beautiful woman has had less chance of marrying, and more chance of becoming a prostitute, than the more intelligent and beautiful. Whenever this condition exists for a long period, prostitution has undoubtedly a eugenic effect,¹ although that effect may be far outweighed by the dysgenic effects of venereal disease which prostitution promotes. In ancient civilizations, the same conditions may not have prevailed. Whereas the intelligence of woman today leads her to avoid prostitution, as less advantageous than marrying, in some ancient civilizations the upper class prostitutes (*hetairai*) were more respected, and in many ways more favorably situated than wives, and the profession was taken up by some of the most intelligent and accomplished women.

In all civilizations, however, the more sexually ardent women, and those whose sexual desires were most like the average male type, have had a greater chance of becoming prostitutes than their "colder" sisters, or those whose sexual desires were more different from the masculine in the direction of the average female of today. That prostitution may have been the important agent in differentiating the average type of sexual desires of the civilized female from the male average, cannot be definitely concluded. This is possible, however; and it is significant that savage peoples, among whom prostitution has not flourished, are said to lack this differentiation of desire between male and female. At any rate, prostitution merits, on this account, more careful consideration as a possible factor in modifying the characteristics of a population. But in the case under consideration, the effect would be dysgenic, not eugenic.

In another way, prostitution, in a monogamous system, may have

¹ The woman who becomes a prostitute definitely loses whatever chance of marrying she still might have had, and as a prostitute, the chances of her producing children are very small. The fertile-mad woman, if not a prostitute, produces children with or without marriage.

a eugenic effect through sexual selection, since it tends to increase the number of unmarried women who will be, in general, of the less desirable types. There is always, in such a system, a considerable number of males who will confine themselves to patronage of prostitutes, instead of marrying, and since the number of patrons is relatively large in proportion to the number of prostitutes, the number of potential husbands is thereby reduced. If the classes of patrons were consistently distinguished from marrying men by any specific characteristics, rather than by fortuitous circumstances of life, the fact that this group of men leave practically no progeny would in itself tend to have a eugenic effect. The existence of specific distinguishing characteristics in this group, is, however, not highly probable.

B. *Sexual selection in polygyny.* In a polygynous system, if males were selected sexually, modifications of the population in the direction of the selected characteristics would be more pronounced than in monogamous systems. If, for example, women freely selected their husbands, preferring the more handsome, vigorous, or intelligent men to those possessing these characteristics in less degree, many of these less preferred males would be left wifeless (or would have to engage in polyandrous marriage together with other ill-favored males), so that the procreation of the ill-favored males would be significantly reduced, and the procreation of the highly favored males with their numerous wives would be signally increased. The general average of the population would be gradually raised, even if some of the selected characteristics were sex-linked, and a differentiation of the sexes in those respects produced.

Unfortunately, in polygynous systems of the past, the females have been able to exercise no selection, the distribution of wives among the males having been on an economic and political basis. Polygyny has without doubt exercised an important influence in modifying population characteristics, but the selection has not been sexual.

Selection of females in polygyny has, of course, no eugenic effect on the average. The wealthier and more powerful male will have the more desirable wives. But the less desirable have more chance of mating than in monogamy, since in a polygynous system a certain proportion of the males must be wifeless, unless the proportion of fe-

males to males in the population is excessively large. On the other hand, it is possible that selection of females for desirable qualities may tend, in polygamy, to have a slight dysgenic effect, because of the reduction of the birth rate per wife in polygynous marriages. The average number of children per wife decreases on the average as the number of wives per husband increases, although not in the same ratio. This is in part due to economic reasons, and in part to simpler causes. Since the men who are able to obtain and support several wives are the wealthier, they have the advantage in the selection of the more desirable women, who will therefore be those whose rate of reproduction is decreased, relative to the single wives. How far this feature of selection has actually affected the population is conjectural, but it is possible that in some stages of society it may have been important.

C *Sexual selection in polyandry* In polyandrous marriage, either of the Tibetan form, or one of the other forms, the conditions of selection of females would not be effectually different from the conditions in monogamy. An effective change would be produced only if the less desirable women did not mate in all a condition which apparently does not occur. Selection of husbands, on the other hand, occurring along with selection of wives, should tend to have a more decidedly dysgenic effect than selection of wives in polygyny, for increasing the number of husbands of a woman decreases the number of children each husband will have. The more desirable women, under such a system, will tend to have more husbands than the others, and these will be of the more desirable type. The selection will, therefore, tend to decrease, relatively, the progeny of the more desirable husbands.

There is, however, a new factor introduced through the intercourse of several males with the same female, which may be somewhat effectual. The more desirable of the husbands will undoubtedly be given preference by the wife in sex relations, and thus their chances of procreation will be slightly greater. In most of the systems, however, the privileges of the husbands are rather formally arranged, so that the preferential selection by the wife among her actual husbands is reduced to a minimum. The total effect of polyandry would seem, therefore, to be rather dysgenic.

D *Sexual selection in primitive society* In primitive society of the Indo-European peoples, there was, apparently, an elastic marriage

system, typified by the *mats* and *hans* systems of the early "Semites," in which personal inclinations were the most important factors in the choice of mates, and the marriages were entered upon, and continued, only in so far as they were personally satisfactory to both parties. Under such conditions, there would be assortative mating, determined by the personal characteristics of men and women, and little interfered with by economic considerations, since the children and the women were charges upon the larger family group, not on the individuals. Selection of women would have little general eugenic or dyogenic effect, since all women would mate, and have no difficulty in obtaining mates for periods of time sufficient to ensure a rate of reproduction practically equivalent to that of the more desirable women. But the selection of husbands would ensure that the more desirable male would mate with a larger number of women than would the less desirable. Hence, the chances of procreation by the "better" males would be greater, and the number of their progeny would be relatively greater. At the same time, the relative number of progeny of the "better" women would not be reduced as it is in polygyny, since they would mate at least as frequently as the less desirable. Under such conditions, sexual selection could have a definite and important eugenic effect, and it is impossible to escape the conclusion that the characteristics of the so-called Indo-European races have been largely modified by such selection during the period of free marriages, those characteristics of the males, at least, which were most highly valued by the women, being heightened in the race.

Among the male characteristics which have in primitive times been the basis of selection of husbands, have been certainly the characteristics of strength, agility, and motor control, and bodily structure contributory to these. Intelligence and intellectual ability have also been preferred, not only because they condition success in hunting, war, and leadership, always attractive to women, but also because of the greater stimulus supplied by the intelligent male. Emotional characteristics which make the man agreeable are also valued, although in primitive society the practical considerations have the greater weight.

E. Possibilities of sexual selection in the future With increasingly strict monogamy, and the repression of war, pestilence, and infanticide, and with the chance of accidental death more and more equalized

between the sexes, the possibilities of sexual selection are more and more restricted to assortative mating, which in itself produces neither eugenic nor dyogenic effects, but which may furnish a basis for other eugenic measures. Obviously it would be advantageous to have the "best" males mate with the "best" females, and the "worst" males with the "worst" females, and this holds for sexual desirability as for other characteristics.

Sexual selection is inhibited, at the present time, chiefly by economic factors, so far as the selection of husbands is concerned, and by a certain trade-unionism of women, so far as the selection of wives is concerned. Feminine clothing and cosmetics are devices which tend to equalize the sexual attractiveness of women. Naturally, the beautiful and graceful form is preferred to the ungainly and misshapen one, and the clear, fine skin to the coarse, or rough, or discolored. But in the civilized costumes of the immediate past, the well-formed woman has been put more nearly on a par with the ill-formed, by the concealment of the forms of both. Artificial distortion of figure, as by corsets, changing the walk to a hobble by high heeled shoes, and artificial complexions, have still further leveled the ugly and the beautiful. Every step in the freeing of women from these disguises has been bitterly fought because it destroys the fictitious equality and gives the really more beautiful an advantage. Nevertheless, the process goes on slowly, and women probably never will return to bustles, hoopskirts, corsets and vast masses of hair.*

From the standpoint of eugenics, anything which aids sexual selection is a benefit. Whether social conditions will eventually be so modified that the economic restrictions on selection of husbands will be removed, is an important problem. But this must occur if sexual selection is to be made again effective, since selection of wives

* The progress which the modest movement is making, in spite of ridicule and legal oppression, is an encouraging sign. On the other hand, nudists at present tend to go to extremes which weaken their case. The practical limit of public nakedness must include the wearing of a lion cloth or narrow breeching, not from prudishness, but from monetary and esthetic reasons. This is all that is necessary for males, but females beyond puberty should wear a bandage to support the breasts, which otherwise sag and flap in a way which is comic if not ugly. This bandage, however, may be of the texture which does not conceal. The adoption of this costume for bathing suits has already taken place in the public beaches of the Pacific Coast.

alone is eugenically of no consequence. Selection must be exercised by both sexes to be effectual eugenically, or to contribute assortatively to eugenic matings.

54. The control of reproduction

Sexual selection, if it can have an effect on modifying the characteristics of a people, can do so only through a modification of the rates of reproduction of certain types, so that the increase of one type is changed relative to the increase of a different type. This, in fact, is the only way in which the "hereditary" characteristics of a population can be changed. Reproductive selection, therefore, is the only measure which can be directly eugenic, or directly dysgenic.

With respect to any assigned characteristic, which is "hereditary" and which it is desired to increase in the stock, the eugenic possibilities are two-fold: 1. The rate of reproduction of those of high rank with respect to the characteristics may be accelerated, or, 2. The rate of reproduction of those low in respect to the characteristics may be decreased. Eugenics, as a definite program, is therefore interested in the methods which may be practically available for the promotion of either or both of these results.

Obviously, the other conditions being equal, the number of offspring produced by any group of people will increase with the number of marriages, provided these marriages take place during the period of genital vigor of the individuals. The positive program of eugenics, therefore, is to encourage and promote as much as possible the marriage of the "fit," and encourage them to marry as early as the inescapable economic, physiological, and psychological conditions permit. Such encouragement has been proposed as a solution of eugenic problems, and various persons have engaged in propaganda for the early marriage of the "better" classes.

Undoubtedly, early marriage, where conditions are favorable, is in itself a benefit to society and the individuals. Development of personality is promoted; permanency and stability of the marriage relation is increased through the greater possibilities in the way of mutual adaptation during youth, and social vices are decreased, when the average age of marriage in the group is lowered, provided certain disadvantageous factors are not thereby introduced. The conditions which must be observed are as follows:

1. *A certain stage of physiological and psychological maturity* must be attained. No one could, at the present day, advocate the marriage of children. On account of individual differences in development there is no fixed minimum age limit possible for marriage, but it is probable that all who are not sufficiently well developed, physiologically and psychologically, at the age of twenty, are pathological cases and should not marry at any time later. An absolute legal minimum age at 18, with consent of parents required for both sexes until the age of citizenship at 21, is as much restraint as the law can afford to give on this point. It is not demanded that complete "maturity" be reached even at the latter age: nor is it desirable that marriage shall be postponed until such complete maturity be reached.

2. *Sufficient social education* must be assured before marriage, to make intelligent adaptation possible. The youth of twenty-one, with little social knowledge of his fellows and of the opposite sex, has low chance of success in marriage, and so has the ignorant person of thirty or forty. There are individual differences in ability to make up deficiencies, and the possibilities of learning are not necessarily checked at marriage. But, a certain minimum of social training is essential; a minimum which cannot be arbitrarily prescribed, but which must be determined empirically.

3. *Cultural and professional education* must not be checked. In the majority of individuals from eighteen to twenty, schooling is over, and further learning is acquired by general social contact, reading, and the actual work of trades and professions. With these, marriage does not interfere, but rather facilitates the general educational process. For the smaller group, who pursue professional training in various lines into later life, marriage is a serious handicap, especially for women. This, however, is not an intrinsic incident of matrimony, but is due to peculiarities of our economic system. There can be little question, however, that a man and woman who have finished college at twenty-one, look forward to three or four years each of graduate work, at the end of which they propose to marry, would be better off in every way if they should marry at once, provided it were economically possible.

4. *The economic handicap of marriage* is of course the serious one, and can overcome all the advantages of marriage, whether it occurs at twenty, thirty or fifty. While it might be argued theoretically,

that aside from the problem of children, there should be no such handicap: that two persons married to each other should be maintained as easily as the same two unmarried, the present economic system which prescribes that the husband maintain the wife, introduces a practical consideration which cannot be escaped. The advent, or possibility of advent, of children, on the other hand, adds a fixed economic factor, which is even more scrupous, and the advantages of youthful marriage must frequently be forgone because of this.

As a eugenic measure, the encouragement of early marriage by propaganda of any sort is ineffective, as the same measures which might slightly encourage the "fit" will obviously much more encourage certain classes of the "unfit," to whom the educational and economic disadvantages of early marriage make less appeal. Encouragement by measures other than propaganda—bonuses, tax exemption, or any other possible means—would have the same lack of effect.

The other possible method of positive eugenics is the increase in number of children per marriage. Obviously, even if the number of marriages of the fit are not increased, if the average number of children per marriage is increased, a eugenic effect is produced. This method has been publicly urged within recent years, but probably not with any serious purpose beyond its "political" effect, since upon examination it is seen to be as futile as the attempt to increase the number of marriages, and would be actually pernicious in its effects if it should succeed.

Bonuses for children have always been futile and always will be. No state could possibly pay enough to be an incentive to reproduction, without raising taxes so that the increased cost of living would reduce the effect of the bonus to zero. Moreover, no system of bonuses which would apply to the "fit," and not to the "unfit" has ever been devised.

Propagandizing, or appealing to the "group spirit" of the classes which are apparently not reproducing rapidly, is apparently ineffective. If it had any effect, it would affect the opposite class as well, since no such propaganda can be carried on secretly, but it has actually no effect at all, for reasons which are clear.

The appeal to group spirit, in respect to progency, is appeal to the desire that the group shall continue, and grow. Each member in a

disappearing group (let us say, the "old New England stock") desires the group represented by his stock to flourish and increase. But, it is the group he is interested in, not his particular family. And the eugenic appeal is to his interest in the group. Hence, his social desire is that *some persons* in the group shall produce more children: not necessarily *his* but *any one's*, so long as they belong to the group. As soon as the need for progeny is put on the group basis, there is no inconsistency in urging more copious reproduction, while avoiding it one's self. Hence, the eugenic propaganda for increased reproduction is absolutely without effect, so far as can be observed.

Furthermore, it may well be doubted whether the success of the propaganda for increased reproduction of the declining classes of the population would not be a serious evil. In the first place, it is by no means certain that these declining classes represent the desirable stocks for future generations. The more carefully we consider the families in which women devote themselves to idleness or social pastimes, becoming more "kept" women rather than mothers, the more doubtful we become whether we wish these stocks preserved and multiplied. On the other hand, in many families where children are wanted and born, but where the number is restricted to two or three, an increase in the number would be disastrous to the educational and cultural standards of the classes represented by these families, and such disaster would react injuriously on society generally. It may seriously be doubted whether, if the number of children in such families were doubled, the total group of children would be as useful to the nation, as efficient members of society, as are the fewer number.

If the desire for children is an "inheritable" character, and there is no reason to doubt this, then it would seem that the multiplication of the stocks which possess this desire strongly would be one of the most certain protections of the race. Stocks with the desire might be otherwise "unfit," but stocks without the desire would be unfit, whatever other characteristics they might possess.

Assuming that relatively high economic standards of living (including the comforts, conveniences, and intellectual advantages), are commendable, then the stocks which, while holding these standards, also desire children so strongly that they will make efforts and sacrifices to maintain their standards while raising children, are manifestly "fit" stocks, and stocks which have not sufficient

reproductive desire to offset the tendencies to ease and comfort are less fit, and society should be grateful to them for their self-extinguishment. Increased reproduction of the classes which do not wish children is always more probably a dysgenic than a eugenic measure.

Finally, on account of the fact that the world is in general over-populated, and that over-population is the most serious problem the human race has to meet, the eugenic emphasis must for the future be on repression of reproduction of the less fit, not on increase of the reproduction of the more fit, even if the latter program were feasible.

§7. The negative eugenic program

The repression of reproduction of the clearly unfit seems practicable, provided we are in control of a definite means of repression, and provided, further, we know who are eugenically "unfit." Various methods for the restriction of propagation have been employed or proposed at various times. These methods are: 1, Lethal treatment, 2, Sterilization, 3, Prevention of mating, 4, Contraception, or so-called "Birth Control."

1. *The lethal method.* One of the simplest ways of preventing the multiplication of "unfit" stock is to exterminate the stock. While modern eugenicists do not advocate this treatment, even for the extreme cases of mental and physical defect, it has nevertheless been applied extensively and on relatively large scales at times. Leaders of the ancient Hebrews enjoined their armies to slay certain conquered enemies, both male and female. These peoples, from the Hebrew standpoint, were eminently "unfit," and it was reasonable, therefore, that their breed should be drastically reduced. Slaying the males, and saving the females for wives and concubines, reduces the reproduction of the stock one-half, and obviates merely political and cultural difficulties. Both males and females must be exterminated, if the breed is to be eliminated. Many other ancient peoples practiced this eugenic measure upon their enemies, and doubtless many stocks have perished almost completely in this way. In modern times, the French revolutionists, and more recently the Russian revolutionists, have practiced the same method upon the aristocratic stocks in those countries, partly to eliminate the individuals, but in part for deliberate purpose of effectually stopping future multiplication of these stocks.

2. *Sterilization* has been extensively advocated for the feeble-minded, has been legalized in a number of states for this purpose, and actually applied in several of these states. Sterilization as practiced on the male consists in the cutting of the vas deferens (the duct which conveys the spermatozoa from the testes to the seminal vesicles). The operation is simple, and almost painless, even without anesthetic. The individual is rendered sterile, that is, incapable of producing offspring, although no other change is introduced in either his amorous functions or general functions. In fact, if the operation were performed under general anesthesia, and no information were given to the individual, he would have no certain means of knowing that it had been performed at all.

The operation as performed on the female consists in cutting the Fallopian tubes, which convey the ova from the ovaries to the uterus. This operation is more serious than the one of the male, since the abdominal cavity must be opened. But the subsequent effects are practically the same as in the other sex. There is no disturbance of sex or other organic functions, except in the one fact, that pregnancy cannot occur.¹

From the purely eugenic point of view, sterilization is an ideal measure, since the life and freedom of the individual need not be otherwise interfered with. There are, however, practical difficulties in the administration of the measure, and legal difficulties have been encountered in many states. Quite aside from the doubtful eugenic value of sterilizing the feeble-minded, it seems to be of social value as a means of freeing certain cases from institutional confinement, while preventing them from having children for which they would be unable to provide, and which would therefore become a charge

¹ Sterilization, therefore, must not be confused with castration. *Castration* is the removal of the testes from the male (or ovaries from the female (ovariotomy, or oophorectomy). Removal of these glands has profound effects both on the sexual functions and on bodily activities generally.

Sterilization by means of the x-ray is also employed, it being possible to apply the x-rays for a length of time sufficient to destroy the germ cells, without seriously affecting other cells. Sterilization by this method is apparently a process little, if any, more dangerous to the female than to the male.

Experimental work is being done on another method applicable only to women, by application of electric current to the Fallopian tube externally, with the purpose to cause the formation of scar-tissue, thus closing the tube.

upon the state. As an operation to be undergone by any individual who may voluntarily seek it, regardless of his mental or physical abilities, it has possibilities of moral value, and there is some evidence that it is being increasingly performed in private practice.

3 *Prevention of mating.* Legal prohibitions of marriage might be effective for certain physical defectives. For other "unfit" classes it is useless, either because of the impossibility of enforcing it or because it would be ineffectual in limiting mating, even if enforced. For the lower grades of the feeble-minded, it would have no restraining value, because these classes will mate any way, marriage or no marriage, if opportunity is given.

The most effective method of prevention of mating is segregation of the seriously unfit in institutions where they are under such supervision as will restrain their sexual tendencies. Institutions for the feeble-minded, for the insane, and for defectives of certain other types, are already caring for many individuals of these classes. The numbers of feeble-minded persons which can be maintained in such institutions, even with large expansion beyond present provisions, is small, relative to the total number in society. In general, only the most helpless cases can be permanently taken care of in this way. Segregation cannot, therefore, be expected to be more than a minor eugenic measure, even in regard to the feeble-minded.

With regard to defectives of most types, the policy of institutions is to retain them only for such periods of time as are necessary to restore them to a condition such that they are able to return to their former conditions of life. Their hereditary and transmissible characteristics are, of course, not changed by this period of detention.

4 *Contraception.* Although enforced sterilization is eventually impracticable on a large scale because of the grave political danger it involves and although relatively few persons will be willing to have the operation performed because of its irrevocable nature, vast numbers of individuals are willing to avoid procreation by temporary measures to prevent conception. The low birth rates prevailing among the wealthier and better educated classes of society today are due to this measure of prevention of conception (contraception), and not to a decline in actual fertility. The higher birth rates among the poorer and less educated classes are due to lack of facilities for contraception, not to greater natural fertility, nor greater desire for

children, nor to any considerable extent to religious prejudices, except in so far as the prejudices of a minority keep the majority from obtaining the contraceptive facilities.

From the eugenic point of view, it would be much better if contraceptive knowledge and facilities were more uniformly distributed throughout the various classes of society. The more intelligent and better educated classes are bound to possess the knowledge and facilities, and to employ them. The differential of rate of reproduction is, therefore, enormously in favor of the ignorant and less intelligent, and although ignorance is in itself not inheritable and is not a certain evidence of inferior stock, it is socially inheritable in the families characterized by it. The keeping from the poorer and less educated classes the information possessed by the middle and upper classes is, therefore, inadvisable.

Contraception has important eugenic possibilities which have been, until recently, overlooked. The limitation of offspring practiced by the upper and middle classes is undoubtedly a eugenic benefit in itself, since the really "better" stocks among these classes include the individuals who limit their offspring only to an adequate number, and the "poorer" stocks extinguish themselves. The only evil, eugenically, is in the failure to apply the same selection to the economically and educationally lower social classes.

For the worst grades of feeble-minded, eugenic contraception is out of the question, since their mentality precludes their taking the proper measures systematically. For the somewhat higher grades, the conditions are different. They do not strongly desire children, although they do have amorous desires, and their thirsts for comfort and ease are strong enough to make them wish to limit their offspring, if the means are simple and convenient enough to be available to them. The negro population in cities and towns is in the same situation, and the making of contraception available to negroes generally would undoubtedly solve the "negro problem" by decimating the negro generations. All the defectives other than the feeble-minded are easily amenable to education as to the desirability of not producing offspring to perpetuate their infirmities, provided the limitation involves contraception, and not refraining from marriage. And it is not advisable that any classes of human beings should refrain from marriage provided they can maintain themselves economically, and

provided the defective types mate assortatively and do not produce offspring.

In view of the general eugenic advantages of contraception, it is necessary to inquire into the objections which have withheld it, and have resulted in the present grave situation. These objections are all psychological. A. Religious prejudices have undoubtedly had their effect, but these are largely incidental. When any religion puts a *tabu* or ban on any human activity, there is always a reason (and every activity of man has been under the ban of some religion, even eating has been only grudgingly permitted by some). The religious *tabu*, in other words, is a form of regulation, but never the reason for the rise of the regulation. The reasons must be sought elsewhere. Practically, at the present time, the religious objections do not prevent many of those who possess contraceptive knowledge and facilities from employing them. B. Need of rapid increase in the population, regardless of quality. This is the prime source of objection to contraception. Where each nation and group is in arms against other nations and groups, the larger crushes the smaller. The nation which reproduces fastest may be the stronger. At any rate, almost all modern nations have believed this, and have feared the decline of the birth rate as a decline in effective strength against the enemy. Undoubtedly, there is a tendency for the fastest breeders to crush out the slower; a tendency to sacrifice human quality and human comfort and progress to mere breeding rate. This martial stimulus to breeding is undoubtedly the main source of the religious prejudice against contraception. C. It is believed by many that contraception is "unnatural," and hence detestable. It can easily be shown, however, that "unnaturalness" is never a reason for denunciation, but merely a form of denunciation for other reasons. Nothing that man can do is "unnatural." The laws of nature cannot be broken, but limit and prescribe every human act. But some acts are disadvantageous, or evil, and those acts we call "unnatural." We do not think them evil because unnatural, but we call them unnatural because we think them evil. Is the cooking of food, or the use of antiseptic dressings in surgery, or communication by radio unnatural in any literal sense? Then neither is contraception. D. Many persons sincerely believe that increased facility for contraception would very much increase sexual immorality. Widespread

knowledge of contraception among married persons is not possible without the unmarried possessing the same information and tending to use it; and the married also will apply it to extra-marital matings. This is, indeed, a serious supposition in many ways. If it were true, we should find that the "upper" and "middle" classes, who practice contraception so extensively, are far more immoral than the "lower" classes. This, however, is not the case. But what is more serious, we should be assuming that sexual morals are almost solely matters of fear of the immediate consequences of coitus on the way of conception, and not based on any more complex considerations. If this were true, then it would seem that the obviation of this danger would dispose of the moral question entirely.

As a matter of fact, close observers of human life are rather unanimous in their conviction that contraception has little effect on sexual irregularity. It has some, of course, but in general, those who tend to overstep the sexual conventions are not deterred by consequences so uncertain as pregnancy. What contraception outside of marriage undoubtedly does is to reduce markedly the cases of abortion, of infanticide, and suicide, and the number of cases of irretrievably wrecked girls' lives. But that the actual number of extra-marital matings is increased to any important extent is not apparent.

B. Back of all these specious objections to contraception, there is a real objection which is of vital importance. This is, that all contraceptive methods employed up to the present time fall into one or both of two classes: the ineffectual, and the harmful. There is truth in this. Some popular methods are of slight efficacy. Almost all are psychologically objectionable, and some are physiologically deleterious. And some of these lead eventually to serious trouble, affecting the family relations disastrously. This is the real difficulty in the way of contraception, and the obstacle to its wider spread. With the development of harmless and effectual as well as simple methods, (which are well under way at the present time), the apparently vital objections, (including the religious), will melt away. For it is a fact that in so far as means are available, people will use them, in spite of their theoretical views, and as they use the means, their theoretical views change. Neither laws nor religious interdictions can seriously affect such a vital matter. From present indications, what is now a partly dynamic force, with other attendant evils,

will be in the future a mighty eugenic force, assisting in the solution of many problems that now threaten society.

Among the immediate effects of more widespread knowledge of and confidence in contraception, we will find still further reduction in abortion, infanticide, "ruined women," and, therefore, in prostitution. Increased marriage and lowering of the average age of marriage, through removal of probability of children before the parents are economically able to care for them, will increase the expectation of marriage among the young, and tend therefore to decrease illicit mating. Undoubtedly, an industrial revolution will be produced, through the change in the "labor market" when the rate of reproduction of the "laboring classes" rapidly drops. But there are no predictable effects of a deleterious sort.

12. Various classes of undesirables

Assuming the adequate control of reproduction by some means, we next have to consider the types of individuals whose reproduction we would prevent for eugenic purposes. Various classes have been proposed as eugenically "unfit," as follows.

1. *The feeble-minded* It has been widely held that low-grade intelligence is hereditary in the sense that the children of feeble-minded parents are feeble-minded regardless of their environmental setting, including nutrition and training. Certain enthusiastic geneticists have in fact, proclaimed that feeble-mindedness is an "all-or-none" character, transmitted in a simple Mendelian way. That is to say, that the individual is either feeble-minded or is "normal" in intelligence. We know, however, that there may be various grades of intelligence in the children of the same family, and that the intelligence of a moron, or *moronoid*, varies according to his training, as does that of a "normal" person.

We are aware, moreover, that the studies of feeble-minded families on which the theories are presumably based, are incompetent. In some cases the data itself are entirely unreliable, having been gathered by persons unable accurately to diagnose mental conditions. In some cases, the data, as presented, do not agree with the conclusions. In the remaining cases the data, valid as far as they go, are not complete enough to be accepted as evidence.

From our general observation, we know that feeble-mindedness

tends to "run in families." But so do the French and English languages. The actual hereditary conditions of feeble-mindedness we do not yet know, and we will not know until elaborate studies have been made by experts on mental deficiency.

Another feature of the problem which has been generally overlooked is the actual rôle which the moderate and higher grades of feeble-minded may play in a properly organized state. Perhaps we may actually need, in the future, a considerable percentage of feeble-minded in the population to stabilize the state. The fact that in many lines of business, men of low-grade intelligence are eminently successful, does not in itself prove their usefulness to society, but it raises serious questions as to various occupations and economic levels.

As a means of relieving society of the present embarrassment of caring for children whose parents are incompetent, prevention of procreation by the lower grades of feeble-minded is a measure which can be defended. As an eugenic measure, even this is questionable.

2 *The insane.* The inheritance of tendencies to mental disease is at least as troublesome a question as that of the inheritance of feeble-mindedness. In the meantime, we must distinguish between cases of the actually insane, and those not insane, but belonging to families in which insanity crops out. For the former class, prevention of reproduction may be proper, for a variety of social reasons. For the latter class, however, it is by no means indicated. There are few families in which mental aberration is not found, if the family tree are traced exhaustively. The actual causes of mental disease, (except for those due to infection with syphilis) are far from being determined. Many young people worry about marriage and procreation, because of an insane, or mentally aberrant, grandparent, uncle, or aunt. So far as we know at present, these persons are needlessly concerned, and are no more in danger of having abnormal children than are those who have no abnormal relatives—or who do not know of them.

3 *Criminals.* Confusion arises in the consideration of criminals because the term has two applications, first, to those who commit crime, or break laws, second to those who are caught by the law and convicted of crime. So far as the problem of heredity is involved, therefore, there are two questions, first, concerning the hereditary tendency to break laws, and second, concerning the hereditary tendency to get caught at law-breaking.

The actual consideration of the problem in the past has concerned criminals in the second sense almost exclusively. It was supposed by Lombroso and his followers that there was a "criminal type," possessing hereditary tendencies to crime (in the second sense), and distinguishable by certain structural characteristics, such as the shape of the ear and conformation of the jaw. This theory of the "criminal type" has, however, been generally abandoned, and it is not believed now that any distinguishable anatomical signs of criminal tendency exist.

A more recent theory has held that criminality is in large part due to defective intelligence. If this were true, there would be here an important hereditary aspect of crime, in the inheritance of intelligence. Plausibility has been lent to this theory by the obvious fact that the man of low intelligence has less chance of eluding detection, if he breaks laws, than has the man of higher intelligence, so that convicted law breakers (criminals in the second sense) might reasonably be expected to average lower in intelligence than law breakers in general, and perhaps lower than the population at large.

This expectation was apparently justified by the earlier results of intelligence tests on criminals and minor offenders of various sorts. Some groups of convicts in state prisons, and groups of female delinquents were actually found to be low in intelligence by the standards adopted. But extension of the work to larger groups, with wider inclusions of crime and misdemeanors, and with more adequate normal standards of comparison, fails to show any such general conditions.

Apparently, the mentally deficient are either more disposed than "normal" individuals to certain petty offenses like pilfering, wanton destruction of property, and to minor sex offenses like peeping and exhibitionism, and towards sex perversion, or else a higher percentage of these offenders of low mentality are apprehended. Very likely, both of these propositions are true. The average mentality of apprehended prostitutes and "female delinquents" is low, by any reasonable standard, but this merely indicates the greater ease with which the feeble-minded loose women are caught in the trap set for them, and does not indicate the mental condition of the larger uncaught group. Major sexual crimes, such as rape and seduction, are at least as characteristic of the intelligent as of the feeble-minded,

and burglary, robbery, swindling, fraud, and murder are likewise not characteristically dependent on low intelligence.

Comparison of the intelligence of criminals in penitentiaries in six states, with the norms of the draft, fails to show an essential difference between the draft average and the prison average intelligence,⁴ although decided differences are shown between groups convicted for different types of crime. The norms from the army draft may be said to be too low to represent fairly the average of the male population within the draft ages, since large numbers of the more intelligent males avoided the draft by previous enlistment, or by obtaining commissions or office positions. At the same time, we may assume that an equally effective selection of law breakers has taken place, the more intelligent escaping arrest and conviction in far greater numbers than do the less intelligent. We have no reason to suppose, therefore, that law breakers in general, (criminals in the strict sense), are on the average any lower in intelligence than the general population.

The average for the total draft should not be far different from the average for the large sample tested. In view of the relative numbers of officers and men, the addition of the officers to the draft army would probably not raise the total average to a point where its deviation from the prison average would be significant. The measures used are rough: what better measures might show cannot be conjectured.

Further comparative work on the intelligence of criminals and non-criminals is highly important. In the meantime, there are practical considerations which tend to lessen our emphasis on the hereditary factor in crime. Australia and certain American colonies were primarily settled by "criminals" from Great Britain deported to those places. Yet the descendants of these colonists show no excess of criminality which could be attributed to that source. Undoubtedly, many hereditary characteristics, especially high intelligence, and certain emotional traits, do contribute to crime, or at

⁴ C. A. Murchison, *American White Criminal Intelligence*, *Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology*, Vol. XV, (1924). It should be pointed out that the intelligence distributions of prisoners are bimodal, that is, the total group could be resolved into two overlapping groups, one higher, the other lower, than the army average. Whether the bimodal feature of the distribution would disappear if the number of prisoners approximated the far larger number of the draft, or represents a definite similarity of group in the prison, cannot be clearly determined.

least to law breaking, under favorable circumstances. But these circumstances vary so from era to era and from place to place that no persistent criminal tendency results. Furthermore, it is quite possible that the same characteristics which under certain economic and political circumstances conduce to lawlessness, may also conduce to initiative and useful social contributions under proper circumstances and proper educational directions.

Eugenics, therefore, has but a minor rôle to play in connection with the lessening of crime. The larger part must be accomplished by cultural progress and moral education.

4. *Poverty*, like crime, is socially undesirable. And the poor usually reproduce more rapidly than the economically better classes because of their more limited possession of adequate contraceptive information and means. While it is desirable that the same selective limitation of offspring which occurs in the wealthier classes should occur in the poorer as well, it is not to be assumed that the poor, as such, are eugenically less "fit" than the wealthy. Some non-success in life is due to physical weaknesses and susceptibilities to serious disease, such as tuberculosis, and some of these weaknesses and susceptibilities are inheritable. Some, perhaps a considerable proportion, of non-success is due to low intelligence, disposition to indolence, and similar mental characteristics, which may be, perhaps, non-variable. Moral deficiency is probably not a factor contributing to poverty, but perhaps the contrary. There are, moreover, many mental characteristics which are strongly contributory to poverty in particular circumstances, which are nevertheless extremely desirable, and should be preserved in the stock.

No adequate analysis of the social value of the descendants of poverty stricken ancestors, as compared with the descendants of the economically well off, has been made, nor would it be feasible to make such an analysis. The comparison is made difficult by the complicating lack of educational and other opportunities of the poor, the greater difficulty in tracing descent, and the different ratio of reproduction. The numerous instances of highly valuable men and women emerging from poverty can be taken only as an indication that it would be unwise and dangerous to assume that poverty is *per se* an indication of eugenic weakness. The improbability of such an assumption is further indicated by the fact that the descendants

of English debtors and other economic unfortunate^s who were colonized in America show no less economic ability and success than the descendants of other colonists.

5. *Neurotic tendencies and neurotic individuals* present an important problem in modern society. These individuals, quite distinct from the feebly intelligent and the insane, are characterized by relative inability to withstand the conflicts and emotional stresses of life, and show evidence of this inability in various degrees of neurasthenia, hysteria, nervous breakdowns, "instability" and inefficiency. Apparently, some of the characteristics which underlie the neurotic tendency are "inheritable," but it is not certain what these characteristics are. Perhaps they may be organic weakness, of certain glands, but this remains to be determined. But concerning the larger range of neurotic manifestations, it is by no means certain that the characteristics which determine them, whether "inheritable" or not, may not be such as are most valuable to the race under proper conditions of education and general environment. We must remember that many characteristics which are desirable for certain environments may be serious disadvantages in other environments. Social progress consists, to such a large extent, in the shaping of the environment, that we can definitely label any human characteristic as undesirable only when we can assure ourselves that any environment in which the characteristic would be an advantage to the social group is either impossible, or in itself undesirable, or that its attainment will be so long deferred that the characteristic will in the meantime have done irreparable damage.

6. *Specific physical defects.* There are a number of specific malformations which are congenital, and which crop out in certain lines of descent in ways which suggest a micro-variable inheritance tendency. Among these are cleft-palate and hair lip, certain malformation of the hands, legs and feet, and defective development of the organs of hearing. Individuals showing these defects seem to have a higher probability of descendants showing the same effects, than do other individuals under the same environmental conditions. These defects are relatively infrequent, and it would be socially advisable, perhaps, for such to refrain, or be prevented, from having children.

There has been more concern over the possible frequency of micro-variable hereditary defects of a type not based on obvious malfor-

mation of the auditory organs. Possibly deafness of this type does occur, but is not as frequent as has been assumed. The vast majority of cases of deafness in young children and older persons is due to infectious general diseases, such as measles, or to specific infections of the middle ear, and we cannot conclude that deafness is of much eugenic consequence, until extensive scientific investigations shall have thrown further light on the whole problem of auditory deficiency.

7. *Personal ugliness* may seem to be so much a matter of evanescent taste that it can have no dysgenic value. The standards of male and female beauty are notably different for different races, and differ somewhat from age to age among civilized races. Among certain barbarous and savage races, fatness to an extent which we would count deformity is a mark of great beauty in the female. Among European races, the exact degree of fatness or leanness which is most fashionable varies somewhat from generation to generation, and various deformities of the waist and feet, produced by corsets and high heeled shoes, have had their vogue. These considerations, however, prevent our giving as much weight to these fluctuations in standard as has popularly been accorded them. In the first place, we must set standards of civilized peoples above those of savages and barbarians in respect to beauty just as much as we do in matters of intellect and of morals. The fact that some savage races have valued highly tendencies to violence and cruelty, does not prevent our holding opposed standards, and attempting to mold social conditions and personal development to agree with those standards. Nor do we value less the civilized standards of naturalism of feature, in spite of savage tendencies toward mutilation of ears, nose, and mouth, towards tattooings, scarifications, and hideous paintings; nor are we disposed to abandon our standards merely because of periodic outbreaks among civilized females of the savage tendencies.

In the second place, the standards of male beauty are relatively fixed in the European races, and vary in the other races only in accordance with the physical limitations of those races. Strength, agility, grace and ease of movement, power and perfection of body and limb contributing to these and to general organic efficiency, are everywhere attributes of male beauty, and no race which possesses these characteristics in low degree fails to admire them in the races which possess them in higher degree. In particular, the "superior"

male, can always win the female of another race from the males of her own race, if these are inferior in personal beauty.

In the third place, the variations in standards of female beauty among civilized races are almost wholly variations in female opinions, due to the complex factors which determine female fashions, including the "trade unionism" already referred to. The male opinion is disturbed somewhat by male eagerness for female approval, and still more by eagerness for approval, by other females, of his chosen female. Every man wishes his women to be "fashionable," in order that they may not be despised or adversely criticised, however little he may care for the particular fashions intrinsically. Aside from this, the intrinsic male standards of female beauty vary little from generation to generation, and the Dionys and Aphrodites of the ancient Greek ideals are still the same ideals of the men of today. The fact that feminine fashions in regard to personal charm fluctuate about these same standards as norms also indicates their permanence.

Moreover, there are many details of form in respect to which there has never been any variation in opinion. Thick ankles, large feet and hands; bow legs; knock knees, taperless and too fat or too thin calves; skinny legs, hips, and waists; muddy skin, awkwardness of movement and lack of poise, and a multitude of lesser characteristics, are unanimously apprehended as ugly, and detract from the sexual desirability of any woman to any man.

One can hardly doubt that conformity to the generally accepted standards of beauty, by both male and female, is a sign of "fitness," and since these structural and motor qualifications are certainly inheritable, of eugenic "fitness." With our present understanding of mental processes as essentially based on activities, we can also understand that efficiency in motor coordination is an important basis for mental processes, although the motor efficiency may be present without the mental. We can understand, therefore, the importance of maintaining and increasing the motor fitness of the race, and its organic vitality, not merely for the efficiency of the reproductive process as such, but also as a foundation for every kind of social program.

Certain physical characters are apparently more-variable in inheritance, and others are more-variable. Others, like stature and weight, occupy intermediate positions. Since these physical traits, in a mixed

population, have no demonstrable linkage with mental traits, there would seem to be a general advantage in selecting from beauty character. If selection has practically no effect on certain of these, it is at least harmless.

CHAPTER X

THE PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL FIDELITY

II. Social Consciousness and Social Feeling

IN A really social group, each member of the group is at various times conscious of other members as members along with himself. That is, he perceives, or thinks of, the others, as related to himself in the complex way which constitutes a group. This social consciousness, or "group consciousness," is no more mysterious than any other occurrence of perception or thought. Just as one perceives a spot of color as located in a certain relation to other spots in a diagram, or thinks of a certain number as related to smaller and larger numbers in definite ways, so he perceives other individuals as related to himself, and thinks of himself and others as related in the same system. When an individual belonging to a certain group is conscious of that membership, we say he has social consciousness, just as we might say that when he is conscious of color he has color-consciousness, or when conscious of numbers he has number-consciousness.

Social consciousness is the essential factor in social organization, and without it there is no social group. A mass of pebbles on the beach may interact on one another physically, under the influence of waves and tide, but there is nothing social about the interaction. A number of hunters may be stalking game independently in the same forest, but if each is unaware of the presence of the others, there is a collection of hunters, but no hunting-group. As soon as the hunters become aware of the presence and purpose of the others, even with no further types of organization, there is at once a definite social group. Such a group is, of course, quite different from a hunting band, in which there are additional types of organization; but it is nevertheless a social group, and may become subsequently organized into a band.

The importance of social consciousness in the family, the religious organization, and the political organization, has already been emphasized in connection with these organizations, and the importance is equally great in every other type of organization. Without social consciousness there can be no effective common activity, and no interlocking activities or specialization of function such as is essential

to the highly organized band, the political group, the industrial group, or even the family. Nor can there be any social feeling. By social feeling we mean the emotional states and social sentiments which arise in conjunction with group consciousness. If one's family, church, lodge, or state is divided or denounced, one may feel anger, or shame. Or, one may feel pride at the praise of one's group, or at the view of some achievement by its representative, or even at the mere thought of the group. Loyalty, group pride, and other sentiments regarding the group are sometimes described as group feelings, but more properly as group sentiments.

Social feelings and social sentiments are not essential to the existence of a social group, but they are important factors in group organization. Pride, loyalty, devotion, and the various feelings which systematically occur in these sentiments, strengthen the bonds which unite the members and increase the efficiency and permanence of organizations very much. These feelings and sentiments which are positive in their effects on the group are sometimes called *group spirit*. Conversely, the class of social feelings of which shame is typical, and the class of sentiments typified by disloyalty, are destructive of group organization and group permanency. The race without racial pride, the nation without national pride (patriotism), and any group without loyalty on the part of the members, is sure to be weak in action and insecure in its existence. The group with distinctly negative group feeling and group sentiments such as shame and mutual distrust, is still weaker and more evanescent, because these negative feelings are actually disintegrative elements.

Because group spirit strengthens organization, patriotism, local pride, family pride, pride in religious organizations, and group loyalty are factors of extreme importance, and worthy of cultivation. The nation without patriotism is incapable of accomplishing anything beneficial either to itself or to the rest of the world, but not necessarily incapable of accomplishing evil. In the long run, patriotism is a benefit to other nations, and family pride is a benefit to other families, just as college spirit is an ultimate benefit to other colleges. Those who decry and deride family pride, patriotism, and college spirit are as foolish as those who decry physical health in the individual because the healthy, strong individual may use his strength in ways injurious to others. The development of group spirit is really one

of the first steps toward the healthy functioning of the family, nation, or any other group.

§2. Communication

Social groups may exist without communication between the members, but unless such communication be established their functions are very limited. The hunters referred to in the preceding section become a social group as soon as social consciousness is established, that is, as soon as the individuals in the group know that the others are present and united in the same occupation. But they function as a group only when they begin to be influenced by one another, directing their activities through stimulation by the sight of the others, or the sounds of their voices. That is, when communication is established.

Certain other groups, however, may function in a narrowly limited way when there is communication only between a single person, the leader, and the other members of the group. A number of individuals listening to an appeal by radio for contributions to a certain cause, may be aware that they belong to a group of listeners to this particular appeal, and therefore constitute a real social group. They may subsequently send their contributions, with full understanding that no individual contribution will accomplish the purpose desired: in other words, with consciousness of their action as a part of group action. Yet there may be no communication between the listeners themselves.

In general, the effectiveness of action of any group is increased by multiple communication: by communication between the members generally, and by increasing richness of means of communication. Radio appeals for money are slightly effective, as compared with appeals to an audience in physical communication with one another, and bands function more effectively with communication between all the members, as well as between leaders and the members. In family, state, church, and lodge, increasing facility, richness, and accuracy in communication increases the group consciousness, the group spirit, and the effectiveness of action.

Communication occurs in two forms: perceptual and linguistic. Perceptual communication is illustrated by the avoidance of collision between pedestrians on a sidewalk. The visual and auditory stimu-

lations emanating from one person modify the actions of the others so that each walks with reference to the others. Yet this modification is not merely mechanical, for the modifications of reactions produced by these stimuli are actually conscious, that is to say they are perceptions. The perceptual modifications are based on habit, that is to say: they involve past learning, but as they occur they do not involve ideas, although ideas may have been involved previously in the learning process.

Some of the modifications of reaction produced in this perceptual way are *similitude reactions*¹. In these cases the stimulus is an act performed by another person, and the reaction is the same act, (or nearly the same act) performed by the reactor. The sudden movement of one member of a herd of wild cattle, springing to his feet, or snorting, may produce similar movements on the part of the other members. Laughter by one member of an audience may set others to laughing. One man's movements of speech and gesture are simulated by other men. One person's stopping on the sidewalk and gazing upwards, causes others to do the same.

In the family group, simulation has wide scope. Habitual actions of the older members are "copied" by the younger. Habits of speech, of movement, and of emotional expression, habits of appreciation of human and of æsthetic objects, even habits of clothing and habits of thought.

In the band, control is frequently exercised in the forms of similitude reactions. The movements of the leader, or movements of the members, are direct guides to the movements of the others. The leader

¹ The terms *similitude reactions* and *simulations* are here used arbitrarily for the process of producing an act which is similar to the act, (of another person), from which the stimulus comes. That is, the term *similitude* is used as in botany, for example. The term must not be interpreted in the derivative sense of *proved*, but simply to express the similarity of the act of the second person to that of the first, and to distinguish these reactions on the perceptual plane from sensitive reactions, with which they are frequently confused. If it were not for this confusion, which is embodied in some of the literature of the "association school" of social psychology and in the current popular doctrine of "unconscious imitation," it would be better not to separate the similitude reactions from the perceptual reactions in general, since the more accident that in this type of reactions the terminal act resembles an act of another person, an act which contains or produces the stimulus, so of no psychological importance.

changes his direction of march, the others make a similar change. One man suddenly makes his weapons ready, others make ready also as direct responses.

These similitude reactions are sometimes said to be *unconscious imitations*, but such is not really the case. They are not *reflective*, it is true, they are *unintentional*, but there is perceptual consciousness involved in each one of them. Moreover, they are not imitations, and should not be confused with imitative reactions.

Feelings and emotions are acts, and are subject to imitation as are other acts, in so far as they are perceptible to others. Approval, indignation, disgust, and a long list of feelings are capable of transmission through similitude reactions and are frequently imitated. Group feeling is propagated by similitude reactions more effectively than by any other means. Expression of civic pride, family pride, or other group feelings by one person arouses the same feelings in others without deliberation.

The schematization of the similitude response offers no greater difficulty than does any other conscious response. In the case of response in general, we assume a nervous system so disposed by growth and previous responses, (by habit formation or learning), that a certain stimulus pattern produces an integrated nervous transit, (a neural pattern), of a certain specific type, and that the final efferent discharge of this neural pattern produces a movement pattern, (action pattern), which we designate as this or that "act." The stimulus pattern in any case involves stimulation details of the internal (visceral and somatic) receptors, as well as of the external receptors (receptives in the "special senses"). Conventionally, we select for discussion certain parts of the total stimulus pattern and designate these parts as "the" stimulus. For example, in one case, where the reaction-pattern involves colored lights displayed on a traffic semaphore, we speak of the color as *the stimulus* which produces the reaction of starting or stopping an automobile, as the case may be, although the actual reaction is influenced by the visual stimulation from other cars and pedestrians, by various sounds, and by the internal stimulation of the driver. All these details are a part of the effective stimulus pattern, but are neglected in our statements because the change in lights is, in the circumstances described, the feature in which we happen to be interested.

An excellent illustration of similitude reactions may be drawn from a phenomenon which sometimes occurs in dancing. Sometimes, in dancing at a social gathering, one notices that he has adopted a new method of holding his partner, or of varying the rhythm of his steps, of holding his arms, or what not, a method which he has not heretofore used, but which is in accord with that of the group in which he is now dancing. Although it is true that in most cases such innovations are copied intentionally, that is, imitatively, there are nevertheless these distinct cases in which there has been no intention of adopting the movement or attitude, and no ideational process of considering that detail of the behavior of others. In such cases it frequently happens that one's first deliberate attention to the type of behavior comes in noticing that one has made an innovation in his dancing; and, second, in recalling that it is the similitude of what others have been doing. That the acts of the others have nevertheless been perceived is evidenced by the possibility of remembering them. In any case, the action must have been learned previously. The reactor must have built up, by previous reactions, the neural integration which results from the stimulus pattern in question.

In imitation, the stimulus pattern afforded by the act of another person produces, not the reaction of doing the act, but a perceptual reaction of some other type, and this first reaction, (the perception), produces an idea, (an ideational reaction), which includes the act. This ideational reaction may be produced immediately by the perception, or it may be produced mediately, by an intervening ideational reaction, or by a series of such. The distinguishing characteristic of the imitation reaction, in short, is the intervention of an idea, or a series of ideas, between the stimulus pattern of perception and the act which resembles that stimulus pattern.

The social effects of imitation are enormous, and are most conspicuous in the carrying out of the tendency to conform. Social customs, manners of speech, and details of dress are adopted from others mainly through deliberate imitation. No woman copies the type of costume of another woman except in so far as she has ideas that this costume represents a type which is to be worn by the group to whom she wishes to conform. Selective adoption of action is not impossible in the level of similitude reactions, but selection is vastly extended and facilitated by deliberation.

Ideas are simulated and imitated, along with other activities. Simply, or deliberately, we adopt the religious, political, scientific, and other notions of others by repeating them. The expression of the idea by another person is the stimulus pattern, the thinking of the same idea is our imitative reaction. Although this is only one of the types of promulgation of ideas, and has been overemphasized in the theories of the past, it is important. All forms of the promulgation of ideas, including imitation, involve language, which is the most important of mental instruments, both socially and individually.

Neither similitude reaction nor imitation, therefore, is a means or method of learning, so far as specific acts are concerned. The reactor must have learned to perform the acts, or he cannot reproduce them. He cannot imitate the methods of speech of another person unless he has already learned to make the inflections and sounds involved, any more than he can imitate the starting of a motor car unless he has learned how to start it.

In another way, however, imitation may be an important method of learning, that is, in the synthesis of acts already learned as individual acts. One might learn to start an automobile by imitating the successive acts of a driver, provided one is already able to perform these successive acts. These acts being called forth in a certain order by successive imitation, may then become fixed in that order, in accordance with the laws of association, and the total reaction, comprising the series of previously learned acts, becomes learned.

In the simulation and imitation responses, the final act resembles the act of the other person which serves as the stimulus pattern; or else, the situation resulting from the act resembles the situation which constitutes the stimulus pattern. When one person's clapping his hands together causes another person to clap his hands, or when an American imitates a Britisher's drawl, we have illustrations of the first type. When the shop girl clothes herself, as nearly as skill and finances will allow, like my lady of the know-nothing, we have an illustration of the second type.

There is, however, another type of communication which is like imitation in that the ultimate act is the expression of an idea, not of a perception, but differs in that the idea does not result from a perception of an act or situation similar to the act or situation ulti-

mainly produced. This type of communication is properly called *suggestion*, and should be distinguished from *imitation*.¹

Suggestion is exhibited in a startling way in many of the phenomena of hypnosis, but it is no less present in normal life. On the other hand, neither hypnosis nor the social activities of normal life can be fully accounted for in terms of suggestion. If the hypnotist makes a bow to a properly prepared subject, the subject will bow in return, that is obviously imitation or else mere *imitation* reaction. If the hypnotist says "You will now greet politely Miss Blank, who is speaking to you," the subject again will bow. This is not imitation, but suggestion.

In both suggestion and imitation we are dealing with the same process, absent in *imitation* reaction, namely, "the tendency for an idea to express itself in action," or more strictly, the tendency for the idea reactions to become strong and definite enough to produce outward effects of importance.

In normal life, suggestion and imitation contribute only part of the springs of social action. Many other factors contribute to the determination of the actions of man upon the stimulation furnished by other men, so that suggestion and imitation may be inhibited, accentuated, or reversed. Among these other factors, the influence of desires, and the process of associative recall of ideas are the most important. In hypnosis, both of these factors are reduced, so that the "suggestion" of a course of action fails to bring up associatively conflicting ideas, and the desires have less effect on impelling to or against the suggested act. The effect of suggestion in normal life however, is very large.

11. Language and culture

Language may be broadly defined as a type of stimulation which produces ideational responses rather than perceptual responses. Actually, the distinction between perceptual and ideational reactions

¹ The confusion of the two types of action which has led to a fallacious explanation of all social behavior as "imitation" is due in part to the fact that we have the verb *to imitate* for the reproduction of a model, but we have no verb expressing the influence of the model on the imitator, while, on the other hand, we have the verb *to suggest* for the influence which one man may have on another in this second way, but no convenient verb for the act of the person on whom the suggestion is made effective.

is not so sharp as this definition would imply. There are types of responses which are purely perceptual and types which are purely ideational. There are also responses which are both perceptual and ideational in their nature; and stimulus patterns which produce this "mixed" type of reaction are properly designated as *language*, along with the patterns which produce purely ideational responses.

The above definition applies to language in a wide sense of the term, although a perfectly proper sense. In many instances, however, we use the term in a distinctly narrower sense. We indicate those stimulus patterns which provoke ideational reactions of a conventionalized, or habitual sort. Thus, while any sort of sign, sound, or other stimulations which another person can give you may arouse an idea, the idea may be much more dependent upon the general features of the pattern than upon the sign itself. For example, if the other person turns and looks at you, the gesture may mean "come on" in one situation, "go back" in another, and have various other significations in other circumstances. The gesture, or sign, then, is "language" only in the broad sense.

If, on the other hand, another person says "come ahead" or makes a beckoning gesture, the auditory stimulus pattern or the visible gesture is "language" in the strict or narrow sense, for it is capable of arousing *practically* the same idea in a great range of situations and circumstances. The habit of responding to these stimulus patterns in relatively fixed ideational ways has been developed, and it is this habit that makes the pattern "language."

The distinction between the two sorts of language is, however, not a matter of sharp separation. Even in such a highly conventionalized system of stimulus patterns as the "English language," the same sound-pattern, (or the visible pattern by which it is represented in writing), does not arouse the same idea in all circumstances. The wide range of "meanings" of many words are matters of common observation. Even the words which have but one possible definition have nevertheless certain shadings of meaning within that definition.

Language-communication, moreover, shades into perceptual communication. The signal to "go," whether vocal, gestural, or verbal-visual, may not, in the person thoroughly habituated to response thereto, arouse an idea, it may be merely the stimulus pattern for

the perceptual reaction of going. How far, in the development of language reactions in the individual, the perceptual reaction functions as an antecedent, is a matter for investigation. At present we have no precise information on this point.

The natural cries of animals are sometimes designated as language. Unquestionably, they are means of communication: stimulus patterns which produce definite reactions in other animals. It is probable, however, that they remain entirely on the plane of perceptual communication, and should not, on that account, be classed as language.

In addition to its function in communication, language plays an important rôle in the mental life of the individual in that it affords the most important means of thinking, and a large part of our most important perceptual processes, quite aside from the social perceptions, are based on language.³

All thinking involves reactions, since reaction is the only conceivable basis for conscious process. It is possible for individuals to think in reactions which are consciously significant only for themselves, which are not language reactions in either the strict or the broad sense of the term, but which, since they serve the same purpose in thinking as that served by language reactions, are sometimes called by the same name. These reactions may be called *idio-language reactions*, and their stimulus patterns, (muscle patterns resulting from preceding reactions), may be designated *idio-language*, in order that the terms *language* and *language-reaction* may be restricted to their true significance as social stimulus patterns and reactions to social patterns.⁴

Idio-language, as a vehicle for thinking, suffers in two respects as compared with true language. First, since thought processes and their results are important principally for social purposes, the maximal efficiency is attained when the language of communication and the language of thinking are the same. The thoughts of others are obtained in terms of their language expressions. If these must be

³ The importance of verbal language in thinking was first emphasized by Max Müller, and later introduced into psychology by the "scientific" movement in an effort to bring thinking and perception under the same laws of reaction and habit formation. Still later, verbal language was taken up by "behaviorists" as a *substitute* for thinking.

translated into an *idio-language*, an additional and confusing process is involved, inaccuracies are introduced, and so much time is lost that the "following" of the presentation of another person's ideas, whether spoken or written, is imperfect and unsatisfactory.

Second, no one person in an ordinary life-time, can develop a language of adequate flexibility, richness, and accuracy, even if he gives his entire time to the work. In the modern languages, developed by long generations of practical use and assisted by the contribution of the most brilliant minds of past generations, we have vehicles of thought of amazing efficiency, due to their richness, flexibility, and exactness. In the English language, for example, we have stimulus patterns, (words), for hundreds of thousands of different objects, relations, feelings, and conditions. We have words for individual objects, for genera, species, and endlessly varied sub-species of objects of all types. The language is far from perfect, but steadily progresses in efficiency as the needs of thinking require. If we need to make a distinction between two things not heretofore distinguished (that is, designated heretofore by the same word), we immediately invent a new word for one of the objects, or in some cases, new words for both. The ease and accuracy with which stimulus patterns but slightly different evoke, after slight training, distinct reactions, is so great as to be astounding when we first consider the matter.¹

It is quite understandable, therefore, that in proportion as social life, culture, and science develop, social language becomes more and more the vehicle of thinking, and *idio-language* drops out. It is true, that thinkers, for economy's sake, must develop short cuts in thinking, in order to abbreviate the somewhat lengthy details of language necessarily used in communication. But if this sort of *idio-language* is developed on the basis not only of social language, but on the basis of an adequate command of social language, it is a help, and not a hindrance. It is evident that command of language and command of thinking go hand in hand, that improvement in one is improvement in the other, and that from the person's type

* It makes no difference whether different people use the same *idio-language*, or different *idio-languages*, so long as they are mutually significant to one another, and have to be translated into social language.

¹ Consider, for example, *small, small, small, small, small, small, small, small, small, small*.

of language, his type of thinking can be determined. The man of bombastic, ornate speaking, for example, is a loose, vague thinker, and the man whose language is precise and rich is a precise, rich thinker.

For certain divisions of social psychology, the field of language is an important source of data. In studying the structure of the language of a people, we are studying the forms and methods of their thinking. In studying their vocabulary, we are finding their types of discrimination. The description of a language as the crystallized thought of a people is not far from wrong. In studying the development of language in general, from the crude picture writing of primitive man to the stage of modern languages, we are following the general course of development of human thinking. The principal source of data for phylogenetic psychology, including the genesis of religion, of the family, and of other social institutions, is to be found in philology, linguistics, and comparative literature.

Language, however, is far more than a matter of words and their arrangement. Communication through words, although based on their set meanings, goes beyond that, and includes as its most effective means of communication, the contents, or associative values of language, words and phrases as the means of communicating other contents. Words and their direct denotations constitute only a part of language. A further part is the body of common knowledge possessed by a group. This is popularly called "culture," although it is but a part of what the term covers in anthropological usage. We commonly evaluate cultures, in this restricted sense, as "high" and "low," according as they are the cultures of groups which we respect highly or little, as when we speak of a man as being "highly cultured." This rating has no correlation with the value of a culture as a means of communication, which we might indicate as its *richness*. Again, when we speak of "cultural education," we imply the extension of cultural materials beyond the knowledge strictly necessary for earning a living, thus providing a broader means of communication. The entire range of literature, art, religion, mythology, political history, and science is at the disposal of language for its communication. A reference to the "black hole of Calcutta" or to the "bulrush cradle of Moses," or the "luxuriant spindle," may be made to convey a meaning to one who knows the reference, which would other-

wise take a long exposition to convey less definitely. And this meaning may be quite outside the topic from which the reference is taken. A mythological allusion may be effective in politics or in biology. A biological reference may be useful in religion or in economics.

Using "culture" in the limited sense (and unfortunately we have no other term for this), we may say that no topic of knowledge, and no group of topics, constitutes culture in any wide except in so far as it is common to the group. To those who know Greek literature, Greek literature may be made an effective means of communication of a wide variety of ideas. For those ignorant of Greek literature, this means is not available. But the same is true of physics, chemistry, or any other science. That which is a cultural subject in one age may cease to be cultural in another age, and something else may take its place. The scholar in classic literature, in a society composed of those with no classical learning, is as devoid of culture as is the biologist who knows no classics in a group of persons who are educated in nothing but the classics. In either case, his means of communication is restricted.

A family in which culture, i. e., common topics, is restricted to affairs of the household, where otherwise the fields of knowledge of the individual members are different, has inadequate means of communication, and its family life is necessarily low. Community of interest and information in art, in politics, in history, in literature is an invaluable addition. Common interest in baseball, racing, or the movies, is perhaps just as valuable as some of these others.

In the church, proper organization and group consciousness are very often inhibited through lack of a common culture. Some members know nothing but domestic affairs, debts, and social affairs. Others know nothing but "business." Others have still different departments of information. There is no culture, no body of common knowledge, and hence the various members can communicate only with their small cliques of the membership, and the minister must be exceptionally versatile in order to communicate even with these cliques, and founders woefully in attempting communication with the whole group. This state of affairs is avoided by selective membership, and remedied by introducing common culture through clubs, lectures, and other social instructional activities.

In the civic group, also, lack of culture is an inhibitory factor

In the older rural communities, the farmers had a common culture in agricultural topics, extended into other realms by reading the same papers, attending the same churches, and patronising community musical and dramatic performances. In industrial communities the same conditions prevailed. Under modern conditions, community culture is lessened. The younger generation is not oriented in the topics which concern the older generations, and vice versa, hence neither generation understands the other. With more rapid movement from place to place, and especially with the introduction into the same community of different nationalities, culture breaks up still more, communication is reduced to mere verbalism, and few understand the ideas of others. Obviously such conditions must be remedied, or the civic community, the basis of the state and nation, disintegrates. In this revival of culture the public schools must do the greater part of the work, hence parochial and other schools devoted to a separate culture are especially deplorable. Next to the public schools and the private schools of similar type, movies contribute (for better or worse) to community culture more than any other agency, because of the enormous number of people who come under the influence of the same ideas and information, and possess, in consequence a culture which tends to break down the lines of sectarian, local, and racial separation of thought, and to give people of diverse classes a common social fund for communication. We may judge the culture of the movies to be a low form, but it is a culture nevertheless, and a rich one, embracing in increasing volume the facts and settings of history, the geographical and anthropological features of the whole world, the progress of science, and the art and literature of the past. Certain recent social changes can be directly attributed to the movies, and greater changes will undoubtedly be worked by it, through its addition to social communication. That these changes affect family, religious, and social organization has been well recognised by many observers.

14. Contiguity

Contiguity, in the spatial sense, is an important factor in many types of social organisation, although not necessary to all. In the family, the band, and all other types of civic and military organisations, contiguity is an essential factor in the formation of the groups,

which, however, may persist when afterward the group members are more widely separated.

Contiguity is not to be measured in absolute distance, but in relative and variable. A group of primitive villagers, in huts closely packed together, are but little more contiguous than a group of modern farmers, with their houses miles apart, but put in touch with one another by telephone, radio and motor cars. Without these appliances, the dwellers at such distances would be almost non-contiguous, and social organization would be exceedingly limited.

Yet, with increasing spatial separation, contiguity, although it may not decrease in measure (and it may decrease) becomes changed in kind. For contiguity, as a social factor, is expressed in two phases, communication, and physical interaction. In a crowded village or cave, communication is through all the senses, and one man reveals to another his meanings and his feelings, more closely and richly than is possible through modern contrivances at longer range.⁴

The increase of distance between individuals excludes progressively the various means of communication. First, touch and odors go, leaving vision and hearing, with the latter rapidly becoming ineffective, even under primitive conditions, and visual signalling alone left. With the introduction of electrical contrivances, vision becomes more largely discarded, and hearing again becomes predominant. With each of these changes, the type of response to social stimulation changes, and with these changes, the social organization differs. The modern office organization, occupying perhaps a huge building, every office connected with every other by telephone, pneumatic tube, and hurrying messengers, differs in many ways from the football team, the army division, or the savage band. And these differences are based in part on the differences in conditions of communication, whether these be closer or looser in the one case than in the others.

Through habit, visual stimulation through the printed word does not have the same reactive effect as does vocal stimulation through the spoken. Corresponding differences obtain for all departments of visual and auditory stimulation. Now is the timbre of the voice the same over the telephone, as when heard, without instrumental

⁴ The skin odor, for example, is a detail of which the others take cognizance, and this cognizance is not without its effects.

intervention, at short range. The addition of odors and touches makes a vast difference. In some cases, they increase the energy and speed of response, in some cases they decrease them. But most important is the difference in pattern of response.

Extreme cases prove little, but are usefully illustrative. That the insurance or bond salesman can work more effectively upon his victim in a personal interview than over the best of telephones is common knowledge, that a phone conversation with his adored one is not the same as a personal interview, no longer doubts for a moment.

Manifestly, community organization in the village where normal voice and visual appearance are constant stimuli, where the movements of persons, the lighting and darkness of houses, the sounds of babies crying, children laughing, and elders quarreling are constantly heard, where the fragrance of the cooking meal and the stench of defective sanitation are wafted from house to house, where gossip over back fences and on steps and sidewalks is a continuous performance, will be quite different from that of the community of wheat farmers, long distances apart, although provided with the best of telephone equipment and motor cars. Effective contiguity exists in the latter group, but it is of a different kind from that in the former.

At the other extreme, the quarters of a crowded city may stand. In some of our cities, solid blocks of houses of moderately well-to-do citizens are packed together. In other quarters, huge apartment houses are compacted. In such localities, the dwellers are, in mere space, closer together than in the primitive village, but the actual contiguity is in many cases less than in the wheat rancher's community, and is certainly of a vastly different sort. The dwellers of such quarters may see each other frequently, may constantly hear the sounds of their next door neighbors, but verbal interchange is almost absent, the names even of neighbors are not known, and the few stimulations that come from them have little social significance. In such cases, community organization hardly exists, it must be built up by extraordinary means.

The type of organization built up in crowds and mobs is not possible without close contiguity in actual space, so that the richest means of communication are possible. Congregations, scattered in their homes and listening to sermons and services by radio, are not congregations of the same type as those collected in churches, seeing

and hearing at first hand, and stimulated by one another optically, acoustically and spiritually. Neither the same meanings, nor the same emotions will be aroused, nor will the same later group results be achieved. Changing the means of communication to the printed word, and letting the several individuals read the sermon and services, is but a little further division.

Without literal contiguity, the family could not come into existence at all. Continued contiguity maintains and strengthens the family organization, and interruption of the contiguity eventually weakens it. The old fashioned family in which family prayers are celebrated, in which the whole family assembles for at least two meals a day, and in which a considerable part of the member's time is spent in a common "living room," has its serious disadvantages in limiting individual interests and personal development. But it has, in its rich intercommunication, a strength of organization which is entirely lacking in the family in which the contiguity of living is reduced, not so much by spatial distance, as by the cutting off of these means of communication.

Contiguity, in the spatial sense, is so important for the maintenance of psychological contiguity, and therefore effective organization, that periodic conventions, rallies, and other physical collections of the members of a scattered organization are really important. It is not that the "business" of a trade, a party, a church, or a scientific society really requires these conventions. The "business" in most cases can be transacted more expeditiously and effectively by mail and telegraph. But the "business" gives a nucleus and a technique for convening. And the contiguity builds an organization which carries over to and vivifies the organization established by other means of communication at greater range.

§5. The lower grades of social organization: the crowd

Social groups differ from one another, not merely as to type, (as, for example, the difference between the family, the band, the state, and the church), but also as to grade. Some groups are very loosely organized, others are organized very closely, or as we sometimes say, very "tightly" organized. The meaning of this classification may best be shown by considering certain groups which we have not heretofore discussed and comparing them with groups which have been previously considered.

The "lowest" form of organization in the scale we are considering is the *fortuitous crowd*—the collection of people brought into contiguity without prearrangement, except that which comes about through other social organization and individual considerations, and without direct intention, on the part of the individuals, to form the group.

Such a fortuitous crowd may be observed in the waiting room of a railroad station, or on a busy corner in the shopping district. It is fortuitous only in a limited social sense, since the presence of each individual in the crowd is the result of definite causes, and definite purposes or intentions. The crowd at the railroad station is assembled because each person present has the intention of taking a train, or accompanying some other person to the train, or of awaiting some one on an incoming train. But these causes and intentions exist and operate without respect to the other persons present, and have brought the several persons together without preceding reference to the others or to the assemblage. In this sense only, such a crowd is "fortuitous."

A fortuitous crowd is, however, a social group, with a definite, although "low" grade of social organization, for it involves social consciousness and social action. Each person in the crowd is aware of his membership in the crowd, and his actions are, to a considerable extent, governed perpetually and ideationally by the actions and contiguities of the others. One goes to the ticket window, buys his ticket, sits on a bench, and goes through the gate to the train, in a very different way, when a member of the crowd, from the way in which he would proceed if the concourse were vacated by all save himself. Group feeling frequently arises in such a crowd. The resentment against the hurried accommodations for purchasing tickets, for example, or against muddy street crossings, is felt socially as resentment against a condition affecting one's self and others.

The principal characteristics of a fortuitous crowd are transitoriness and ineffectualness. There is group action, but it is directed solely to individual ends, and is less efficient than it would be if it were purely individual. It takes longer to buy one's ticket, or to accomplish shopping, because of the interference of other persons.

A *selective crowd*, such as one finds at a church social or a political rally, is somewhat higher in degree of organization. The causes and intentions which have brought the crowd together have had reference

to the other members. One joins such a crowd, not merely to transact individual business, but for the purpose of forming one of the group. This purpose carries over into the situation in the group assembled, and one's social consciousness, when in the group, is accordingly richer, and one's actions more completely social. Group feeling arises more easily, and in greater variety, as well as being relatively more intense on the average. These groups are also relatively more permanent than the fortuitous ones.

Between the obviously fortuitous crowds and the obviously selective crowds there is no distinct line, but a gradation of intermediate sorts of crowds. The crowd assembled at a baseball game, for example, is in part fortuitous, in part selective. Most of the spectators are there partly for the individual purpose of seeing the game, and partly for the social purpose of being one of the crowd.

In the constitution and function of every crowd *common stimulation* is involved. This is a necessary consequence of the contiguity which is a primary characteristic of most crowds, and which is displaced in certain types of crowds peculiar to civilized society (such as the radio audience), only through the substitution of a type of common stimulation which renders contiguity needless, or widely extends the limits of contiguity. This means of common stimulation may employ languages, or a non-language stimulation, such as music. With the development of the mechanism for "broadcasting" colors, further means of common stimulation will be afforded. The contiguous crowd is, however, and probably always will be, much "higher" in actual social constitution than the unctiguous crowd.

Common feeling, (including emotion and desire), and *common attention* are also factors in crowds generally. In the fortuitous crowd, these may be reduced to a low degree. But in any crowd, necessarily subjected to some amount of common stimulation, there is consequently some degree of common feeling and attention, from the statistical point of view, although in the fortuitous crowd the measure of variation is sometimes very large. The common feeling and attention are, however, not necessarily social, that is, the different individuals, or the majority of them, may have the same feeling without the consciousness that other individuals share it. The crowd on the street corner, for example, may share generally a type of feeling dependent on the character of the weather and the season,

(as on a swansea holiday), without awareness on the part of the individual that other individuals feel as he does. In the selective crowd, however, the common feeling is more distinctly social, on the average, and reaches higher stages of sociability.

In many cases, common judgment is an important factor in a crowd. Community of judgment or opinion may occur, as may common feeling, on the mere basis of similar preestablished tendencies on the part of the individuals, and may be elicited by a common feature of stimulation, the same stimulus acting upon similar organisms producing similar results. Thus, a street crowd, with attention arrested by a reckless individual standing on his head on a fourteenth story window ledge, may have not merely a common feeling aroused, but may also form the common judgment as to the needless risk of the performance, without communication or social stimulation within the group of observers being involved at all. In its more usual developments, however, common judgment is decidedly dependent on communication and other forms of social stimulation. Social control is established and maintained very largely through these methods ■ shaping common judgment

Common activity is a feature of ■ contiguous crowds. Even the fortuitous crowd has some degree of community in this respect, at least such as is expressed in avoidance reactions. With higher degree of organization in other respects, the community of action becomes, of course, more complex, and the possible effectiveness of action becomes increasingly great.

16. Intermediate grades of social organization: the mob

When a contiguous crowd reaches a certain degree of community of stimulation, feeling, and attention, and a relatively high degree of common activity, it is called a mob. No metrical limits can be set, in regard to these characteristics, between the mere crowd and the mob, the two terms being applied to indefinitely distinguished phases of what is really a continuous gradation of organization.

A crowd may reach an extremely high plane of community in stimulation, attention, and feeling, without being classed as a mob, if a significant common action is not manifested. For example an audience listening to an effective political or religious speaker may have its attention concentrated on the speaker's appearance,

voices, and ideas, and be carried by these to a high pitch of feeling of a common sort, and yet not be properly designated as a mob, until definite common activity occurs. Mark Antony's audience is only a crowd until it begins to "Tetch fire, pluck down benches, pluck down forms, windows, anything," then it becomes a mob. Obviously, the most distinctive characteristic of a mob is its activity.

Much nonsense concerning crowds and mobs has been popularized by social philosophers who have sought to make the crowd or the mob the basis of social theory. In addition to this sterile notion itself, the notion that in a crowd the intellectual, emotional and moral level of the individual is necessarily lowered, has been widely popularized. This confusion has been fostered by the consideration of crowds and mobs of one type only, neglecting the wider manifestations of the same type of organization, and by comparing the individual in a crowd or mob with the individual in a higher type of organization only, neglecting the comparison of the social behavior of the individual with his merely individual behavior.

That the feelings and judgment of the individual are profoundly influenced by his social relations is, of course, obvious. That common stimulation, and especially communication, whether from a leader or from diverse members of the group, are efficacious, this chapter is designed to demonstrate. Which feelings and which types of judgment will become most common in a crowd or mob are determined by a complex pattern of circumstance, which includes not only current stimulations and communication, but also the predisposition of the individuals due to their training and social experience. Given a certain individual predisposition, the common stimulations of non-language sort, (as, for example, the sight of a fire bursting out, or of the attempt to escape on the part of an automobile driver who has just run down a pedestrian), will be determined by these predispositions, and modified by imitation of the actions of other individuals and by communications from these. No influences, aside from these, which shape the feelings, judgment, and actions of individuals in such circumstances, are known to psychology, and the assumption of a magic force which somehow lowers the individual's mental or moral level must be classed as mythical.

The individual in the crowd or mob is still an individual, and aside from direct social influence, exhibits his individual tendencies,

which, of course, have been socially developed in his past life. The effect of the immediate social influences of the crowd depends upon the nature and predominance of these influences. Through imitation, or communication, the tendencies of a superior group in the crowd may predominate, and the mental and moral average be considerably raised above the average which the individuals would show without these influences. This occurs in many cases. In the case of an accident, or other occurrence requiring group activity for the remedy, the ideas of the most clear thinking are apt to have such weight that the crowd acts with an efficiency far above that which would be displayed by a group composed of "average" members merely. In respect to ideals, the printed or spoken communications of effective leaders often raise the judgments and actions of the crowd to temporary levels far above the usual level of the average member.

On the other hand, bad counsels, and deplorable ideals frequently prevail, because these are sometimes communicated more effectively than their contraries. Mobs do perpetrate outrages, and sometimes the actions and ideals involved represent a level below that which would be reached by a group composed solely of individuals approximately the average of the larger group. In such cases, the result can be definitely attributed to the communications of a leader, or a group, representing a level below the average. In many cases, however, the appearances of lowering of the "individual" level are fallacious. If the worse counsels prevail when the better are as well presented, this is itself an evidence of the low individual average in mentality or in morals of the members of the group. Often, the members of a group express, in action, feelings and judgments which are fairly representative of their individual tendencies, but which they would be afraid to express in other groups.

The more important confusion in respect to the effects of crowds and mobs is due to the comparison of crowd action with the action of more highly organized groups. These latter groups unquestionably show more efficient action than do crowds and mobs, but the higher "individual" action in such groups is no more really individual, no less the result of the social influences, than is action in a crowd or mob. In any social group, the actions of any member are individual actions. They are the resultants of the interaction of the environmental forces on his "tendencies." But these "tendencies"

are not independent of environmental stimulations, they are tendencies to act *that way* on certain stimulus patterns, and *that way* on certain other stimulus patterns, and no one of these types of action represents his "individual" tendencies more than does another. A man's action and judgments in a mob are no real indications of his individual tendencies as are his actions and judgments in a parliament or in the family group, and no more so. The comparison between the individual's standards in the crowd and out of it is really, in the most important instances, a comparison between his standards in the crowd and his standards in an organization or social group of a higher type. Rarely is a comparison with abstract "individual" tendencies important, or even possible.

§7. The higher grades of social organization

The essential factors in the higher type of social organization are permanency and specialization of function. The crowd and the mob are transitory. The cooperation of the members is less affectual because it is clumsy, lacking the smoothness of operation of the adjusted machine. The efficiency of the mob is, therefore, limited, both in good and evil. The mob secures its results most conspicuously where there is little to overcome, in the way of physical conditions or opposing social agencies. The mob group may rescue persons from imprisonment under an automobile by the simple expedient of lifting the car off and carrying the victim away. A pickpocket may be caught, or a skater rescued from drowning by similarly simple action. A negro may be lynched, a home wrecked, or the cargo of a ship thrown overboard expeditiously by a hastily gathered mob. Yet, any such activity may be prevented by a slight natural difficulty, or the opposition of a small group of determined opponents. A fire saving organization, vigilance committee, or other permanent band is enormously more effective either for good or evil, because of the coordination permitted by previous organization, and by the group habits established.

Specialization of function is, however, the feature which most significantly distinguishes the more effective type of organization from the looser and less efficient. The effect of specialization of function on the band has already been pointed out. In its lowest forms, the band is merely a crowd or mob. But its characteristic

features and functions become distinguishable as soon as its organization includes distribution of function, which makes of it an interlocking mechanism.

Specialization of function may begin in a variety of ways, and proceed to an indefinitely complicated stage. It may, in fact, reach a degree of development in which the group becomes unwieldy and inefficient because the machinery is clumsy and wasteful. Organizations constructed on an arbitrary plan, instead of evolving in a normal way, frequently suffer from this defect, although at the same time they may suffer also from sufficient lack of specialization of function in certain directions.

In the family, specialization begins in the psychological and physiological complementariness of the sex function, and extends to other functions, including the economic and civic function which the family exercises. Since the sex specialization is inescapable, the other specializations must take form with due regard to this primary differentiation, and as a matter of fact, such coordination is the general rule, although faulty in many instances. The relation of economic and civic functions to sex function is not fixed, but is dependent upon general social conditions, as well as upon such "physical" conditions as climate. As social conditions change, these secondary specializations must be readjusted with respect to the sexual specialization. In some social environments, for example, the male is adequately the bread-winner, but in other environments, the economic specialization cannot so rigidly follow the sexual. It cannot be assumed, therefore, that existing coordinations of family specialization are final or perfect, and readjustments must be considered from time to time.

In the church, and in the band, the state, and other organizations of the civic type, the primary form of specialization is in respect to leadership, and final efficiency of action is not reached until such specialization is as complete as possible, although other types of specialization are essential also if full efficiency is to be reached. In the economic groups, although specialization does not so essentially begin in leadership, the same considerations otherwise apply. Maximal efficiency of group action is reached only with the fullest specialization in leadership. The fullest specialization is reached only when a single individual exercises a certain function. In most respects,

such extreme specialisation is impossible and approximation to it is detrimental, but in respect to leadership, it is essential that one man shall exercise the highest leadership, as director, executive, or administrator.

This principle has long been recognised in religious organisations, is practically established in economic organisations, and should be recognised in civic organisations more generally than it is. Efficient specialisation in leadership is defeated when several individuals attempt to exercise the same supreme function, or when the leader attempts to exercise functions which might be delegated to subordinates of various sorts: boards of directors, trustees, faculties, cabinet officers, legislatures, vestries, departmental superintendents and foremen, lieutenants, and appointed committees. Organisations are frequently wrecked either upon the Scylla of division of ultimate responsibility, or the Charybdis of pulling too many subordinate functions on the leader.

10. Morals and conduct

The practical life of any group of a relatively high degree of organisation consists in its promotion of the satisfactions of the desires of its member, and the only excuse for the existence of a group is its success in this promotion. Certain philanthropic groups, foundations, and charitable organisations, seem to find their reasons for existence in the promoting of the welfare of persons outside of the group, but these groups are professedly emergency groups, and furthermore, do promote the satisfactions of their own members, otherwise they would be failures. In this promotion, justice is involved. The political group, in general, lowers the satisfactions of its members in certain directions and in certain extents, in order that the satisfactions in other directions may not be too much limited. The ordering of the limitations and the balancing of these against relief from limitations presents a problem which has sometimes been considered insoluble, because the balance is in every case the limitations of certain individuals against the liberties of others. Thus, however, is precisely the problem of justice.

On a simple aristocratic basis, justice would present a less difficult problem. A favoured class should have satisfactions limited as little as possible, whereas the satisfactions of the remainder of the popula-

tion should be reduced to a minimum, in so far as this reduction in any wise contributes to the satisfactions of the aristocrats. In this situation there is no real balancing to be attempted, but merely the determining which limitations of the masses are useful to the aristocracy, and the minimum of satisfaction which will permit the continuation of life and advantageous work of the masses.

There are few modern defenders of aristocracy who are willing to adhere publically to the full aristocratic principle, although only in this adherence can an actual basis for aristocracy be found. The admission that a certain regard for the welfare of all is essential to the life of the group, while urging a favored position for one's own class, is virtually an admission of the basic principle of group psychology as we have presented it, while seeking to take selfish personal advantage of the group.

On the democratic basis, justice is simple in theory, but extraordinarily difficult to attain practically. Starting from the principle that restraint is necessary, for the welfare of the group, a principle practically involved in all organizations, and outstanding in political organizations of the past and the present, we readily conclude that there are maxima and minima of restraint within which justice resides, but the determination of these maxima and minima is still a matter of power, and not scientifically approached. This is unfortunate, but it is so.

An important consideration in this problem is the fact that justice, of the democratic sort, involves morality, whereas in a consistently aristocratic group there would be no morals. On the question of the adoption or non-adoption of morals, however, there are no logical grounds for argument. One who in theory refuses completely to regard the welfare of others, and claims to act entirely on selfish motives has taken a position from which he cannot be dislodged, although the group may control his actions as completely as those of other persons. On the other hand, one who adopts the moral position and claims altruistic motives is also in an unpreignable position, so far as logic is concerned, since neither position is based on logic. One who attempts to take an intermediate position however, has a sorry one.

The determination between the two opposed theories of society can be made only through appeal to the facts of social organization and the determination which agrees with the living principles of social

growth. That which is actually working in group life, however inadequately, and however obstructed by numerous factors, is evidently that which we can most usefully promote to fuller function. Morality does seem to be the actual sustaining principle of society, and it seems futile to discuss the organization of the state, or political functions of any groups, on any other basis.

Morality is however not restricted to mere justice. Negatively, it is justice, but positively it impels to actions which definitely promote or enhance the welfare of others. Political organization, as we have already seen, has its minimal function the securing of justice, but goes on to the requirement of actions which positively enhance human welfare. Adequate social control, so short, is guided by moral principles.

In the preceding discussions we have used the term *conduct* to designate human responses (or from a simplified point of view, human actions), considered as subject to social control. It is expedient for purposes of clarification to digress somewhat to an analysis of the two main types of conduct as general psychology presents them. These types are the *impulsive* and the *reflective*.

1. *Impulsive conduct.* There are two forms of impulsive conduct which, for moral considerations, are equivalent, although their psychological conditions are different. (a) An individual may react to a stimulus pattern immediately, without the intervention of ideas. One "feels moved" and stops work, one sees a piece of pie, and attacks it with a fork, one hears the voice of an enemy, and springs up to fight (or to run), one feels a sex urge, and gratifies it. Such conduct, when the action takes place upon stimulation without "consideration," "reflection," awareness of alternative, or planning, is *impulsive*. (b) An idea, however aroused, may express itself in action in the same impulsive way. It is not the absence of ideas, in the preceding cases, which makes the conduct impulsive, but the absence of ideas intervening between the action and the stimulus pattern which evokes it. An impulsive action may, however, be evoked by an idea, or be the "expression" of an idea,¹ and if this

¹ It may be that a preceding perception has aroused the idea, but if that perception has taken place, as a completed reaction, and an idea is aroused by its completion, the action which expresses the idea (or embodies it) is not the termination of the stimulus pattern which aroused the perception, but of the stimulus pattern resulting from the perception.

expression (action) follows immediately upon the stimulus which arouses the idea, without reflection, consideration, or any other intermediate ideational process, it is properly classed as impulsive.

It is clear that the thought of suffering may lead as directly to an impulsive act expressive of pity as may the sight of suffering. A thief may impulsively steal money which he sees, but he may just as impulsively begin the sequence of actions leading to complicated theft upon merely thinking of unguarded money in the adjoining room.

Impulsive reactions are not necessarily reactions to the stimulus of the moment merely. These reactions are determined by preceding reactions, as well as by feelings and desires of the moment. The cat, whose impulse is to take any food which is conveniently located, comes, as the result of repeated chastisings, to have a different impulse, at least when his master is near. The babe whose early impulse may be to grasp the snake which glides by him, acquires, through admonitions, a different impulse, to avoid the snake, and acquires a different set of desires and feelings in respect to the snake. Yet all later actions may be as impulsive, as free from reflection and planning as the first of their occurrence, as were his earlier actions.

All human beings act impulsively a great part of the time. While those of lower mental grade act impulsively in a greater proportion of their conduct than do the highly intelligent, the conduct of even the most intelligent person must necessarily be impulsive most of the time unless he be neurotic. It is quite possible that the behavior of lower animals is entirely impulsive, although at the same time it may be in part ideational.

2. *Reflective conduct.* Frequently, a stimulus pattern evokes a reaction of a type more complex than the impulsive reaction. Before the action is completed, ideas are aroused, which enter into the determination of the final reaction. Conduct involving this type of reaction is commonly termed reflection.

The ideas which enter into reflective conduct may be classified under four types. (1) Ideas of acts which might follow from the perception of idea which involves the stimulus pattern. (2) Apprehension of consequences which might result from the act or acts in question. (3) Recollection of the consequences of similar acts in the past. (4) Ideas of standards of action or conduct, and of the

agreement or disagreement of the act or acts in question with these standards. Ideas of these four types may be accompanied by feelings and desires of various intensity and complexity, which also enter into the final determination of the conduct.

These ideas are not necessarily mutually exclusive. There may be, for example, an idea of an act which might be the result of a certain situation, followed by an idea of the consequence of the act, or by a recollection of effects of past acts. But in another case, the first idea may be of the act and its consequences. In any case, reflective thinking necessarily involves an idea of a possible act, also there cannot be ideas of consequences, future or past, nor can there be a comparison with standards.

Ideas of the second, third and fourth classes serve as checks on impulses, or determine the issue when impulses tend in different directions. Obviously, reflection delays and weakens action, and is in itself disadvantageous. It is desirable, therefore, only in so far as its benefits, in the way of increased accuracy, and improvement in type of action, offset the disadvantage of delay. A man whose conduct should be always reflective would be incapacitated for any useful part in life, even for maintaining his own life. The most advantageous type of conduct would be that which should be completely impulsive, but with the impulses always in the proper direction. Reflection, therefore, is useful in conduct only in so far as it may serve to correct improper impulses and form new ones, so that ultimately reflection will not be needed in similar situations.

Reflective walking, in which each detail of procedure should be ideationally considered, would be a troublesome method of procedure if long carried out, but reflective walking at certain times may be a great aid to the establishing of better walking habits, in which each detail shall be eventually an "impulsive" one. Reflective enunciation of words, long continued, leads to stammering and other difficulties of speech, but periods of reflective articulation may be of service in the improvement of speech habits. Just so, reflective conduct in any department of life is of service if it leads to the establishment of correct impulsive conduct; disastrous, if it does not. Imagine a man reflecting each morning on whether he should go to his office, or reflecting each noon on the propriety of upbaiting the restaurant waiter with his tray of dishes, and you are imagining a case of

least incipient mental trouble. Yet any man may profit, both in his immediate and his later conduct, by reflection at some critical moment on one or the other of these possibilities. In matters of morals, the situation is just the same. The bank cashier who keeps his accounts straight *reflectively* each day, that is, who considers each time the consequences of being "straight," and of stealing, or compares each time his acts with a standard of honesty, would be a dangerous man in a bank. Habits of impulsive honesty are the only safe reliance in such circumstances. Reflection, in other words, is justified only where its occurrence makes its repetition unnecessary.

(9. Social control of conduct

Our survey of the forms and functions of family, religious, and political organization reveals the complication of group relationships in a civilized population. ■ typical cases, an individual is a member of several groups at the same time. In many cases he is a member of a large number of distinct groups. Some of these groups are of an inclusive, or hierarchal nature, exemplified by the city, state and nation in which, with some minor exception, all of the members of the lesser group are members of the higher group. In a similar way, the members ■ a local church may all be members of a larger regional group, all members of this may be members of a national church, and the hierarchal relationship may extend to ■ international organization. Members of a modern small family are also members of a larger family, and may also ■ be members of a religious group, ■ they are of the political group.

On the other hand, various groups to which the individual belongs may be non-inclusive, as in the case of the Odd Fellows, the Methodists, and the Democrats. Even in this case there are apt to be common members of two groups, and the relative number of these has its effects on the characteristics of both. ■ In any case, the effects on a given individual of membership in any group is, to a greater or less extent, modified by, or determined by, his membership in other groups. In the case of the inclusive groups, this principle is obvious. That it is valid for other groups we can hardly doubt.

Our psychological problems regarding group life, we should now see, turn upon the fundamental question. Just how, in detail, does group organization produce any effects upon the group members?

We may formulate this question in a slightly different way, as *How are the group functions, of which we have spoken in various places, actually exercised?*

The effects which may in any way be produced on an individual may be roughly classified as modifications of his general physiological conditions and modifications of his responses. These two systems are of course causally related reciprocally to each other, and we may usefully confine our discussion to the responses. For convenience, we may here distinguish between responses which directly modify the environment, and those which do not directly modify it, or *intra* which the modification is relatively negligible. This distinction is not sound, if it is depended upon for thoroughgoing scientific usage, but is admissible within certain limits.

The first class of responses are popularly called *actions*, in distinction from the perceptions, thoughts, feelings and combinations of thoughts and feelings or desires and emotions, which make up the second class. As has been pointed out earlier, "actions" are really perceptual or ideational responses, but the environmental distinction drawn in the preceding paragraph may still be maintained.

We have already described the group effects on the actions of individuals as distributable into three types, namely (1) Restraint of action (2) Requirement of action (3) Promotion of action which is not required. These three types must now be considered in detail.

1. Restraint of action may occur with reference to the effects which such action would have on other individuals. Restraint so determined is essential to any group in which the individuals are in any way affected by the action of another, and forms therefore the minimum of political function. It is the basis also, of negative or minimal morality. Consequently, it is in some degree a function of all groups, and for this reason every group exercises some degree of political function, whether independently, or with the permission and regulation of the state.

Restraint of action may however be determined from consideration of the effects of the action on the acting individual himself, regardless of the effects or lack of effects on other individuals. This restraint is well exemplified in the family, which controls the activities of its junior members, partly at least, with the consideration of their individual welfare. It may be exercised by other groups in which there

are members who are deemed to be incompetent to safeguard their own welfare, and who are accordingly treated as non-adults. Institutions for the feeble-minded, and orphan asylums are examples of these groups. Religious groups exercise this restraint with regard to sin. In all these groups the desires of members are deemed to be properly disregarded and their needs, as formulated by other persons, emphasized.

2 Requirement of action is a function of all, or nearly all, groups, and may be in certain cases of more importance to the group than is restraint. In modern states, taxation is a substitute for required action in the way of services to the state, but actual services, especially military service, may still be exacted. The state may require actions, or monetary substitutes, for the benefit of particular classes of members, on the same grounds as those on which it restrains actions for the benefit of particular classes, although in a democratic state, the requirement must be generalized in its form, however particular it may be in application.

3 Promotion of non-required activities is a third function of all organizations. The family may make it possible for its juniors to attend college, to engage in sports and recreations, to learn a vocation, to engage in various social activities, while exercising no form of compulsion to those activities. The church makes it possible for its members to engage in the ritual, although it may not require such participation. The church may also offer educational and recreational facilities. Clubs and a long list of other organizations provide facilities of various sorts, with no requirements on the members to make use of the facilities. States at present provide opportunities and facilities for sports, recreations of various types, adult education, musical enjoyment, and the various activities which the public expends on museums, with no requirements that these facilities shall be used.

§10. Methods of controlling action

Groups restrain, promote or require actions of individuals in several ways. 1 The group may provide materials and opportunities for the satisfactions of desires. Practically all organizations proceed in this way. We have given illustrations in the preceding section. For promotion of free activity, this may be sufficient in certain cases, but other means may be employed conjointly.

2 Activity may not only be promoted, but may actually be required through education, advice and propaganda. By these means standards of action are presented, and these may be made the basis of habit formation, or the direction of desires. In particular, by presentation of alleged sequences of a causal nature, motivation to specific lines of conduct may be built up. Further, through control of the environment, and hence of perception, tendencies to certain activities may be built up without resorting to direct advice or propaganda. Presentations on the stage or screen, for example, may have a restraining or a facilitating effect on the conduct of members of the audience.

3 Force may be employed in several ways to control activities.

(a) We may inflict bodily injury or suffering, through beating, starving or other maltreatments which have run into a long list of tortures in the past, or we may put an individual to death. Any such procedure may be retributive punishment, that is to say, a revenge wreaked by society upon the individual. Death may be a *proclative* punishment, relieving society from any further activities on the part of the victim. Any of these punishments, including death, may, on the other hand be *motiveless* (sometimes called *exemplary*) considered as means of deterring other individuals from the omissions or commissions for which the individual is punished. Minor physical injuries may be motivational for the individual himself, deterring him from further actions of the kind for which he is punished, or inciting him to perform acts which he is punished for failing to perform.

(b) We may forcibly restrain an individual, by holding him, or by incarcerating him within walls or boundaries. This also may be retributive, *proclative*, or motivational in its purposes.

(c) We may forcibly take from an individual a portion or all of his material property or a monetary equivalent designated as a fine. In this way, without actual incarceration, we may reduce the satisfactions of his desires, through the reduction of the materials, and opportunities for satisfaction. This may be retributive, or motivational, but could not, in most cases, be *proclative*.

In so far as force is motivational or *proclative*, it is a factor in social control, and as motivational, it obviously depends for its actual effects on the ideas, emotions, and desires it introduces or modifies. Retribution, except in so far as the threat of retribution may have motivational value, is of no consequence socially.

(d) *Reward* In general, individuals work for the satisfaction of their desires and the avoidance of physical and mental injuries. In one use of the term, the satisfaction of a desire is the reward for the activities involved in seeking satisfaction. In a more common usage, however, we apply the term "reward" to a transcendent desire which is created socially. Thus, to induce the dog to jump through the hoop, we may reward him with a bit of food. To induce the child to study his lesson, we give him a picture card as a reward. An appropriate reward for careful driving might be an emblem to be attached conspicuously to the driver's car. In each of these cases there is a certain amount of arbitrariness in the setting of the satisfaction to be obtained, as a motive to the accomplishment of something we wish the individual to do, or to the refraining from certain activities.

(e) The essentially mental nature of all social control is especially evident in control through *public opinion*. In so far as an individual has desires of preeminence and of conformity, he desires to stand well in the opinions of his fellows. He may desire the good opinion of his total group, or merely that of a certain limited class within the group. The group opinion is primarily a matter of judgment, but it is rendered more important by the involvement of emotion. Approval, adulation, suspicion, disgust, dislike, scorn, ridicule, and envy are typical of the group attitudes which are designated as public opinion, as directed towards individuals. Public opinion can therefore be a retributive punishment or a reward, or motivational, and is therefore an important factor in social control.

(f) *Exemplary leadership* In a preceding section we have considered imitation as a complex form of response involving ideational factors, and have pointed out that fundamental learning through imitation is not possible. We must now qualify this conclusion somewhat, and point out that in the choice of two types of action, both of which are possible to the individual through his previous learning processes, imitation of, as well as simultaneous reactions to, the conduct of a leader who exemplifies the conduct he upholds may in certain cases furnish an important means of social control, superior to that provided by the mere suggestion which a leader exercises through advice and propaganda.

The state exercises supervision over every subordinate group in respect to the control of individual action. The state exercises

physical force upon adults, but permits no other organization to use force, except in emergencies, and then only as a protective means. Exceptions are made for certain semi-public groups, such as institutions for the insane and the feeble-minded, but under definite restriction and regulation by the state. Families are permitted to use force in the control of children, but this also comes more and more under state regulation, and families are strictly accountable to the state for every misuse of force. Public schools, as state institutions, use force in controlling pupils, but the restrictions in this field are rigorous. The principle towards which civilization tends is an absolute restriction of force to the state, outlawing private combat, feuds, and group tyranny. Kidnapping or any form of confinement without state authority is an especially abhorrent offense politically.

The state operates by all methods of controlling action, but with respect to methods other than the use of force, other organizations are allowed free scope except for certain important conditions. First, there must be no promotion of actions which the state, by direct enactment of clear implication, prohibits. Second, there must be no restraint, by any method, on actions which the state requires. Third, in respects in which action or inhibition in childhood prejudices future actions and inhibitions, the state may intervene to prohibit advice, information, propaganda, supply of materials, or other means of influencing conduct. The state may therefore with propriety determine the attendance of children on picture shows, and may strictly control the circulation of certain types of literature, the sale or giving of tobacco and alcoholic beverages, and a variety of other matters, in so far as children are concerned. The state may not properly, and cannot with safety to itself, make such determination for adults, although selfish interests arrayed against the public welfare are constantly attempting to seduce the state in these regards.

The methods of social control, as analysed, reduce to two sorts: (1) Appeal to the desires which are already strongly developed in the individual. By emphasizing the relations of these desires or their satisfactions to certain responses or lines of conduct, we may motivate these responses, or this line of conduct, or we may motivate against them. In other ways we may change the balance of importance of the several desires. Through education we may perhaps create new desires, or weaken or abolish old ones. Further, by bringing about

the required conduct in these ways, we may form habits of action which may operate in partial independence of desires. In all these ways we are utilizing, as means to our ends, the satisfactions of the individual's desires. This is social control through individual selfishness.

(2) We may, on the other hand, emphasize and appeal to altruistic interests of the individual—that is, to his interest in others in the group, aside from his own private interests. These interests have their expression in social consciousness and social feeling, and more emphatically in morality.

§11. Standards and codes

Standards of conduct, in so far as they are not nebulous and obscure, are formulated as rules or codes. Even where such standards are embedded in a common praxis, within which and through which they have developed, they tend easily to be abstracted from this praxis in popular thought, and formulated specifically, for convenience in application in judging specific acts. On the other hand, however, the rules may be so well understood by every one that there is little occasion for explicit formulation, and they may be implied in folk tales and legends, as well as common speech, without the need of formal reference. The Homeric tales are excellent illustrations of the embodiment, in oral tradition, of rules of conduct which were universally understood by contemporaries of the narrator, and which even we may with little study extract from the stories as handed down to us.

In a more complex culture, formulation of the rules in exact language becomes useful, and further advance is made when the rules can be committed to writing. Recorded codes, of which the Babylonian laws of Hammurabi are the earliest still preserved, mark an important transition in civilization. With written records, however, a source of moral confusion, which is present in all eras, was increased. All codes are actually variable, in accordance with the variations of culture in which the codes are embedded, and with progress in civilization comes progress in the codes. Written records, even more than oral crystallizations, tend to fix codes, and to cause them to lag behind culture in its evolution. This is the evident cause of much of the failure of codes to embody the morality which is at any time actually attainable, a failure which has been, and still is, a source of damage to public welfare.

The standards which the codes represent fall into three general classes, namely: A Standards of taste B Moral standards, or standards of duty C Political standards Codes representing standards of the first two types are sometimes designated as *conventions*. Political codes are *laws*, when formulated by the state, otherwise they also are conventions.

A Standards of taste and their development A standard of taste is the measure of what one does, or doesn't do, merely because it "isn't done." It is the crystallization, metaphorically speaking, of the desire to conform to the group types of conduct. It is not connected with law except in so far as it may, (or may not), be "good taste" or "good form" to obey the laws in general, or this or that particular law, and in so far as it is true that the best foundation for effective law is in convention of good taste.

Standards of taste are built up through the operation of many factors, among which the most important are: (1) preeminence of certain individuals, (2) natural appropriateness and economic advantage of certain types of conduct, (3) deliberate propaganda, and (4) failure of discrimination. The desire to conform is involved in the effects of all but the second of these, and standards, once evolved through any cause, are maintained through this desire.

1. Leaders in any social group set the standards of taste in certain respects, but the leaders in matters of taste are not necessarily leaders in other respects. A conspicuous individual may set the standard for men's attire in America, yet he may not be a leader in political, religious, economic, or any other aspect of life. On the other hand, the Presidents of the United States, although in the past several of them have been great leaders in things political, have had no leadership in manners, dress, or any other matters of taste. In art, and music, great artists and musicians seldom establish or modify standards of taste, but are usually crushed by those standards set by critics, until other critics later arise and make the standards more favorable. In literature, conditions are more favorable to the pre-eminent author, and many authors are notable for the modification of taste which has been wrought by their writings. Diverse as are the qualifications for leadership in various department of taste, the influence of these leaders is nevertheless huge.

2. In many instances, the natural appropriateness of a line of

conduct, or its economic advantages, determine its adoption as a standard. In the case of invention by a leader, the mode persists only if not really inconvenient nor opposed to practical needs. But certain modes persist as "good taste" long after their practical advantages cease. Such are the practice of drinking healths, saluting with the right hand, doffing masculine head gear in the home, and various forms of deference to females. Other modes gain slowly because of their practical advantages, although violently opposed at first. Among such modes which have triumphed in spite of opposition through conservative adherence to older conventions, and through denunciation on the scores of religion and morals, are the use of bath tubs and underwear, the bobbing of women's hair, and shortening of dresses. Man's attire changes but little in its modern form, because of its practical utility, which can scarcely be improved. The recent achievements in woman's attire, made so painfully, will probably never be repudiated. Corsets, hoop skirts, long dresses, and long trains are so practically disadvantageous that they cannot be reintroduced, once woman has realized the utility of modern clothing. On the other hand, trousers, knickers and breeches will never supplant skirts for woman's outdoor wear because of certain practical advantages of skirts for women which they do not possess for men.

In all matters of "courtesy" and manners, utility generally rules. The ways of conduct which grease the wheels of society and make social relations more pleasant, persist until more efficacious procedures are invented. We will long continue to utter flagrant social lies to say "pleased to have met you," "enjoyed the evening so much," applaud the amateur pianist, and condone other acts of falsehood and mendacity which deserve no censure, because social relations generally are made more satisfactory in that way.

3. Standards of taste are often set up through deliberate propaganda calculated to appeal to the desire to conform. Let the fashion magazines proclaim that "purple will be fashionable among women. Announce widely that Mah Jong is "the thing" and it becomes so. In art, standards are upheld by propaganda, and innovations fought and fostered in the same way. That the majority of persons other than trained musicians enjoy "high brow" music only because they are told that they must

do so in order to conform to "good taste" is demonstrated by analysis of any opera audience. Propaganda fails in such accomplishment only when it is directed against practical utility, or against a general appreciation too strong to be denied by the individual who has it. Thus, the wide announcement that "this year the shorts will be long again" preceded each further shortening, and persistent thunders emitted voluminously from press, pulpit, and "authorities" of all kinds against "jazz" have hindered very little the establishment of jazz appreciation as "good taste."

4 Failure to make adequate discrimination may not actually establish standards of taste but it effectually extends them. "Free verse" of the common type is countenanced, even admired, by the public because there is real free verse of high excellence, and the public (including even many literary critics) cannot discriminate between them. So, terrible stuff of the type which any ten-year old child can write, is accepted and applauded because there is some successful free verse, more difficult to compose than is rhymed verse, and distinctive in its effects. The vogue of the bizarre or "futurist" type of art is due to the same lack of discrimination. An ocean of sewage pours in through the gap made by a few great masterpieces, and neither the public nor the rank and file of critics can discriminate between them.

B. *Standards of duty* The recognition of duty is indicated by the judgment "I ought to do so and so," "it is my duty to do so and so," or "it is right." These judgments are based, reflectively, on standards in every case, and although considerations of possible consequences of acts, and recollections of past consequences, are frequently involved, they are always subsidiary to the standard, as means of interpreting and applying a standard in a particular case. The standard of duty is based on no specific desire, but arises from the consideration of the total system of desires, and from the effects which the satisfaction of the desire of the individual have on the satisfaction of the desires of others in the social group.

Standards of duty are sometimes indistinguishable from standards of taste. There are many things which are awarded by men of certain classes, and many things which are done without question or hesitation, although personally disagreeable, dangerous, or even certainly fatal. Yet, in many such cases it is difficult to decide whether the

avoidance or actions are dominated by standards of good taste, or standards of duty. An Anglo-Saxon man, in a sinking ship, stays on the ship to drown, in order to let women and children be saved. He may be acting impulsively, but his impulse has undoubtedly been formed by earlier reflection. If he should reflect, would his reflection take the general form: "It is my duty," or "as a gentleman, I can't do otherwise?" Certain types of men can be trusted with large sums of money, in places where they are under no surveillance. Have the reflective processes which have led to this type of action been dominated by standards of duty, or of good form? Certain men will sacrifice their lives for others. Certain men may be trusted to protect the persons of women, under circumstances which would preclude a lapse becoming known. Soldiers will go voluntarily to certain death, in carrying out the responsibilities placed upon them. Are these men swayed by duty, or by pride as "keeping the faith"—in being "gentlemen" to the last check?

It might perhaps be said, that there is no difference between good taste and good morals, where they lead to the same results; that there is a difference only where the two are in conflict, as in groups of men among whom it is perfectly good form to take any advantage of a woman which will not result in legal complication or unpleasant publicity, where yet moral standards condemn the act. Yet, the fact that duty and good taste may be opposed shows that they are not identical. The matter is further complicated by the fact that it is frequently one's "duty" to conform to standards of taste. Most persons recognise that where deviation from accepted standards of taste causes annoyance, or hurt, to other persons, one ought to conform to the standard, except as he is in opposition to a distinct standard of duty. Moreover, it is recognized by most people that it is good taste to do one's duty, where the duty is clearly recognised. Apparently, then, there is a real distinction between standards of taste and standards of duty, the one could be applied as a measure of the other.

The diversity of particular standards of duty, that is, of rules concerning the specific conduct to which the fundamental or general standard applies, is admitted, and the existence of these diverse rules is not difficult to explain as soon as we consider the most important sources of these rules.

1. In some cases, the rules are standards of taste, and in certain other cases they are conventions of a closely similar nature. In other words, we feel it our duty to follow the dictates of good taste, and otherwise to conform to standards of conduct which in themselves might be indifferent, but which are accepted by our fellows. It is one's duty to bear pain without whimpering. It is one's duty to defer to women and children. It is one's duty to say "please" to the telephone operator. But in some exceptional cases, good form may not require these particular sorts of conduct, and then they are not morally obligatory.

2. Usually, rules of conduct which it is our duty to follow are rules which have been taught us. These rules may have been developed slowly in our ancestral group under the influence of practical considerations, or they may have been dictated by an influential ruling class, or they may have been impressed by an especially influential person, such as the Buddha or Jesus, but we accept them because they have been impressed upon us by education, in the home and in the civic and religious groups. If we who are civilized Christians had been brought up as Kafir or Buddhist, our rules of conduct would have been Kafir or Buddhist.

3. In a relatively few cases, individuals think out their own rules of conduct, making them different from the standards of taste and other conventions which have been taught them. These individuals are enemies of the existing social order and must be suppressed if the group is to retain its established order. Usually, they are suppressed. If they are not, but succeed in teaching their rules to a sufficiently large part of the group, they are great leaders and teachers, and captains of progress. It may well be assumed that most of the radicals who repudiate the doctrines which the group has evolved, setting up independent rules of conduct against the group rule, are pernicious innovators whose influence would simply be to disintegrate society, and that their suppression is desirable. The exceptional few, whose variant rules of conduct are valuable improvements on the social order, may, unfortunately, be suppressed also. To those who succeed, all social progress is due.

4. The major causes of variation in moral codes are, first, varying cultures, and the varying conditions of human life. Second, our lack of complete knowledge of these conditions, and of man's desires,

which lacks together make our knowledge concerning the actual effects of specific acts upon group welfare seriously inadequate.

Human desires have a differing balance in different cultures and conditions, a fact which we have already illustrated in outlining the development of civilized religion. We cannot, therefore, evaluate the effects of this or that action, or system of conduct, as it affected the group satisfaction of desires in an ancient culture, or as it affects satisfactions in a savage culture, unless we are familiar with that culture in all of its details, and also familiar with the details of the environmental situations of the groups.

In certain savage cultures, for example, it is a man's duty to kill his parents before the ages at which they should become infirm. This moral obligation is of the same order as the duty of an American citizen to protect and support his parents in old age. In both cases, the man acts, or fails to act, in accordance with a code which is deemed to represent a standard of welfare for the group as a whole, although the supposition may be wrong in either or both cases. On the other hand, both codes may be morally adequate for the cultures or conditions in which they obtain. Similar considerations apply to the whole mass of varying and conflicting codes and standards of duty.

It should be freely admitted that every code is a rough approximation to standards which would be really adequate for a given culture and environment, and that some codes are actually opposed to group welfare. As we have already pointed out, codes must change with changing conditions, and tend to change too slowly. Hence, in any group, improvements in standards and the codes which represent them, must be constantly sought, if the welfare of the group is to be promoted in the highest possible degree. We have already implied this point of view in our discussion of marriage and the family.

From the point of view of general psychology, morals present no conflict with our accepted principles. Obviously, duty, objectively considered, belongs in the realm of relations, that is, of intellectual data: a realm as yet but imperfectly analyzed by psychology, which has, (perhaps usefully), concentrated its efforts so far rather on sensory data. Admitting relations and systems of relations as facts, we admit duty, objectively considered, as perhaps the most difficult datum in this group to deal with scientifically, but still a datum of no extraordinary sort. Awareness of relations is one of the fundamental

facts of experience, and awareness of duty, (the so-called "sense of duty" or "feeling of duty"), must be recognized in a specific instance within the general class. Variations and errors in applications, and dependence on "rules," upon the facts to which the standard is applied, belong then in the general sphere of variations and errors in judgment generally, that is, variations and errors in measurements.

§12. Laws and conventions

Laws and conventions are standards of conduct which are in general not sharply separable from moral standards, although in specific cases such separations may be possible. Laws, in the civic sense of the term, are rules of conduct which are definitely formulated by specialized functions of a civic group having a permanent organization, and having a specialized force to back up the rule. No laws are absolutely enforced, if they were, penalties for breaking laws would not be needed. A civic rule may be very widely infringed and still be a "law." On the other hand, if the rule as formulated is entirely disregarded and no attempt made to enforce it, (a "dead" law), it is hardly a law in the factual sense at all, but a mere verbal formulation, such as any individual might concoct for his own amusement. Between the "dead" law and the actual law, however, there is no line of demarcation, but there is a gradation of small differences in observances and enforcements from zero to a relatively high degree. Many bodies of "laws" pertaining to special departments of life show the entire range. Among "traffic laws," for example, we have in Maryland some which are so dead that few drivers know they are on the statute books, and the police make no effort at all to enforce them; we have certain others which are admirably enforced and observed by almost every one, and other traffic laws fill in the range between these extremes.

The process of formulation of a law, that is to say, the enactment of a law as in the case of an ordinance enacted by a group, is a function which may be specialized in one of two ways. 1. The whole group may enact the law, as in the case of an ordinance enacted by a town meeting. In this case the group is functioning in a specialized way at the time, in the absence of many or all of its other functions; or else, the organization of the total group for the purpose of enacting laws is its only group organization, and the legislative function its

only function. 2. The enactment may be the function of a specialized group or an individual within the larger group, organically related to it through the permanent organization of the larger group. By "delegated authority" or by arbitrarily grasped authority, the legislative group or individual legislates for the total group. In either of these two cases the general nature of the law and the conditions are eventually the same.

Conventions, when definitely distinguishable from laws, differ from them in respect to the two characteristics of law above mentioned. (a) Conventions are not enacted, but come about through general consent of the group, acting without definite specialization for the purpose. These conventions may be rules of taste, or rules of morals, or rules of more general sorts of behavior. (b) Conventions are not backed by an enforcing mechanism. No specialized agency in their group (comparable to a police force for the maintenance of law) exists for their enforcement.

Between conventions and laws, however, there is no sharp line of demarcation, but rather a gradation. The "common law" where it obtains, is really something which begins as a mere convention, but which is eventually recognized, and enforced by the courts and police force. Theoretically, we can draw a line even here, and say that the first moment at which the convention is enforced, or at which it is recognized by legislative reference to it, is the moment of its enactment. Practically, however, that moment can be assigned with difficulty in many cases, and the early legal recognitions of conventions are usually vague, leaving for further interpretation the exact details to be recognized.

Even where we can draw a sharp line between convention and law on the basis of enactment, there can not always be drawn a line on the basis of enforcement. Many conventions have no penalties except "natural" ones, that is, penalties due to social action which is general rather than specialized. The man who inhales his soup or eats baked beans with his knife encounters no specialized agency, and no specialized action of his fellows which should enforce upon him the rule he breaks, but he is subjected to penalties just the same, through the opinions formed of him by his fellows and through exclusion from certain groups. In other cases, however, conventions are enforced by force, and many a man has been physically disciplined

by his fellows for conduct which infracts established conventions, but infracts no law recognized by the courts.

The distinction between convention and law is still further confused through a delegation of general legislative powers to judicial and police agencies under such vague designations of disorderly conduct, vagrancy, and contempt of court. This legislative authority is used arbitrarily, and it is intended to be so used, otherwise, it would not be delegated, but more specific laws would be enacted covering the situation. It is admitted that such delegation is dangerous, and has been the source of grave abuse, but no better way has as yet been found. Social progress is uniformly in the direction of restriction of enforcement to actual laws, and the abolition of lynch law, private justice, and all other forms of enforcement of rules of conduct except by socially designated and specialized officials.

In an imperially organized group, laws are decreed by the ruler, or by an aristocratic group, and enforced on the other members of the group by military power. Such a system requires a military machine of size and power sufficient to overcome the total power of the others in the state, and sufficiently active to detect and punish almost all infractions, otherwise it cannot maintain itself. The inherent viciousness of such a system is obvious, inasmuch as the rulers are enabled to disregard any interest of the public, and use the state for their private purposes, however selfish or misguided, and progress is impossible except through revolution or democratization to some degree. The history of imperialism seems to justify this conclusion.

In a democratically organized society, the majority imposes its will on the minority, through the laws it enacts or causes to be enacted. Laws may be as vicious as the majority are vicious or ignorant, but the probability of vicious laws is no greater than in an imperial state, and progress is not cut off. In a democratic state, the maintenance of laws depends on two factors:

1. There must be a mechanism, which we may designate as the police,³ specialized for the enforcement of law. The police mechanism is, however, merely the nucleus of the total law enforcement mechanism, around which the total power of the citizen is ranged.

³ Including, of course, a wider range of officials than mere policemen.

This principle is well recognized, in that the citizens are expected to aid the police in enforcing laws, and may be definitely drafted into service in various ways.

The police must be limited in its total power. It must be large enough to be effective, but small enough so that the larger group of citizens may overcome it at any time. This fact is vital for the preservation of democracy, and is recognized in the constant vigilance of the public to prevent the police growing to the point at which it would become a master of the group rather than its servant, and recognized also in various laws such as the constitutional provision concerning the right of citizens to possess arms.

2. A law must be supported by a convention accepted by a large proportion of the citizens. The approval of the law is to be distinguished here from the acceptance of the convention, since there are clear cases in which the majority of citizens approve and support a law which they have no intention of observing. Such is the case with game laws in many places: those who favor the law doing so in hopes that others will be compelled to observe it, and thus game will be multiplied, but hoping to be able to take this game illegally themselves. In the case of the so-called "blue laws" the case is outwardly similar, but perhaps the motives are different. Apparently, the laws prohibiting labor and sports on Sunday are popularly supported, although universally disregarded, and enforced occasionally in a way which arouses the suspicion of the use of the civic machinery for private interests. Undoubtedly the support of these blue laws, which are broken openly even by state and city agencies, and by individuals who are most active in maintaining the law, is due to a mixture of corrupt motives, religious inconsistencies, and desires to use the state machinery for the regulation of commercial and industrial competition. In all these cases, it is clearly evident that the vicious consequences of the laws are due to the fact that there are no conventions supporting them.

It is not certain that the convention supporting a law must be accepted by the majority at all times. While it seems probable that no law will long remain reasonably effective unless the supporting convention is accepted by a majority, it is quite possible that acceptance by a substantial minority in the beginning may be followed later by majority acceptance. The prohibition amendment and its

supporting legislation furnish an interesting case for study in this connection. Apparently, these laws were approved by a majority of the citizens of the United States, but the convention of abstinence from the use of "intoxicating liquors" was accepted only by a minority. Instead of gaining, the convention lost adherents. Consequently the laws became unenforceable, and the situation was disastrous. There was, accordingly, no way out but the repeal of the amendment in order that other systems of control might be substituted.

Whatever the nature of the convention supporting a law, the law must at least be respected if it is to be in any measure effective. Even in an imperial state under alien domination, where the convention upholding an *irksome* *whage* *ill* based on fear alone, this respect is essential. In order that a law can be respected, it must be enforced to a certain extent, although the exact percentage of enforcement necessary in any case cannot be predicted. The percentage of penalties inflicted to the total infraction of a law is an important, although undetermined factor, but is not the only factor of importance, since a large part of law enforcement consists in prevention of infraction, and a law may, in certain circumstances, be most effectively enforced when the percentage of punishment is lowest. Laws which are not enforced to a reasonable degree not only become virtually dead, but also breed disrespect for laws generally, since the formation of habit occurs in every sphere of life. Sunday laws in the United States at present are undoubtedly prolific breeders of disrespect for law. Laws requiring all motor cars to stop at all railroad crossings, even in the open country, may decrease accidents somewhat, because they may be actually enforced at the most dangerous crossings. But the grave effects of the habitual disregard of these laws by practically all motorists at the majority of crossings, cannot be safely disregarded, hence a more rigidly enforceable law, requiring stops at certain crossings plainly marked with "stop" signs, will not only produce greater safety, but promote observance of traffic laws generally.

In a democracy, and in a partially democratized imperial society, there are still further conditions of the respect for law. Laws, although reasonably well enforced, will not be respected unless enforced justly, without distinction of class or wealth. Our present laws against gambling command no respect because it is well known

that they are enforced chiefly against the poor, negroes, foreigners, and others without social standing. Raids on Afro-American crap games are frequent. We seldom hear of a bridge or poker game in a club of high social or financial standing being similarly raided. Dishonesty becomes accepted, when only small grafters are punished, and large "deals" are swung without interference.

In a democracy, in short, laws become not only ineffectual, but harmful, unless the infraction of the laws is actually a disgrace. The dependence of law upon convention is everywhere apparent, and laws can only be enacted or maintained reasonably where the supporting convention exists.

In any state which acquires a large population, and reaches a high state of organization, laws tend to become so numerous as to be troublesome, because of the increasing difficulties of social relations, the increasing necessity of exact definition of rules, so as to leave less to the arbitrary action of police and judicial authorities, and because of the constant tendency of smaller groups within the state to appeal to the state to do for them through special legislation what they should do for themselves. The first two causes of the multiplication of laws are inescapable, while the last is an unnecessary evil. We have today the spectacle of widespread protest against the multiplication of laws, while some of the protestants are actively promoting the passage of more laws, and the maintenance of old laws, of a similar type.

We have earlier pointed out that "business" cannot exist in a highly organized state without very extensive state regulation, and that business is constantly demanding new legislation to protect its interests, while protesting regulation which is in the interest of other groups. Unquestionably, the regulation by the state of every form of activity should be kept at the minimum necessary for effective satisfaction of desires generally, but that minimum should be uniform and impartial in its nature.

The regulation of conduct in all its phases obviously depends on conventions as the basis for laws, as the means of application of ethical and esthetic standards, and as the regulating force in a multitude of matters to which these standards hardly apply. Convention is, in short, the essential regulating force in social relations, without which society is impossible. Conventions need constantly to be

modified, but above all they need to be conserved. Those who rail against conventions are merely objecting to particular conventions which they dislike, and are as much dependent upon other conventions as are other persons. There is no reason to suppose that any convention has become established which has not been useful, but many conventions outlive their usefulness and many definitely useful ones can be improved. The reformer, that is, the person who wishes to change a certain convention, must therefore always be given a hearing, although we may reasonably assume that most reformers will be wrong, and only an occasional one have an idea of real value.

§13. Conflicts of duties

Standards, at their best, are the results of judgments founded on the premiss of the past. Any individual, therefore, may form an honest opinion which contravenes a code, seeing his opinion as to group welfare against that of the group itself. In this case, it is his duty to follow the group code, and also his duty to follow his own moral judgment. The choice which he should make, in accordance with the principles we have extracted from social organization, is between conforming his actions to the group code, which is always moral, and becoming a martyr to his convictions, which is probably a higher form of morality. In choosing the latter course, he will absolutely infract the code, and accept the consequences, considering his injury or death as his contribution to the welfare of the group. If his view is practically unsound, he will have done no harm. If his view is sound, he may by his martyrdom contribute to its advance. The situation is much the same when a law is in conflict with a moral standard of one's group. One must either obey the law or the moral code, and the choice will be determined by individual convictions.

We designate as *moral offenders* those who act against moral codes, reserving the name of *criminals* for those who break laws, recognizing that there are two classes of criminals. Those of one type break laws for selfish or immoral reasons, seeking their own satisfactions at the expense of the group. Those of the other type break laws on strictly moral grounds, deeming the laws unjust. These are of the stuff of real reformers and martyrs. They become exemplary leaders, or at least conform to an exemplary group, and exemplary leadership reaches in them its highest level of effectiveness in social control.

It is worthy of note that all great reformers of history, from Moses and the Buddha down, have been criminals, or else breakers of moral codes of their groups. Jesus was punished with death. Washington would have been so punished if his treasonable activities had failed. That actual martyrdom of a leader strengthens a cause, rather than weakens it, is better understood today than it was a century or two ago.

The conclusion presented in a former chapter, that civilization is founded on lawbreaking, and that uncivilized cultures are the product of universal obedience to laws, is confirmed by the foregoing considerations.

§10. The progress of socialization

* A comparative survey of political, family and religious organizations reveals a steady growth, through the historical period of civilization, in what is properly called *socialization*. This growth has accelerated in the last few generations, and is proceeding rapidly at present in the United States and in Europe. Quite apart from socialism, and various other equally obscure -isms, this progress is a matter of discernible fact, and unless we repudiate the principle of continuity in nature, we must expect it to go far, unless civilization is destroyed.

Socialization includes the assumption by the state of functions primarily exercised by lesser groups, and the expanding of the functions of the including groups at the expense of the included. It includes also the wide substitution of social liberty for personal liberty. The assumption of functions of the family and the church by the state has proceeded so far, as already described, that there is now no question of principles involved. The only questions of interest are: How fast, and in what order of details can the remaining part of the course be travelled, for the highest public welfare? What will be the irredicable minimum of functions for each of these groups?

As regards the quasi-political groups usually called "economic," in spite of the rapid progress in the transfer of their functions to the state, there still appear to many persons to be a question of principle involved. This question, however, has been confused, if not completely invalidated, by the extensive juggling in the state of economic functions which were earlier claimed as individual. A survey of the economic functions of the state, which are no longer questioned, is

impressive. The roads, water works, sewage systems, parks, playgrounds, power plants, postal systems (and in Europe, other utilities), owned and operated by cities and states, sufficiently illustrates the point. The rapidly increasing government supervision of operation of financial systems and industries has come about largely through the breakdown of independent operations, not on theoretical grounds. The present issue in these respects is between two courses: on the one hand, governmental support and maintenance of business at the expense of the general taxpayers, profits going to favored individuals, or on the other hand, government operation with profits to relieve taxation. Governmentally operated banking of the commercial type obviously offers an immediate step for the general economic stabilization, but the plan of government guarantee of deposits in corporations, banks, the government thus "holding the bag," may prevail, for the present.

Two strong objections have been made to governmental operation in business, as opposed to the present government support and guarantee of business. One urges the importance of private property, the other the need of prospective private profits for the stimulation of invention and creative work in general.

The second objection is disposed of by any adequate survey of facts. The most important inventions have in the past been made by men who have received negligible profits therefrom, and creative work in art and literature has depended little on financial reward. In modern times, the great discoveries and inventions have been made by university scientists on fixed salaries, who have not received profits from the commercial exploitation of their work, and by men employed at fixed salaries by the government or by corporations. Apparently, the greatest stimulus to creative work which can be offered is the assurance of a comfortable living, assuring the opportunity to devote one's total energy to research.

The first objection is complicated by the change in property which has come about through corporational operation. Formerly, property was capable of definition, although not with great clarity. At present, nobody knows what property is. Corporations are undoubtedly organizations which are justifiable in situations where business is too complicated for private operation, but where governmental operation is for various reasons not feasible. The wastefulness of corporate

operation, the opportunities they furnish for what would be called "graft" if it occurred in state operation, and the confusion of gambling with business, which they make inevitable, indicate the probability of the future disappearance of the corporational system in the interests of economic stability and public welfare. There would seem to be no inherent difficulty in harmonizing private property and private ownership, with governmental operation and ownership in matters where private operation is incompetent. With corporationally confused property out of the way, the real psychological advantages of private property may well be restored.

Whether the present breakdown of the corporational system will be utilized to avoid the danger of Communism or Fascism (which are the same in principle) by a sufficient advance in socialization, is a question on which prophets may differ.

The essential feature of socialization, however, is not the increasing power of the state, but its increase along moral lines. The progress which has occurred up to the present crisis has been along this line. Group welfare, as the goal which has been approached, is the welfare of the individuals composing the group. The alleged group, as something other than the sum of the individuals, has been clearly seen as merely a smaller aristocratic group (whether military, industrial, or religious) controlling and manipulating group activities in their own interests and against the welfare of the total group. That progress has actually been continued in this respect is historically certain. This is the essential feature of socialization. The criterion which might be applied and which should be applied, to all changes and all measures which may be proposed to produce changes, is that of minimal restriction of individual liberty. No restraint on action, except where curtailing of individual liberty is plainly to the advantage of the total group of individuals. no cases of doubt, no restraint.

CHAPTER XI

PROPAGANDA

§1. The importance of propaganda

IF THE analysis in the preceding chapter is approximately adequate, social control of the conduct of members of the group, although operating largely through habit, and to a certain extent through force, is based on ideas, opinions and beliefs. For our purposes, these three terms may be taken as equivalent, and the term "idea" be taken as representative.

Conduct is largely determined by standards, which, we have seen, are ideational complexes. Habits are developed in large part through reflective thinking, although in their final development they may approach the condition of merely impulsive systems. For the modification of habits and standards, thought-processes are obviously of fundamental importance.

In groups in which social control has become well stabilized or crystallized, as in certain uncivilized groups, it offers further only minor problems. In civilized groups, in which many standards are not adhered to with approximate universality, there is the important problem of securing wider adherence, or of modifying the standards. This has been richly illustrated by the conditions obtaining in the United States in the interval between the adoption of the prohibition amendment and its repeal. Further, there are certain standards, fairly well maintained, which minor groups wish to modify. Finally, there is, theoretically, at least, the problem of erecting standards, in regard to points on which no standards exist. In any case, the fundamental problem is that of modifying the ideas of members of the group.

Such modifications may be brought about through education, the exact nature of which is at present ill defined as regards the total inclusion in its proper field. Whether in or out of the field of education, there are certain processes and conditions, of vital consequence for social control, which are commonly summed up under the title of *propaganda*.

The term "propaganda" is often used in two limited senses. First, as designating the activity of a definitely organized smaller group within the larger society, which attempts to change the opinion of the larger group. Second, as designating the attempt to spread a wrong or vicious view as contrasted with a noble or correct view. Neither of these limitations in meaning can be justified, and the acceptance of either has unfortunate practical consequences. Vicious propaganda, as viewed at a certain time, may succeed, and later be viewed as beneficent and progressive, and advocacy of apparently essential reforms may ultimately turn out to have been vicious propaganda. The distinction between the work of an organized group, (such as the Anti-Saloon League, or the Associations opposed to Prohibition), and the work of an individual is hardly useful, when both employ the same means, nor can the propaganda addressed to a small group in a Pullman smoking compartment be usefully contrasted with the efforts of a speaker in Madison Square Garden. The more useful sense of the term is in its designation of every deliberate attempt to influence the opinion of another, or of others, in respect to accepted conventions, laws, or standards of conduct, or to influence any other opinion affecting the organization of society or the interrelation and adaptation of its members generally.¹ The pedagogical work of inculcating in children the opinions which adults of their group hold, without essential modifications, is not usefully classed as propaganda, although it is obvious that propaganda in the strict sense may be, and often is, extended into pedagogical work.

32. The principles of propaganda

There is no practical aspect of psychology in which the "laws" or principles involved are more clear than in propaganda. They are clear not only from the scientific point of view, but also in the

¹ In using "propaganda" in the broad sense, we blur over more of the distinctions which are made by the narrower usage. We have adequate terms to designate these various distinctions. "Systematic propaganda," "organized propaganda," "individual propaganda," "racial propaganda," "personnel propaganda," etc., are terms which are quickly intelligible and widely used.

² It is gratifying to find that the once despised term "pedagog" and its correlates have been so rehabilitated by the transfer of their usual implications to the term "educator" and its correlates, that one can now use the term "pedagogical" in its properly effective sense.

practical work of agencies engaged in systematic propaganda. It is important, therefore, that the general public, which is subjected in steadily increasing volumes to propaganda of political, religious, commercial, and other less general types, conducted with high efficiency, should be informed as to the way in which this propaganda works.

1. *Logical arguments and bases for logical inference.* It is frequently possible to influence a person's opinion by argument, and by the presentation of facts from which the person approached may himself make logical inference leading to the acceptance of the idea which it is desired to make accepted. The decisions of justices of the Supreme Court and of lower legal tribunals are supposed to be influenced by the carefully presented arguments of the attorneys, and doubtless the logical and factual aspects of these arguments do have considerable effect. In these cases, the opinions are formed with respect to certain very definite standards—the laws and constitutional provisions, and the legal opinions of the judges may be quite different from their personal opinions. In other words, the opinions are formed in an abstracted or detached sphere of the person's mental life. But even here, there are other than logical causes at work, as is shown by the mere fact that judges of the Supreme Court divide on clear cut issues. In many cases, as in Congress, arguments seem to have no bearing on opinions, because the decision made by the individual is not really his opinion at all, but is the registration of a vote decided by a complex of practical matters which in many cases do not affect his personal views.

In the practical affairs of life generally, there is no doubt that argument and evidence do affect opinion. We are constantly resorting to this sort of influence, with our children, our parents, our friends, our enemies, and our customers. But after all, the logical appeal is in the great majority of cases, a minor factor in a large complex. The advertiser gives certain facts which are bases for arguments that his wares are valuable. The life insurance agent emits a cloud of statistics bearing upon his "prospect's" particular situation. The lecturer or author leads his readers or auditors over a path smoothly paved with facts and carefully wrought influences. The child adduces confirmatory evidence for the justification of his lateness in coming home from school. But in most cases of these

soda, the actual evidence hangs upon a single point, or a relatively restricted issue, and a relatively great amount must be accepted in advance, or without argument, in order that the logical inference may have importance. The advertising claim that a certain sauce contains "no benzoate of soda or other preservative" assumes the acceptance of the statement itself as true, and assumes the belief that benzoate of soda is harmful. The usual political and theological arguments assume an acceptance of authorities and statements that is by no means based on logical process of the reader or listener; and so on throughout the various types of arguments. On the whole, logical arguments are useful to harmonize details with general theories already accepted, or speaking figuratively, to convince the hearer that since he is already prepared to swallow the camel, he should also swallow the great resting on the camel's ear.

The class of people to whom logical reasons for the acceptance of ideas is paramount is a small one, comprising the class properly called *scientists*, and that even among scientists the logical procedure of "scientific method" is by no means the sole motive to the acceptance of ideas as well known. Scientists are more prone to be influenced by other than logical factors when dealing with fields outside their own special lines of work, in fact, the expert in the natural sciences, when dealing with problems in the fields of politics and religion, is no more free from extra-logical influences than is the unscientific man, and far less so than the professional politician or student of religion.

Although argument is of minor importance in propaganda directly, it has its uses as a means of attracting attention. In order to implant an idea in a subject he must be caused to pay some attention to the stimulation it is desired to impress on him. In other words, the man you want to influence must listen, or must read. Now, there are few things which have as general an effect in attracting attention as does a fight, and an argument is a species of fight. Propaganda is sometimes wasted because no one listens or reads, except those who already accept it, and becomes effective when opposition to it catches the public attention. The theory that wild radicalism is least harmful when its utterances are not opposed has sound reason behind it, and a little martyrdom has helped many a languishing cause. The propaganda for woman suffrage was only slightly effectual for many years, because it was not attended to except by those

who favored it. The organization of the Association Opposed to Woman Suffrage,¹ and the personal opposition of various energetic women, quickly changed the situation. Man, seeing a diverting fight, turned his ears to listen, and the really able propaganda immediately began to be effective.

3 *Desire* The influence of desire in bringing about the acceptance of an idea is exhibited by all men, and in the case of society at large, is far greater than that of logical processes. We believe what we want to believe, to a far greater extent than we are usually willing to admit. In commercial advertising, politics, and religion, the influence of desire is most strikingly demonstrated, but it is not absent from any field of thought. The metaphysical arguments for the existence of God and for the immortality of the soul are widely accepted by those who are strongly desirous of accepting the conclusions of these arguments, in spite of the fact that the logical fallacies involved in them have been completely exposed, and the fact that to others, as well educated, these arguments may have no force. Acceptance of the results of "psychical research" is at the present time wholly conditioned by desire. Evidence which, to the coldly logical scientific man, is of no cogency, is accepted by the man whose desire for immortality is strong, and who lacks religious assurance. Even certain physicists will accept, in the field of psychical research, "proof" of a type which they would immediately reject if it were applied to problems in their own field of physics. The commonly observed fact that the tendency to accept inadequate "proofs" in this field becomes stronger as a man becomes older and faces death more closely has illuminative bearing on this efficacy of desire.

In politics, the effects of desire are equally obvious. A scandalous story about one's own candidate, for example, even supported by strong circumstantial evidence, is rejected, but a similar story about the rival candidate, however flimsy its probability, is eagerly accepted. The responsibility of the Republican administration for the graft scandals developed under it is accepted by Democrats, and rejected by Republicans, who, on the other hand, accept as eagerly the idea

¹ While the woman suffrage leaders apparently did not plan and organize this opposition, they were quick to recognize its opportune advantages and undoubtedly promoted it in unconscious ways.

of personal responsibility of Wilson for every form of inefficiency exhibited during the war.

In commercial affairs the primary object of the advertiser is to establish a relation between his wares and the desires of the potential customers. Patent medicines and "faith cures" of all sorts are notoriously sold in this way. The sufferer from a certain disease violently desires to be cured thereof, and eagerly accepts statements concerning which non-sufferers are skeptical. The hypochondriac, depressed person, or the one who feels his inferiority in any way, as eagerly accepts the statement which convinces him that his troubles are due to the disease the nostrum pretends to cure. In the advertising of foodstuffs, automobiles, and non-medical wares of diverse kinds, the appeal to the various desires of the public is just as efficacious and just as obvious.

In advertising and propaganda of all sorts, advantage is taken of the fact that desires "spread" from effect to cause, that is, where the desire of a certain thing or process exists, the same desire will align to that which is known or believed to be its cause. The advertisements of correspondence schools and of books and courses on fraudulent systems of "psychology," (self development, power of personality, etc.), are the most striking examples of this sort of appeal, but its use in politics is no less important. Suggestion that a certain party, if in power, will bring about "business" depression, which, of course, "business" men do not want, arouses strong aversion to the party in question, and desire for the success of the rival party. In some cases the acceptance of the causal relation is brought about by logical appeal, but more usually, it is effected by much simpler means.

3. *Simple suggestion.* In order to make a man accept an idea, he must first be made to think it. But since acceptance is the thinking it without conflict, the method by which he is made to think it is of supreme importance. In a relatively few instances the logical approach is adequate, but even in those cases, the premises for the logical inference must be accepted. Argument, moreover, has the inherent disadvantage of hanging up opposing ideas and reinforcing them, through the usual associative processes. Hence, argument must be of such nature that it is cogent immediately, or else it merely strengthens opposition. In an argument between two persons, each of whom at the beginning accepts an idea opposed to that of the

other, the convincing of either party seldom occurs. In a relatively large number of cases, the presentation of an idea which fits in with strong desire brings about the thinking of the idea with repression of conflicting ideas which otherwise might arise. Where causal relations are to be established as a basis for the "spreading" of desire, the acceptance of these causal relations must be brought about. Non-argumentative methods of implanting ideas are therefore of paramount importance in propaganda of all kinds.

Direct statements, devoid of argument, are, of course, efficacious in many cases. In commercial advertising, in politics, and in religious propaganda, such methods are efficacious because the associative processes of people generally are not highly efficient. The statement "Flubdub tobacco is free from the pernicious effects of all other tobaccos" is followed by the reader, that is, he thinks the idea stimulated by this printed word pattern. A certain percentage think also "this is a prejudiced statement," "what reason is there for a difference in effect?" or one or more of many possible conflicting ideas brought up by association. A greater number, however, merely think the idea mechanically, with but slight associative process, and the idea is *implanted*; the process of its acceptance is begun. Similarly, the positive statement "accept this religious dogma or you will be damned eternally" is rethought and eventually accepted by many persons, without any support except the desire to be "saved," the causal relation between the desired salvation and the assumed means of salvation being accepted because of the absence, from the start, of conflicting ideas.

Positive assertions, to be efficacious, must be couched in simple and familiar language, so that the persons addressed may think the idea without difficulty. They must be free from qualifications, reservations, statements of probability, or other details which would of themselves call up associating "doubts," i.e., ideas of alternatives, clear or vague. These statements must be repeated, since habit is as important in this field as in any other, and the idea once thought is "fixed" by repeated thinking, however mechanical the rethinking may be. But direct assertion is by no means the most efficacious means of implanting an idea.

Indirect statements, when sagaciously employed, have the double advantage of lessening the associative tendency towards the wrong

of conflicting ideas, and at the same time making the idea apparently not new to the reader or hearer, but seemingly one which he has himself already thought. The rule of efficiency in this respect is to make the statement of an idea, which is to be implanted, as an aside or contributory remark, in connection with some other statement to which the attention of the reader or hearer is preponderantly directed. For example: in making a direct attack on the competency of an official, A, the casual statement that, "Of course A is not as incompetent as B," usually damages B more than would a direct attack. In a direct attack on B, impugning his honesty indirectly, while apparently circumventing on the question of his ability, is an efficacious and much employed method. Of course if the indirection is clumsy, the reader's attention is drawn so forcibly to the idea which it is intended to implant that the whole purpose is defeated.

The implication that an idea is already accepted by the auditor or reader is frequently made by the skilful indirection of the statement. More subtle and extended means of conveying this impression are also used, and the techniques employed by different writers differ widely. No prescriptions can be given for accomplishing this end, nor can labels be posted warning the reader when he is being made the target of such methods. The psychological object to be attained is plain, but the technique is an art of writing and speaking, not an explicit science. One who is intelligent, and on the watch for "blarney" acquires skill in detecting it, and one who wishes to use it becomes expert through practice. The more obvious methods of "now, you know already," "you are intelligent enough to see that," "as you already know," etc., of *sapientism*, are crude devices which succeed only with the less intelligent and less educated.

Even in advertising, the method of indirection is extensively and usefully employed. Some persons have wondered why, in advertising a cigar or an insurance company, an attractive picture is often presented, with the name of the commodity, or the statement about it, reduced to a relatively inconspicuous adjunct. The direct method would be to make the statement the central and conspicuous thing, and the decorations contingent upon it. But the indirect method apparently works the better. The prospective customer perceives the name, or thinks the statement, under very favorable circumstances, when it is thus presented unobtrusively, in connection with

a pleasing or interesting major content, so that no comparisons, or objections arise. By repetition, the idea implanted is "accepted" without the individual knowing at what time he accepted it.

On the other hand, offensive material in connection with an advertisement or other propagandist effort inhibits the acceptance of an idea. A dull, or morally offensive picture arouses resistance to the idea attached to it, because the judgment passed on the picture is actually thought in connection with the idea. A really competent advertiser takes pains to avoid all material which will offend the moral, esthetic, or religious susceptibilities of the audience he proposes to solicit, and the astute propagandist in any line exercises the same care.

Humorous treatment ■ one ■ the old reliable methods of indirection. Quaint and funny advertisements, (if they do not go to the length of offensiveness), are among the most effective commercial means of propaganda. Ridicule, and jokes implying inferiority on the part of the man it is intended to discredit are the most effective part of political attack. Evangelists have the common habit of slipping over an idea attached to a funny anecdote. *Tasso Danner, et danc ferencies*, applies ■ all the pleasures and interests the propagandists arouse.

As a corollary to the principle of indirection, it is worthy of notice that dogmatic statement is one of the best methods of stirring up discussion, and stimulating healthy thought, provided the real questions at issue are plainly indicated in the course of the statements. This use of the dogmatic method presumes a certain amount of mental alertness and education on the part of the audience addressed, but nevertheless it has a wide range of usefulness in cases where the purpose of the presentation is instruction, rather than propaganda.

4 *Repetition*. The ultimate secret of success in propaganda, making use to the full of indirect and direct suggestion, the force of desire, and the appeal of logic, is persistent repetition. Although clumsy repetition may produce weariness, or even disgust, with due skill, endless repetition will produce effects where brief campaigns may fail. Commercial propagandists understand very well the wastefulness of sporadic or occasional advertising, and the efficiency ■ the "follow up" process. For any other type of propaganda, the

essential thing, after outlining the idea to be impressed, is to talk about it continuously: to talk in carefully chosen words, and with due respect to the principles above laid down; to talk amiably; to introduce constantly new forms and ways of talking—but never omitting the formulas which have been adopted for the idea, and above all, to keep talking. One of the effective features of the campaign against the saloon was the steady persistence in the broadcasting of the slogans: "the saloon must go," "the saloon is the plague-spot of civilization," "the sources of political corruption are in the saloons," and so on. In the course of time these repetitions, rather than the moral and economic arguments, did their work, and the idea became generally accepted.

Such progress as has been made towards the abolition of war, towards the scientific use of birth control, towards the suppression of graft in government, is due to the constant talking and printing on these subjects, never letting the propaganda die down. Words are but sounds and marks, but they are the most powerful forces in the world because they stimulate ideas.

§3. The rules of propaganda

The principles of propaganda as it is employed today by agencies of all sorts are reducible to succinct rules. These rules read like a catalog of social shams, but that they are in use is "a condition and not a theory," and it is imperative that those to whom propaganda is directed should recognize them, since the propagandists recognize them well enough. There are six fundamental rules:

1. If you have an idea to put over, keep presenting it incessantly. Keep talking (or printing) systematically and persistently.

2. Avoid argument, as a general thing. Do not admit there is any "other side," and in all statements scrupulously avoid arousing reflection or associated ideas, except those which are favorable. Reserve argument for the small class of people who depend on logical processes, or as a means of attracting the attention of those with whom you are not arguing.

3. In every possible way, connect the idea you wish to put over with the known desires of your audience. Remember that wishes are the basis of the acceptance of ideas in more cases than logic is.

4. Make your statements clear, and in such language that your

audience can repeat them, in thought, without the need of transforming them.

5. Use direct statements only when you are sure that a basis for acceptance has already been laid. Otherwise, use indirect statement, innuendo, and implication. Use direct statement in such a way that the attention of the audience shall be drawn to it sufficiently to take it in, but not sufficiently to reflect upon it.

6. For the most permanent eventual results, aim your propaganda at the children, use it in your pedagogy. Follow the example, in this respect, of the successful propagandists of the past.

It is clear that propaganda according to these rules may be used for the spread of good as well as of bad ideas. It is important to recognize that it is being used for both. Political nostrums and medical nostrums are being "sold" by this method, and so are modern sanitary and hygienic conceptions and ideas of justice and political program. In commercial propaganda, the method sometimes extends the use of new and important products, more often impels people to buy what they should not buy, and in general has its principal effect in adding enormously to the cost of living. If one manufacturer of toilet soap ceases to advertise extensively, he will be ruined by the advertising of his rivals, but it is not probable that any more soap like total is sold than would be sold if the advertising of all manufacturers was cut down 90 per cent. Commercial advertising is much like the expensive ornaments which the leading nations must maintain, because the other nations do. It is in the fields of political, religious, and general social life, however, that we need especially to be on our guard against propaganda.

A consideration of the facts concerning propaganda may lead to the pessimistic conclusion that social control rests entirely on insincerity, charlatanism, and the relative power of conflicting selfish interests, and that righteousness, justice, and social progress have little chance except that which the unarmed man has in a conflict with ruffians. Yet neither the psychological nor the historical survey shows the case to be really so bad. We must not overlook the fact that logic and scientific method do play their share, small though it may be, in social control; and if we use effectively against evil propaganda the same weapons which it uses, and which are justified if our repetitions and suggestions and appeals to desires are based on scientific

and logical consideration, these latter forces must surely, if slowly, turn the battle in favor of the right.

The issue can be favorable only if propaganda is free. Control of propaganda, through muzzling of the press, censoring of books, theaters, and movies, and regulation of the expression of teachers, is the sure method of putting propaganda eventually in the hands of the strongly organized and socially destructive powers of selfishness. If we wish to conserve the possibility of fighting for the right, we must first of all conserve and guarantee the power to fight.

REFERENCES

Sergey Sushkev's *La folie déguisée*, was first printed in 1894. The subsequent editions were titled *L'oublié du folle*, in 1903, 1910, and (embellished) in 1923. It has been translated into French, German, Spanish, Russian and Polish. At this late date, an English translation of the fifth Russian edition has been prepared by Dr B. M. Bondy and will appear shortly as a volume of *Psychology Classics*. The translation presents also the text of the first edition, from which Tarde and Le Bon draw their ideas.

The important works of Gabriel Tarde are: *Les lois de l'imitation*, 1902, English translation by Eliaz C. Parsons, 1959; *La logique sociale*, 1895; *Opposition insurmontable*, 1907; *Les lois sociales*, 1896, English translation by H. C. Warren, 1909; *L'opinion et la foule*, 1900.

The chief early works of Gustave Le Bon are: *Psychologie des foules*, 1895, English translation, 1896; *Les psychologies de l'éducation des peuples*, 1895, English translation, 1904, (probably first edition); *Psychologie du socialisme*, 1904, English translation, 1909; *La révolution française et la psychologie des révolutions*, 1912, English translation, 1913.

The early American works of the Sushkev school, drawn apparently from Tarde and Le Bon by J. Minto Baldwin, *Social and ethical interpretations of mental development*, 1897; Edward A. Ross, *Social control*, 1901; *Social psychology*, 1901. The most conspicuous recent book in this tradition, somewhat hybridized, however, with various other views is Everett D. Martin, *The behavior of crowds*, 1920. Treats featuring imitation and suggestion prominently, see Charles A. Kilwood, *An introduction to social psychology*, 1917; *The psychology of human society*, 1925; Emory S. Bogardus, *Elements of social psychology*, 1918; *Fundamentals of social psychology*, 1924; Robert M. Gault, *Social psychology*, 1923; L. L. Bernard, *An introduction to social psychology*, 1926.

William McDougall's chief works in this field are: *Social Psychology*, 1908; *The Group mind*, 1920. The first of these appeared at a time when not even would-be radicals had begun to question the validity of instincts as explanatory principles, as is evidenced by John R. Watson, *Behavior*, 1914, and *Psychology from the standpoint of a behaviorist*, 1919. Both the First-behaviorism of the former volume, and the second behaviorism of the latter, were founded on the instincts. Instincts still have a prominent place in several texts, notably Floyd W. Allport, *Social psychology*, 1924; Rogers, *op cit*; Elwood, *op cit*; Bernard, *op cit*; Samples of the various lists of instincts which have been formulated are presented in E. T. Kravitz and W. C. Reckless, *Social psychology*, 1924, Chap. VI; L. L. Bernard, *op cit*, Chap. IX, and *First-cit*, 1926, Chap. VII.

The revolt against the instinct doctrine, and the dissemination of the concept of "instinct" from the concept of "an instinct" or "instincts" was inaugurated by the present writer in a paper presented before the American Psychological Association in 1914: "Are there any instincts?", 1919, *Journal of Abnormal Psychology*, XLV, 307-

311. That was followed by "The identity of instinct and habit," 1922, *Journal of Philos.*, XIX, 85-99 "The foundations of social psychology," 1923, *Psychol. Rev.*, XXX, 81-102 "Instinct and desire," 1925, *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychol.*, XX, 170-172

In the meantime, the revolt had gained adherents rapidly, and a crusade against the instincts was maintained in the journals by various writers, with some counter attacks. In a surprisingly short time the instincts were so thoroughly in disrepute that the less critical psychologists even announced *instinct*. The suddenness of the about-face is indicated by the case of John Dewey, who had enthusiastically backed instincts in "The need for social psychology," 1917, *Psychol. Rev.*, XXIV, 266-77, but renounced them in *Human nature and conduct*, 1922. John B. Watson's title less promptly discarded instincts and his second behaviorism, in *Behaviorism*, 1924, in which he deplored behaviorism for good measure.

Dewey has had a curious history in psychology, having been recognized in the scholastic period, but ignored in modern sciences. The present writer's *System of psychology*, 1912, was virtually the only text of its period which gave Dewey a place. The first edition of the present book made Dewey fundamental to the problems of social psychology, and it has since been receiving more attention in this sense, in particular in Krueger and Rockless, *op cit*, Chap. VII.

As these authors point out, Dewey, as treated by the scholastics and by modern psychology, has no connection with the "Protean web," which rather tended to confuse the issue. The present writer's interest in the topic began, and the lines of development represented in the present volume were initiated, before he had heard of Freud.

The books listed above are dated by their first editions. Some of them, notably Le Bon's *The Crowd* and McDougall's *Social psychology*, have run through many editions. Le Bon's book has been translated into many languages, including the Arabic. The first editions are uncertain, however, in confirming the historical connections which we have other reasons for accepting.

Texts since McDougall's *Social psychology* do not actually fall into distinct groups. They have been classified as those written by psychologists and those written by sociologists, but this does not distinguish their points of view. Some authors confine themselves to analysis of the individual life, emphasizing the implications which this life has for social psychology, but hardly emerging from the field of general psychology. Among such books are Allport, *op cit*; Gardner Murphy, *Experimental social psychology*, 1933. Krueger and Rockless, *op cit*. Others approach social psychology through social problems and social organization, as is done in the present volume, as J. B. Watson, *Principles of social psychology*, 1922, and more or less in several other texts written by sociologists. Several texts emphasize "personality" and "personality traits," apparently under the illusion that they are something new in psychology. Among such books are Krueger and Rockless, *op cit*; Allport, *op cit*, and to a lesser extent, Bernard, *Introduction*.

The book which goes over most enthusiastically to the personality school, and presents its methods most fully and clearly, is J. K. Folsom, *Social psychology*, 1931. Folsom makes social psychology almost exclusively a study of personality and personality traits. No exception can be taken to this on formal grounds, since in

almost all places where the author uses the term "personality," one of the older and more frankly vague terms "mind," "mental" or "individual," can be substituted, without alteration of the real significance of the statements. In other words, in making (implicitly) social psychology the study of personality, one merely makes it the study of psychology. To the untrained reader, however, the use of the deceptive term seems to imply the discovery of new facts or principles. In reality, the approach to psychological problems through personality traits is merely the approach through the "faculties of the mind," developed by the scholastic psychologists and appropriate to the infancy of the science. If we have to go back a hundred years and develop modern psychology again from the foundations of the earlier centuries alone, ignoring the progress of the last century, evidently psychology has accomplished nothing during this period. Felsch has collected and organized the recent material on personality and personality study in an excellent way, and the book is recommended to those who are curious as to the movement. It is to be hoped that some new well collected and organized treatise of material on personality, and the numerous lists of personality traits, which accumulated between 1900 A D and the period of Gaul and Spengler.

One text, J. J. Smith, *Social psychology*, 1930, stands by itself in an interesting attempt to base social psychology on the organism. Two texts which steer a neutral course between the individual approach and the social approach are Gaul, *op cit*, and R. Maltby and N. N. Sen-Gupta, *Introduction to social psychology*, 1928.

In the field of ethnology and become original fundamental books are A. H. Keane, *Man, past and present*, 1899, revised by Quigley and Hoaden, 1920. Arthur Smith, *The antiquity of man*, 2 vols., 1925. G. G. MacCurdy, *Human origins*, 2 vols., 1924. A. C. Haddon, *The races of man*, 1925. To be read critically is W. Z. Ripley, *The races of Europe*. Ellsworth Huntington, *Civilization and climate*, 1925, and *Chorology of races*, 1925, are interesting and suggestive, but involve highly questionable premises and deduction. Roland B. Dixon, *The racial history of man*, 1923, is a masterly *reductio ad absurdum* of the method of identifying and distinguishing racial groups by the cranial index.

There is a long list of books dealing with racial problems on a thoroughly unsound basis which has been called "racial psychology." Among these are C. C. Brigham, *A study of American ethnology*. Clinton S. Beck, *America's race history*. Edwin S. East, *Misconduct of the cross races*, and other volumes. Madison Grant, *The passing of the great race*. S. K. Humphrey, *Misconduct*. T. Lathrop Stoddard, *Racial rebirth in Europe* and other volumes. Many other books of this type are equally unsound and less interesting. These "solid" books are all based, directly or indirectly on Arthur de Gobineau, *Essai sur l'Inégalité des races humaines*, 4 volumes, 1853-55. The abominations of Gobineau have reached their greatest height in Germany, where the myths of "Nordicness" and "Aryanism" have been so long and widely heralded as an extremely racial population including large Mongolian elements, that the myths have become supports of political racketeering and have led to the adoption of the Aryan symbol of racial superiority ("good luck") as the national emblem.

The book which best debunks Gobineau and similar pseudo-ethnological systems

Of the many books on the psychology of religion, William James, *Varieties of religious experience*, 1902, is the classic. E. D. Starbuck, *Psychology of religion*, 1896, is the first by that title. Others of importance are: I. Kung, *The development of religion*, 1910. E. S. Ames, *The psychology of religion*, 1910. J. H. Leuba, *A psychological study of religion*, 1912. G. A. Cox, *The psychology of religion*, 1916. J. H. Pratt, *The religious consciousness*, 1908. G. M. Stratton, *The psychology of the religious life*, 1911. Recent books which are of negligible value, or worse, are: F. L. Sturckland, *Psychology of religious experience*, 1919. D. M. Trout, *Religious behavior*, 1931. R. H. Thouless, *An introduction to the psychology of religion*, 1925. C. J. Plomer, *An approach to the psychology of religion*, 1929.

The best of these treatises seem to ignore the real scope of religion in life, treating some abstracted phase, often pathological, as if it were the whole religious life. In the present stage of development of the psychology of religion, the important need of the student is to learn something about religion itself, in particular, about the older religions of civilization, in their development and their connection with human culture. Useful books on the history of religion are: C. H. Toy, *Introduction to the history of religion*, 1929. E. W. Hopkins, *Origin and evolution of religion*, 1923. *History of religion*, 1918. C. F. Moore, *History of religion*, 1913. E. Renan, *Origines. A history of religion*, 1899, translation by Symington, 1930, from the 36th French edition. C. de F. et de la Sorbonne, *Histoire de religion*, English translation by Colyer-Parsons, 1891. There are later editions in French and in German.

For anthropological information on religion, J. H. Frazer, *The golden bough*, 12 vols., 1907-15 is a magnum opus although organized about an hypothesis which has little value. *Hastings Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics*, is a store house of authoritative articles on various topics. Other dictionaries and encyclopedias are less generally available.

There are a few books purporting to bear directly on political psychology, and these are negligible. The really important material must obviously still be sought in books and articles dealing with special problems, such as A. A. Berle and G. C. Means, *The modern corporation and private property*, 1933. There is little room for doubt, however, that the next decade will see much of that material collected and elaborated in special works. At present, the development of political psychology seems to be inhibited by a merely verbal confusion, "political" implying, for those who contemplate the subject, the mere technique of controlling details of government, instead of the organization and life of the political unit of population.

On heredity, there are a number of excellent books not too technical for the student and layman. Among these are: T. H. Morgan, ed. of W. G. Coulter, *Heredity and environment*, 6th edition, 1930. H. S. Jennings, *Life and death*, 1920 and *The biological basis of human nature*, 1930. The psychology of the heredity of feeble-mindedness is illustrated by R. L. Duggan, *The Jester*, 1895. H. H. Goddard, *The Kallak family*, 1921. A. H. Estabrooke, *The New family*, 1912.

The reader of books on intelligence and intelligence testing is both extensive and widely varied in character. The best account of the development of intelligence tests is given by J. Peterson, *Body measurements and tests of intelligence*, 1926. Among the numerous books on the applications of tests, without reference to the

fundamental problems of interpretation, see R. F. Porter, *Intelligence testing*, 1927. F. Freeman, *Mental tests*, 1926. The present writer's chapters on "Learning ability and intelligence," in *Factors of behavior and learning*, 1932, and the chapter on "Mental measurements" in *Old and new tests-grounds in psychology*, 1925, are attempts to arrive at the presuppositions underlying intelligence testing.

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The references herein are mostly to topics, rather than to terms, and are leading references only. Many of the topics occur continuously throughout the text, and hence comprehensive references would be useless and confusing. Names of authors which appear in the text are included but not those appearing only in the references on pages 363-7.

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Sans Tache



Sans Tache

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